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Sammendrag
I denne avhandlingen tas det sikte på å undersøke hvorvidt det rettslige designet av 
Fylkesnemnda for barnevern og sosiale saker innfrir et løfte om tillit. Den første delen utreder 
hva det vil si å innfri et løfte om tillit. Jeg vil redegjøre for de nødvendige premissene som må 
være på plass for at det skal være meningsfullt å sette opp et slikt løfte. Dette vil bli uttrykt i 
en modell som stipulerer at en forventningsorden er konstituerende for hva tillit er, og at man 
skal kunne evaluere hvorvidt en rettslig orden sammenfaller med forventningsordenen på et 
angitt tidspunkt. Sammenfall eller spenninger mellom disse to vil gi oss et inntrykk av 
hvordan det rettslige designet kan sies å holde sitt løfte om å skape tillit.   
 Den andre delen tar utgangspunkt i at forventningsordenen formes av hvilken tid man 
lever i. Den må derfor kvalifiseres gjennom historiske studier. Man må forsøke å spore hva 
det er som har skapt tillit og også hva som har endret oppfatninger om hva man kan ha tillit 
til. Den historiske analysen av forventningsordenen, og derfor hva som har skapt tillit 
tidligere, er nødvendig for å få et så klart innblikk som mulig i hva den nåværende 
forventningsordenen består av. Del to vil konkludere med at beslutninger om tvang innen 
barnevernet i dag skaper tillit dersom de innfrir et krav til et rettighetsbasert og et post-
nasjonalt design.  
 Den tredje og siste delen vil gå inn i bestanddelene til hva et tillitsverdig 
rettighetsbasert og postnasjonalt barnevern består av. Dette vil si å ta tak i de dominerende 
forventningene i forventningsordenen, for deretter å etablere den normative selv-forståelsen 
av et tillitsverdig barnevern. Det vil bli argumentert for at barnets beste interesser og ikke-
diskriminering skal betraktes som dominerende forventninger innad i et tillitsverdig 
barnevern. Den rettslige ordenen kan deretter evalueres opp imot den normative 
selvforståelsen som forventningsordenen inngir. Spørsmålet er derfor til slutt om 
beslutningsorganets design overholder disse to prinsippene i den forventningsordenen som 
utledes. Graden av overlapp mellom forventningsordenen og rettsorden vil derfor være 
avgjørende for hvorvidt beslutninger om tvang kan sies å innfri et løfte om tillit eller ikke. 
 Avhandlingens konklusjon er at fylkesnemnda innehar sentrale tillitsskapende trekk, 
spesielt gjennom en formalisering av prosedyreprinsipper og forhandlingsprinsippet. Allikevel 
har den også mange svakheter ved seg. Disse svakhetene ved designet vil bli argumentert for 
at er opprettelige.  
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Summary
In this thesis the aim is to examine whether the legal design of the County Board for Child 
Welfare and Social Affairs upholds a promise of trust. The first part investigates what it 
means to redeem a promise of trust. I will explain the necessary assumptions that must be in 
place for making it meaningful to set up such a promise. This will be expressed in a model 
that stipulates that an order of expectations is constitutive of what trust is, and to be able to 
evaluate whether a legal order complies with the order of expectations at a certain point in 
time. Convergence or tension between these two orders will give us an idea of whether or not 
the legal design keeps its promise of trust.  
The second part is based on the idea that the order of expectations is shaped by what 
time you live in. It must therefore be qualified through historical studies. One must try to trace 
what it is that has induced trust and also what has changed perceptions about how you trust. 
The historical analysis of the order of expectations, i.e. what has induced trust in the past, is 
necessary to provide as clear an insight as possible into what the current order of expectations 
consists of. Part two will conclude that decisions about coercion in care today inspire trust if 
they meet the requirements of a rights-based and a post-national order of expectations. 
The third and final part will dive into the constituents of what trust is, i.e. what rights-
based and post-national child protection implies. This means to address the dominant 
expectations in the order of expectations, and then to establish the normative self-
understanding of this particular type of trust. It will be argued that the child's best interests 
and non-discrimination should be considered dominant as expectations within trustworthy 
child protection. The legal order can then be evaluated against the normative self-
understanding of the order of expectations. The question is how ultimately the design of the 
decision-making body complies with these two principles of the order of expectations. The 
degree of overlap between the order of expectations and the legal order will therefore be 
crucial to whether the decision-making complies with a promise of trust or not. 
The thesis concludes that the design of the decision-making body holds key trust 
inducing components, especially through a formalization of principles of procedure and the 
meeting of negotiation. Yet it also has many weaknesses. These weaknesses of the design will 
be argued are repairable. 
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1.Introduction
 
 
 
 
 
In historic time, state-based protection of children stretches back to 1896 in Norway. Norway 
was among the first states to introduce legislation set to take care of children exposed to 
detrimental care. Currently, the most important decision-making body within this system is 
Fylkesnemnda for barnevern og sosiale saker (FBSS).1 This decision-making body is set to 
reach decisions in the hardest, most complex and most intrusive cases of child protection—
those involving the coercion of parents in the best interest of the child. 
 The public is prevented from access to what takes place behind closed doors, and for 
good reasons. The FBSS invade the private lives of families. It is to be expected that parents 
and children experience what happens in the FBSS with severe emotional distress. Families 
are on the line, and at the same time parents can lose custody of their children completely or 
for a limited period of time. The coercive nature of the FBSS can potentially ruin lives. The 
threshold should be set high when it comes to justifications of interventions; they should be 
thorough, and respect should be paid to those involved no matter what.   
 The case-work is subtle and very sensitive, but it is illegitimate to hold these cases 
transparent and open to public scrutiny. This leaves us with a very delicate problem. Everyone 
must be able to trust that which happens behind closed doors. We need to trust that the 
justifications provided are thorough, and that everyone involved are treated with respect, and 
that decisions are qualified. Hence, it is a need to design a decision-making body that is 
capable of ensuring trustworthy decisions. The public does not know the specifics of the 
matters at hand of each case, but should be able to trust the decision-making because of the 
quality of the procedure. The substantial input to the procedure, whatever it might be, must be 
                                                 
1 This organization translates to the “county board of child protection and social affairs.” However, the semi-
official translation is “The County Social Welfare Board”. Although the former is a more accurate translation, I 
will stick with the latter. 
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treated in a manner that makes the decision, the outcome, worthy of trust. Trust, in this way, 
is seen as the outcome of a ‘correct’ procedure. The procedure must be designed according to 
such principles that makes everyone trust the outcome, the decision. Said differently, 
everyone must be able to trust decisions without knowing what the decision is about. What is 
needed, then, are legal designs that can keep what I will refer to as a promise of trust.  
 Hence, this dissertation has been written with a firm belief that it is, in fact, possible to 
evaluate if decision-making bodies can induce trust due to the merits of the legal design alone. 
The idea is very appealing; but presently no such perspective on trust exist, let alone a 
research approach, which can be applied to actually evaluate if a legal design can be said to 
cash in on the promise of trust. Consequently, we need to develop the perspective and 
approach that can explain how it is possible to design decision-making procedures that 
comply with what is worthy of trust. When such an approach is established, we can evaluate if 
the FBSS keeps the promise of trust. The efforts involved are worth making, not only because 
nobody has done it before, but most importantly, I do believe it to be imperative that decision-
making performed by the FBSS can induce trust on the merits of the procedure design alone 
simply because decisions reached behind closed doors must be worthy of trust.  
 In this dissertation, I will assume that an ideal constitutional democracy can craft a 
legal order that makes an implicit claim to be worthy of trust—this is its promise of trust.2 
Furthermore, it will be argued that what is worthy of trust is grounded in an order of 
expectations and constitutes the essence of what binds society together. Expectations 
constitute anticipations, normative or predictive, of events in the future. Although 
expectations are variable and fallible, individuals employ them in order to trust and keep their 
guard down during interaction.3 On a general level, these expectations establish the order of 
expectations. Legal codes can be crafted that comply with the order of expectations, and 
hence regulate according to what is found worthy of trust. The consequence is that the legal 
order can be said to redeem the promise of trust. The order of expectations is a purely 
descriptive denomination of what is found worthy of trust. Turned around, we can argue that 
what is found worthy of trust is what we can expect others to do. Hence, expectations are 
what we act upon when we trust.  
                                                 
2 Legal order implies not merely the legal code itself, but the entire system it establishes.  
3 See Grimen (2009): 39ff. 
3 
 
The promise of trust, as just expressed in a simple ideal form, implies that a legal order 
that uphold principles of constitutional democracy as a regulative ideal, has the potential and 
perhaps even the obligation to comply with the binding force of society, which is what I refer 
to as the order of expectations. When a legal order complies with the order of expectations, 
the legal order in principle expresses the will of demos. It seeks to accommodate the complete 
social order that the legal order regulates. Furthermore, to continue keeping such a promise, 
the legal order must be developed and maintained through an active law-making procedure 
that answers challenges and dynamics of the order of expectations, and all by observing 
procedural constraints that grants new legal codes potential acceptance of every member of 
society. Taking inspiration from the idea of reconciling the constitutional and democratic 
view of legitimate government, I will seek to study if the political will-formation that craft the 
legal order manage to express the order of expectations.4 Cashing in on a promise of trust 
involve a legal order developed by self-legislation of citizens themselves through a 
representative assembly. Hence, those who are regulated and affected can also understand 
themselves as the authors of the law.  
If tensions arise, and a legal order is no longer found worthy of trust, it means that the 
order of expectations of the political community in question no longer complies with the legal 
order that is enforced. The two orders, the order of expectations and the legal order, must 
again become aligned through political craftsmanship, where democratically elected 
representatives are provided a popular mandate to reach decisions for all that can again 
redeem the promise of trust. In such a way, the trustworthiness typical to any social 
community can become stabilized when it is transferred through law-making to the legal 
order. In many respects, ensuring that the legal order can redeem a promise of trust is a matter 
of democratic politics. This is how the legal order of a constitutional democracy can make an 
implicit promise to regulate in a manner that is found worthy of trust, and in that sense 
legitimate, by the subjects it regulates.  
 In this dissertation it will be acknowledged that such an ideal constitutional democracy 
is very difficult to obtain, let alone maintain. I will nevertheless hold it to be true that Norway 
belongs to those nation-states that do attempt to practice such an ideal, and as such has a 
constitutional democratic foundation. It is merely a matter of actively seeking to let popular 
sovereignty rule through a representative assembly that is sensitive to who they represent, and 
                                                 
4 See Constant (2003). Hollis (1998):92. 
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constrained by constitutional rights that protects individual liberty for all. Although it is 
difficult to fully redeem the promise of trust, the goal is for government to try—the goal is to 
let the will of the people shape rule of law so that the promise of trust is redeemed. Hence, in 
this dissertation, I will for the sake of the argument treat the Norwegian legal order as if it 
were built upon principles of a constitutional democracy seeking to be in line with popular 
conceptions of rightness and correctness.  
This means that I will hold it to be true that if the legal order that regulates Norwegian 
society maintains practices that depart from the trust that binds society together, reforms will 
be instituted to repair the legal order so that practices once again can redeem a promise of 
trust. Hence, the legal order will not redeem a promise of trust before the tension that the legal 
order has towards the existing order of expectations, has become corrected. The political 
craftsmanship within Norwegian parliament and government must be vigilant and competent 
enough in order to craft legal orders that continuously strive to keep its promise of trust. 
Constitutional democracy holds the necessary procedures needed to chisel out a legal order 
that can hold and keep a promise of trust. How the representative assembly conduct politics 
becomes imperative for striving to align the legal order to the order of expectations.  
 Child protection law is one branch within the legal order that has deep roots in 
Norway. The central node of decision-making within the current legal code regulating child 
protection is, as mentioned initially, Fylkesnemnda for barnevern og sosiale saker (FBSS).5 It 
is a Norwegian court-like decision-making body set to reach decisions in cases in need of 
coercion, i.e. the hardest and most complex cases where children are suspected of being 
subjected to detrimental care. The design of this decision-making body figures in the legal 
order through barnevernloven (Child Welfare Act – bvl). On January 1st 2008, an amendment 
to the design of the FBSS was put into effect. With this last amendment, it was explicitly held 
that trust was induced by the principles the decision-making procedure was founded upon.6  
It is not important for this study that the bvl has a legally entrenched claim that 
decision-making is supposed to induce trust, but what is important is the explicit focus upon 
establishing a decision-making procedure that is meant to induce trust. Said differently, the 
decision-making procedure of the FBSS invites itself to an evaluation. The purpose of this 
                                                 
5 This organization translates to the “county board of child protection and social affairs.” However, the semi-
official translation is “The County Social Welfare Board”. Although the former is a more accurate translation, I 
will stick with the latter. 
6 The opening sentence of first paragraph of bvl §7-3 states: “The decision-making procedure of the board shall 
be reassuring, expeditious, and induce trust.“ 
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dissertation is to find out whether or not decision-making of the FBSS redeems a promise of 
trust. To meet this aim, the dissertation will consist of three parts: First, I will develop the 
perspective of trust and the approach theoretically, of what it means for a legal order to 
redeem a promise of trust (chapter 2). Second, I will trace the order of expectations, i.e. what 
is worthy of trust, through history in order to establish what trustworthy decision-making 
constitute today (chapters 3, 4 and 5). Third, I will establish an evaluative standard based 
upon part II, and then evaluate the legal order of the FBSS (chapters 6 and 7). To what extent 
the legal order complies with the order of expectations will tell us to what degree the promise 
is redeemed. Thus, on a basic level, this dissertation is meant to be a critique of political 
craftsmanship by finding out if democratically elected officials are vigilant and competent to 
craft legislation that abides by the trust instilled in them by their office.   
The FBSS reaches decisions involving coercion as the state removes parental rights 
temporarily or permanently and provides non-detrimental care to the child. Before reaching 
such a decision, the parents have a right to raise a counter-claim in order to argue that the care 
they provide is non-detrimental and that coercion is not necessary. Once the case is presented 
before the FBSS, the parties will argue their cases in a meeting of negotiation. The case is 
decided either by a regular board consisting of one judge, one professional and one lay-man, 
or by a large board that consists of one judge, two professionals and two lay-men. To delimit 
the discussions, this dissertation will make a clear distinction between child protection and 
child welfare, whereby the former involves coercion in order to protect a child, and the latter 
does not. Although both types of interventions figures in the bvl, this dissertation focus upon 
the child’s need of protection. The dissertation contains three different parts:  
1. Theoretical approach—“the promise of trust” 
2. The historical development of the order of expectations 
3. Evaluation of the legal order 
1.1.TheoreticalApproach—“thepromiseoftrust”
In order to analyze if a legally entrenched decision-making procedure can redeem a promise 
of trust, or be trust-inducing, there is a need to develop an approach that allows for such a 
study. The study requires a theoretically substantial framework that can establish an 
analytically tangible approach to study how decision-making can induce trust by way of legal 
design only. The approach needs to tell us what trust is, and how it can be used to evaluate 
whether or not a decision-making process induces trust.  
6 
 
 The first part involves an arrangement of theoretical nuts and bolts, or stepping-stones, 
drawn mainly from action-theory seeking to establish the theoretical approach that can 
explain how a promise of trust can be redeemed. Hence, I will argue that trust is best 
explained by employing an action-frame of reference. Trust will be treated as an action-
theoretical base item with the individual actor’s point of view as a point of departure.  
 The fundamental component of the order of expectations is in basic communication. 
Basic communication will be held to be the individual action-theoretical point of departure for 
trust.7 Mutual understanding, and how it becomes established through basic communication, 
will be used as the spring-source for explaining trust. In order to understand why, we first 
need to provide a plausible solution to the problem of order. The problem of order is a 
theoretical construct that takes a world void of trust as its point of departure. I will argue that 
the solution to such a problem is the incremental development of an order consisting of 
expectations that individuals can direct towards generally applied action norms that are 
established through a mutual understanding. Hence, one can expect that others choose to act 
upon certain action norms.  
Only by first explaining what trust entails on such a basic level, through an action-
frame of reference, can trust be approximated to a promise of trust implicit to a legal order of 
a constitutional democracy. The basic theoretical level will argue that a specific spatially and 
temporally delimited legal code can express a specific type of legal order that can stabilize the 
order of expectations. The legal order, it will be argued, is supposed to comply with the ever 
present, yet changing, basic expectations that individuals carry.  
The order of expectations itself express what is worthy of trust and constitutes the 
bond of society. To study the order of expectations is to study what is worthy of trust. Acting 
according to expectation is to act trustworthy, and to act trustworthy is to act according to 
expectations. Breaches in expectations constitute breaches of trust. Expectations constitute 
anticipations of events. Stability of expectations and their accuracy and quality can signal a 
level of trustworthiness. The more individuals constituting a social community act according 
to expectations, the higher this level becomes. The development and dynamics of expectations 
is dependent upon social integration, and will be clarified in part I.8  
                                                 
7 See for instance Grimen (2009) and Baier (1986). We will return to this later. 
8 The role of expectation play a major role in trust-literature. See Grimen (2009):35ff.  
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Expectations come in two different categories: Normative and predictive. The latter 
are expectations based upon assumptions that events will occur in a foreseeable fashion as 
“they are supposed to”. Normative expectations are independent from the event, and are 
aimed at social norms reached and maintained through mutual understanding. Both types of 
expectations might be rational or irrational to hold, and both are fallible. However, an 
irrational normative expectation can be kept although the expectation is not met regularly. 
Although the distinction between predictive and normative expectations is important, this 
dissertation will refer to both while it refers to expectations.  
 If the legal order is to become worthy of trust, it needs to comply with the basic 
expectations dominating the order of expectations. For instance, within child protection, there 
are always some expectations that are more fundamental. Consequently, they are basic to the 
order of expectation with regard to child protection. The legislator must attempt to insert the 
basic expectations into the legal order. When basic expectations become entrenched in the 
legal order, it becomes more able to redeem the promise of trust. If the legal order in child 
protection did not comply with basic expectations, it would not bestow trust either. Hence, the 
basic expectations constitute ideals that political craftsmanship should strive to implement in 
order for a legal order to redeem the promise of trust.  
Since the order of expectations develops due to learning processes of different kinds, 
the order of expectations is in constant flux. The political craftsmanship must exert vigilance 
and continuous competence in order to redeem the promise of trust. Due to the flux within the 
order of expectations, it is a continuous problem in crafting a legal order that complies with it. 
Learning-processes of different kinds will produce tension towards the facticity of positive 
law. The lower the tension is, the more the current legal order complies with the order of 
expectations and harbor what is worthy of trust. Thus, the higher the tension between the 
basic expectations and the legal order, the less evidence it is of the presence of basic 
expectations within it, and hence the ability of the legal order to redeem the promise of trust is 
lacking. I will now present the approach in a more formal language in six steps.  
 The order of expectations (OE) at a certain point in time t can be illustrated within a 2-
dimensional simplex when it is constituted by two known basic expectations (BE), BE1 and 
BE2, and one unknown amount of expectations that are not basic BEu. A basic expectation can 
for instance be the principle of child’s best interest or the principle of non-discrimination. If 
more known basic expectations are present, the simplex increases in complexity. Thus, BEu 
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represents expectations that are universally present within an order of expectations at a certain 
point in time, but can potentially become more dominating as time goes by. Hence, 
expectations can become more specified and defined as time goes by. For the sake of 
simplicity, it can be assumed that BE1 and BE2 have an equal distribution within the order of 
expectations, and that the presence of BEu is very low. Thus, the vector of the order of 
expectations at t0 can be drawn, as shown in Figure 1.  
1: The order of expectations in time t0: 
 
2: It will be assumed that the current legal order (LO) can be plotted within the order of 
expectations at t0. A legal order that is introduced as a new legal code, is supposed to comply 
with the OE provided certain principles of constitutional democracy are upheld. Some 
discrepancies are to be expected, but in general, a legal code is supposed to reflect the OE at a 
specific time to redeem the promise of trust. This assumption can be stated as: 
LO(t) § OE(t0). 
where the LO(t) can be reflected as a vector coordinate relating to the simplex. The coordinate 
illustrates to what extent the corresponding basic expectations of OE are operative within LO 
at time t.  
3: At different points in time t0, t1, t2, t3,…, tn, corresponding OE(t1), OE(t2), OE(t3),…, OE(tn) 
will be identified.  
4: For each point in time, a potential discrepancy (į) between the current legal order, LO(t), 
and the order of expectations, OE(t) can occur. This discrepancy constitutes a tension between 
the order of expectations and the current legal order. Formally, this can be represented as: 
į(LO(t), OE(t)) 
BEu 
BE2 BE1 
 
OE(t0) 
Figure 1: 
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Such discrepancy can be illustrated in three scenarios (Figure 2): į(LO(t1),OE(t1)), 
į(LO(t2),OE(t2)), and į(LO(t3),OE(t3)). 
5: As time goes by, the order of expectations develops, potentially introducing tensions to the 
legal order. For example, if, at a certain time, tx, the tension į(tx)=į(LO(tx),OE(tx)) is 
identified, it implies that the order of expectations has developed away from the current legal 
order so that the tension, į(tx), is too great for the current legal code to carry. In other words, 
the basic expectations held by OE, and which is found worthy of trust, are no longer operative 
within the current LO and hence the LO can no longer be said to redeem the promise of trust.  
6: In the above scenario, at tx, a need for legal reform emerges, as identified by the orientation 
of the order of expectations, OE(tx), which the current LO(tx) do not align with. The į(tx) 
consequently leads to the introduction of a new legal code that again reflects the order of 
expectations at a new time-interval LO(t)§OE(t0).  
If the promise of trust is to be studied, it is a need to infer what the order of 
expectations is about with regard to the object of trust. In our case the object is decision-
making involving coercion to protect children. The basic expectations need to be expounded 
from the order of expectations as the most dominant expectations. Once achieved, it is 
possible to evaluate whether or not the legal order is aligned with the basic expectations. If it 
is, the promise of trust is redeemed. If not, the legal order does no longer reflect a trustworthy 
practice. This is most probably always a matter of degree. 
Only by establishing a stable tool by means of basic expectations, can the purpose of 
the dissertation be met. An evaluative standard must be developed which is a general 
expression of the basic expectations. This standard can be referred to as the normative self-
understanding of current child protection. The decision-making design that is going to be 
evaluated according to the general expression made by the basic expectations is settled in 
Chapter 7 of the bvl. In the third part of this dissertation, the evaluation of how the current 
BB
 
BEu 
LO(
Figure 2: 
OE(t1) 
į(LO(t1),OE(t
BB
 
BEu 
LO(
OE(t2) 
į(LO(t2),OE(t
BB
 
BEu 
LO(
OE(t3) 
į(LO(t3),OE(t
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legal order complies with the basic expectations, the child’s best interest and non-
discrimination, will be laid out. These two basic expectations, it will be argued, constitutes the 
two main pillars of the current order of expectations. The general expression reflected by 
these two basic expectations can be referred to as both rights-based and post-national.9  
In order to establish the order of expectations and its components, a study of the legal 
discourse that led up to the establishment of the bvl in 1992 is required. The second part of the 
dissertation will focus upon the history of the order of expectations, and how it has been given 
different expressions in 1896, 1953, and 1992, and also how the order of expectations have 
continued to develop up till 2008.  
1.2.TheHistoricalDevelopmentoftheOrderofExpectations
This second part of the dissertation analyzes the history of child protection law and its 
adjacent discourses in Norway. It will specifically focus upon the decision-making bodies set 
to enforce coercive interventions and their designs. This implies a study of three legal orders. 
The first came in 1896, in 1953 the second, and the current one was introduced in 1992. It is a 
narrow approach to history in the sense that I will only locate the development of the order of 
expectations with regard to decision-making involving coercion to protect children. Hence, 
the purpose behind the historical study is to qualify the current order of expectations. I will 
use the legal orders, i.e. the different legal codes, as a lens to elaborate upon the political 
processes that made them.  
However, pragmatically treating the legal order as observing principles of the ideal 
constitutional democracy, the legal order can align with the order of expectations at the time 
of reforms or amendment-procedures are set in motion by parliament. At these moments, the 
representative assembly in principle reflects the entire demos; at this moment the assembly is 
most vigilant to the bond of society that it represents, and the data regarding the legal-political 
discourse on child protection abounds. Since we know the specific legal codes and how they 
came about, and hence how this alleged trustworthy child protection system became 
established, we can backtrack to the origin and reconstruct the basic expectations that become 
stabilized in the new legal code. The particular method deployed is process tracing.  
                                                 
9 I will refer to fundamental political principles as rights. I borrow this idea from Ronald Dworkin who argues 
that rights are “political trumps held by individuals. Individuals have rights when, for some reason, a collective 
goal is not a sufficient justification for denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have or to do, or not a 
sufficient justification for imposing some loss or injury upon them” (1977:xi).  
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The purpose of the historical investigation is twofold. First, I will provide a qualified 
description of the development of the order of expectations. Provided the presuppositions laid 
out in part I, it is assumed that, at the moment of the introduction of a new legal code (1896, 
1953 and 1992) or large amendments (2008), we can expect the largest effort to make the 
legal orders redeem the promise of trust.  
 Second, it will be assumed that, throughout the legal history of child protection 
discourse, the tension between the order of expectations and the legal order of all three legal 
codes, increased with time, culminating in the establishment of a new legal code. The 
historical development can be illustrated, as in Figure 3. 
 
The line at the bottom of Figure 3 is the order of expectations of child protection. Although it 
is continuously in flux, it is still stable because it is the ever present order of expectations. 
Legal orders, on the other hand, come and go. A legal order constitutes stabilized expectations 
and departs from the order of expectations as time goes by and as new expectations become 
dominant within the order of expectations. The area between the departing legal order and the 
order of expectations illustrates the degree to which the promise of trust is redeemed. A high 
tension signifies that the promise is broken. In the end, for a legal order to comply with the 
order of expectations, it is most likely that a new legal order must be put in place.  
 The motivation for studying the entire history of child protection is that the current 
order of expectations is deeply rooted in the events that took place during the two prior legal 
codes on child protection. Based upon lessons from the past, trust in the decision-making 
body can only be rebuilt if the criticism that has been leveled against child protection, and that 
is agreed upon throughout its history, is acknowledged and the problems and criticisms met. 
Thus, the current order of expectations relating to the bvl of 1992 and 2008 can only be fully 
understood by first studying entire historical development.  
 
į(t) 
OE(t) 
LO 
1953 1896 1992 
Figure 3: 
2008 
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The data material that has been made use of for the evaluation of the legal order and 
the promise of trust consists of documents. These documents have predominantly three 
origins: the legal codes, the legislative history, and important events and criticisms that have 
influenced the political craftsmanship. First, the legal codes constitute the legal orders, and 
will be used as past attempts to stabilize orders of expectations. Hence, the legal orders of 
1896, 1953, 1992, and the amendment of 2008 are all attempts to stabilize orders of 
expectations. The different designs of decision-making boards that figure in these different 
legal orders are all products of the time they became established, and illustrate how the order 
of expectations have developed.   
Second, I will make use of documents that lead up to new legislation as expressing the 
order of expectations. Methodologically, this can referred to as process tracing. A wide range 
of documents will be treated as constitutive of a law-making process that has the potential of 
making legal orders redeem a promise of trust. If a legal order has the potential of redeeming 
a promise of trust, it is because it has the necessary input to do so, namely the documents-
material. It involves documents such as Norges offentlige utredninger (Green Papers–NOU), 
Odelstingsproposisjoner (Parliamentary Propositions – Ot.prp), Stortingsproposisjoner 
(Propositions to the Storting – St.Prp.), and Stortingsmeldinger (White Papers–St.meld). I will 
return to methodological considerations in the conclusion of part I. 
Third, I will draw upon factors that have influenced the order of expectations 
throughout the history of child protection. They contribute in leading up to legal reforms and 
amendments. For the most parts, I will deal with these as primary sources embedded in 
documents. These are important events such as the criminalist movement of the late 19th 
century, the School-Asylum Inquiry in the beginning of the 20th century, the Labor-party’s 
ideological domination after Second World War and the introduction of the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. I will follow critiques or persons that have influenced the political 
craftsmanship of child protection, such as Bernhard Getz, Bjørn Evje, Johan Castberg and 
Inge Debes. It will also be a need to look at different types of public reports, legal proposals 
etc. that did not lead to the establishment of a new legal order. Finally, I will also use 
secondary sources, but most often as commentary. Most notably are Tove Stang Dahl, Rune 
Slagstad, Gerd Benneche, Erik Oddvar Eriksen, Marit Skivenes and Lucy Smith.  
In the first part of the dissertation, the approach will be laid out. In part two, the 
expression of the order of expectations will be established through the study of child 
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protection history. This leads to the third and last part of the dissertation where the evaluative 
standard, the normative self-understanding of current trustworthy child protection, will be 
established first, and the evaluation of the FBSS as second. 
1.3.EvaluationoftheLegalOrder:IsthePromiseRedeemed?
The third and last part of this dissertation provides an in-depth evaluation of the current legal 
order with the design of the FBSS. The point of departure is the basic expectations of bvl 
1992, and how they have developed towards 2008. It will be argued that what is worthy of 
trust in 2008 are the basic expectations introduced in 1992, child’s best interest and non-
discrimination, filtered through a post-national turn. In chapter 7 of part III, I will elaborate 
upon the type of normative expression provided by basic expectations, and thereby explain in 
detail what is worthy of trust, and thus establish an evaluative standard. In chapter 8 of part 
III, I will provide an evaluation of the legal order and its design of the FBSS. 
 It can be argued that currently, the order of expectations relates to legal developments 
aligning with human rights obligations. One of the articles of the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the principle of non-discrimination, is to be considered as 
one of the two basic expectations. It states that children are not to be discriminated against in 
any type of decision-making procedure. The most important basic expectation, besides non-
discrimination, is to reach decisions that are in the child’s best interest. In short, a decision-
making procedure that promotes trust today must be in each child’s best interest and with no 
discrimination.10 If decision-making does not comply with basic expectations, decisions 
become unworthy of trust. Hence it is up to the political craftsmanship of parliament to chisel 
out a legal order that harbor the basic expectations that redeems the promise of trust.  
 The outline of the basic expectations is my interpretation and attempt to reconstruct 
and develop a systematic, consistent and rational expression of what is currently worthy of 
trust. The point of departure is the legally entrenched “statement of legislative purpose” of 
child protection.11 It states that child protection is about securing and promoting the 
development and health of a child. This ‘purpose’ will be approximated to a human rights 
rationale. I will argue, from the point of view of the order of expectations, that childhood 
should be seen as a foundation of, and transition to adulthood, whereby the child’s future as 
an adult should guide the decision-making regarding the protection of the child in particular 
                                                 
10 See figure 1. The principle of non-discrimination can be seen as C1 and the principle of the child’s best interest 
can be seen as C2. 
11 Bvl §1-1. 
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circumstances. The right to liberty that an adult has, and the need for opportunities this right 
entails, is central to the understanding of how the legal order should operate in order to 
redeem a promise of trust. All through the history of child protection, it has been a focus upon 
making sure that once adulthood ticks in it must be capable of living life on its own terms.  
1.4.WhatThisStudyisNotAbout
Now that I have clarified the three different parts of the dissertation, I will pause to argue 
briefly regarding what this dissertation is not about. There are three other main routes to 
evaluate to what extent the decision-making procedure of the FBSS induces trust: Judicial, 
normative legitimacy and sociological. None of them, I will argue, can provide a satisfactory 
answer to whether or not the procedure is designed in a manner that induces trust. The first 
alternative approach is the judicial. Within the bvl §7-3, where it is stated that the FBSS-
procedure itself induces trust, it is also stipulated what this would entail. Hence, from within 
the legal code itself, it is provided a practical answer on how to redeem a promise of trust. 
The promise is redeemed if the decision-making procedures observe certain principles of 
decision-making, such as hearing both sides and provide justification for decisions. These are 
principles that allegedly underpin a fair trial. 
 These principles are not necessarily the answer to the promise of trust emanating from 
the relation a constitutional democracy has to the social community it governs. For instance, 
in 1953 a new legal order was established that is significantly different from the current one, 
and efforts were made to make a trustworthy design of a decision-making body different from 
a legal trial. Hence, the claim that principles of fair-trial induce trust was wrong in 1953, 
whereas not necessarily today. Hence, it is not possible to argue that what is worthy of trust is 
located within the legal order decoupled from the bond of society. There is a need to 
reconstruct and qualify an analytical standard based what is held to be worthy of trust.  
 Trust is a consequence of interaction, irrespective of what is claimed from within the 
legal order itself. What is worthy of trust develops through discursive practices within the 
social system itself. These practices can produce mutual agreement regarding what to 
expect—these expectations has the potential of becoming embedded in a legal order provided 
constitutional and democratic law-making. Law can be codified with a claim to induce trust, 
and it can sum up principles that would achieve such an aim, but it would nevertheless only 
presume trust. For instance, what is assumed as worthy of trust according to bvl §7-3 today 
was not worthy of trust in 1953. This does not mean that the legal order of 1953 was not 
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found worthy of trust. In part I, I will lay out an approach to trust that suggests how the legal 
order can be crafted to redeem a promise of trust. It is a matter of political craftsmanship and 
not a matter of legal practice or jurisprudence. Once what is worthy of trust is stabilized 
within a legal order, the legal order will be worthy of trust. However, as time goes by, what 
was once stabilized can no longer be said to be worthy of trust because the order of 
expectations has developed away from the legal order. What is worthy of trust is continuously 
in flux, and unless law-makers are vigilant to their duties as elected officials, legal codes, or 
legal orders, will most likely become unworthy of trust in due time.  
Underpinning such a notion is an idea that trust can become established by 
implementing a “right” type of design for decision-making. Although this is correct, what is 
found worthy of trust is first and foremost located in the social community and its order of 
expectations. Hence, the legal order and the legal design of the FBSS must still abide by what 
is found worthy of trust in the social community to maintain such a claim. It is also not 
important that the legally entrenched design explicitly argues that the FBSS-procedure 
induces trust, as is done in bvl §7-3. Even if such a claim were not provided, it would still be 
relevant to evaluate if the decision-making procedure would uphold the promise of trust. 
 Furthermore, the order of expectations is not to be confused with the general sense of 
justice (allmen rettsfølelse). The order of expectations is independent from law, and in a 
constitutional democracy it is always “ahead” of the law. Hence, I am not referring to a 
conception of the law when I refer to the order of expectations. The general sense of justice 
relates to how the subjects of the law believe the law is supposed to function. This is relevant 
from the point of view of jurisprudence, and not from a political point of view where the 
mandate is to craft the law in accordance with a popular will. This means that the general 
sense of law and the order of expectations are two different things in principle. On the other 
hand, the order of expectations and the general sense of justice might overlap in real life.  
 The second approach that is not chosen is to evaluate the legal design of the FBSS up 
against a normative standard of legitimacy. Although this is fruitful in itself, the standard we 
will attempt to evaluate FBSS up against is an empirical order of expectations within society 
itself, i.e. what is found worthy of trust. This standard can, hypothetically, be repulsive. For 
instance, corporal punishment of children was widely held to be acceptable in the late 1880s. 
A child protection system was suggested in 1892 that incorporated corporal punishment. This, 
we could argue, was a practice that was found worthy of trust by many, but it is indefensible 
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as a normative standard of legitimacy. The order of expectations, which is the standard 
employed here, is reconstructed empirically, and is not a normative standard of legitimacy.  
 A normative conception of legitimacy would also fall for the same argument as a 
judicial approach in the sense that it could only assume to maintain what is worthy of trust. 
For instance, it might be claimed that so-called knowledge-based decision-making, i.e. 
epistocracy, is one conception of trust/legitimacy, and that it is at odds with another 
conception of trust/legitimacy, namely democracy. Although both of these conceptions of 
legitimate decision-making can be worthy of trust, it is still only presumed. To illustrate: The 
legal design of decision-making established in 1953 reflected trust in democratic decision-
making. In 1992, it reflected a desire for performing more knowledge-based decision-making.  
Although legitimacy-approaches such as these are very fruitful within the framework 
of normative political theory, it is not the object of concern here. To find out if the legal order 
redeems the promise of trust, it needs to be evaluated up against the existing expression of the 
order of expectations. This can be referred to as an empirical type of legitimacy that changes 
over time. In that case, conceptions of what is held to be legitimate changes over time.  
Hence, we could argue that what cashes in a promise of trust is also what is considered 
legitimate. In this case, it can be argued that what I am doing is a study of legitimacy, but then 
again the concept of legitimacy would become parasitic upon a conception of trust and thus 
redundant in itself. I will seek to reconstruct and qualify an empirical claim of what is found 
worthy of trust, and then evaluate the FBSS-procedure up against it.  
 The third alternative approach I will not choose is to investigate perceptions of the 
decisions being trusted, i.e. the sociological approach. Although this could be interesting, and 
can tell us something regarding how the FBSS is perceived, it will not answer the question of 
whether or not the procedure itself induces trust. With regard to the perception of trust, the 
promise of trust is made ex ante. If it leads to trust in the decision-making ex post is 
something else. If we would study the perception of decision-making, and seek to find out if 
different affected parties would trust it or not, we would not have any information regarding 
the procedure itself. It would not make sense to retroactively state that, since the perception of 
the outcome of the decision-making procedure, i.e. the decision, leads to trust, the procedure 
itself induces trust. Such a claim would be unfounded.  
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However prudent it is to empirically investigate the perception of decision-making, or 
the aggregate of perceptions of decisions and experiences, this study tries to address the issue 
of whether or not the promise of trust holds in and of itself, i.e. that the design of decision-
making procedures can make a claim upon being worthy of trust regardless of what any other 
empirical investigation might conclude with regard to perceptions of decisions. Hence, the 
focus is on the procedure and its design, and that a design can comply with what is worthy of 
trust on a more fundamental level.12 The claim raised stipulates that decisions made according 
to certain principles are conducive to trust, and trust can be seen as procedurally induced.  
1.5.TheSignificanceofKeepingthePromise
A formulation within bvl §7-3 stipulates that the FBSS-design observes certain principles that 
induces trust. Although it is the first legal code that explicitly expresses the need for 
trustworthy decision-making, claiming that only the current design has had such a goal is 
naïve. It can rather be argued that §7-3 could be a reflection of the transformation of the fair-
trial principle into Norwegian law, and also that all decision-making bodies throughout 
history have had a goal of redeeming a promise of trust by abiding principles of constitutional 
democracy. 
A problem in studying trust in relation to child protection is that the public does not 
know, are not legally entitled to know, and should not know, all the facts of a case that are in 
need of coercion. This sets restrictions on how we can study trust with respect to the FBSS. 
The benefit of the most common approach to the study of trust, namely through surveys, is 
limited.13 The case-work is delicate and sensitive, and proceedings are not public. This means 
that this particular decision-making procedure is especially in need of being trusted on the 
merits of procedural design because it is illegitimate for these cases to be transparent and 
open for public scrutiny.14 Everyone must be able to trust that which happens behind closed 
doors, namely that everyone affected by the decision-making is treated according to proper 
standards worthy of trust.  
                                                 
12 See NOU 2005:9: 40 and NOU 2001:32: 650. 
13 Although it is common to perform such studies, there are at least three problems with trust-surveys: (1) Onora 
O’Neill argues that answers on direct questions phrased: ”Do you trust...?” are in many cases not a matter of 
trust. Many say they distrust what is written in a newspaper, but their statement have seemingly no consequence 
for whether or not a newspaper is bought or not, see (2002): 8ff. (2) To trust means to transfer something into the 
hands of others and thereby become in one sense ignorant. As such, what happens to the transferred object is in 
most cases not something the person who trusts can have any informed idea about. (3) Trust is, as will become 
clear in part I, a complex topic, and it is hard to make any sensible question-battery that would genuinely reflect 
the state of trust. Examples of such studies can nevertheless be found in NOU 2000:12: 264. 
14 NOU 2005:9: 39. 
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Through the motivation to establish whether or not the promise of trust is redeemed or 
not, this study has been driven forth with a firm belief that it is, in fact, possible to discuss the 
promise of trust in an informed manner. However, no general theoretical framework has so far 
been developed or applied to approach this particular question—there are no pre-established 
theoretical frameworks to apply. Moreover, this issue has not been previously approached 
empirically in the same manner. Hence, the present study contributes to the extant body of 
knowledge in the field, through theory, the inquiry process itself and the outcome. 
Within the Norwegian research-community the FBSS-procedure itself has not been 
previously studied with regard to a promise of trust. However, some authors have evaluated 
the FBSS and discussed how the FBSS came about. The most prominent example is the 
dissertation of Marit Skivenes, and her publications, some of which were co-authored by Erik 
Oddvar Eriksen.15 In addition, numerous studies relevant to child protection are published, 
focusing on custody questions, coercive and non-coercive measures, principle of biology and 
principle of child’s best interest, legal protection etc. The goal of the present study is to take a 
step back and evaluate the entire design of the FBSS and whether or not its decision-making 
process can be said to redeem a promise of trust.  
Furthermore, most of the work of Skivenes was written prior to two important years in 
the development of the FBSS—2003, when children’s rights became incorporated into the mrl
and the bvl was amended to stand by the demands of the CRC, and 2008, when the design of 
the FBSS became reformed. Today, it is clear that neither politicians nor scholars have 
discussed the ability of decision-making to promote trust as will be done in the following.  
 The CRC is made statutory by its incorporation into Menneskerettighetsloven (Human 
Rights Act – mrl) in Norway, and has precedence to other regular legal codes. Through 
Ot.prp.nr.76 (2006-2007), the design of the FBSS was for the first time scrutinized in a real 
legal sense through the perspective of human rights. It was explicitly held that the FBSS was 
to abide by the CRC as part of the obligation towards the mrl. Did it stand the trial of such a 
post-national turn? If so, it might be that the FBSS also abides by the current order of 
expectations. Does the FBSS redeem the promise of trust? Let us now begin.  
                                                 
15 Eriksen & Skivenes (1997), (1998); Skivenes (2002a). 
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PartI–ThePromiseofTrust
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2.OrderofExpectationsandtheComplianceofaLegalOrder
 
 
 
 
 
John Locke argued in the spirit of the Enlightenment that by their reason alone, “…the 
community put the legislative power into such hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they 
shall be governed by declared laws.”16 Since everyone within the community were to stand 
behind those governing, certain unalienable rights had to be instituted to ensure the protection 
of all. Furthermore, no “edict of anybody else…have the force and obligation of a law which 
has not its sanction from that legislative which the public has chosen and appointed.”17 Law, 
according to Locke, has to have the consent of society, a consent that draws upon the bond of 
society, i.e. the trust that keeps society together—vinculum societatis. Locke argued that 
nothing could override the legislative that honored that trust. Hence, the legislator had to 
respect the trust of society when crafting a legal order, and thus redeem the promise of trust. 
This Lockean perspective is what this chapter will attempt to expound. I will lay out a 
perspective on trust and an approach to how trust can be examined that stipulate a legal form 
that can make a legal order comply with trust and hence redeem a promise of trust.  
 It will be argued that immanent to a conception of a constitutional democracy is a 
legal form that has a fundamental and a continuous relation to the order that binds society 
together. The order of expectations is constitutive of the bond of society, and express what is 
found worthy of trust. In this regard, an elected assembly is mandated as a representative 
legislator of the entire demos to craft legal orders that comply with the order of 
expectations.18 I will in the first part of this chapter explain how the order of expectations 
originates and develops, and in the second half how a current legal order can be made to 
comply with the order of expectations. What is worthy of trust, expressed by the order of 
expectations, is purely descriptive.  
                                                 
16 Locke (2000): §136. 
17 Locke (2000): §134. 
18 I will use the denomination “order of expectation” and “bond of society” interchangeably.  
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 In order to develop the perspective of trust, based upon this basic Lockean insight, I 
need to utilize different fundamental theoretical contributions within sociology and political 
theory as stepping-stones to establish the perspective on trust and the research-approach. The 
first half of this chapter is dedicated this task, and I will begin by explaining order and explain 
myself down to the basic components that order consists of. The first part of this chapter 
involves taking a look at what order is. By explaining how order can become established from 
disorder, we can begin to grasp how trust actually works as a binding force of society. Hence, 
I will present a problem of order that provides such a challenge, and also how the order of 
expectations can emerge as its solution. By establishing how order can and must emerge from 
disorder, I will move on to the second effort of this chapter, namely to delve deeper into the 
specifics of the solution to the problem of order, to that of reducing contingencies. Action-
norms can become established that interacting agents can act upon and that can leave a 
perception of reduction of contingencies. In the third part of this chapter, I will argue how 
action norms reached through mutual understanding can be utilized by individuals in the 
effort of expecting actions of others. For individuals to act upon action norms makes an 
individual act expectedly. Turned around, the same individual can expect actions of others. 
Hence, knowing that members of the same social system act upon settled action norms makes 
the members act expectedly. This, it will be argued, is how order works. 
 The next half of this chapter is devoted to explain the legal form that has the potential 
of establishing legal orders capable of redeeming a promise of trust—the constitutional 
democracy. In the fourth part, I will briefly explain how what is found worthy of trust is in 
constant flux due to processes of modernity. The fact of reasonable pluralism and how it is 
embedded in democratic institutions will be emphasized as especially important in explaining 
the flux within the order of expectations. This flux generate tension between the legal order 
that once stabilized the order of expectations and the order of expectations. The fifth part of 
the chapter explains the relationship between the order of expectations and principles of 
constitutional democracy. It will be explained how this legal form incorporates law-making 
having a potential of complying with the order of expectations and redeem a promise of trust.  
 Norwegian law-making will be treated, for the sake of the argument, as attempting to 
abide by principles underpinning a constitutional democracy. Hence, I will treat the 
Norwegian law-making assembly as having the potential and desire of redeeming a promise 
of trust. In this effort, the sixth part will examine the relationship between constitutionalism 
and democracy, which both must figure in such a law-making procedure, or legal form, in 
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order to redeem a promise of trust. In the seventh part, I will lay out how flux, caused 
especially by the dynamics of reasonable pluralism, generate new expectations in the order of 
expectations. Furthermore, that dominant expectations, referred to as basic expectations, will 
change as time goes by. A legal order that is supposed to redeem a promise of trust, must at a 
minimum comply with basic expectations. In part eight, I will lay out key characteristics of 
the political craftsmanship in question. I will explain that only by having political 
craftsmanship that is vigilant and competent, can the legal order comply with the order of 
expectations continously. In the conclusion, I will lay out methodological considerations for 
the research underpinning the dissertation. 
 The different stepping stones will be laid out without the resistance it might deserve. 
The focus here is to explain the perspective of trust, and establish it as an approach. The 
reason is to keep the focus upon the overall purpose of this dissertation, which cannot allow 
for too much theoretical outline of what constitutes trust. To reiterate, I only use fundamental 
insights from sociology and political theory in the effort to establish the approach needed to 
answer the research-question of this dissertation: Does the FBSS redeem a promise of trust?   
2.1.TheProblemofOrderandtheInadequacyofRationalSelfǦInterest
In Structure of Social Action, Talcott Parsons presents the Hobbesian “problem of order.”19 
This ‘problem’ will be used to explain how the order of expectations relies on multiple action-
types in order to come about. The formulation problem of order captures a central topic in 
theoretical sociology and refers to the very nature of social organization. For Thomas Hobbes, 
the peaceful organization of society was assured through an absolute sovereign.20 Today, 
within constitutional democracies, the standards of order are higher, and make the question of 
‘order’ even more important to discuss. ‘Order’ can be understood not only as absence of war 
and conflict, but also as a type of social organization that is considered reasonable to its 
members—an organization they would, on some level accept and want to be a member of.  
Order is absent in the Hobbesian state of nature. Due to the lack of order, each person 
will seek to arm themselves with whatever means, coercive if need be, to satisfy their interests 
for goods and security. Force and fraud are two such means. The search for satisfying each 
person’s own self-interest, always with the potential of violent means, would hinder any 
establishment of order. Due to the absence of order in the state of nature, each individual’s 
                                                 
19 Parsons (1968): 90. It has also become referred to as the problem of collective action, or the problem of free-
riding or the problem of voluntary provision of public goods, See Elster (1989): 17ff. 
20 Hobbes (1985): 81. 
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life is in danger. How can you trust anyone, if every person is potentially your enemy? It is 
the war of all against all – bellum omnium contra omnes.  
The underlying thrust behind the “problem” is that each person “is essentially a 
servant of the passions.”21 In other words, each person is driven forth by their rational self-
interest to acquire the objects of their passions, to become content and to be safe. Hobbes 
refers to the objects of a person’s desires as a “good.” Hence, the problem of order emerges 
when individuals strive for their own conceptions of good without being collectively 
restrained by order. Furthermore, Hobbes argues: 
“...because the constitution of a man’s body is in continual mutation, it is impossible that all the 
same things should always cause in him the same appetites and aversions.”22
This assumption of human psychology is equally valid today, and is hardly controversial. 
Conceptions of good will shift as the desires of each person ‘mutate’, or simply change. This 
can happen on a whim, through personal crisis, or revelations, changing workplace, taking an 
education, going through a divorce etc. This claim would entail each person to potentially 
always want what another man has, and make each individual a potential threat towards 
another. The unpredictability and uncertainty that arises constitutes the lubricant in 
maintaining the state of nature—needs and desires will bring individuals at odds with each 
other in a world characterized by scarcity of the desired objects.  
 To establish a social order would imply morphing motivation of actions based on 
rational self-interest with something not reducible to any one individual actor’s self-interest. It 
would imply a binding force between individuals. It would require a mutual desire that all 
members of the social order could agree to on a basic level. Hobbes’s suggestion is for all to 
enter a binding contract and subordinate themselves to a sovereign ruler. Parsons observes 
that this type of contract implicitly requires rationality that cannot be explained by mere 
individualistic self-interest. Hence, Parsons illuminates a weakness in Hobbes’ argument—
perhaps even the Achilles heel. 
 A contract that secures collective order is not reducible to every person’s effort to 
purely satisfy their own conception of the good. Parsons argue that Hobbes needs to stretch 
the conception of rationality “beyond its scope in the rest of the theory” to raise order from 
                                                 
21 Parsons (1968): 89. 
22 Hobbes (1985): 120. 
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disorder.23 The idea of rational self-interest must be stretched to the extent that it includes the 
ability to have an intersubjective will-formation, ability for social coordination, a way of 
stabilizing expectations prior to the contract that establish order—it needs a type of mutual 
understanding. If a contract is to be agreed upon collectively, all the actors must…  
“…come to realize the situation as a whole instead of pursuing their own ends in terms of their 
immediate situation and then take the action necessary to eliminate force and fraud, and, 
purchasing security at the sacrifice of the advantages to be gained by their future employment”.24
However, this type of action is hardly plausible since it depends upon abilities that, as Hobbes 
argued, individuals could not possess. The state of nature loses its analytical thrust for Hobbes 
by making individuals able to, “realize the situation as a whole,” as a collective system.  
To Hobbes, the solution to the problem of order lies in the recognition that constraints 
are needed in order for individuals to live without danger. Parsons claim that Hobbes’ solves 
the problem of order by establishing a political order through a kind of collective and 
complete realization of the need for security. Survival and security, ironically, allegedly 
becomes safeguarded by the same faculties causing “force and fraud.” 
Furthermore, even if the Hobbesian order became established, there is another 
weakness in that it cannot be made to last. Securing “the observance of norms through 
external sanctions alone, [can] not be made to last and is, therefore, unsuitable as a model for 
explaining how social order is possible.”25 Without internalizing order on an individual level, 
disorder will always be a possibility. The Hobbesian order might hold for a while, but 
eventually it will collapse into the violence from where it once came from.  
Parsons argued, that, “social relations cannot assume from the start the form of 
peaceful competition.”26 In a factual order, Hobbes holds as an ontological truth that 
individuals are utility-maximizers.27 Since we know for a fact that order can be established, 
and that the “problem of order” shows us that it cannot be established by rational self-interest 
alone, other action-types needs to be invoked that can explain order. Consequently, the 
incompatibility that arise between the Hobbesian conception of the nature of man on the one 
hand, and the fact that social orders exist that carry mutual trust, needs to be remedied. 
                                                 
23 Parsons (1968): 93. 
24 Parsons (1968): 93. 
25 Habermas (1987): 212. 
26 Habermas (1987): 211. 
27 Hobbes (1985): 189ff. 
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The Parsonian “problem of order” is a theoretical problem that can reveal weaknesses 
of approaches to order that is based upon pure rational self-interest. Hence, to explain the 
order of expectations and how it arises, rational self-interest must be supplemented with a 
broader action-frame of reference—alternative action-types that explain how individuals can 
establish and sustain order from disorder. The presuppositions of pure rational self-interest 
theories are unable to recognize or do justice to the fact that the complex of actions involved 
in the pursuit of individual actors’ self-interests takes place within social systems 
characterized by an order not reducible to rational self-interest alone. Such a social system is, 
it will be argued, “independent of the immediate motives of the contracting parties.”28 
2.2.DoubleContingency,MutualUnderstandingandStableExpectations
Double contingency is the Parsonian denomination of the coordination problem.29 The 
doubling of contingency is due to the interaction between two agents. If more agents were to 
interact, contingencies would increase exponentially.30 It captures the essence of the problem 
of order, and will serve as a point of departure in arguing for its solution. It involves a 
situation where two individual actors engage with each other communicatively for the first 
time. The situation is characterized as uncertain, by disorder, and to establish order the two 
agents must learn to trust one another. Both individuals’ actions are conditioned by how the 
other acts and no action is impossible or mandatory. How should they act, if they want to 
solve the problem of existing contingencies where insecurity is caused by uncertainty of 
action choices? How can they generate expectations towards each other that make interaction 
safe and predictable? Or, when actions are not guided by certain norms of expectancy, how do 
they proceed?  
 Knowing what to expect, it will be argued, is at the core of developing order. 
Developing workable expectations that they can act upon would incrementally establish order. 
General behavioral expectations, utilized to eliminate perception of contingencies, are 
depending upon a mutual understanding regarding action-norms.31 Having reached a mutual 
understanding regarding what norm to act upon, provide the ability and potential for 
                                                 
28 Habermas (1987): 213ff. 
29 Parsons (1951): 36ff.  
30 Luhmann (1976): 509. 
31 Mutual understanding is a neutral concept that does not lay any emphasis on how persons relate to 
understanding. As such, it does not necessarily denote any happy feelings or that everything becomes better as 
soon as mutual understanding emerge. It simply denotes that every actor who is a part of the understanding 
understands why it is so, and also accepts it.  
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expecting actions of others. You can expect others to act in a certain way, albeit knowing that 
the expectation is fallible.  
 One actor, in the situation of double contingency, can initiate interaction with very 
basic communication in the effort to minimize the danger of contingencies caused by being a 
stranger. A gesture, a smile, a simple handshake or “hello” will suffice. In this way, and by 
minimizing conceived danger and risk, order can become established incrementally. The 
contingencies will eventually be narrowed down as communication commence. A smile and a 
“hello” can for instance communicate that the person is not aggressive or have the desire to 
kill you right away. The interacting agents become familiarized to each other and develop a 
capacity to know what to expect and not to expect from each other. The reduction of 
contingency can help bring about expectations towards others specific to interaction. The 
interaction develops action norms that can successfully be acted upon, and which can be 
expected will be acted upon. The genesis of order can, by establishing action norms, be 
anticipated from a situation that was initially characterized as lacking order.32  
 Although order is established, the expectations that establish order are normative and 
fallible. Acting upon expectations towards others involves risk-taking. You risk that your 
expectations are not met. With regard to disorder it is not a matter of risk, but a matter of 
danger. When you apply expectations in a dangerous and unfamiliar environment, the 
expectations are not a product of mutual understanding, but rather personal contemplation. 
Hence, you have no way of knowing what to expect, and those you direct your expectations 
towards have no way of knowing what to expect of you. Hence, a social system emerge when 
a system of shared expectations begin to take shape. In order to build such a social system, 
which in this case involves order, it is a need to first reach mutual understanding regarding 
what norms we can expect others to act upon. Hence, it involves the development of action-
norms that serves as references for individuals’ choice of action.33  
 General behavioral expectations carried by interacting agents provide intersubjective 
stability as interacting agents can anticipate the behavior of others. Expectations are stable 
and intersubjective in that they are directed towards affirmed mutual behavioral-patterns 
among interacting agents, viz. that they are directed at action norms. Expectations are 
                                                 
32 Luhmann (1995): 110-111. 
33 Hollis (1998):11.  
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therefore a basic component of action norms.34 Expectations harbor shared and stable set of 
norms that are maintained and acted upon through mutual understanding among interacting 
agents. On the greater scale of a social system, valid norms consists of those action norms that 
has been passed down through history, and that have been found acceptable and continuously 
acted upon.35 
To illustrate, it is possible to establish an expression of the normative self-
understanding of a particular community or a particular practice within a community,36 for 
instance child protection, by elaborating upon those action norms that have come to dominate. 
These action norms, constitutive of the normative self-understanding, are what basic 
expectations are directed towards. For instance, the action norm of protecting the child’s best 
interest is dominant in current child protection, and child protection is expected to enforce this 
action norm. If it enforces this action norm, and act expectedly, it is increasing the likelihood 
that the child protection system redeems a promise of trust. Hence, it is a basic expectation 
towards the system of child protection that they enforce such a principle. If we combine this 
expectation with other, equally dominant expectations, we can configure the order of 
expectations, i.e. what constitute trustworthy protection of children. Once we have located the 
different basic expectations, it is possible to configure the order of expectations by 
establishing the normative self-understanding of child protection. Once the normative self-
understanding is settled, and is an expression of what is found worthy of trust, it serves the 
function of being an evaluative standard. 
 Embedded in a system of norms is a conjunction of shared and stable set of 
expectations that is parasitic upon the mutual understanding upheld by the stable action 
norms. Expectations emerge with action norms and are verified by all as acceptable to act 
upon. Such expectations can be applied with acceptable risk. If expectations are not relating to 
action norms reached upon mutual understanding, they cannot become part of trustworthy 
interaction. The order of expectations, which harbor what is worthy of trust, is a platform of 
shared expectations that originates and develops according to efforts of forming mutual 
understanding upon what action norms to choose from among interacting agents. If this 
                                                 
34 See Habermas (1998a): 107: “I understand “action norms" as temporally, socially, and substantively 
generalized behavioral expectations.” 
35 This is meant to be a purely descriptive approach to the concept of norms and expectations. This means that it 
does not matter if they are valid in any moral sense, but that action norms have become validated by the fact that 
the general public have acted upon certain expectations. Clearly, some action norms have been found worthy of 
trust although they are morally repulsive. For instance is the disciplining of children that was broadly seen as 
legitimate until the late 19th century. Disciplining children is a euphemism for causing bodily harm to children.  
36 This is the purpose of chapter 6. 
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platform shakes, i.e. that we no longer can expect others to act upon shared action norms, one 
becomes... 
“…confronted by the alternatives of switching to strategic action, breaking off communication 
altogether, or recommencing action oriented towards reaching understanding at a different level, 
the level of argumentative speech.”37
If expectations towards others break down, we are again left with our rational self-interest, 
and motivation towards mutual understanding regarding expectations must develop anew. 
In short, for a person who enters a situation in which one depends upon one another 
for the first time it is a situation of double contingency. Initially it is uncertainty of outcome, 
and both actors know that they relate in this manner. Nevertheless, upon interaction, they both 
have expectations towards probable reactions from the other.38 This situation is uncertain and, 
in its purest form, serves as the point of departure for describing how agents anticipate 
probable behavior of others, or simply learn what to expect.39 Both agents involved know they 
can expect a great variety of actions, and that choosing differently among them would 
produce different outcomes and generate different cues for the other agent to act upon. 
 Trust develops as you can act upon the expectations towards the other, knowing that 
they can and will do the same with you. By establishing action norms that both act upon, 
based in mutual understanding, the uncertainty caused by contingency can be ignored. The 
cost of not conferring trust will be to exit order, and live in distrust. Contingencies will always 
be there, but positive expectations towards the other will make you commence upon risky 
behavior in order to get by. Basic communicative interaction and shaping action norms that 
are agreed upon through mutual understanding, is an important part of generating and 
maintaining the order of expectations.  
In a complex world, it has become a truism that each individual actor become 
interdependent in order to get by, thus, the number of situations characterized by contingency 
has increased.40 A modern society even presents hidden contingency, in that there are many 
aspects of an agent’s life that the agent is unaware that it is depending upon. The potential of 
success or failures of others, known as unknown, whom we interact with and that affect us are 
crucial for many outcomes in our daily lives. Getting by in a complex environment would 
                                                 
37 Habermas (1998b): 24. 
38 Parsons (1951): 5. 
39 Günther (1993): 256.  
40 This is essentially the whole purpose for Luhmann (1979) to write his book on trust.  
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become even harder if we were unable to act upon expectations, i.e. to trust. In a modern 
society, not being able to trust those who we interact with, knowingly or not, would make our 
lives hard or even impossible.41 Distrust in others can lead to two outcomes—we either cease 
to act in situations that would require cooperation of others, or we would acquire necessary 
skill that would make us more self-sustained, thus avoiding the issue of trust. The latter is in 
many respects practically impossible and sometimes even illegal (self-surgery comes to mind) 
in a modern complex society. Choosing to be a part of order implies trust, and pathologically 
distrustful behavior would involve exiting order.   
In a complex world, we must interact willingly or not in many areas and on many 
levels, and we become dependent upon those we are interacting with. It is in situations where 
interaction takes place that expectations incrementally develop as you gradually become able 
to expect what others will do. These expectations can become mutually confirmed and thus 
become generalized behavioral patterns. It means that certain types of behavior become 
expected in general. Thus, at a later stage, we can trust others to act according to stabilized 
behavioral patterns because it is what is expected—they act upon norms. It also works the 
other way around, namely that general expectations become mutually invalidated, and thus 
weaken its standing as anticipating the actions of others upon formerly generalized behavioral 
pattern. In this manner, you can no longer expect others to act in a certain manner.  
An individual’s ability to act upon general behavioral expectations has been acquired 
either by experience, observation or by being told by others. Interaction is thus dependent 
upon the ability to learn and recall past experiences. By having access to the order of 
expectations, it is possible to trust that someone is acting upon action norms that have been 
established through mutual understanding. For instance, the beams holding your ceiling up – 
who made them? The person paying your salary – is she complying with your contract? Your 
toothpaste – who made it? The bus-driver – who is he? The water you drink – is it water? 
Each day is filled with small acts of trust, where you expect things to happen the way it is 
supposed to. Most of the time, these expectations are only reconfirmed. Sometimes however, 
they become invalidated.  
Since it is a lack of certainty regarding what action norms are chosen as a response in 
a situation of double contingency, we can only assume that others act according to general 
action norms. If, however, the interacting partner does not have access to general action 
                                                 
41 Baier (1986); Barber (1983); Hardin (2002); Luhmann (1979). 
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norms, it would imply that the interacting partner have not participated in mutual 
understanding regarding how to act. Hence, it cannot be presupposed that it can act according 
to expectations. The situation is thus characterized by a lack of mutuality of expectations, and 
the problem of contingency is not solved and order is not established. For order to be 
established, an agent must be able to expect that interacting partners act upon certain action 
norms.  
On the other hand, the person who responds by applying generalized action norms to 
guide actions must know what such an action norm involves. Hence, an important part of 
general expectations is that they are generated on an intersubjective platform of mutual 
understanding, which must be accessible to all agents who interact. Although action norms 
give birth to expectations, it eventually becomes a dialectic relationship where action norms 
feed into expectations and vice versa. General action norms and general expectations are, 
therefore, inferred and applied by individual agents who interact in specific scenarios. 
Communication becomes a matter of complementary expectations; namely that the 
internalized expectations that are applied overlap among interacting agents. If a person does 
not know what to expect in a given situation, it is probable that they have not ever 
communicated before in similar situations. In such cases, the actors must probably initiate the 
communication with a gesture that can be interpreted as a friendly “hello”.42 It can be 
illustrated with two laymen A and B. The condition for B, being dependent upon the actions 
of A, is that he acts responsive to A’s expectations when he reacts, and also that he acts with 
expectations towards the future response of A. If B did not do this, B would not respond to A 
in a relevant manner, and hence A would not understand B’s response as adequate.  
 The stability within order is provided by complementary expectations, and is based 
upon the ability to expect others to act upon mutually recognized action norms. Hence, the 
order of expectations depends upon a concurrent system of norms that develop through 
history. A system of norms is a result of mutual adaption among interacting agents in 
combination with the recognition of norms in their application. A precondition towards 
finding something worthy of trust is that those involved must be able to understand or accept 
the risk involved in trusting others. This means that it is a need for accurate expectations, and 
that these expectations can be directed towards generally recognized action norms that one 
                                                 
42 Showing your hands usually works. You can also show them in a manner that you do not carry anything 
suspicious – like a knife, gun or water balloon.  
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can expect are followed. Hence, if individual actors are not able to trust the action of others, it 
is because expectations towards them do not exist, or that they are too fragile. Where there are 
no solid expectations, there are no action norms one can expect others to abide by. Not 
knowing what to expect makes it impossible to find something worthy of trust. On the other 
hand, mutual understanding regarding what action norms to abide by would also mean a 
consensus with the interacting agent regarding what to expect of the other. For those who do 
not share in the mutuality of action norms, or even does not accept the norm, the social 
system has become unstable and cannot foster social interaction. A social system, at a basic 
level, depends upon an order of expectations for the possibility to thrive and to develop. 
2.3.ExpectingActionsandActExpectedly—theRoleofNorms
Expectations are directed at action norms that can be chosen in interaction. These action 
norms must imply the same thing for the interacting agents in order to correspond to 
expectations. It is a need to establish mutual understanding regarding action norms. Since we 
have plausible theories that can explain what it takes to establish mutual understanding, we 
can acquire a grip of what is implied by having a mutual understanding regarding the relation 
between expectations and action norms. I will argue that implicit to the process of 
establishing mutual understanding are discursive rules. Hence, one way of interpreting how 
mutual understanding is reached is thereby through the study of rules of discourse. Mutual 
understanding on what constitute action norms can be said to be in reach if rules of discourse 
are observed. By establishing action norms that have general recognition, it also makes it 
possible to expect what others will do.  
It should be noted that rules of discourse are referred to as an evaluative tool for 
analytical purposes and not assumed as an integral part of factual communication. Adults can 
proceed as competent speakers, and be conscious of the rules implicit to communication, but 
it is no guarantee that this will bring about mutual understanding. I am more preoccupied with 
analyzing what makes mutual understanding possible with regard to establishing general 
action norms. Rules reflect ideal preconditions for reaching mutual understanding. An ideal 
speech-situation is practically unattainable, and should not be seen as attainable either, but it 
describes a procedure for testing the validity of action norms and the quality of mutual 
understanding and a test upon the ‘mutuality’ of the shared action norm.43 
                                                 
43 Habermas applies the denomination ‘ideal speech situation’ as an analogue to Kant’s ‘kingdom of ends’, and 
is merely supposed to be a regulative ideal – see Heath (2003): 213. 
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Discourse rules can be formulated as formal and pragmatic preconditions for reaching 
mutual understanding.44 Formal pragmatism involves the investigation of argumentation in 
search of reconstructing the communicative competence involved when interaction occur with 
the aim of establishing mutual understanding. Argumentation involves the employment of 
meaningful sentences observing an intuitive and implicit rule consciousness among 
communicatively competent agents. There are at least four different rules: That the utterance 
is understandable, that its propositional content is true, that the speaker is sincere and 
normative rightness, i.e. that it is appropriate for the speaker to put forth such an assertion.45  
Here we are preoccupied with situations of double contingency, and how contingency 
compel us to establish mutual understanding concerning action norms to create order. If some 
of these four rules become violated, mutual understanding regarding action norms will not be 
established, contingencies will again be visible and action-coordination becomes hard. 
Intersubjective and stable action norms are not maintained if what is correspondingly 
expected, i.e. that others abide by and act upon the formerly agreed upon action norms, do no 
longer apply. Then the order of expectations, as a binding force of society, must become 
revised. In other words, the particular order, or aspects of a particular order that was once 
established, must become revised if expectations fail to work. The only way to re-establish 
order is to discursively involve anyone who must abide by the action norms that is to be 
agreed upon—those who collectively constitute the order. If not, action-norms would not be 
established upon an understanding that was mutual, and the action-norm would probably not 
acquire the stability needed for general application; coincidentally nobody would know what 
to expect and order would not be established.  
Including everyone affected by the action norm into the process of argumentation, is 
equivalent to instilling accountability of outcome of that particular communication upon all 
participants. Each participant must expect that everyone affected by the action norm could 
raise an claim to test its validity, all in the effort to secure that an action norm is reached by a 
mutual understanding. If action-norms are to establish order, false and weak expectations 
must be eradicated and replaced by general expectations. The aim of action norms is to 
generate stability and have a coordinating effect through mutual understanding upon what 
interacting agents will be likely to do. This is achievable through subjecting counterfactual 
expectations to a discursive test that would prove them no longer applicable upon a general 
                                                 
44 Alexy (1989): 93 and See McCarthy in Habermas (1984): X.  
45 Habermas (1998a): 4ff.  
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level, namely that they do not originate from mutual understanding. Unknown expectations 
can erupt and challenged generalized and stabilizing expectations as what individuals want 
others to do might change. New types of expectations can replace dominant, or basic 
expectations within the order of expectations as action norms become revised.  
If the goal of individual actors is to coordinate their action in a complex world, they 
must reach mutual understanding on what action norms are currently in place and worthy of 
respect. Mutual understanding provides the necessary stability for living with complexity 
where many circumstances affecting life are beyond an individual agent’s control. If an 
individual actor chooses force and fraud instead of abiding by general action norms that have 
been validated, living in a complex world would become impossible. Such actions are not 
expected in a system based upon mutual understanding and could perhaps not be made to 
belong to such a system, nor be deemed valid. Such behavior would be an incremental step 
towards disorder. Hence, mutual understanding, and the process of reaching it, constitutes the 
core of trustworthiness in that mutual understanding is a precondition for developing a system 
of norms that stand in conjunction to the order of expectations.  
The rules of discourse can only be inferred as preconditions for reaching mutual 
understanding. In this regard, Habermas argues for an impartial justification of action norms 
through the discourse-principle, “D: Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly 
affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourse.”46 This principle requires 
that every action-norm pass a validity-test if it is to be lifted onto a general level. Nobody can 
alone decide whether or not an action norm is valid, they can only make a claim towards such 
an end.47 Action norms must be agreed upon by all affected parties through mutual 
understanding, in order to be able to expect the action norm to guide actions of one’s peers. 
 It can be argued that rational discourse involves a commitment upon participants to 
reach mutual understanding, which is above and beyond rule-abiding behavior (e.g. not to 
resort to coercion) or logical and semantic rules (e.g. demand for consistency and non-
contradiction).48 The commitment also involves discourse-internal norms that govern the 
procedure itself, such as sincerity, accountability, and truthfulness. Although mutual 
understanding is beyond any single individual agent’s control, since it must be confirmed by 
interacting partners, mutual understanding depends upon the efforts of each interacting agent. 
                                                 
46 Habermas (1998a): 107.  
47 The principle of discourse renounces the Kantian first categorical imperative which is monological.  
48 Habermas (1990): 86. 
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If the single individual agent did not commit to such an effort, it would risk not coping in a 
world of increasing complexity, where an individual is dependent upon trusting others to act 
upon generally recognized action norms.49 
In order to reach mutual understanding, individuals must on some level provide 
justifications by way of assertions, or speech-acts. The driving thrust behind a justification is 
how speech in itself is performative, in that “the uttering of the words, indeed, usually a, or 
even the, leading incident in the performance of the act.”50 Examples of performative 
utterances are: “I am taking the train”,  “I accept your apology”, “I promise you”, and “I will 
stop giving examples.” Hence, it is a matter of commitment by the speaker to certain action 
norms. The performative aspect of speech is at the centre of attention in action coordination 
and how individual actors can interact—it is in the performance of speech-acts that each agent 
can be held accountable for, because that is what we can ‘hear’ and thus react to. It is also the 
performative aspect of the action that is chosen that can or cannot become expected.  
The demand to observe rules of discourse, and being committed to them, means that 
any individual actor can, being communicatively competent, provide justification for the 
performance of an action when this has been requested. Demanding justifications and 
producing justifications for actions is a built in feature of discourse because each individual 
actor can potentially be held accountable for their own actions and also hold others 
accountable for theirs.51 
Mutual understanding concerning action norms is a coordinating mechanism in 
interaction, and basic to this coordinating effect are the birth of expectations one can have that 
the action norm will be acted upon. Hence, the expectation rely parasitically upon the general 
action norms that are agreed upon. Mutual understanding that validates action norms let 
interacting agents know what to expect from one another. Order can thus be established by 
way of the coordinating effect that expectations provide in interaction. Hence, we need to 
stretch Habermas’ theory further to establish order.  
“The aim of reaching understanding (Verständigung) is to bring about an agreement 
(Einverständnis) that terminates in the intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal comprehension, 
shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one another.”52
                                                 
49 I will return to this later. 
50 Austin (1962): 8. 
51 Regh in Habermas (1998a): XIV. 
52 Habermas (1999): 23 - my emphasis.  
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Order is not established by mutual understanding itself, but from the expectations that become 
established towards the action norms that have been reached upon mutual understanding.  
The type of speech-acts that have the potential of reaching mutual understanding are 
so-called illocutionary; these speech-acts constitute the infrastructure of a process that can 
reach mutual understanding. It involves the illocutionary obligation to the exchange of speech 
acts due to its particular properties, and which separate illocutionary speech acts from other 
types of speech acts.53 It is not only a matter of providing reasons for a claim to be valid, or 
providing reasons for why others are wrong, it is the obligation to adhere to the outcome of 
the discursive procedure even if the reasons of an agent have been proved wrong.  
By entering this discursive environment, knowing it involves raising criticizable 
validity-claims, each participant becomes obligated to follow the outcome due to the 
illocutionary force carried by the mutual understanding—everyone involved should accept the 
outcome as participants in discourse. The participants in discourse bind themselves in the 
presence of all to take the propositional content of the accepted action norm into account in 
how they subsequently interact. This illocutionary obligation is a consequence of participating 
in validating action norms, and is an “obligation relevant to the sequel of 
interaction…inasmuch as it establishes between speaker and hearer an interpersonal relation 
that is effective for coordination.”54 Hence, validating action-norms, needed for action-
coordination, depends upon the illocutionary force of speech-acts. By reaching mutual 
understanding regarding action norms, expectations can be shaped towards them, and thus 
deployed to create order—you can act expectedly and expect action. 
To sum up, in search of mutual understanding, each individual actor must assume that 
each participant in discourse will argue their own aims. The resulting agreement will stand as 
the valid action norm for further interaction until a conflicting but reasonable valid claim is 
raised. Social integration of this kind is driven forth by the “illocutionary binding 
energies…to reach understanding”, and makes trust possible because actions of others can 
become expected.55  
                                                 
53 John Austin differentiates speech-acts between locutions, which simply is the semantic utterance of words, 
illocutions and last perlocutions, which is separated from illocutions because they have consequences external to 
the utterance itself. A perlocutionary act can for instance involve persuading, convincing, scaring, enlightening, 
or inspiring the listener.  
54 Habermas (1984):296. 
55 Habermas (1998a): 8. 
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If new assertions enter public discourse, its claim can shake and replace former 
agreements and establish new types of action norms that again feed into the order of 
expectations. In this manner, unknown expectations can develop to become dominating, or 
basic, within the order of expectations. This dynamic is not necessarily ensuring a being 
“better” direction. The order of expectations, no matter what it might look like, is purely 
descriptive of what is found worthy of trust. The flux within the order of expectations stresses 
the descriptive notion of trust and of order.  
2.4.TwoCircumstancesthatCauseFluxintheOrderofExpectations
There are two main circumstances that cause flux within the order of expectations: 
Reasonable pluralism, and the increasing complexity of modern societies. Flux influence how 
mutual understanding is shaped, it challenge action norms and cause questioning of whether 
or not expectations can be applied accurately. If a legal order has managed to stabilize the 
order of expectations, and thus redeemed the promise of trust, the flux within the order of 
expectations is what causes a legal order once worthy of trust to become unworthy of trust. 
The reason is that what was once found worthy of trust and thus stabilized into a legal order, 
will be pushed further by flux and tension will develop towards the legal order. These 
circumstances represent facts that make the tension between the legal order and the order of 
expectations more important as a focus-point. The order of expectations is placed under 
tremendous stress by these different and intertwining traits of modernity. These 
circumstances, as facts, constitutes a perpetual challenge towards modern political 
craftsmanship, and are what pressures those accountable for the legal order to stay vigilant 
and perform competently towards the order of expectations.  
 The first circumstance is the magnitude of reasonable choices on how to live life, i.e. 
the fact of reasonable pluralism. The gradual realization of, and implementation of the fact of 
reasonable pluralism has fragmented earlier common religious or sacred worldviews, it has in 
Weberian terms disenchanted the world and left it open for individuals to strive for whatever 
reasonable conception of good they might choose. This empirical fact must be seen in 
combination with the incremental introduction of the constitutional right to choose how to 
live your life in a modern society.56 By this I only imply that a principle of equality must be 
enforced on a fundamental level to secure the right to choose how to live life for everyone as 
long as that choice is reasonable. Hence, the freedom to choose how to live life has taken a 
                                                 
56 Rawls (1993): 36 and xxivff. 
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constitutive role within modern constitutional democracies. Thus, the fact of reasonable 
pluralism can be deemed as a basic feature of democracy, and “…is the normal result of its 
culture of free institutions.”57 The establishment of constitutional protection of individual 
liberty thus becomes a hallmark of ‘free institutions’. 
 Securing the right to freely choose how to live life involves instituting constraints 
upon government and others from interfering into the everyday lives of citizens. A right to 
individual liberty must be constitutionally settled so that it can apply to everyone equally. 
John Rawls further states that pluralism is a, “permanent feature of the public culture of 
modern democracies.”58 Pluralism stresses that a legal order must be recognized by very 
different individuals at all times. The constitutional constraints will guarantee that different 
reasonable opinions can intersect, and that collective problem-solving occur in a manner that 
can be acceptable to all even if they are not agreed upon.59 As a legal order becomes 
established, it might have elements that some disagree to, but if the constitutional rules of the 
game have been observed, and even if these elements strive for the fulfillment of diverging or 
even irreconcilable conceptions on how to live life, the legal order is nevertheless reasonable.  
 Since individuals can be said to be free to choose how to live life, the configuration of 
how different possible choices will vary continuously according to what individuals want out 
of life. It will lend pressure to those action norms that has previously been agreed upon. 
Certain action norms will diminish, contested and reconsidered, while new norms can begin 
to take shape that one day could receive general recognition. In such a manner, reasonable 
pluralism will always challenge existing set of action norms, and thus also the behavioral 
expectations that are associated with the action norms. The fact of reasonable pluralism keeps 
the order of expectations in constant flux.  
 The second circumstance is the steady growth of complexity. Processes of 
modernization ensure differentiation of functional spheres that organize social reproduction. 
Examples of such spheres are the economy, educational systems and politics.60 What the 
increase in complexity shares with the fact of reasonable pluralism is that it increases with the 
growth of number and variety of action norms that individuals can choose from. In this 
respect it is a steady growth in the amount of general expectations within the order. Hence, 
                                                 
57 Rawls (1997): 765-766.  
58 Rawls (1987): 4. 
59 Habermas (1998a): 37. 
60 Coping in a world of increasing complexity is at the center of Luhmann’s theory of trust (1979):14-15.  
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what binds society together becomes increasingly complex. What is implied is that having 
entrenched stable general expectations as legal rules has become a precondition to cope in a 
world of great and increasing complexity. The legal order, and how it is enforced, work as a 
library of reference upon what to expect, and can thus function as to organize complexity. 
Hence, the legal order has the potential to stabilize the complete order of expectations. 
Knowing that this order of expectations is in constant flux, it sets demands to political 
craftsmanship, and that it needs to perform with competence and in a vigilant manner.  
2.5.EstablishingaLegalOrderfromtheOrderofExpectations
The need to achieve and make claims that are valid across many types of value spheres 
facilitate the logic of communicative rationality and the need to reach mutual understanding 
that can lead to, and become, crafted into a legal order. 
 “Modern law can stabilize behavioral expectations in a complex society with structurally 
differentiated lifeworlds and functionally independent subsystems only if law, as regent for a 
"societal community" that has transformed itself into civil society, can maintain the inherited 
claim to solidarity in the abstract form of an acceptable claim to legitimacy. Modern legal systems 
redeem this promise through the universalization and specification of citizenship.”61
Holding for a moment this quotation to be true, it can be argued that by establishing a modern 
law-making system that abides by principles of ideal constitutional democracy, a nation-state 
has the potential of redeeming a promise of trust by stabilizing general behavioral 
expectations into rule of law. Expectations can become stabilized by embedding them as rules 
in a legal order—they become reference-points on what to expect of others that abides by the 
same rules. Each citizen becomes able to hold the legal order as a reference-point for what is 
worthy of trust—of what to expect from others. Hence, rule of law can be referred to as 
having the ability to stabilize general expectations, and back the enforcement of law with 
threat of sanctions if you do not act upon what is expected.  
By legal order, I simply mean a code of law and the type expectations that are 
stabilized within it. The legal order has the potential of complying with the order of 
expectations. For the legal order to have this potential, it must be established through a law-
making procedure that includes the vindication of claims raised through legal-political 
discourses that include all those constitutive of the order of expectations. If a legal order is 
crafted that manage to redeem the promise of trust, it can be argued that the legal order is 
stable and express concurrent democratic agreements of what action norms one can expect 
                                                 
61 Habermas (1998a): 76. Note that this concept of legitimacy is empirical – see discussion in section 1.4.  
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others to abide by. In this way, these agreements can uphold the effect of expectations, and 
stabilize them indefinitely or until the legal order is changed.62  
Redeeming the promise of trust can be a regulative ideal of nation-states that can be 
claimed to be constitutional democracies. Hence, for the sake of the argument, in order to 
evaluate whether or not the decision-making of the FBSS can redeem a promise of trust, I will 
treat the legal construct as if it actually can do so. This implies that the system of political 
craftsmanship that creates the legal order must be assessed according to an ideal form. The 
goal is to proceed beyond the obvious empirical imperfections of government, and focus upon 
the relationship between the order of expectations and the competence and vigilance of the 
political craftsmanship to craft legal orders that comply with the order of expectations.  
 As a result of the increase in pluralism and increasing complexity, the variety of 
action-norms within a social system has become enormous. It can be argued that many action-
norms are upheld that affect individuals without them knowing it. That the tap-water is 
healthy, that food is of a certain quality, that education has certain merits etc. The variety of 
norms all needs to be regulated in some way by a legal order simply because they affect 
everyone. By not establishing rules that uphold the action norms that are expected, each 
individual must learn for themselves what to expect; such an undertaking is daunting in an 
increasingly complex social order. Immense diversity has a corresponding consequence of a 
massive increase in the need to have sound expectations towards actions. It is practically 
impossible for individual agents to carry the knowledge of all these expectations alone. The 
legal order can stabilize expectations and become a reference-point, or library regarding what 
to expect.  
 As already argued, the potential for a legal order to become a stabilized order of 
expectations is depending upon maintaining constitutional constraints upon political 
craftsmanship. If it did not, a legal order would not have the potential of reflecting what is 
worthy of trust by the complete demos. The genesis of law, its enforcement and threat of 
sanction are all constrained by constitutional provisions. In this manner, what can be expected 
of anyone is bound by the constitution on one side, and stabilized into a legal order by a 
democratically appointed assembly exercising political craftsmanship on the other. 
                                                 
62 This does not mean that law is what binds society together. Trustworthiness is what binds society together, and 
a particular type of law can work to entrench and safeguard trustworthy behavior. This is the point originally 
made by Locke (2000).  
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Pluralism and increasing complexity all contribute to differentiate between ways of 
life, the increase of potential norm-conflicts and system differentiation. However, legitimate 
practices can only be achieved across the total sum of reasonable ways of life, whereby 
legitimate practices become increasingly difficult to ensure. Political craftsmanship becomes 
increasingly complex as it must deal with all the circumstances of a legal order. These 
circumstances push the legal order further. For the promise of trust to be redeemed and the 
entire order of expectations infused into the legal order, political craftsmanship must be 
constrained by the constitution, letting all different types of individuals be represented 
equally. 
2.6.ReconcilingConstitutionalismandDemocracy
The legal order can be perceived of as worthy of trust if it can make two promises 
simultaneously. First, it must demarcate an area where private individuals can act 
autonomously, according to their own rational self-interest, as a matter of individual right. 
Second, reasonable individuals can always agree to the constraints of law in a rational fashion 
because disagreements would be resolved through civic deliberation. Combining these two, it 
can be argued that a legal order is a product of civic democratic engagement and 
simultaneously that its genesis maintain and secure the private autonomy of all. Only by 
combining these two types of liberty can the desirable purpose of a legal order be issued from 
democratic rational self-legislation and the promise of trust redeemed.  
 The legal form that Jürgen Habermas prescribes incorporates these two conceptions of 
liberty.63 His legal form is located between the constitutionalism of Immanuel Kant and the 
civic republicanism of Jean Jacques Rousseau.64 Constitutionalism can have the goal of 
establishing basic institutions that can secure the autonomy of every single individual as a 
matter of right. A precondition for the latter to unfold is that each individual agent has a 
constitutional right to liberty. 
Civic republicanism, i.e. democratic political autonomy as a matter of right, 
emphasizes democratic processes of self-government through collective deliberation. The 
goal is to ensure that a common good becomes established through the “expression of ethical 
                                                 
63 I borrow substantially from his legal theory. My contribution is how I use it to argue that the legal form can 
comply with an order of expectations.   
64 Habermas (1998a): 99. The importance of the distinction of liberty was first illuminated clearly by Constant 
(2003). It is also maintained by John Rawls (2001): 2, Rawls (1993): 396. 
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self-realization.”65 Constitutional liberalism is in opposition to democracy mainly because of 
the restrictions individual rights to liberty impose on reaching collective self-realization. 
Collective self-realization should never violate individual rights. If violations were to occur, it 
would be in breach with reasonable pluralism and hence each individual’s right to equal 
influence upon collective problem-solving. All individuals are bound by law, and if one 
person, or a group of persons, are violated, the order of expectations has not become 
embedded into the legal order. Those violated are a part of the social order and violations 
imply that the promise of trust has not been kept.  
Civic republicanism, furthermore, separates itself from constitutional rights in that it 
demands participation in collective self-rule and problem-solving. It is not merely about 
electing representatives, but also engaging in public deliberation. Therefore, civic 
republicanism has popular sovereignty built into it as a fundamental principle of legitimate 
rule of law. On the other side is the constitutional view that holds legitimate rule of law as the 
mere protection of individual rights and the freedom from interference. 
 A modern liberal legal order is only in need of external obedience, rather than internal. 
External obedience means that individual agents are motivated to comply with the legal order 
because it applies to everyone equally. It means that the legal order does not demand that 
individual agents must ethically comply with it. Reasonable pluralism would be strangled if 
that was not the case. It would imply that many would potentially have to ethically reorient 
themselves against their will, resulting in a violation of their rights to personal liberty.  
 Anyone can disagree ethically to a legal order, and the legal order is pervaded by 
ethics, but most individuals will comply with it because it is reasonable and because it has 
come about in a manner that is legitimate. If a socialist-party had a majority, and hence 
constituted the government, political craftsmanship would have a socialist imprint. A 
conservative would not ethically comply with their policies, but the conservative would—as 
long as law-making is constitutionally constrained—recognize the legal order as legitimate 
and the promise of trust is still kept. Consequently, law must be rationally accessible so that 
individual agents are able to understand and accept it, albeit be able to disagree with it.66 It 
can be referred to as rule compliance, rather than ethical compliance.  
                                                 
65 Habermas (1998a): 99. Immanent to the idea of political liberty is also the notion of deliberative democracy or 
public reason, see Habermas (1997): 44. 
66 Habermas (1998a): 37. 
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 Legal codes and procedures are found worthy of trust without any need for a higher 
source of justification than being crafted in a way that upholds a standard that makes it 
comply with the order of expectations. Hence, once legal codes and procedures have become 
a part of a democratic constitutional legal corpus, it has been crafted according to a procedure 
that has the potential of making it redeem the promise of trust. It all depends upon the 
competence and vigilance of political craftsmanship to craft legal orders that complies with 
the order of expectations. By this, it is meant that the legal order complies with the action 
norms that it is expected to, and thus stabilize what is expected on the basis of the order of 
expectations. Hence, the legal order must ‘communicate’ with the basic expectations within 
an order of expectations. A legal code becomes respected because it is “possible to follow the 
norm out of respect for the law.”67 Citizens are able to abide by the law as co-authors in 
democratic political opinion- and will-formation, i.e. through their own self-government.  
The respect for the law is upheld because those action norms that are stabilized into 
the legal order, and thus enforced with a threat of sanction, uphold the two types of liberty 
simultaneously due to the legal form of constitutional democracy. It means that what actions 
can become expected of others is crafted in a manner that deserves general recognition 
because everyone has been allowed to influence it. Democratic law-making with 
constitutional constraints reaffirms both types of liberties in the genesis of law. Hence, within 
law-making of a constitutional democracy is a potential for trust-repair because the legal order 
can be amended or reformed to comply with those action norms that at any time is expected. 
If a legal order complies with the order of expectations all depend upon how vigilant and 
competent those responsible for political craftsmanship are.  
A trustworthy legal order is challenged on both types of liberty. The first challenge is 
to locate what is worthy of trust at the correct level. This means not to consider the legal order 
to be universalistic, or moral. What is worthy of trust, i.e. the order of expectations, depends 
upon the composition of expectations binding society together. Hence, what is found worthy 
of trust is conditioned by a temporally delimited context. Furthermore, these contexts are in 
constant flux. The second challenge is that a trustworthy legal order consists not of law bent 
in direction of conforming to one group’s claim upon ethical convictions. The latter could be 
the outcome of pure democracy and majority rule, where certain types of civic standpoints 
colonize rule of law and effectively establishing minorities who might have different 
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expectations. This leads us to a conclusion that moral and ethical components can be traced in 
the legal order and pervades positive law on every level. Democratic law is shaped according 
to the concrete legal-community’s particular history and its obedience to constitutional 
constraints. Hence, redeeming the promise of trust depends upon the context of the social 
system and the order of expectations that binds it together at a specific time. 
 The point is that neither a universalistic moral defense through constitutional human 
rights nor ethical self-government can by themselves provide the account of a legal form that 
can redeem the promise of trust. They must be combined in having constitutionally protected 
reasonable pluralism on one hand and allowing for the democratic establishment of legal 
orders that comply with the order of expectations on the other. Provided that the order of 
expectations is in constant flux, the legal form must be considered conceptually prior to the 
distinction between constitutionalism and democratic conception of law because it needs the 
capability of encompassing both simultaneously to redeem the promise of trust.  
In order to establish a legal form that can encompass both types of liberty and thus 
comply with an order of expectations, a system of rights must be incorporated into the legal 
form that guarantee constitutional democracy. Only by having a legal order that can comply 
with the order of expectations, can a legal code be established with the potential of redeeming 
a promise of trust. According to Habermas, who I will align with here, such a system of rights 
consists of five broad categories. The first three are basic negative rights, membership rights, 
and the right to legal remedies. These three, and the way in which they are interdependent and 
interconnected, is a constitutional guarantee of personal autonomy/freedom and, “in a word, 
there is no legitimate law without these three.”68 These three types of rights is a necessary 
condition for embedding the fact of reasonable pluralism into a legal form. The fourth 
category, which can only work given the former three categories of rights, consists of political 
rights to participate in public discourse—it guarantees public autonomy.69 This is the 
democratic component that incorporates the principle of popular sovereignty, i.e. the liberty to 
engage in collective self-government, which can only become legitimately enforced if the 
personal right to liberty is introduced first.  
Neither of these two types of liberties, constitutionalism and civic republicanism, can 
be reduced to the other. Without the first three rights, there will not be any freedom or 
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equality before the law to speak of. These rights neutralize law so that it does not infringe 
upon reasonable doctrines of a pluralistic society. Without the fourth category, collective 
coordination and problem-solving would potentially not be anything but paternalistically 
imposed on its subjects without them having any influence. With rights to political 
participation, citizens themselves shape and specify what types of action norms they want to 
expect others to follow.  
The last type of rights are social-welfare rights. They are necessary insofar as the 
effective exercise of civil and political rights depends upon certain social and material 
conditions that can only be achieved through redistribution and the establishment of some 
level of justice. These rights can secure the level of welfare necessary for providing a fair 
opportunity-set for individuals to make use of their personal liberty.70  
The system of rights is a necessary component for establishing a legal form capable of 
stabilizing expectations. Put differently, the system of rights is a precondition for a 
constitutional democracy, which again is a precondition for the potential of crafting 
legislation that can redeem the promise of trust.  
“From a reconstructive standpoint, we have seen that constitutional rights and principles merely 
explicate the performative character of the self-constitution of a society of free and equal citizens. 
The organizational forms of the constitutional state make this practice permanent.”71
The “system of rights” is something that each modern democratic state-system must 
appropriately elaborate and specify as constitutional to enable a law-making procedure that 
can establish legal orders redeeming the promise of trust. Accordingly, it can be argued that 
such a system “states precisely the conditions under which the forms of communication 
necessary for the genesis of legitimate law can be legally institutionalized.”72 A system of 
rights, constitutionally embedded as a type of legal form, provides the necessary ingredients 
and backdrop for designing decision-making bodies reflecting the order of expectations, and 
which has the potential of redeeming a promise of trust.  
2.7.FluxGeneratingBasicExpectationsandTensiontotheLegalOrder
A constitutionally entrenched system of rights bring to the fore an internal and necessary 
tension between the legal order and the order of expectations.73 The tension alludes to the 
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dynamics of democratic rule of law, and the potential disintegration between the positivity of 
the legal order on one side and what is perceived of as worthy of trust on the other, or the 
opposite, of the move towards reconciliation, viz. that the legal order becomes more and more 
close to what is perceived of as worthy of trust. The flux within the order of expectations is 
what causes the tension to the legal order—the legal order consists of stabilized expectations, 
and is thereby not in flux. When it is no tension, it can be argued that the order of 
expectations is embedded in the legal order. This is very hard to achieve perfectly due to flux, 
but constitutional democracy as a legal form carries a potential for, and a driving thrust to 
stabilize generalized behavioral expectations into the legal order through political 
craftsmanship. The most important general expectations within the order of expectations 
dominate the orientation individuals have towards the practice of the legal order. These 
expectations are basic to the order of expectations, viz. they dominate the order of any given 
area. If basic expectations are not embedded in the legal order, the legal order cannot be said 
to be worthy of trust at all. However, this is most likely always a matter of degree, i.e. that the 
basic expectations are expected to be embedded in the legal order to a certain extent.  
Consequently, a tension arise by the fact that an order of expectations always has the 
potential of becoming embedded in a legal order, but as the legal order stabilize expectations 
at one moment in time, the order of expectations develop away from what was once 
stabilized. Being politically vigilant and competent towards the order of expectations requires 
commitment to engage in political craftsmanship that incorporates basic expectations 
continuously and correctly, or dissolves the wrongfully incorporated basic expectations when 
needed in order to craft legislation that redeems the promise of trust. Accordingly, it is a 
matter of political craftsmanship whether or not a promise of trust can be redeemed or not. In 
order to study whether or not the promise is redeemed, an evaluation of whether or not the 
political craftsmanship has been competent and vigilant is in place. 
Democratic law-making is passed, enforced and developed by an assembly 
representing the popular will. Law can, thus, replace each individual agent’s need to become 
acquainted with all matters in life in the sense of knowing what to expect. Due to a massive 
increase in complexity, an individual agent does not have the time nor competence to go 
through such a massive learning process. It is a constant increase in complexity provided by 
different processes of differentiation and social reproduction. However, the different 
subsystems and divisions of labor belonging to a complex system still belong to the same 
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order of expectations and can be kept together by, among other factors, a legal order that 
comply with the order of expectations. 
Each individual agent can draw upon legal rules as reference-points on what to expect. 
Breaching the law is thus a breach of what is expected, and can be met with a threat of 
sanctions. Stabilized expectations within the legal order can direct the individual when 
interacting with others who must abide by the same legal order. They are both expected to act 
in a certain way because the legal order prescribes it, and because the legal order is an 
expression of the order of expectations. The legal order creates a safe environment for action-
choices and can become expressions of a behavior worthy of trust: “Modern law displaces 
normative expectations from morally unburdened individuals onto the laws that secure the 
compatibility of liberties.”74 
 When an order of expectations becomes embedded in a legal order, it is what is worthy 
of trust at the moment in time that legal order was crafted, rather than the order of 
expectations in itself. Since the latter is continuously in flux, a legal order can only replicate it 
at one moment in time and stabilize that particular version of the order of expectations. By 
this, I simply imply that as the order of expectations is in flux, the legal order becomes less 
worthy of trust if not amended or replaced by competent political craftsmen. 
The study of the order of expectations involves locating the constituents of the order of 
expectations—namely the basic expectations of the legal order. To a certain extent, it can be 
argued that a number of basic expectations form the complex that is the order of 
expectations.75 This means that some expectations dominate and are decisive for redeeming a 
promise of trust. Basic expectations allude to those action norms that have gained massive 
support, and which individuals want to expect others to act upon by enforcing it through a 
legal order. If the legal order regulate the social system without adhering to basic 
expectations, the legal order is not worthy of trust.  
Unknown expectations, which can also be dubbed as latent, are the last piece of the 
puzzle. The “unknowns” constitute the driving thrust that any expectation, no matter how 
insignificant it is to a current order of expectations, can become basic within a future order of 
expectations. Hence, it can develop from being something that is borderline to unexpected to 
an expectation that dominates within the order of expectations. When, for instance, an order 
                                                 
74 Habermas (1998a): 83.  
75 This was captured in the simplex-figure in the introduction. 
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of expectations profoundly changes, e.g. due to different types of significant events, it is due 
to an articulation and gradual incorporation of an unknown expectation into a known and, 
perhaps, basic expectation. The new basic expectation makes some kind of imprint on the 
order of expectations that influences significantly what is worthy of trust. 
Once it becomes a basic expectation, the order of expectations has fully developed into 
something different from what it was prior to the articulation of this new basic expectation. 
For a legal order to become worthy of trust, the new basic expectation must become 
incorporated in a manner that once again complies with the order of expectations. It becomes 
a matter of political craftsmanship. For instance, if a basic expectation, such as the principle 
of the child’s best interest, is embedded in a legal order at one point in time, it does not imply 
that the principle of the child’s best interest remains as basic when the order of expectations 
continue to develop.  
This leaves a tension between what a current legal order factual enforce on one side 
and what is worthy of trust within the order of expectations on the other. It sets a demand 
towards the legal order to be worthy of trust. The tension is embedded in the legal form in 
general and also within each particular legal code. Observing this tension reveals the flux of 
the order of expectations and how it becomes bent away from the stability of the legal order. 
The tension reveals how the dynamics within basic expectations evolve and alter what is 
worthy of trust within the order of expectations. Thus new basic expectations can stand in 
potential contrast to those basic expectations once stabilized into the legal order. 
Incorporating new basic expectations into the legal order can push the legal order once again 
in direction of being worthy of trust. However, an unavoidable consequence of having ruling 
majorities is that the order of expectations of the complete social system will never become 
embedded at once into a legal order. Hence, it will always be imperfections and tension.  
A constitutional democracy owes its stability to agreements molded through decades 
of practices and legal-political discourses that incorporate new experiences. This is the 
procedure that can transform an unknown expectation into a specific basic expectation that 
must be embedded in a legal order to redeem the promise of trust. Again, it can be argued that 
mending the tension is the driving force of vigilant and competent political craftsmanship. 
2.8.TheDynamicsofPoliticalCraftsmanship
Democratic rule of law implies self-government. Tension can arise between the legal order on 
one hand, and the order of expectations, constitutive of the social system, on the other. Since 
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the order of expectations can become stabilized by embedding it in the legal order, it is 
possible to study the order of expectations by studying the political-legal discursive 
development towards the introduction of a legal order.76  
 The order of expectations at any point in time in history can be studied. A legal code 
from 1953 can be said to be the attempt to stabilize an order of expectations pro anno 1953. 
However, unknown expectations of the past can become dominant in a future order of 
expectations – erupting from the facticity of the social system itself, and that can, as already 
argued, penetrate, develop and put legitimate pressure on the legal order from the outside. 
Thus, tension arises between what is found worthy of trust on one hand and what is settled 
within the legal order on the other. This pressure alludes to the promise of trust, and that a 
legal order that has stabilized past expectations, no longer comply with the order of 
expectations due to flux. Consequently, an order of expectations will develop and be different 
in 1963 from what it was in 1953. If the legal order has not changed with it, it does no longer 
redeem the promise of trust.77 The legal order can stabilize the order of expectations at the 
time legislation is passed, not necessarily in its aftermath. It is a matter of how competent and 
vigilant political craftsmanship of parliament is. Hence, the study of the promise of trust is a 
study of political craftsmanship.  
Furthermore, a legal order that complies with the order of expectations is crafted 
according to democratic procedures that are constitutionally constrained. The legal order can 
thus reflect the self-rule of the entire demos, and not merely a majority. Hence, political 
craftsmanship is procedurally constrained. In a system regulated by an ideal constitutional 
democracy, the compliance of the legal order with the order of expectations is, thus, implied. 
Mending tensions between these orders is the driving force of responsive and responsible law-
making and a matter of political craftsmanship. A high amount of tension equals a less 
trustworthy legal order as it departs from the order of expectations, a legal order is thus no 
longer an expression of popular will. High amounts of tension equals that a political 
craftsmanship that is not competent and vigilant. 
On a more fundamental level, and with regard to how constitutional democracy works, 
it can be argued that rules, principles and procedures are applied to treat “equal cases equally 
and unequal cases unequally.” This is referred to as the formal principle of justice, or as the 
                                                 
76 I will return to methodological considerations at the end of this chapter.  
77 In the introduction to this dissertation, the expectations that drove an order of expectation away from what was 
legally entrenched were referred to as unknown expectations.  
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principle of equality, principle of law, equal treatment, or as I will refer to it as non-
discrimination.78 Its application has ramifications for legal designs of decision-making 
bodies’ ability to evaluate equality and inequality.79 Therefore, cases that are evaluated as 
being equal are treated in an equal manner, whereby different treatment must be justified by 
giving valid reasons for differences in treatment. Equally, persons evaluated as being equal 
before the law will receive equal treatment.  
 The consequence of constitutional rights is the limitation of government and especially 
democratic rule of law. It implies that every individual agent can act freely with no other 
limitation on actions other than what is necessary to safeguard every other individual agent’s 
similar range of freedoms. Constitutional rights and the constraints they place upon 
government, implies a fundamental application of the principle of equal treatment or non-
discrimination.80 It states that all citizens that carry rights, and carry them equally are thus 
treated equally, and also opposite—that relevant inequalities justify unequal treatment. Since 
everyone becomes equal before the law in such a manner, each rule applies equally to all.  
However, the rule in rule of law has a twofold meaning. The first is rather obvious, 
whereby “rule” means the enforcement of law, and the credible threat of sanctions if rules are 
broken. Second, and a more substantial meaning, is that the rule of law is a constitutional 
constraint on government and majority rule, and how it can only sanction actions that do not 
abide by law. A democratic constitution ensures that rule of law is on accord with the 
standards prescribed by rights and popular sovereignty. This means that law is substantial and 
instrumental and must be applied equally to equal cases. A right to property and the right to 
free-speech means that a person can own the fruits of their labor and speak without 
interference against his or her will. However, a person or group that hinder others from 
owning property, or speaking their mind, are de facto and de jure violating that person’s 
constitutional right to speak and own property. This is an important restriction that rule of law 
set upon democratic majority and government. The constitutional constraints upon rule of law 
are set in place to bind majority rule, and hinder groups attempting to curb individual liberty 
of others. Hence, if the promise of trust is to be redeemed, a legal order needs to comply with 
expectations that everyone can accept.  
                                                 
78 See Dworkin (1977): 66ff. 
79 Alexy (2002): 264-265.  
80 It can also be referred to as a formal principle of justice, a principle of non-discrimination and a principle of 
consistency.  
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The last parameter laid out to configure an ideal constitutional democracy is the 
republican insight of democratic representation. Modern democratic rule of law means 
electing an assembly that, on a basic level, is intended to represent and reflect the entire 
population that is governed. For instance, the legal form presented here can be achieved 
through a parliamentary or a presidential system; it can also vary with regard to who 
constitutes the electorate etc. Electing representatives has become a practical precondition for 
democratic rule of law due to the need for making competent decisions in a great variety of 
cases. This does not eliminate elements of direct democracy, but direct democracy cannot 
perform legislation in any informed manner on a daily basis in a modern complex world. If 
political craftsmanship is to perform with certain skill, it needs to be competent and vigilant 
all the time. Hence, rule of law needs to be representative if it is to appear as informed and 
effective and reflect popular will.  
2.9.ConclusionandMethodologicalConsiderations
This chapter has laid out how the order of expectations can become operative through a legal 
order that is crafted by a legislative procedure that abides by principles of an ideal 
constitutional democracy. Such a legal order carry the potential of stabilizing what is worthy 
of trust. Due to the flux within the order of expectations, the stabilized legal order can move 
away from the order of expectations as time goes by. Consequently, an operative legal order 
can become unworthy of trust. Basic expectations, which are dominant within the order of 
expectations, can in due time become less dominant and also be replaced altogether by new 
basic expectations. New basic expectations are not a part of the legal order, and hence a legal 
order that has stabilized past basic expectations cannot be expected to redeem the promise of 
trust any longer. Consequently, the legal order might become unworthy of trust if political 
craftsmanship is not competent or vigilant towards the flux of the order of expectations. In 
order to rebuild trust towards a particular legal code, it is up to political craftsmanship to 
amend or reform the legal code to once again comply with the order of expectations.  
 Although the potential of redeeming a promise of trust is purely theoretically 
established I hold Norwegian politics to abide by principles of constitutional democracy as a 
regulative ideal. Hence, the Norwegian political system will in the remainder of the 
dissertation pragmatically be treated as an ideal constitutional democracy with the potential of 
redeeming a promise of trust. Child protection law has been subjected to two reforms and 
numerous of amendments throughout history. In what has been laid out in theory, such a legal 
development can be seen as a way to reestablish trust in child protection.   
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 As already defined, expectations are anticipations, normative or descriptive, of events 
in the future. They are variable and fallible, but they are nevertheless employed in order to get 
by in a world characterized by increasing complexity. On an aggregative level, these 
expectations constitute the binding force of society in that individuals know what to expect 
and what not to expect of others. Now that the basic theoretical terms of the approach have 
been established and how they relate, i.e. “order of expectations”, “basic expectations” and 
the “legal order” which can be crafted to redeem the promise of trust, and we thereby know 
what is going to be studied, it is prudent to say something about how it is studied 
methodologically. How do we study if decision-making of the FBSS redeems the promise of 
trust or not?  
 Whether or not legal orders can redeem a promise of trust and express the order of 
expectations is not something that we can get access to through ‘objective’ method; that is 
through ordinary empirical or statistical methodology. However, it is this order that needs to 
be located, because this is what express what is worthy of trust. Even though we know that 
order has prevailed simply due to the fact of relative consensus and absence of contestation, it 
cannot be objectively observed; seen or heard. Furthermore, the development with regard to 
what is trustworthy child protection is often not something that the different actors involved 
are conscious about. However if it is a fundamental development in the conceptions of trust, it 
must be possible to establish and articulate its meaning. Hence, it is a need to uncover the 
type of child protection that the bond of society express and want—namely a child protection 
system that is found worthy of trust and that as such can be the object of the legal order. What 
must be identified is how the order of expectations is structured and made meaningful on one 
side, and made into an object of political craftsmanship on the other. 
The parliament can ideally be treated as a representative assembly of the complete 
social system it is set to govern. Consequently, it is also a representation of the order of 
expectations, and has the potential of crafting legal orders that complies with it and can be 
worthy of trust. This presupposition is made for the sake of the argument. If the political 
system is treated as having the capability of redeeming a promise of trust, it implies that the 
political system must be able to access the order of expectations. Hence, the inputs to the 
system are the documents that establish the premises for politics and political craftsmanship. 
These consists of documents such as legal propositions, public reports, white- and green 
papers, in combination with relevant contributions to the public discourse such as books, 
academic articles, speeches, newspaper articles etc, that influence the process of crafting new 
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legislation and are the objects of political craftsmanship. By studying such documents, it can 
be possible to establish expressions of the order of expectations. 
Consequently, in order to answer my research questions, I will make use of documents 
that underpin the political craftsmanship and that can be used to establish legal orders that can 
comply with the order of expectations and hence redeem a promise of trust. The question is 
therefore if the politicians responsible have been vigilant and competent enough to meet such 
a challenge. These documents will be treated as input to the political process and constitute 
expressions of expectations at different times. The documents have this quality because they 
relate to the political craftsmanship as background documents.  
We know what documents are most relevant because we can backtrack from the legal 
order itself, to propositions and different reports, to academia, books and speeches, and to 
important persons. From these background documents, we can trace how the decisions came 
about, how the legal-political discourse on child protection developed, what actors were 
important and which events triggered the effort towards political change. In tracing this 
empirical data, the background documents to a legal order and different discourses that relate 
to these documents, I will unveil patterns of a general nature, and a continuous development 
of the order of expectations can be discerned.  
 The particular method that will be used to empirically establish what the order of 
expectations consists of is called process tracing.81 It serves the heuristic function of 
generating new variables inductively on the basis of an historical narrative unveiling 
sequences of events traceable in the document corpus that constitute the legal-political 
discourse in child protection history. In this dissertation, these variables I seek out are the 
temporally specified types of expressions of the order of expectations, i.e. what is worthy of 
trust at a certain point in time. Hence, the goal of the second part is to establish empirically 
what constitutes the development of trustworthy child protection. The first chapter in the third 
part will attempt to provide an interpretation of what the current expression of the order of 
expectations is like, by establishing a theory of what constitute current trustworthy child 
protection, by drawing upon the development of the order of expectations of the second part.  
 Hence, the aim is to establish, refine and reach an expression of what constitutes the 
current order of expectations, i.e. what is currently held to be worthy of trust, through 
studying hypothesized causal connections that leads to the current expression, or standard. 
                                                 
81 See e.g. Brady and Collier (2010).   
53 
 
Only by having such a standard expression of what is worthy of trust, can we proceed to 
evaluate the 2008-design of the FBSS. This implies that part II will figure a parsimonious 
account of the historical development with a deliberate focus upon only unveiling the causal 
connections and sequence that is necessary to establish the different expressions of the order 
of expectations throughout history. Hence, document data of different types are selected 
because of its importance as part of establishing an adequate theoretical explanation.  
 In this way the historical narrative becomes transformed from being an account that 
implies causal connections, into an analytical causal explanation of the order of expectations 
embedded in different theoretical variables. Turning an historical narrative into an account of 
causal connections and sequences leading to theoretical variables will undoubtedly lead to a 
loss of information from that of a rich historical narrative. This shortcoming notwithstanding, 
the purpose of the empirical undertaking is to develop theoretical variables that can establish a 
standard of child protection that is worthy of trust—all in the effort to evaluate the FBSS.  
 In order to establish this historical development, the empirical research has undergone 
four steps. This procedure can be illustrated with a line of 40 dominos whereby I drop ten 
dominos backwards at the time. It leaves four interconnected causal sequences that make up 
one row of dominos. The complete line of dominos is the order of expectations, while the 
years 1896, 1953, 1992 and 2008 are the different markers where the data-access abounds due 
to significant reforms. I use the legal order of 1896 as a point of departure and ask what made 
this type of legal order come about. This implies that I trace the causal sequence backwards, 
i.e. I begin with the domino I pushed and see how it is connected with the next domino, and 
then the next etc. In doing so, I unveil the legal-political discourse that became the backdrop 
that led to the legal order. Unveiling this historical narrative is the first step, and the second is 
to establish theoretical propositions that can express the development of the order of 
expectations.  
 As stated, for the sake of the argument, I treat the Norwegian legal system as if it has 
the potential of crafting legislation that redeems the promise of trust, what can redeem such a 
promise must be located within the background documents to the legal-political discourse. 
The procedure applied for locating the order of expectations that led up to 1896 is repeated in 
1953, in 1992 and 2008. By establishing the complete historical development of the order of 
expectations, we can acquire a deeper understanding of what is currently held to be worthy of 
trust. Once I have established what can redeem a promise of trust in 2008, I will elaborate 
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upon what the order of expectations implies as an analytical standard for the purpose of 
evaluation in the first chapter of part III.  
 In the daily run of empirical research, the processing of the document-data has 
undergone evaluation: Is the document data sufficient for establishing a causal connection, or 
is it necessary for a causal connection, is it both or is it neither?82 Hence, not all data has been 
treated as if it was of equal importance: “not all information is of equal probative value in 
discriminating between alternative explanations, and a researcher does not need to examine 
every line of evidence in equal detail. It is possible for one piece of evidence to strongly 
affirm one explanation and/or disconfirm others.”83 For instance, most data are, on default, 
straws in the wind. Others can be both necessary and sufficient to establish a causal 
connection with the type of order of expectations that becomes diagnosed. Hence, part II is to 
be read as an extrapolation of the development of the order of expectations.  
 The final expression of the order of expectations, located in part II, will be utilized to 
establish the normative self-understanding of child protection. This is the evaluative standard. 
This self-understanding, based upon basic expectations, is what the legal order must comply 
with in order to redeem the promise of trust. Since what is worthy of trust changes slowly and 
on a basic level of the social system, it is important to identify its sources in a broader, more 
long-term context. Thus, in order to understand how decision-making that authorizes coercion 
can be worthy of trust today, it is necessary to lay out the complete historical development of 
the order of expectations.84 This is why I will establish and trace the development of the order 
of expectations that led to the current configuration of basic expectations in child protection—
all in the effort to understand how the nature of our current order of expectations work.  
By treating the system of law-making as if it can develop legal orders that comply 
with the order of expectations, the system itself becomes the spectacles/lenses through which 
the order of expectations can be identified. This implies analyzing the input to a law-making 
process as if it was expressions of the order of expectations. These expectations are inferred 
from the document corpus that constitutes the political-legal discourse on child protection, 
and which seem to drive the law-making process. These expectations are not necessarily an 
explicit part of the legal order itself.  
                                                 
82 For a more elaborate version, see Collier (2011): 825. Mahoney 2012: 5ff.  
83 Brady, H. E., & Collier, D. (2010): 209. 
84 This will be the focus in part II of this dissertation. 
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 The approach relates to a document-analysis with two hermeneutical levels. On the 
first level, it is a need to establish the order of expectations, and the basic expectations, 
through the analysis of documents. On the second level, it is a need to interpret what the order 
of expectations and the basic expectations express regarding a normative self-understanding. 
The second step involves introducing a theory of child protection currently held to be worthy 
of trust. It is a search for, and a qualification of a normative self-understanding that constitute 
trustworthy protection of children. Hence, the hermeneutical exercise is an effort of making 
implicit knowledge explicit. It is a need to make the order of expectations, which is implicit 
wherever order resides, explicit, and turn it into an evaluative standard.  
 The  current legal order will not merely be studied as to what type of child protection 
was found worthy of trust at the inception of the legal code in 1992, but also what is found 
worthy of trust as of 2008 when the FBSS was last subjected to a large amended and could 
once again be crafted to comply with the order of expectations. Only through an historical 
approach can the development within the order of expectations be credibly reconstructed and, 
hence, help understand how the basic expectations dominant to the current order of 
expectations be justified.  
 To illustrate, the order of expectations of 1896 will be referred to as a defense of a 
conception of good, i.e. of what was deemed as “normal” or “moral” at the time. This general 
description, it can be argued, is configured by different basic expectations that describe more 
specifically how the order of expectations works. One basic expectation could for instance be 
the criminalist ideology, and another the need for correctional education. I have come to such 
a conclusion by analyzing the different documents that led up to the legal order of 1896. In 
1953 the child protection worthy of trust was a system set to protect the family. Here, the 
basic expectations constitutive of the order of expectations could be the principle of 
democracy in combination with a principle of subsidiarity and insights from developmental 
psychology that stressed the importance of the family. Again, in order to acquire this 
knowledge, I made use of the background history of the legal order of 1953 as a point of 
departure, and studied different documents that unveiled how the order of expectations 
developed from one standpoint in 1896 to a completely different one in 1953. This effort can 
be repeated again and again depending upon what type of legal order we are interested in 
evaluating. In this dissertation, it is the legal order of 2008.  
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 In part III, I will explore the order of expectations of 2008, located in the second part. I 
will explore the configuration of basic expectations, and develop a normative self-
understanding of the current child protection system. This self-understanding is what the legal 
order must comply with in order to become worthy of trust. I need to explain how the basic 
expectations work in order to understand what is currently held to be worthy of trust. Once I 
have established the normative self-understanding, I will move forth to analyze to what extent 
the current legal order, with its design of the FBSS’ decision-making procedure, abides by the 
normative self-understanding constitutive of the current order of expectations. The extent to 
which the legal order complies with the order of expectations will tell us to what degree the 
promise of trust is redeemed.  
 Knowing that this involves interpretations of events that can explain this development, 
as well as knowing that the explanation of the normative self-understanding of current 
trustworthy child protection is also an interpretation of a document corpus, the entire study is 
of a fallible nature. The different interpretations are open for affirmations or even 
falsification. What constitutes the order of expectations is entirely descriptive, viz. an 
interpretation of what constitute a factual order. The evaluation of the legal order up against 
this empirically construed notion of trust, makes this dissertation an empirical investigation of 
political competence and a critique of political craftsmanship. The analysis that is presented is 
confined to an historical context, and this type of context is complex, unstable and in constant 
flux. In this regard I recognize that the analysis in the following can become challenged and 
disproved. Furthermore, what I hold to be well-founded and true is in this regard open for 
revision and can be proved to the contrary through new arguments, better analysis and more 
solid conclusions.  
 
 
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PartII–TheHistoricalDevelopmentoftheOrderofExpectations
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3.1896:ExpectingChildrentobecomeMoral
 
 
 
 
 
The Norwegian legal-political discourse on coercion in child protection circles three specific 
legal orders. These were introduced in 1896, 1953 and 1992 respectively. These three 
different legal orders constitute the history of child protection law. The goal of the three 
following chapters is to unveil the history of the order of expectations that circles these three 
legal orders. The point in time when a new legal code passes through parliament will be used 
as a main entry-point to the study of the order of expectations. Hence, this part of the 
dissertation should not be read as a regular historical-empirical account, but rather as an 
historical investigation to unveil how child protection has been found worthy of trust, i.e. how 
the order of expectations has developed. This effort is undertaken as a necessary step in 
learning what trustworthy child protection contains by 2008.  
Since I am preoccupied with finding out if the legal design of the FBSS of 2008 
redeems the promise of trust, it is prudent to investigate the current order of expectations 
more extensively in the third chapter in this part of the dissertation (chp 5). I will not only say 
something about the order of expectation in 1992, whereby we can observe the important 
reaction to the legal order introduced in 1953, but also how the order of expectations have 
continued to develop until 2008. Finally, I will identify the different basic expectations within 
the current order of expectations, i.e. find out what type of expectations that dominate the 
current order of expectations. The reason for this extended focus upon the current legal order 
is that it is this legal order that will become scrutinized in part III. In order to acquire 
knowledge regarding what the order of expectations is in 2008, which we need in to move on 
to part III, we need to study the historical development within the order of expectations. Only 
then can we know in what way, and why we trust child protection in a certain manner today.  
The three legal orders throughout history of child protection have become established 
due to different motives and have had different aims. This implies that although the three 
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legal codes specifically can reflect similar design-criteria on how operative decision-making 
is taking place, the legislative histories and different justifications that have promoted each of 
the legal orders have been remarkably different, and reflects the ever present flux within the 
order of expectations.85  
Bernhard Getz was the engine behind introducing the first legal code on child 
protection. He argued that the way children became treated by the Criminal Code was wrong, 
and especially the criminal prosecution and imprisonment of children beneath the age of 16:  
“This admission has grown in giant strides in recent years. The steady increase of attention, which 
all over the civilized world has been directed towards circumstances of criminal law, and which 
has not only made an imprint within an overflow of literature, but also in the series of the more or 
less international meetings and congresses, have fixedly directed itself at this point; and time and 
again in recent years it has been emphasized by experts as well as by convention resolutions, that 
society, if it is to accomplish anything effectively against the world of crime, must pull the evil up 
by the root, must energetically and systematically proceed to protect the children from corruption 
that is often caused by the vices of parents or by their more or less undeserved misery.”86
The experts and meetings and congresses he is referring to are the international criminalist 
and penitentiary movement of which he too was a member. The spring-source of the 
discourse regarding Norwegian child-protection is rooted here, and many European nation-
states were at the brink of introducing legislation of the type that Norway received in 1896. 
Hence, Norway was among the first nation-states in the world to introduce such a system.87 
3.1.ThePathtowardsReform
The practice of dealing with problematic children prior to 1896 was to send them to prisons or 
asylums. The punishment could be quite harsh from the age of 10. Francis Hagerup argued in 
the first meeting in Den norske kriminalistforening (The Norwegian Criminalist Association) 
on 1st October 1892 that this way of punishing children did no longer make sense, and it 
seemed like everyone agreed to such a statement. It was no empirical evidence that this way 
                                                 
85 The legal-political development has been presented two places: Kjønstad (2002) and Larsen (2002).  
86 Getz, 1892:2. 
87 Tove Stang Dahl (1978), has written the most important academic contribution regarding the system of child 
protection introduced in 1896, but she has arguably got one small thing wrong. Her opening sentence claims that 
Norway had the first system of child protection in the world. This claim is contestable. First, Bernhard Getz, the 
author of the first legal code, claimed that France had the first legal code already in 1889—Getz (1892):12. 
Second, international literature confirms such a claim—see e.g. Friedlander (1962): 106 or Heywood (2007): 
144. Third, the legal code of France itself: Loi Du 24 Juillet 1889 Sur La Protection Des Enfants Maltraites Ou 
Moralement Abandonnes (Act of July 24th 1889 on the protection of abused and morally corrupted children)—
Lallemand (2009). See also http://oned.gouv.fr/documents/ressources_juridiques/L3.pdf. It is unfortunate that 
this small sentence has become used to argue that Norway was a pioneer in child protection, for instance in NOU 
2000:12: 21, St.meld.nr.40 (2001-2002): 18 and 20 or Wikipedia, especially since Dahl herself stressed the fact 
that the Norwegian legal development in child protection was an invariable part of an international criminalist 
discourse.  
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of punishing children actually helped the children back on track.88 Punishment through 
imprisonment was in fact counter-productive.  
 In particular, it was argued that kriminalloven (the Criminal Code) of 1842 was a 
failure with regard to convicting children. First, it was argued that the prisons rather worked 
as an arena for recruiting children to join the ranks of criminals. Second, they questioned the 
manner in which children between 10 and 16 were prosecuted through the so-called rule of 
relative criminal responsibility.89 This meant that children were sent to prisons for committing 
crimes, not legally as adults, but to their individual degree of adulthood.  
 The time had come to argue that the consequence of sending children to prisons, in 
combination with a perceived increase in youth crime, had made it prudent to establish a 
separate legal code to counter what was called moral decay.90 Bernhard Getz diagnosed the 
problem and prescribed the cure: Increasing crime among children, caused by parental neglect 
was the main cause, and this had to become compensated for through state-driven correction 
of the corrupted child.91 
In 1885, professor Bernhard Getz, was appointed chairman of a government 
commission that was to arrive at a proposal on reforming the Criminal Code of 1842 – 
Straffelovkommisjonen (Criminal Code-Commission). This commission was not mandated to 
develop any legal code on child protection on its appointment. The commission’s work lasted 
until 1886, resulting in a draft-proposal in the following year. In the proposal of 1887, 
Almindelig borgerlig straffelov (General Civil Penal Code), Getz argued that the legal age 
should be raised as high as 15, compared to 10 at the time. Furthermore, imprisonment was 
suggested to become limited of children up to the age of 18.92  
                                                 
88 Hagerup (1893a): 11. The Norwegian Criminalist Association was established by Bernhard Getz and Francis 
Hagerup, Andenæs (1973a): 42. Their first meeting ever was about neglected children, and what the state should 
do about them. They discussed the legal-proposal written by Getz on this issue and how the contemporary 
criminalists movement would answer to such a problem. 
89 See quotation of Professor Stoos in Getz (1892):4. Here it is commented that relative criminal responsibility, 
where a child is to be punished according to “criminalist intent” of an adult.  
90 Some, as e.g. Slagstad (2001), argue that it in fact was not any drastic rise in youth-crime in Norway. This is 
why we can refer to it as perceived increase in youth crime since Getz firmly believed this increase to be true. It 
is really not the issue here to dispute Slagstad’s claim. What we know is that Bernhard Getz was of the opinion 
that youth crime had tripled in three decades, and was on a rising trend – see Getz (1885): 175, and especially the 
footnote on page 176, and that such a trend constituted a grave threat to the nation. He set the diagnosis and gave 
the cure to what he believed to be a nation-state fallen ill.  
91 Getz (1892): 2. 
92 See Hagerup (1903): 117. This article is the same as the first 23 pages regarding “motives” given in Getz 
(1892). 
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The first time Getz argued the case that children were in need of more specialized 
measures than imprisonments, he argued that child protection should be included as a §56 in 
the Criminal Code. He later retracted and proposed that this type of “arrangement should be 
transferred to a special legal code.”93 The very fact that Getz changed his mind on this matter 
is the primary reason for why the first legal code on child protection became established.  
Getz argued his desire to implement arrangements that took care of children who had 
shown traces of criminal behavior or were showing other types of “moral decay” or “neglect.” 
He wanted to implement a system that accommodated these children, and that could treat 
them in a systematic manner in correctional facilities, i.e. school-asylums. Children who were 
in need of better care, and did not show any traces of “moral decay” or other types of 
“neglect,” could be re-located to healthy families. However, the important focus of this 
inquiry was the treatment of children who were showing the potential to do more harm than 
good to society, and who were thought could, in the extreme cases, develop into criminals. 
These children were the focus of attention for Getz’ work. As chair of the commission, Getz 
argued that the §56 should be omitted from the initial proposal so that organizational 
arrangements, with a specific decision-making body, could be established to include all 
children in need of protection.  
Five years after Getz had written a first draft on a new Criminal Code, his legal 
proposal on child protection was complete. In 1892, the new type of legal arrangements that 
he had argued was needed was in place. This was the beginning of the path towards a legal 
code specifically dedicated to child protection. The initial draft proposal was dubbed Om
sædelig forkomne og vanvyrdede Børns Behandling (On the Treatment of Morally Corrupted 
and Scorn Children). Getz argued that the new Criminal Code assumed, without having it 
already incorporated in its draft, the need for establishing a system of correction/forced 
upbringing of children that earlier would be affected by the Criminal Code. The asylum was 
to ensure that children were given the opportunity to get their lives back on the right track; i.e. 
correct what was wrong into what was deemed as “moral” or “normal”.  
This idea, namely to correct corrupted children that could develop a personality that 
was allegedly immoral or abnormal, or thought to have potential to develop into something 
abnormal in due time, was to become the justification for the use of authorized coercion by a 
decision-making body to remove children from families. At the time, the increasing number 
                                                 
93 Getz & Hagerup (1903): 118.  
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of individuals behaving abnormally was perceived to be a threat towards established and 
desirable behavioral pattern, i.e. what was “moral” or “normal” behavior.94 Hence, the 
defense of morality, as a specific type of normality, it can be argued, was the justification for 
implementing measures that corrected abnormality.95 It was claimed that the increasing 
number of imprisoned criminals was endangering a healthy of society.  
This was not a Norwegian problem per se, but rather something that challenged the 
so-called “cultural nations” of the world.96 Abnormal behavior had to be “corrected” into 
becoming acceptable behavior. This did not imply that children placed into asylums were 
taught to behave in a desirable manner, acceptable and useful to the rest of society. The goal 
was to ensure that children did not grow up to become a burden to the rest of society, or a 
liability. The defense of “morality”, or “normality” as they also referred to it, can be argued is 
a good denomination of the first order of expectation. A child protection system worthy of 
trust had to defend what was perceived of as “moral” or “normal” against corrupting forces. 
The commission that Getz directed, was set to reform the Criminal Code according to 
the new jury-arrangements in the Criminal Procedure Act. On appointment, the mandate was 
not about erasing the old legal arrangement, but Getz had other and grander plans. He wanted 
to introduce a new type of law and argued that it’s establishment was a logical consequence of 
his original mandate from the Criminal Code-Commission. Within the new legal proposal for 
Almindelig Borgerlig Straffelov (General Civil Penal Code), the age of criminal responsibility 
was raised from 10 to 15, and this established an age-gap where a new legal code could enter 
to deal with the problem of corrupted children earlier affected by the Criminal Code.97  
Professor Johs. Andenæs argues in his book on great Norwegian legal scholars that 
Getz had immense prestige. Getz was known as the almost brilliant genius.98 His only flaw, as 
Andenæs reports, was that he lacked some abilities as a public speaker. The prestige that Getz 
carried made people hesitant to question his judgment on matters of the law. The fact that 
criminal law was reinvented, for better or worse, was probably due to his merits alone.99 His 
                                                 
94 The use of the denominations such as «moral», «normal» or «social» was normal in the legal discourse. They 
were not specified in any defiantly manner, but applied as synonyms in the legal discourse. In the following I 
will refer to the denominations as “normality” or “morality” interchangeably.  
95 See Slagstad (2001). He also claims that the introduction of the LBFB was motivated by a need to defend 
“normality” (2001): 145.  
96 See e.g. Getz (1892).  
97 Getz (1892): 1 
98 “Hagerup was a brilliant talent and Getz the not so brilliant genius”, Andenæs (1973b): 34-35. 
99 Andenæs (1973b): 35. 
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work can be argued is the introduction of a new criminalist legal system in Norway, and child 
protection was a part of it this effort. 
3.3.OutdatedCriminalCodeandStatisticalEvidence
There were two main reasons why Getz argued for the need to write a new legal code that was 
to protect children. The first was that the minimum age of criminal responsibility was too low 
for seemingly no good reason. Age of criminal responsibility was the initial academic field of 
interest that drove Getz to submit the first legal-proposal of 1892.100 The age of 10 could no 
longer be maintained, and argued that children had nothing to do with being labeled as 
criminals. They did not have proper will, or self-determination to resist criminal 
inclinations—they did not have sufficient moral power to resist.101 
 The criticism against the French Penal-invention that the criminal court should punish 
children according to their discernment to the criminal act, had gained momentum. In 
particular, Getz quoted the Suisse professor C. Stoos, who argued in the Suisse Criminalist 
Convention of 1891 that criminal children were nothing more than “neglected and morally 
corrupted.”102 Getz later argued that children were in need of protection, correction and 
care—not punishment. 
The second reason was the continent-wide problem of increasing criminal activity. Not 
only among the “criminal proletariat that constituted the permanent flocks of the penal 
asylums,” but more importantly, it was claimed, among children.103 This problem was 
especially coupled with increasing urbanism and the fact that children in major cities 
allegedly did not have anything better to do. Enrico Ferri, regarded as one of the most 
important pioneers in criminology, argued that the origin of such a problem was that the 
industrious society had left the child at home while both mother and father had gone to work. 
This line of thinking gained support in Norway.104 The problem would never end, it was 
argued, since the steam-engine that drove industry forth did not stop at night-fall. The child 
was then “left to its own resources, in the filth of life, and that its history will be inscribed in 
criminal statistics, which are the shame of our so-called civilization.”105 The potential for 
introducing a legal-reform such as the one Getz would present was in part due to his ability to 
                                                 
100 Getz (1892).  
101 Stoos in Getz (1892): 4 and Hagerup (1893b): 46. 
102 Getz (1892): 4f. 
103 Getz (1892): 45. Bilag I. 
104 See for instance Hagerup (1893b). 
105 Ferri (1913): 32. 
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portray a crisis for the Norwegian society. People would want to trust others, but as Getz 
argued, this ability was under severe threat by the corrupting forces of crime. 
The problem of crime among children was furthermore narrowed down to how law 
could be designed to stop the growth of habitual criminal behavior as they approached 
adulthood. The solution was to introduce child protection law in Norway. Hence, the 
motivation was to prevent that more children became recruited to destructive criminal 
behavior. The statistics that showed increasing child-criminality, Getz argued, were what 
made the criminalists and the law-makers stand together in a continent-wide mobilization.106  
The perception regarding the increase in child criminality became reflected in Getz’ 
preparatory works:107 
“While the rest of our penological results can be referred to as satisfying, the number of criminal 
children has been in a rapid growth, in which nothing else can compete”108
Within the legal discourse it was stressed that child delinquency and criminal behavior was an 
urban problem. However, Getz did not care. He had broader plans. The new legal code was 
not made entirely for those affected by urbanism. Now, the entire population of Norway was 
to correct the behavioral types that threatened general morality. Johs. Andenæs argued that 
Getz had his will.109 The destructive forces of criminal behavior was believed to become 
prevented by a new legal code, and the society could once again get “back to more normal 
conditions.”110 Correctional ideology backed by state-coercion could restore moral behavior.  
Getz argued that the fast-track development that the Norwegian society was in, the 
lives of people was “bereft of their former basis without having a new one.”111 Due to this 
alleged threat, the parliament aimed at implementing means to reduce crime. However, crime 
was actually not a big problem. The criminalist movements of Italy, France and Germany had 
all real numbers to show for, with real problems, and this gave rise to the criminalists’ and 
                                                 
106 Getz quotes Franz von Liszt in Hagerup (1903): 97. 
107 I use the dubious word “perception” because there are reasons to believe that the problem in growth in 
criminal behavior among children in Norway actually was wrong, see Slagstad (2001): 146 and SSB (1978): 
605. If we examine the place where Getz refer to the increase in crime and statistics, he does not show where the 
data is from and how he constructed it, Getz (1885): 175. This leads to a suspicion that it is not an accurate 
assessment. In Getz (1892): 53, the lack of convincing statistical evidence for the claim of increasing crime is 
attempted to be strengthened by arguing that the rules that earlier convicted children no longer were operative.  
108 Getz (1892): 4. 
109 Andenæs (1973b): 29. 
110 Getz (1892): 5. 
111 Getz (1892): 47. Bilag I. Although this quoatation is bereft of logic, it can illustrate how he argued for 
instituting a system that defended the idea of normality. 
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penologists’ recommendations for law-making.112 However, the numbers that were to prove 
the great growth of criminal behavior among children in Norway did not justify the huge 
reform that was to come in Norway. Nonetheless, those who debated the new legal code were 
convinced that the problem was real, or would become real. Getz was convinced that 
something had to be done because the development in Norway clearly showed that the nation 
was heading in the direction of a rise in criminal behavior that was already evident in other 
“cultural nations.” Getz argued that the evidence was sufficient, and if nothing was done to 
counter this development, increasing crime and child delinquency would be inevitable.113  
To illustrate the point of an increase in crime among children, which was an indicator 
for the destructive force that urbanism brought along was, for Getz, that Bergen had an 
increase in convictions for children under 18 in the year 1867 from 21 to 71 cases in 1889. In 
Trondheim, it rose from 27 to 44 cases. In Christiania (Oslo), the numbers were higher, from 
118 to 307 cases. Although presented as evidence of an increase in criminality, it can easily 
be argued that the increase in crime was rather only an epi-phenomenon. The cities had grown 
at a higher rate than the crime. Relatively to the growth in city-size, crime had decreased.114 
However, the increasing amount of convictions seemed sufficient to warrant drastic reforms.  
With the Criminal Code of 1842 rendered outdated, combined with a firm belief in the 
statistical evidence to support the claim of an increase in criminal behavior—children were 
now to receive their own specialized code of law that allegedly was for the good of all. Getz’ 
reform would remove the state’s treatment of children from the Criminal Code and penal 
thinking altogether, and transfer them to another and new body of law; a system that “saved” 
children from becoming “criminals” or “low-lives” through correction. Ole Anton Qvam, one 
of the lead voices on the political left and leader of Left in 1896, argued that the new system 
had the function of ensuring that a child did not “become a recruit to the ranks of the penal 
asylum”, and that such a decision “is a legal decision...[by] a court of law.”115 Qvam captured 
                                                 
112 See e.g. Ferri (1917): 5. 
113 Getz (1892): 47. 
114 This conclusion is made plausible from analyzing two separate tables. One indicates the general growth in 
cities, which stipulate a population of 206338 in 1845, with an increase to 625417 in 1890. The second table 
shows the amount of average prison-convictions between the years 1846 to 1855 being 2020, with an increase to 
2467 in the period 1886-1895. As city-areas tripled its population, crime in general had only gone up with a 
small amount, at least far from being tripled, see table 3 in SSB (1978): 33 regarding the growth in population, 
and see tabel 37 Statistiske oversigter 1914 (1914): 42 regarding the growth in crime. However, these numbers 
do not differentiate the adult criminal from the young criminal, but it illustrates that the panic that Getz attempt 
to establish was in fact highly disputable since the population-dense areas actually grew relatively more than the 
crime itself. He does not provide sources from where he received his statistical evidence.  
115 Forhandlinger i Odelsthinget (No. 25): 193. 
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the core idea behind the legal proposal. In this way the political left aligned with Getz and the 
criminalists on the right. 
However, the new decision-making body, and the institutionalization of child 
protection, could be described as an intrusive institutional innovation in the making. Francis 
Hagerup argued that the state could from now on deprive parents of their children if the state 
saw any threat towards the child’s moral upbringing.116 Both Qvam and Hagerup stressed the 
fear of moral decay among children who grew up, i.e. they were both convinced that 
undesirable behavior could become corrected by subjecting children to corrective measures. 
Together, Qvam and Hagerup represent the two wings of parliament, and they both supported 
a system that would ensure that children became “moral” and “normal” adults.117 
From now on, it would not be about punishment by imprisonment but correction in 
asylums. It would rather become a matter of disciplining a child into becoming a “normal” 
person, or as they argued, a “moral” person.118 The meaning of “normal” or “moral” is simply 
the goal they set for the correction of any child. The purpose was to cut off the recruitment to 
crime and behavior that was a burden for society.  
In 1887, Frantz von Lizst, a leading scholar of criminology in Germany, commented 
positively on the draft of the new New Norwegian Criminal Code written by Getz. It was not 
a small polite recognition, but rather a cheer to Getz’ ambition and talent by one of the 
leading criminalists in Germany and Europe. Lizst argued that, as an author, Getz belonged 
eternally in the history of criminology.119 In this respect, Getz’ legal proposal to a new 
Criminal Code, whereby child protection was deemed by him to be an appendix, was a 
testimony of modern criminology. Getz was a representative of the so-called positivist 
movement of criminology in the second half of the 19th century—a lawmaker trapped 
between the jurist and the sociologist.  
The legal reforms that Getz was in charge of writing can be traced directly to the 
research of both the German and Italian schools of criminology. This connection is 
                                                 
116 Hagerup (1893a): 113. 
117 I am not going to discuss what they meant by ”moral” in depth. I will plainly hold their use of the word to 
mean something equivalent to “normal”. The reason is that the term ”moral”, at the time, did not mean anything 
distinct. Getz refer to morality as a type of will-power that children did not possess - (1892): 4, ”morality” could 
also mean something they did possess, but which was very fragile, corrupted or could become corrupted - 
(1892): 13, Getz also refer to ”morality” as a feeling - (1892): 48, and that a prison-conviction could have a 
”moral” effect - (1892): 49.  
118 This type of terminology pervades the preparatory works of the LBFB. See. e.g. Getz (1892)or Hagerup 
(1893b). 
119 Vogt (1950): 86. Von Liszt, F. (1905). 
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illuminated in the Getz’s biography written by Adler Vogt.120 Getz’s knowledge of the 
currents of criminology can be traced through references in his legal texts, and can be 
evidence that he paid close attention to the continental-wide positivist currents in 
criminology. As such, the work of Getz can be linked to prominent criminologists, such as 
Enrico Ferri in Italy and Franz von Liszt in Germany.121  
This link to positivist thinking is also a reference to a legal technique, i.e. the manner 
in which legal drafts were justified with reference to allegedly solid empirical investigations. 
It is not accidental that very different states, such as Germany and Norway, started to develop 
in a very similar manner with respect to, for instance, child protection law. For instance, 
Getz’s legal proposal makes a reference to the German proposal on Erziehungsamt (Office for 
Public Rearing), which is almost identical to Getz’ own proposal of 1892.122 However, 
similarities were especially true for Scandinavian countries due to access to the same type of 
knowledge, allegedly based upon the solidity that empirical science provided.123  
3.4.TheCriminalistBackdropforEstablishingLaw
The first equivalent of a modern legal code on child protection in Norway was dubbed Lov om 
behandling av forsømte børn (The Treatment of Neglected Children Act – LBFB) of 1896.124 
Although it was passed by parliament in 1896, the LBFB was not fully introduced until 1900. 
It replaced the treatment of neglected children by the Criminal Code and Fattigloven (Poor 
Relief Act), and removed the need for the provisions within Folkeskoleloven (Public School 
Act) regarding the protection and correction of children. However, school-commissions and 
the police would still play a major role in locating and providing reports on children that were 
to be taken care of by the new decision-making body established by the LBFB – Vergeraadet
(the Trustee-board).125 Thus, as of 1896 Norway no longer legally punish children as 
criminals.  
Although children were no longer to be sentenced as criminals, they were still held 
blameworthy for their actions, in particular from the age of 12.126 Older children who had so-
                                                 
120 Vogt (1950): 85 and Hagerup (1903): 93ff. The motives that explains Getz’ thinking regarding the legal-
proposal of 1892 also have substantive references to the criminalist movement in Europe.  
121 Vogt (1950): 39. Furthermore, Jerome Hall argues: “the positivism of the last century…found its warmest 
advocates among German and Italian criminalists” Hall (1947): 287.  
122 Getz (1892): 3.  
123 Andenæs (1968). 
124 This legal code is translated directly to English in order to maintain what it stands for in Norwegian. 
Sometimes it is simply translated to the Child Welfare Act. This takes away its meaning - see e.g. Dahl (1985).  
125 LBFB §6. 
126 LBFB §20 – fourth sentence, and §28. 
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called criminal inclinations were to receive strict correction. The treatment of these children, 
as will be shown in the next chapter, was harsh. As the new legal practice was set in motion, it 
became gradually referred to as a type of punishment when a child was sent to an asylum.127 
The legal code even became referred to as a deterrent—something that would hold 
undesirable behavior among children at bay due to the fear of being sent to an asylum.128  
The interventions into family-lives became regulated by the LBFB. Children aged six 
or older could be sent to regular asylums, and from the age of 12 to stricter asylums. The 
stricter asylums were practically an equivalent to the earlier correctional work-houses, albeit 
from now on solely occupied by children.129 
The establishment of the asylum-system, which allowed for harsh environments on 
asylums such as Bastøy and Toftes Gave, did not address the former treatment of children in 
prisons as cruel. The LBFB was simply a reaction to the Criminal Code of 1842, as the bad 
treatment of children was implemented for the wrong reasons, and that sending children to 
prisons had a bad effect.130 Within the framework of the LBFB, the asylums could be harsh, 
as long as it disciplined and corrected the children into becoming “moral” or “normal.” 
The criminalist movement had gained momentum in Norway in the 1880s. Bernhard 
Getz and Francis Hagerup—both very much involved in the Norwegian legal development at 
the time—founded Den Norske Kriminalistforening (The Norwegian Criminalist 
Association). This association was established on assignment for the International Criminalist 
Association, and would become the Norwegian branch. The goal, according to Hagerup, was 
to “spread the knowledge towards, and increase the interest for crime-politics.”131 Amongst 
the numerous aspects of criminology, the child was receiving increasing interest, and the first 
meeting ever of the Norwegian Criminalist Association revolved around matters of child 
neglect and youth crime and had the forthcoming legal development as focus.  
Deciding upon the minimum age of criminal prosecution was one of the most 
important topics at the time. The problem triggered continent-wide debate on the need to 
                                                 
127 Dahl (1985). This is the English translation of Dahl (1978). This can also be traced in media and public 
debates. We will return to this later.  
128 Dahl (1985). 
129 See Befring (1963). For a good overview of the treatment of children, see Bugge (2001); Dahl (1985); 
Ustvedt (2000). 
130 At the Pentientary Congress in St.Petersbourg in 1890, it was argued that ”it is assumed, for the sake of the 
child, i.e. persons below the age of 16, to give up the question regarding guilt and the understanding of 
punishable actions, and rather ask, if it is necessary that the state assume custody of children and ensure their 
upbringing or re-locate the child in a correctional asylum”, Getz (1892): 2. 
131 Hagerup (1893b): 17.  
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invent state-driven child protection of those beneath this age and who showed undesirable 
behavior. The different congressional meetings prior to 1890, both in the criminalist and 
penitentiary associations, provided an arena for spreading knowledge of what type of systems 
could potentially be implemented. For instance, Frantz v. Liszt, who at the time sat in the 
German Criminalist Association, and one who Getz refers to,132 argued that the inclination to 
commit a crime grew for every punishment a child was subjected to. Punishing children and 
juveniles was, according to him, “the complete failure of our penal system.”133 Scholars in 
criminology thus began to see the treatment and development of children as the fight against 
corrupting forces. As neglected children and dissipated juveniles were seen as the roots to the 
criminal society, in order to save society, these children had to be corrected.  
The International Penitentiary Congresses in Rome (1885), Paris (1889) and St. 
Petersburg (1890), the meetings of International Criminalist Association in Brussels (1889) 
and Bern (1890), all contributed to heightening the focus on finding a solution to the bad 
treatment children had received from traditional criminal- and penal law. As such, Getz was 
on par with the currents in contemporary criminology. Juvenile delinquency was set on the 
agenda, and something had to be done about the deteriorating forces that pulled children into 
the ranks of criminals and low-lives.  
The International Criminalist Association’s German branch met in Halle in 1891 and 
appointed a committee to investigate how to treat juvenile delinquents. Getz referred to its 
members—Krohne, Appelius, Kessler, and Liszt—as renowned criminalist scholars. The 
German branch concluded in their report that the age of criminal responsibility should be 16. 
If a need to do something about a child prior to this age arose. whether due to the child’s bad 
behavior, parental treatment or assumed future bad behavior. the child should be sent to an 
asylum that could provide care and correction, or to a private family. For the German branch, 
the decision-making body empowered to decide in such matters was the Erziehungsamt 
(Office for Public Rearing).134 This organization was to consist of representatives of the state, 
the local government administration, the school and the church. The Erziehungsamt was to 
decide upon cases that involved criminal behavior, as well as potential criminal behavior, 
namely what was dubbed morally corrupt or potentially corrupt behavior. These measures 
were not implemented in German law at the point when Getz referred to them, but was a 
                                                 
132 Getz (1892): 3,46.  
133 Von Liszt (1905): 338-339. 
134 The decision-making procedure on dealing with children that was shaped here is, according to Getz, very 
similar to how Getz argued, see Getz (1892): 3 - footnote.  
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draft-proposal. This decision-making body was strikingly similar to the system that was to 
become implemented in Norway. It clearly illustrates the influence of international currents in 
criminology upon the Norwegian legal discourse. 
3.5.TheOrganizationofAuthorizedCoercion:TheTrusteeǦboard
The introduction of the new child protection system in 1896 could affect the children and 
young adults up to the age of 21, and the state could implement coercive measures onto 
children under the age of 16.135 Getz argued in the draft-proposal of 1892 that the suggested 
arrangement was not only a duty imposed on society by the children’s own desire to grow up 
to become decent future adults, but also that the future adult would welcome the intrusion in 
their childhood to get back on the right track. 136 It was also a duty imposed on society itself in 
the sense that the new legal code was to ensure the future comfort and healthy development of 
society.137 These goals, in Getz’s view, justified the means. If the state came across a child 
that showed inappropriate, undesirable, or potentially undesirable behavior, it would be in 
need of appropriate correction.  
Children that was thought to become morally corrupted were feared to develop 
inclinations that were incompatible with the duties imposed upon everyone to act according to 
what was expected, or what was argued as “moral” or “normal.” 138 It was argued that the 
situation was out of control and that normal conditions had to be re-established.139 
Each child was to be corrected and disciplined to the extent that they acquired a 
preference-structure that made them act according to what was morally acceptable. The 
building-blocks of this preference-structure could be said to be a well-ordered set of utilities 
that supposedly became carried by everyone discharged from the custody of the Trustee-board 
and the asylums. As the Super-Intendent of Education, Karl Aas, explicitly states: “…teaching 
material, should be used for ethical influence, for developing the character of the kin to a 
                                                 
135 As become clear of §1 of the LBFB, it could only intervene with children younger than the age of 16. 
However, once caught in the system, a child could stay until it had become a young adult at the age of 21 - 
LBFB §39.  
136 Getz (1892): 35. 
137 Getz (1892): 16. 
138 The legal code is actually about morally neglected children. However, the original draft put forth by Getz, 
referred to morally corrupted children, pervades the entire LBFB. Neglect is even inaccurate for what the legal 
code did – it was to police the potentially misbehaving children. This has nothing to do with neglect – it has 
rather to do with moral corruption. This is why we refer to corruption rather than neglect.  
139 Getz (1892): 5 – my emphasis. 
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moral level.”140 It was argued that the society’s chance of survival was depending upon the 
moral character of the future generation and hence the success of the correctional facilities. 
Childhood, it was argued, should prepare “moral” or “normal” persons. There were no 
room for abnormal behavior that would contest the conception of what was deemed as 
“normal” or “moral”. Getz argued that the cost of creating the defense of morality should be 
as high as necessary for it to succeed, stating that “a bad arrangement…will deprive society of 
the fruits of their sacrifices.”141 Indeed, the evidence suggests that the system was costly and 
that the government made every effort in order to make it work.  
Hence, Getz implied that a child was not once and for all abnormal or immoral, but 
could be taught to become “normal” or “moral.” This manner of arguing against the use of 
traditional courts with regard to solving cases of failed care has received resonance 
throughout the legislative history of coercion-cases. The legal system recognized that neither 
children nor their parents did something that a regular criminal court could solve through its 
binary system of guilty or not guilty. For Getz, it was a matter of combining the safeguards of 
a judicial procedure with professionalism and local representation in a decision-making 
procedure with exclusive discretionary competence.  
The cases within child protection were in need of special attention as the character of 
the parents and of the child needed to be evaluated and ruled upon. To this extent, Getz 
argued that it was of central importance to let a principle of subsidiarity be applied. This 
meant that decisions were supposed to be made as close to the child as practically possible, 
but without losing the necessary legal protection that such decision-making was in need of 
carrying.142 The legal protection could only be instilled by the state, he argued. 
The decision-making body that was set in charge of child protection became 
Vergeraadet (Henceforth Trustee-board). Two of Getz’ important points argued in his draft of 
1892 did not become a part of the LFBF of 1896. First, that local representation was to be 
kept at a minimum because the decision-making of the Trustee-board needed to draw upon 
legitimating factors for the implementation of coercive state-level intrusion.  
Second, Getz argued that the Trustee-board was to be designed as a Koorporation (a 
corporation) where both the local personal knowledge and unbiased professional knowledge 
                                                 
140 Hagerup (1893b): 106. 
141 Getz (1892): 16. 
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were represented. The corporation were sought to have representatives both from the local 
area and the general society, with the lay-element and the state represented. Getz was heavily 
in debt to the German Erziehungsamt, when he advocated for having members from the 
school-council and the poor-relief commission in the Trustee-board, as he believed that they 
had particular types of knowledge. However, he did not have his way on these two points.  
Nevertheless, the three first legal proposals that was drafted all suggested such 
arrangements. However, the debates in parliament became increasingly polarized, and the 
treatment it received in March 1895 was that state-representation, and the focus on state-level 
intrusion, was too much at odds with the political order of parliament. It turned the draft down 
with 48 against 37 votes in the Odelsting-chamber.143 Contrary to Getz’ desires, the 
parliament demanded it was to be reshaped so that local knowledge and local representation 
would become more prominent. The strongest antagonists even argued against having a 
Trustee-board altogether. They rather suggested that the School-commission could work just 
as effectively. However, Qvam, who was a dominant figure on the political left, argued that 
the draft proposal written by Getz could just as much be referred to as an appendix to the 
Public School Act, as much as Getz claimed it to be an appendix to the Criminal Code. He 
thereby argued that the school movement on the left was supposed to feel accommodated. 
Qvam argued that it was a need for a legal code that guaranteed a functional public school 
system. Hence, members of parliament across the political spectrum could agree that the 
asylum-system was needed.144  
Qvam clearly illustrates how the legal code on child protection finally received broad 
support, and that the educationalists on the left could agree to it. This point, however, would 
not undermine the grand architecture of the legal code or its timing inspired in general by 
European criminalist thinking. Although Getz’ recommendations on the design of the 
decision-making body were rejected in favor of less prominent state-representation, the legal 
code would serve the intended function, albeit as a more democratic decision-making body.  
The final composition of the Trustee-board of 1896 had five laymen as members in 
addition to a medical practitioner, the priest and the local judge.145 Hence, the so-called 
democratic element was in majority. The five laymen, of whom at least one had to be a 
woman, were appointed by formannskapet (the executive committee) in each municipality. 
                                                 
143 Dahl (1985). 
144 Qvam in Oth.Prp.No.33 (1893): 3. 
145 LBFB §6. 
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The chairman of the board was to be elected by the board, which was in contrast to the 
proposal put forth by Hagerup where the local judge had the role as the chairman of the board. 
The educationalists on the left thought that this would make the Trustee-board just another 
type of criminal court, which would be superfluous, since courts already existed and 
functioned well. The judge was, nevertheless, a permanent member of the board, and hence 
served the same intended function for Hagerup.146 
The aim of this arrangement was to ensure that the board acted through local and 
personal knowledge, as well as unbiased knowledge represented by the priest and the medical 
practitioner. These two different knowledge bases were to inform the decision-making, 
whereas the judge was to ensure an adequate level of legal protection of all throughout the 
entire case-proceeding. Those who represented local knowledge could be rendered as 
knowledgeable regarding local circumstances, and knew where the shoe pinched in the local 
area that a specific Trustee-board governed. The unbiased knowledge the professionals 
possessed provided procedural constraints upon the laymen. The decision-making within the 
board was achieved on simple majority and ensured that the judge, the priest and the doctor 
could be outvoted if necessary. 
The Trustee-board were legally equipped to call on witnesses, investigate and even 
search the home of the child, all in an effort to inform the decisions that was about to be 
made.147 Before the Trustee-board was to reach a decision, they gave parents, or 
representatives of the child, a chance to express their views, as a way for those affected to be 
heard and contradict claims made by others.148 This opportunity was deemed as beneficial, as 
the board could evaluate both sides before reaching a decision. The process allowed both the 
child and the parents to voice their views (although written testimony could also be 
submitted). In the final legal proposal, it was stressed that the board was not in any way to 
resemble a court, and it was not bound by any distinct procedural design.149 
                                                 
146 That the legal code was administered by the Ministry of Church and Education have led some to believe that 
the LBFB became a victory for the educationalists on the political left. However, the driving force behind the 
whole proposal is well documented as being the positivist criminalist thought at the time. The reason for 
adhering to the minor changes of the educationalists is better understood as something purely pragmatic in order 
to get the draft proposal through parliament so that a legal could be established. Furthermore, as Super-Intendent 
of Education, Karl Aas, argued, it was more a point not to have this new type of legislation as being a part of the 
Criminal Code—Hagerup (1893b): 108. 
147 LBFB §14. 
148 LBFB §13. 
149 Oth.Prp.No.6 (1896): 22. LBFB §41, Hagerup (1893a): 54-55. 
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The decisions the Trustee-board made could vary between five different measures 
(§§1 and 4): Disciplinary action of the child, place orphans in homes that ensured their care 
(most often private), coercively remove children and place them in families, or confine them 
to mild or strict school-asylums. Although every measure was to ensure some sort of 
correction, the last options, being the most drastic, were least used, but obviously caused the 
most debate. A grid of asylums was established all over Norway, and these asylums, and the 
children that they housed, were the most striking feature of this new child protection system.  
The Trustee-board was preoccupied predominantly with children up to the age of 
fifteen.150 They could, in special circumstances, keep a child that was placed into an asylum 
before the age of 18 up until the age of 21.151 The reason for raising the age-limit can be 
traced to a comment in the Norwegian Criminalist Association of 1892, as Getz argued that 
some needed to be kept because they were morally “backwarded” pupils. They did not 
deserve to be imprisoned for their antisocial behavior, but were still in need of correction.152  
3.6.“Moral”or“Normal”BehaviorisPreferred
The most appropriate point of departure to describe the order of expectations that the new 
legal order attempted to comply with, was the desire to protect an idea of what was desirable 
behavior, i.e. what was perceived of as “moral” or “normal.” All municipalities in Norway 
had established a decision-making body set to enforce correct child-rearing and thereby 
indirectly correct adulthood. The title of the legal code includes the word “neglect,” and it 
clearly points towards parents who have not done their duty to raise the child. Indirectly, the 
parents were charged with a duty to educate the child to become moral, i.e. that the child 
would develop into choosing a way to live life that was considered moral. Neglect had to be 
remedied through correction, which would ‘heal’ the child to no longer be undesirable for 
society.  
Thus, the system implied that lack of morality or the existence of neglect within a 
family would justify the coercive intrusion into family life and into the lives of children. The 
goal of such intrusion was to cure abnormality or rescue a child from the path towards 
abnormality. This line of arguing, where the problems were considered anti-social and thereby 
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an object of correction is clearly influenced by the French criminalist Alexandre Lacassagne, 
who famously expressed:  
“The criminal is a microbe that proliferates only in a certain environment. It is probably the 
environment that produces the criminal, but like a medium that has no microbes, it cannot make 
crime germinate on its own. Microbe and medium, the biological and the social, are hence the two 
fundamental aspects of criminality and constitute the essential data of criminal anthropology.”153
Lacassagne concluded that a society had the criminals it deserved, most significantly because 
the corrupted society allowed for the increase in corrupted and socially-degenerative 
behavior. This is why children stand in a significant position. If the children that were 
showing signs of neglect were treated adequately, they would develop into decent adults, or as 
Getz eloquently put it, “rip the evil up by its root.”154 
Correction and crime were thus both seen as prima facie evils. However, correction 
was thought to be justified wherever it counterbalanced the evil threat of criminal behavior.155 
The focus, it can be argued, was to diminish the threat of evil that morally neglected children 
constituted, namely that they would grow up to become members of the “criminal 
proletariat.”156 The costs of the correctional system would be outweighed by the positive 
consequences in course of time, due to the reduction in costs to maintain an expensive penal 
system. The society would, as Getz argued, in time harvest its fruits, as the “rawness” of 
criminality diminished.157 Thus, he continued, the society had to pay whatever the costs, and 
he painted a picture of a grave escalation of crime-rates if nothing was done.  
Tove Stang Dahl argues that a primary role for the new legal code was to develop a 
defense of society from its future criminals.158 However, this interpretation can be contested. 
For instance, Bernard Getz stresses the opposite in particular. When it comes to defending 
society against children that showed criminal inclinations, it was only argued that society 
needed protection against the most severe cases—not in general.159 Most children did not 
become relocated to asylums, but rather to other families. Hence, the total system of child 
protection that was established by the LBFB cannot support parts of Dahl’s conclusion. 
                                                 
153 Lacassagne quoted in Dedichen (1893): 23. The French Lyonne-School would hold that even though the 
criminal was a weakened organism it could be corrected, or “determine him in positive direction” – Dedichen 
(1893): 24. The French school held education through punishment as a way of correcting the criminal to become 
a normal person, See Kaluszynski (2006) for more. 
154 Getz (1892): 2. 
155 Getz (1892): 5. 
156 Getz (1892): 45. 
157 Getz (1892): 47. 
158 Dahl (1985).  
159 Getz (1892): 29. 
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Furthremore, the legal code introduced a system of correctional facilities because it wanted to 
re-introduce these children as normal adult individuals who would be able to contribute to the 
benefit of all, or at least not become a burden. They were not given correctional treatment 
because society needed protection from them, but rather that the children themselves needed 
protection from what they could become. In Getz’ terms, this was about distinctive means for 
pursuing a social or general good.160 The success of the new system would be entirely 
dependent upon the contribution that the correction of children was, to the effectiveness of 
fortifying a public good, i.e. strengthening what was perceived of as moral.  
3.7.TheOrderofExpectations:RestoringMorality
The order of expectation that can be argued has manifested itself can be explained by 
reference to especially two basic expectations. Although distinct, both basic expectations 
support the claim that a trustworthy child protection authority would be established if that 
system helped fortifying what was generally perceived of as “normal” or “moral.” The first 
can be dubbed correctional ideology. It can be illustrated through the fact that Getz did not 
have sufficient support to pass the legal code through parliament—namely by those on the 
political left. It basically consisted of a group of parliamentarians who saw the legal proposal 
as a means to a different end—namely to ensure a better public school for the rest of society. 
In order to reach this end, they would easily accept a legal code that would send 
troublemakers to asylums instead of public schools. The outcome would be a better school. 
This would mean that the school-system could ensure that pupils became familiarized into the 
established conception of morality, whereas children that stood in need of correction could 
hope to achieve it through increased discipline and correction.  
Second, basic expectation is shaped by criminalist thought. Bernhard Getz wrote a 
legal code on child protection in accordance with the currents of criminology at the time—it 
was dubbed positivist. It was accepted in Norway, not because of the wide-ranging 
knowledge of continental criminalist thought among those who participated in the public 
discourse, but because it applied reasons and evidence that were convincing.161 In 
combination with the support of the school movement on the Norwegian political left, the 
legal code was passed.162 Both of these reasons underpin the order of expectations, which can 
                                                 
160 Getz (1892): 15. 
161 Andenæs (1973b): 34. 
162 Many have argued that since Aas got his will of transferring the legal code from the Ministry of Justice to 
Ministry of Education, somehow the school-movement hijacked the entire legal-process and the new LBFB 
became not an appendix to the Criminal Code, but rather an appendix to the Elementary School Act. This is 
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be described as a desire to mend the problem of a growing threat towards what was deemed as 
“normal” or “moral.” Hence, child protection worthy of trust would secure “normality” or 
“morality.” This could be achieved through complying with basic expectations of the 
correctional ideology and criminalist thought.  
It was no longer maintained that criminal procedure could work preventively on the 
increase of crime among children. Imprisonment did not work as a deterrent on children, and 
a truism had developed in that children did not know the consequences of their own actions, 
or even that their actions could be ruled as illegal. In line with criminalist thought, Getz 
argued that children not fit for family-life, had to be cared for and corrected in asylums to 
become moral adults.  
Furthermore, at the asylum, each child had to be educated, through labor or school, to 
become “moral”. This would mean that a child received the status as “moral” after correction. 
While the Trustee-board provided the input to the correctional system, and consequently 
ensured that children within the jurisdiction of the board could remain normal, the asylum-
system ensured that once the child was corrected, it could be returned. As a result, one third of 
all children affected by the Trustee-board were sent away from their custodians. Was it to be 
expected that they would become moral persons?163 This will be elaborated upon in the next 
chapter.  
The defense of what was held to be “normal” or “moral” was what could devise a 
system of child protection that was worthy of trust in the period of its introduction. With 
increasing number of individuals exhibiting undesirable behavior, what was found “moral” 
became gradually corrupted. In order to re-establish trust towards the system of criminal law 
and the public educational system, the legal order of the LBFB had to operate according to 
expectations that could mend a downward spiral of criminal and abnormal behavior and 
rescue “morality.” The educationalist-left feared that the newly introduced public educational 
system would be destroyed by delinquents, whereas the criminalists on the right feared that 
crime would corrupt society. They were both united in the common effort of rescuing a 
general good.  
                                                                                                                                                        
strange since the entire infrastructure that the legal code rests upon, is based in Bernard Getz initial draft of 1892, 
which is a tribute to criminalist thought. 
163 Arctander & Dahlstrøm (1932): 22-23. 
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 The very motivation for sending children to asylums was to correct them so that they 
would not become abnormal adults. Thus, it can be argued that the fear that they would 
develop into distrustful members of society was the driving thrust for instituting the LBFB. A 
downward spiral of abnormality would create an increase of distrust that could destroy 
society, and in order to remedy the origin of such a problem, children had to be taught how to 
behave. Their behavior would become, if the reform worked, acceptable by the greater 
society. Thus, if this legal code was implemented, the greater society would not only abolish 
crime, but also have a workable school-system. After correction, the children would have 
become “moral” persons that could be trusted. Both the educationalists on the left and the 
criminalists on the right agreed that children should be brought up to become moral persons. 
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4.1953:ProtectingtheFamilytoProtecttheChild
 
 
 
 
 
The legislative process moving to reform the LBFB was put to a halt during the Second 
World War. The plan to reform the entire system had begun in the 1930s. The reform of 1953 
was a result of an initiative made by the majority-government of Einar Gerhardsen’s 
Arbeiderparti (Labour-party) on November 21st 1947. The exploratory committee was 
established same year, and was a continuation of the work of Sosiallovkomiteen (Social Act 
Committee) already established in 1935. The Social Act Committee was led by municipal 
court judge Inge Debes. This commission was mandated to propose a legal reform governing 
social welfare in its entirety.164 The influence and domination of Debes’ work within the 
Social Act Committee of 1935 was so great that after he passed away in 1945, the work 
seized. As a consequence, Debes did not become the main author of the second legal code on 
child protection. However, the work Debes did manage on child protection was not in vain.165 
Child protection was no longer seen as the project of the educationalist-left or the 
criminalist-right. It had moved into an entirely new category of social legislation. This 
development is an implication of how the order expectations had developed. The legal order 
of the LBFB no longer complied with the order of expectations at the time of Debes. Since 
what was deemed as worthy of trust had changed considerably, the time had come to establish 
a new legal order that could again comply with the order of expectations. Once the order of 
expectations again could be embedded in the legal order, child protection would again 
become worthy of trust. 
In November 1947, Sven Oftedal, minister of Sosialdepartementet (Ministry of Social 
Affairs) in the Gerhardsen-government appointed barnevernskomiteen (the Child Welfare 
                                                 
164 Debes (1939): 1. 
165 In Innst. I (1951): 5. His work is credited as being a part of the investigatory efforts made to the report that 
led to the reform in 1953. In this vein, we can argue that he in fact can be credited for instigating the reform of 
1953 by the work he undertook as the chairmen of the Social Act Committee of 1935. 
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Committee).166 It was mandated to “consider questions regarding the revision and further 
development of child protection and the rest of child law.”167 The new committee was 
mandated to continue the work of Debes, but only to the extent of examining legal codes 
relevant to children’s issues apart from the remainder of the social welfare legislation.  
The chairman of the new committee was initially Aaslaug Aasland, but when she 
replaced Oftedal as minister at the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1948, it became apparent that 
she would not perform adequately as both minister and chairman of this committee. 
Undersecretary to Aasland, K. J. Øksnes, replaced her as new chairman. The committee 
submitted its draft-proposal in 1951, which marked the birth of a parliamentary process that 
would result in a new legal code from 1953 that replaced the LBFB. However, intentions to 
reform the LBFB had already been called upon a decade after its introduction.168 This was 
especially true with regard to correctional ideology. Within the draft-proposal it was admitted 
that many years had gone by without any attempts to correct the shortcomings and mistakes 
of the LBFB. The shortcomings were many.  
On July 17th 1953, more than half a century after the introduction of the LBFB, a new 
legal code was adopted by parliament. It was argued that it would alter the way in which child 
protection would work.169 From this time on, child protection in Norway would become far 
more proactive and solve problems within families before the need to intervene coercively. 
The time was ripe to introduce a much more elaborate system of proactive child welfare. The 
order of expectations that underpinned child protection had shifted, and a focus upon non-
coercive and family-based measures had gained momentum. I will refer to the system of non-
coercive proactive efforts as child welfare. 
4.1.ThePathtowardReform
The LBFB of 1896 was criticized immensely during its reign, but in one way or the other, all 
former attempts to reform had failed to correct its shortcomings.170 Prior to the reform of 
1953, it was argued that the LBFB practically ran counter to its original intent. Getz’ ideas 
had now become a correctional utopia, and the reality at the asylums was void of its original 
promises. It was established that the LBFB-system was a problem—a problem that backfired 
                                                 
166 Since the Norwegian norm is to translate barnevern to child welfare, I will do so here. However, barnevern 
directly translates to child protection and not child welfare.  
167 Royal Decree of 7th of November 1947 cited in Innst. I (1951): 5. 
168 See Innst. O. XVII (1953). 
169 See e.g. Innst. I (1951): 10-11. 
170 Innst. I (1951): 11. 
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by letting immoral and abnormal children back into society because correction failed. The 
LBFB was thought to no longer be able to ensure that children were saved from moral 
corruption. It was argued that the LBFB and the Trustee-board had, in fact, despite intents and 
purpose was conceived of as a part of the penal-system in Norway. The new reform of 1953 
was to turn away from the system established by the LBFB, or at least so it was argued, and 
re-establishing a modern system of child protection.171 
 The immediate years after the Second World War were pervaded by reform-starved 
participants in the debate revolving child protection.172 The path towards reform had begun 
long before the committee of 1947 had started their work. In order to delineate this process, 
four different elements will be presented that pushed the order of expectations and hence 
became significant to the reform: First is the publication of the book “Under loven” (Beneath 
the Code) of 1907. Second is the Statutes of Castberg of 1915. Third is the initial reform 
effort by Sosialkomiteen (Social Committee) of 1935. Fourth and last is the shift in 
correctional ideology.  
4.1.1.“Underloven”
“Under loven” (“Beneath the Code”) was a novel written by Bjørn Evje in 1907 under the 
pseudonym of Mikael Stolpe.173 It is a short novel portraying the lives of children at the strict 
school-asylum at Bastøy, an island in the Oslo fjord. Bjørn Evje had worked at Bastøy and at 
Toftes Gave, which was another school-asylum. At Bastøy, he worked as both a teacher and 
acting director. Thus, given his first-hand experience, Evje knew much about what the 
children experienced who were placed in this asylum. His book describes, in an allegedly 
fictional manner, the system established by LBFB; it provides descriptions of cruel and often 
arbitrary punishments, and it describes harsh discipline, and lack of professional knowledge 
among those working in the system.174 A description of cruel punishment is given as follows: 
“Jan saw the director raise his huge birch rod above his head and how his face became hard and 
strong, he heard the sound of the birch shriek in the air – and it was as if his hole lower body died 
and became ice cold for only to feel thousands of glowing pieces of iron be drilled into his body 
and burned into him. But he did not have the time to sense this for long, only to hear again the 
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173 Stolpe (1907). 
174 This exact problem was something Getz was fully aware of could happen. Namely that if the school-asylums 
were not properly run, then the entire system would collapse, see Getz (1892): 20. According to Getz, the 
school-asylums should have been professionalized.  
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shriek in the air and a slap against his own body. This time he felt that the birch sucked itself into 
his flesh.”175
What made portrayals like this shocking for the general public was the fact that it was written 
by Evje, who was, due to his background as acting director and a teacher at a school asylum, 
capable of providing accurate descriptions of what actually took place at Bastøy school-
asylum. Although the book was fiction, it had an impact as if it was real documentation on the 
everyday life of children at the school-asylums.  
Evje’s motive for writing this book could have been, according to Ustvedt, a desire to 
give a critique of the use of large correctional asylums instead of smaller ones. Evje argued 
the case that smaller and more homogenous entities should be considered as best practice, and 
hence replace the larger asylums that allegedly did not work.176 Hence, it was a critique of the 
correctional ideology that had dominated the order of expectations at the inception of the 
LBFB. The publication of the book sparked a huge parliamentary inquiry, shedding light on 
the dark side of school-asylum practice.  
At first, the protagonists of the LBFB, who predominantly represented the asylum-
system, were seemingly able to put out the flames that Evje had lit. However, due to their 
eagerness to silence Evje, and their efforts to criminalize him in media, the government had to 
intervene. As a result, a parliamentary-led investigation that was meant to examine the 
credibility of Evje, boomeranged on the directors and personnel of the large school-asylums. 
Ustvedt argues that in the end, it was the protests against Evje – not only from the managers 
at Bastøy and Falstad school asylums, but from the management at Toftes Gave, an alleged 
“mild” school asylum – that led Kirke- og undervisningsdepartementet (Ministry of Church 
and Education) to proceed with a public investigation that, in the end, resulted in providing 
support for Evje’s novel. Hence, the so-called “skolehjemssaken” (the School-Asylum 
Inquiry) was established.177 The inquiry was initiated early in 1908 and resulted in the 
establishment of Skolehjemskomiteen (School-Asylum Committee) in parliament. The 
committee delivered its report the year after, which was devastating to the asylum-system.178  
                                                 
175 Stolpe (1907): 42-43. Although the wording here provides a kind of drama to the story, the punishment by 
rods were normal, and the wounds of the boys was sometimes severe, see Ustvedt (2000). 
176 “Central to the novel was the critique of the large school asylums and a corresponding defense of the smaller 
asylums…The system was flawed, yes, even condemned to failure beforehand” Ustvedt (2000): 98. 
177 Ustvedt (2000): 95ff and 110-119. 
178 Om skolehjemmenes ordning (1909). The report consists of, among other things, testimonies given by various 
personnel, pupils and other parties at the school-asylums at Bastøy, Toftes Gave and Falstad. Although the 
personnel denies most of the allegations made by the pupils, too many of the personnel, who in this case are 
credible, do argue that corporal punishment was used extensively in the asylums. The worst case is the dairymaid 
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Now the focus was on what was viewed by many as obviously bad circumstances for 
the children at the large school-asylums and the strict asylum at Bastøy. The inquiry 
concluded that the strict and the large school-asylums should be divided internally into 
smaller asylums within one large organization.179 Most important for the general public was 
the need to abolish all corporal punishment. 
 “Toftes Gave,” a large school-asylum established long before the introduction of the 
LBFB, was devoted special attention by the inquiry-committee.180 Its historically harsh 
treatment of children was upheld by Director Nils Navelsaker. He was a close friend of 
Bernhard Getz and had taken office already in 1890. He had maintained a belief in firm 
discipline and corporal punishment of children (as did Getz), and he had ignored that the 
LBFB did not mandate corporal punishment.181 It was significant for the committee’s work 
that the author of the LBFB had direct knowledge regarding the harsh discipline at “Toftes 
gave,”182 where discipline was established through a military organization. The committee 
concluded that the military organization had been proved flawed not only in Norway, but also 
in Sweden and Denmark. Although the model had some success in other and larger nation-
states, with larger populations, it did not fit well in Norway.183 For instance, the argument 
against the organization of “Toftes Gave” was that it did not open up for a family-design 
within the asylum. It had an old military organization and could, according to the inquiry, no 
longer maintain the status as a school-asylum in Norway, and should rather be disbanded.184 
The report from the School Commission even revealed that the toughness at the school-
asylums at Bastøy and “Toftes Gave” often involved grave corporal punishment and lack of 
understanding for the situation that the children in fact were in. Something had to be done.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Eline Nyhus at Toftes Gave that in 1904 had a corpse of a young boy made ready for burial. She insinuated that 
the death was caused by three beatings of the cane from the renowned director at the time – Navelsaker, See Om 
skolehjemmenes ordning (1909): 169. The child suffered from a weak heart, and Navelsaker, who did not deny 
he did beat the child with a cane, argued that he was a weakling, and that was the cause of death. Even though 
we argue that Nyhus was wrong to insinuate that the cause of death was the beating, which might be wrong of us 
to do, it nevertheless portray a director who knew about the child’s weaknesses but nevertheless chose to beat 
him. 
179 Om skolehjemmenes ordning (1909): 83. 
180 See e.g. Asbjørnsen (1908) for an elaboration on this place. 
181 Vogt (1950): 96. 
182 Getz himself argued that corporal punishment should be an option, and that it should be up to the discretion of 
the Director of any school-asylum whether or not corporal punishment should be used - Getz (1892): 95. It might 
also be added that what was corporal punishment earlier was when the pain was inflicted on the body of the 
child. However, many of the punishments would be referred to as corporal today. Solitary confinement, 
withholding meals and hard labor would by many also be rendered corporal punishment. Although consistent at 
the time, Getz’ argued for a type of punishment of children that were particularly brutal, and especially because 
these were children that would push the limits and temper of the asylum personnel to the limit (ibid.).  
183 Om skolehjemmenes ordning (1909): 82-83. 
184 Om skolehjemmenes ordning (1909): 112. 
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Matias Kluge, a school asylum director, articulates some of the main problems in his 
evaluation of the School-asylum inquiry, which is annexed to the report on the school-
asylum.185 The most significant weakness that was unveiled with regard to the Trustee-board 
was how the placement of children was decided upon. The investigation into the life of the 
particular child was often absent. Furthermore, in his view, it had also become established 
that the strict and the large school-asylums did not correct the child; instead, the asylums 
punished children for their bad behavior. For Kluge, in order to mend the problems with the 
LBFB, the law-makers would need to focus more on the family. Parents had to become more 
involved in the rehabilitation procedure of the child, and the child should be subjected to 
family-like circumstances at the asylums. In this sense he agreed with Evje that the problem 
was the correctional ideology.  
Kluge points towards a shift in the order of expectations regarding child protection. 
The criticism captures a move away from the correctional ideology of the school-asylums, 
and towards family-based protection of children. The LBFB was a top-driven legal 
development that did not take into account the public reaction towards the LBFB. As a result, 
the cry for reform came from the grassroots of the asylum-system, media, and ordinary 
citizens. An argument had begun to take shape stipulating that children were not to be 
subjected to correction at asylums. 
The view that the solution to the problem of failed care was essentially located 
somewhere else than in the child alone, namely within family and the child’s place within it, 
started to emerge. Every child, Kluge argues, should be seen as in need of a family and 
family-like surroundings. Children need the safe environment that the family provides, 
allowing it to grow up. This is the new direction that the reform-movement had begun to point 
out—a direction that would point towards a shift within the order of expectations. What was 
deemed as worthy of trust had shifted from correction towards a focus upon protecting the 
child in its natural surroundings, i.e. in the child’s symbiotic relationship to the family.  
 Although the inquiry explicitly investigated the large asylums in the asylum-system, it 
was also the spark of a nation-wide critique of the LBFB as the root cause of the mistakes of 
the asylum-system. The solidity of the LBFB had begun to crack, and for the next decade, the 
stage was set for these issues to be debated in parliament. However, as will be shown, no solid 
amendments cleared the way for dealing with the problems that had surfaced.  
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85 
 
4.1.2.TheStatutesofCastberg–theNewWelfareDimension
Until 1935, when the social-committee in parliament, with Inge Debes as the chairman, was 
mandated to investigate the legislation on social welfare in Norway, no reform efforts had 
been successful in dealing with the problems facing the system of the LBFB. The only 
significant legal development was the introduction of welfare-measures improving conditions 
for children at home, also known as the Statutes of Castberg, after its strongest protagonist 
Johan Castberg. 
Castberg became the minister in the recently established Ministry of Social Affairs in 
1913. In 1915, many legal codes were drafted from his office, including Lov om foreldre og 
ektebarn (Parents and Legitimate Children Act), Lov om barn utenfor ekteskap (Illegitimate 
Children Act) and Lov om forsorg for barn (Child Relief Act). These legal codes were 
directed towards the welfare of children at home, implying that the state should take 
responsibility for ensuring that parents in need received relief to cope with child rearing.  
In 1909, Nicolai Rygg published a statistical account showing that Norway ranked 
second amongst European states, after Denmark, in mortality rates between legitimate and 
illegitimate children.186 The alleged reason was that illegitimate children were often relocated 
and not fed and cared for adequately. Castberg had promoted the social state and especially 
welfare relief for children from the end of the 1880s, but not until he was offered the job as 
minister in the Gunnar Knutsen Government in 1913, did his goals become attainable.187 In 
his view, legal codes could be crafted and enacted upon that could remedy the problems of the 
high mortality rate among illegitimate children.  
The driving thrust for Castberg’s engagement was a social justice-ideology influenced 
by three different traditions—British rights-based liberalism, an idea of solidarity and the 
German socialist Lassalle.188 First, to him, a nation-state’s ranking was entirely dependent 
upon the rights it gave to women and children. The only time that individual rights did not 
automatically receive his support, was when such rights stood against the solidity of the 
national community. In other words, he did not support measures that could ruin the solidarity 
among Norwegians. 
                                                 
186 In Seip (1984): 196. 
187 Seip (1984): 193. 
188 Slagstad (2001): 168. Reading Slagstad’s account of Castberg is completely different from Anne-Lise Seip’s 
account - Seip (1984): 194. She portrays Castberg as a national-socialist, something that is not reflected in 
Slagstad’s depiction of Castberg as a person. This is very important, because Seip gives the impression that child 
welfare law was rooted in a fascist mindset. This is inaccurate to say the least. 
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Secondly, the establishment of solidarity was very important for the wellbeing of the 
state system. As he argued, the strong should not be allowed to crush the weak. The solidarity 
between the different social strata of a nation-state would ensure that those at the lower levels 
were taken care of by the stronger. To him, rights were to be provided to strengthen the 
solidity of popular sovereignty with the aim of always lending priority to those who had the 
least. Only then, according to Castberg, would everyone truly become liberated.  
Third, the German socialist philosopher, Ferdinand Lassalle, inspired Castberg to 
believe in a nation-state that could rise above class conflicts. The state was to be the tool that 
emancipated people by helping those in need first. The state could, for example, ensure that 
people became more self-relied. Castberg’s study of Lassalle was thought to be his inspiration 
for becoming a “practical reform politician.”189 His work as a social-engineer was not merely 
focusing upon child welfare and child protection, but had a much broader aim for introducing 
a general conception of social justice upon the nation state itself.  
However, the important aspects of his work for the present study are not the statutes 
per se, as they had no influence over the coercive measures in child protection. However, it is 
the very articulation of the new mindset that had begun to gain support in Norway, namely an 
increasing focus upon the home and the ability for children to grow up and become decent 
members of society through the natural environment that was provided by the family. A new 
type of public responsibility is reflected through the work of Castberg. He represents the 
dawn of a new type of reflection—the collective responsibility for the general welfare of the 
child and the family.  
4.1.3.TheSocialActCommittee
As already mentioned, Sosiallovkomiteen (the Social Act Committee) was established in 1935 
and was led by Inge Debes. He was a Labour-party protagonist. Debes had great influence on 
how the social policy within the Labour-party became articulated. The Social Act Committee 
was set to solve two problems. The first was to gather and rationalize social welfare 
legislation. The committee was tasked with dissecting the entire Norwegian legal corpus on 
social welfare in order to establish more rational and coherent social welfare legislation. The
second was to provide plans for simplifying administration. This was particularly relevant for 
the legal codes on child relief/welfare and child protection.190 
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 The Social Act Committee did not have sufficient time to finish a draft-proposal for 
amending the child protection system. As the Second World War broke out, their work was 
put to an effective halt. Their work was, however, impressive in other areas of social welfare 
and, as such, it was a success for the first committee established by the Labour-party.191 
 When Inge Debes argued for social welfare that primarily focused on children, 
advocating for both child welfare and child protection policies, he did not only refer to the 
LBFB, but also to the Statutes of Castberg.192 He saw that the entire system of legislation that 
had developed concerning children was in need of being gathered into one legal code with 
one decision-making body and one administration. This decision-making body had to be the 
central node of the system and have the ability to work with the families to make sure that the 
problems could be solved within the families, as well as having the right to implement 
coercive measures. In this sense, Debes had argued the case of proactive child welfare in 
combination with coercion-based child protection in one and the same decision-making body.   
 As Castberg belonged to the political left, so did Debes. He was a social-democrat all 
through the 1920s and was also actively involved in the journal dubbed Sosialt arbeid (Social 
work). As Rune Slagstad argues, “Debes belonged to Castberg’s legal-reformist tradition. 
Castberg and Debes signaled different stages in socialism’s transformation to a social-
ethically welfare ideology in harmony with the economic growth of society.”193 This 
illuminates also the general shift in the order of expectations. From the school asylum inquiry 
that initiated a wide-ranging criticism of the correctional system and the criminalist 
correctional ideology, to family-based pro-active child welfare. 
4.1.4.TheNewCorrectionalIdeology:ProtectingChildrenwithintheFamily
The legal code of 1953 was referred to as Lov om barnevern (Child Welfare Act - BVL).194 
The LBFB had a name that did not signal that the child was to be protected; rather, it was the 
legal code established for the treatment of neglected children. Children were thought to be in 
need of a trustee that could lead the child back on right track. However, from now on, the 
correctional ideology was challenged, and the child was no longer to blame—raising a child 
had become a social problem in need of social solutions. 
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 The new legal code of 1953 was to establish a new decision-making body to replace 
the Trustee-board. It was dubbed barnevernsnemnda (The Child Welfare Board – BVN). In 
comparison to the former body of law, and its decision-making within the Trustee-board, the 
idea had now developed towards the child being in need of a healthy developmental 
environment.  
Knut Sveri suggests that an important reason for this change in motives from 
correction to protection was a result of new discoveries in psychology, and especially the 
influence of Sigmund Freud’s developmental psychology.195 Sveri argued that, conforming to 
the influence from psychology, it had become apparent that children were vulnerable and 
dependent upon their parents for developing into decent persons.196 The new system of child 
welfare would ensure that families raised their children in a decent fashion; thus, the goal was 
to both ensure the welfare of the child within the family and to protect the child through 
coercive means if needed. According to the report delivered by the Øksnes-committee, 
submitted in 1951, proactive measures were to be put into effect in order to avoid removing 
the child from the parents. According to the report, a mother, father and children developed in 
a symbiotic relationship that provided the children with important psychological ties to the 
parents. These ties should no longer be so easily cut through coercive measures. On the 
contrary, child welfare was from now on to implement non-coercive in-house measures as 
long as it did not threaten the child or the family to not coercively intervene.197 
One of the most important contributions that led to legally entrenching the new focus 
was provided by the sixth attachment to the report of the Child Welfare Committee, given by 
the very influential helsedirektør (the Secretary of Health and Human Services) Karl Evang. 
To Evang, it was very important to maintain the state’s responsibility for social hygiene, and 
which involved ensuring that children grew up in a decent manner.198 He had, as Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, direct influence upon how the new legal code was to be shaped. 
He argued for the introduction of professional expertise to assist in curing the ills in child 
rearing, i.e. to assist families that were in need of assistance. In his view, the child protection 
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system could become more systematically assisted by professionals. He especially 
emphasized three areas where “preventive psychiatric health-services” would be important:  
“1: Education among parents, and for the schools also the teachers, about basic principles in 
mental-hygiene for the treatment and rearing of children, as well as how one should relate to 
ordinary occurring behavior problems. 
2: Correction of lighter behavioral problems of adjustment for the individual child, mainly by 
advice to parents and to the school.  
3: Examination, with a goal to ascertain graver psychological disturbances among the children, 
mentally disabled, grave behavioral disorders and neurotic conditions, for referrals to 
specialists”199
The goal was to counter developments of what he referred to as “insufficiency-conditions” 
and create “socially well adjusted persons, and hence useful, and happy citizens.”200 
 The proposals signed by Evang, and which aimed at furnishing child protection law 
with the possibility for professionals to implement preventive measures to curb parental 
neglect in child rearing, received immediate attention. The reaction was the call for something 
to be done immediately to see that child law were designed with such potential—namely to 
introduce a proactive child welfare system and a child protection system at the same time.201 
 The explicit correction of abnormal behavior was no longer at centre. It had become 
acknowledged that it was not one way to correct a child into becoming moral, but that 
families would provide different, but decent care of the child. How children were brought up 
would from now on be allowed to vary among families, as opposed to the old LBFB-system.  
4.2.TheChildWelfareAct:TheEfforttoChange
The reports portraying shortcomings in the LBFB-system were many.202 Some leaders of the 
Trustee-boards would, for instance, use their privilege to temporarily remove a child from the 
custody of the parents, and then attempt to convince the rest of the members of the Trustee-
board that removal of the child was the only right course of action. Another, and even worse, 
practice was that the chairman would make a decision on a certain case, and then circulate the 
proposal by mail—effectively undermining the process of co-decision. Both of these practices 
were illegal, but the chairs of the Trustee-boards, and especially in rural areas, did not have 
enough knowledge or practice to actually understand the implications of such actions. In the 
Øksnes-report, these practices were not only commented upon as illegal, but also disgraceful.  
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 The Child Protection Committee’s mandate was very broad. Everything was set for a 
large revision of the system that the LBFB had established. The reform efforts were made by 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and not the Ministry of Church and Education, and can 
illustrate a shift in the treatment of children. They were mandated to answer three main 
problems:  
1. Foster a greater unity within the administration of child protection.  
2. Evaluate the need to produce one body of law dealing with relocated children. 
3. Propose measures that the public can attempt to institute to care for children in need. 
With such a mandate, the new legal order would also become very different compared to the 
old one. The new legal order was to apply professional competence to a much wider degree, 
and especially to inform decision-making. The new decision-making body was once again to 
receive public support, and especially because it had a primary focus upon non-coercive child 
welfare. The mandate provided the ability to replace the entire LBFB-system—to once again 
make the order of expectations be thoroughly embedded in the legal order.  
The way to ensure that the new child welfare system was become worthy of trust, was 
to ensure that the decision-making body reflected the will of those living in each local 
community in combination with the relevant expertise in the field.203 Knowledge of the 
specific family and professional knowledge would effectively cure the ills in child rearing 
through in-house measures. Allegedly, the standard of care that a family was supposed to 
provide was best known among those living in the same community as the child. This idea 
was, at the time, in great contrast to the practice of the Trustee-board, which was perceived of 
as a state-driven deterrent against bad behavior amongst children. Furthermore, the 
professionalism was no longer dominated by correction, but rather non-coercive socially 
based family-assistance. The new decision-making body was to provide democratic 
legitimacy in combination with professional expertise; and, the legal order would establish 
child welfare. Child protection, on the other hand, with its need to intervene coercively, would 
from now on only become used in the worst cases, but through the same decision-making 
body as the one implementing non-coercive measures.  
The mandate provided to the Øksnes-committee could ensure the establishment of a 
system incorporating new currents of professional knowledge in child protection, in particular 
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with respect to a child’s psychological development and behavior.204 The subsequent legal 
proposition suggested that the new decision-making board, rather than being populated by 
professionals, was to be populated by laymen who sought professional guidance in attempting 
to avoid the need for coercive measures and also reach decisions that incorporated best 
available knowledge. 
Safeguarding democratic legitimacy was held to be imperative for decisions involving 
coercion. Only by ensuring democratic legitimacy would decisions receive acceptance. Each 
municipality became authorized to make sure that children received the necessary level 
welfare it needed to develop in that particular municipality. Thus, for the board to be 
perceived as representative, the decision-making itself had to be representative for the local 
population. In 1967, the local representatives within the BVN were predominantly 
housewives, followed by teachers.205 These were predominantly women, and it was firmly 
believed that housewives carried knowledge regarding the needs of children, and knew how to 
deal with difficult cases of child rearing.  
4.3.GreaterUnityinLaw
The mandate Øksnes received provided the potential of uniting all types of legislation 
involving children into one legal code. The LBFB focused only on coercive measures. 
However, there were many other different legal codes that affected children, such as the 
Statutes of Castberg. The unification within law affecting children also led to the 
establishment of the new local BVN. This board would effectively take over the work of the 
Trustee-board. Every municipality in Norway was to have one, and it consisted of five 
members appointed by kommunestyret (the Municipal council) for a period of four years.206 
 The different arrangements that dealt with children were located in five different legal 
codes prior to the reform of 1953. This broad spectrum made it hard to build any coherent and 
legally just system within child welfare and child protection. The first and the most important 
one was the LBFB that included the design of the Trustee-board. The second was Lov om 
offentlig forsorg (Public Poor-relief Act) of May 19th 1900. It dealt with children that could 
not be supported by their parents but who were still not relocated by the Trustee-boards. The 
Poor-Relief Commission was not authorized to implement coercive measures. The third was 
Lov om tilsyn av pleiebarn (the Oversight of Foster Children Act) of April 29th 1905, which 
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dealt with the oversight of relocated children. The fourth legal code was Lov om forsorg for 
barn (Poor-relief Act for Children) of April 10th 1915 with similar provisions for oversight as 
the previous. The fifth and last legal code was a recent amendment to the two former childcare 
provisions of August 22nd 1947, that relied upon the public to control and approve private 
institutions were children were kept. With the reform, the LBFB and parts of the Poor-relief 
Act were abolished (the board of public health lost some provisions regarding foster-children 
as well) and the decision-making was centralized under the BVN. Ot.prp.nr.56 (1952) made it 
clear that gathering all the legal codes affecting children into one was of highest priority. 
Hence, it established one institution to replace all the others. The BVN became the highest-
ranking unit in charge of all cases in child welfare and child protection within the local 
municipal administration. 
 The composition of barnevernsnemnda (the Child Welfare Board – BVN) caused a stir 
in parliament when the bill was put forth. The minority supported the logic behind the 
Trustee-board, although agreed that the Trustee-boards could not continue on the same track. 
They advocated for permanent members, such as the priest, the medical practitioner, an 
educational specialist, the representative from the system of poor relief etc. to become 
members of the board. However, the left-wing in parliament, and especially the Labour-party, 
had not only a majority government, but also a huge grasp on the public, and it went their 
way. Hence, the second design of decision-making board could reflect a pure Labour-party 
ideology. They argued the case that the board was to represent the public, so that that the 
governed were given the chance to govern.207 The central node of the BVL was to have a 
decision-making body that was to reflect the general, albeit local, democratic point of view. 
This popular appointed board would reflect local self-government regarding child rearing.  
The point of departure for the new BVL was that the parents was to be responsible for 
child rearing, and if they were inadequate, they were to be empowered to manage the care 
situation.208 Children were no longer seen as accountable for themselves, as individual agents 
that had to be corrected and reintegrated by the state if it was deemed as necessary. Children 
were the responsibility of the parents, and of the family, and hence the child belonged therein. 
A child was not capable of functioning alone—it was in need of a healthy family. Child 
protection thus focused on non-coercive child welfare, and determined to conserve the family 
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as the most important safeguard for any child’s needs. If the family functioned correctly, the 
child would be happy and become a well-adjusted adult. This, at least, was the idea. 
4.4.TheOrganizationofAuthorizedCoercion:TheChildWelfareBoard(BVN)
The body of law of 1953 was a result of Ot.prp.nr.56 (1952) and the subsequent parliamentary 
debates. It included, just as LBFB did previously, a design of a new decision-making body 
that would stand as a central node in the work on child protection but now also child welfare.  
Each municipality was set up with one BVN (BVL §1) consisting of five members, 
both women and men, with particular knowledge and interests relevant for child rearing and 
child protection (§2 – first sentence). The Municipal Council appointed the members and the 
chairman for a four-year period. The board, if the chairman attended and whose vote counted 
as two (§4), could make decisions with only three members. In cases involving coercion, the 
vote needed a qualified majority on four members to support the decision (§4 – first 
sentence). However, if the case at hand was in need of implementing coercive measures, the 
decision-making body had to convene with the local judge (§5). According to §6, it was 
demanded that a comprehensive investigation into each case was the responsibility of the 
chairman of the board. Professional expertise was to be called upon whenever it was needed 
in order to ensure that each decision became informed and based upon best available 
knowledge. The Ministry of Social Affairs was to provide instructions with regard to practice 
of calling upon professional knowledge. 
BVL §8 stated that the child´s parents could present their case to the board. However, 
their lack of understanding for such a process prevented them from effectively presenting 
their cases and mount proper defense. In fact, the lack of a coherent way of arguing in cases 
established an unsteady process, and equal treatment would be hard to accomplish. 
Furthermore, §10 argued that the board itself was to make sure that the measures decided 
upon actually were carried out. If a case needed it, the leader of the board could temporarily 
take over the care of a child (§11), whereby the board had to convene as fast as possible. 
The board was to engage with coercive means in all cases were they deemed it 
appropriate (§16). They could intervene if the child was badly treated or were raised in 
unacceptable conditions that set the child´s health at risk (both physical and psychological), or 
that its development in itself was at risk. Such interventions called for evaluations regarding 
the treatment of the child (§6 – first sentence). The board could also intervene if the child did 
not receive the proper treatment due to inadequate care provided by the parents.  
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BVL’s §17 emphasized the democratic aspect of BVN’s design. It stated that every 
public official had to report to the BVN if they encountered anything suspicious that would be 
of interest to the board (§12). The board had the potential of drawing upon a huge network of 
public officials, as it had the assistance of every public official working with children. The 
second paragraph of §17 argued that the decision-making should be guided by a so-called 
child´s best principle.209 However, it also argued in the same paragraph that it could be better 
for other children if a troublesome child was removed from the family. This stressed the fact 
that the unity of the family was very central, and could trump the child’s best. It meant that it 
was better for difficult children to be removed from families if the family itself was 
threatened. This marks a clear focus upon the family, and that the family itself was to be 
protected. 
The board was set with the task to always react whenever someone had reported 
alleged failed care. The board was set to investigate by deploying social curators. These 
services were also to work as assistance to get parents and children back on track as a part of 
the new proactive child welfare-system. New measures had the aim of saving the family as an 
entity first, and the child second. The idea of exhausting every possible means of in-house 
measures before intervening coercively became the manner in which pro-active measures 
were developed. The LBFB did not have pro-active measures in any equivalent manner. 
 The emphasis on keeping the child in the custody of the parents by empowering the 
parents to become capable of providing care can be argued is the introduction of the principle 
of biological presumption. This principle is fundamental for a system of child welfare (as 
opposed to child protection).210 It implies that parents in need were to receive in-house 
measures that would make them capable of caring appropriately for their child, and hence 
empowering them to keep the child in their custody. If that did not work, the state would seek 
to solve the problem of child-rearing by intervening coercively.  
The in-house measures were not based on any systematic body of knowledge when the 
legal code came into effect. Any professionalization within child protection and child welfare 
were absent.211 This meant that in-house measures were guided by the common-sense of those 
                                                 
209 The principle of the child’s best (in mind) is not to be confused with the more modern version that stipulates 
the child’s best interest as a guiding principle. The latter is situated in the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.    
210 For an elaboration and discussion of the biological presumption, see Skivenes 2003. 
211 This was even the case when the discourse on child protection and professionalism entered the 1990s – see 
Eriksen & Skivenes (1997). 
95 
 
working within the child welfare system. This, combined with the fact that the BVN were 
democratically constituted, left the entire new system of child protection at the hands of 
locals. Even though professionals were involved in the decision-making in its preparatory 
stages, they did not make the decisions. 
4.5.TheOrderofexpectations:LocalProtectionofFamilies
In contrast to the new legally entrenched order of expectations stood the former one of 1896. 
The LBFB had the correctional ideology with the Trustee-boards as its core engine. Its goal 
was to correct children to become “normal” or “moral”. The Trustee-board intervened only 
when the corruption was deemed incessant – not before. It intervened to fix the consequences 
of failed care, and not becoming interventionist and prevent failed care from occurring.  
The decision-making body set in charge of child-protection cases changed in 1953 to 
the BVN. It changed from what was viewed as a fixed board of trustees to become a purely 
democratic local board. The principle of subsidiarity was further extended—the type of 
decision-making that was worthy of trust was reached by persons in proximity to the problem. 
The process moved from decision-making bodies that strived to ensure the legal security of 
children by enforcing “morality” and “normality” equally across Norway, to a decision-
making body that reached decisions according to what reasonable people would want to do in 
cases of inappropriate childcare. Any formal guidelines were omitted, no principles or rules of 
procedure on how to reach decisions. It had become important that each member was a 
layman that could perform decision-making that reflected the local solution to the local 
problem. The new legal code was devised to promote the harmonious nuclear family as a core 
value and as inherently good for each child to grow up in. In short, the order of expectations 
reflected in the LBFB had changed dramatically. The type of child protection that was 
deemed worthy of trust in 1953, viz. local family protection, was something completely 
different than the 1896 and its focus upon defending “normality” and “morality.” 
The lack of trust in the child protection system was to be repaired by removing the 
state driven supervision of the Trustee-board, and replace it with municipal decision-making. 
The Trustee-board had an inherent “coercive and condemning nature.”212 By way of 
promoting a proactive child welfare system, in addition to the coercive nature of child 
protection, Rakel Seweriin, a member of the Child Protection Committee in charge of 
delivering the initial draft proposal in 1951, argued that the new system would be “an 
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advisory and helping authority that everyone naturally would approach.”213 It was emphasized 
that the proactive child welfare system was to support the home environment and nuclear 
family, so that each child would grow up with the love and care of the parents. Coercion, it 
was argued, should only be used when the child’s health and development or the family was 
in evident danger. The emphasis on “morality”, that the LBFB had strived for, was no longer 
explicitly a part of the law.  
 From now on, local variations were cultivated by leaving it to the community in 
question to find answers to what type of measures should be implemented. Each municipality 
would decide in a manner that was appropriate for the specific municipality. This also implies 
that decision-making did not correspond necessarily to what other communities in Norway 
would do. The entire system of a pro-active child welfare established a preventive-therapeutic 
ideology, that would, albeit in a different manner to that of the LBFB, strive for defending 
what was now thought to be worthy of trust—namely the well-being of the nuclear family. It 
involved the defense of the family organization for the sake of a healthy local community. 
The time had come to implement a popular-democratic decision-making form that would 
draw upon the people’s desire to govern themselves and how they saw fit.214 The idea of a 
democratic design would entail a relationship between those governing to be on an equal level 
with the governed.  
 Here, we can see that the order of expectations clearly had changed, and that 
especially two basic expectations had developed to dominate. The first basic expectation was 
that the decision-making had to abide by a principle of democracy and subsidiarity to become 
worthy of trust. The second basic expectation dominant to the order of expectations was the 
new insights from developmental psychology that stressed the importance of the family. 
Decision-making worthy of trust had to respect the family-institution as the basic building-
block of any community. 
One main problem of the LBFB and the Trustee-board was its lack of local know-how 
regarding the situations of the families it affected, i.e. the lack of investigation. Moreover, the 
decision-making within the Trustee-board had an excruciating effect upon local 
communities.215 The time had come to implement decisions that did not need coercion, but 
would assist proactively the families in need—investigation was demanded to qualify 
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practice. If the public could assist the family, e.g. financially, to ensure that a child remained 
at home, the BVN was supposed to support it. From now on, the time had come to focus on 
the implementation of non-coercive in-house measures that could rescue the families so that 
the children did not need to be removed from the custody of the parents and from the 
community. Hence, it can be argued that the shifts in the order of expectations, and with the 
increased focus upon the family, ensured that a proactive child welfare service became 
established. 
The best way of making sure that families would cope was to let the locals decide for 
themselves how to ensure that children grew up with their families—it was “in accordance 
with the democratic attitude in the people.”216 This line of argument pervaded the new reform 
of child welfare, a reform that through the democratic motivation became somewhat in 
opposition to the LBFB and the spirit of Bernhard Getz. In Getz’ first draft proposal to the 
LBFB in 1892 (which did not become a part of the LBFB), he underlined that it had to be the 
central state authority that intruded locally into the lives of the families. Local representatives, 
he argued, would constitute a grave threat to the legal protection of both the child and the 
parents. Furthermore, Getz argued that the board was in need of expertise that would 
safeguard both the legal protection of the family and the child and who also carried an 
understanding of best practice. The Trustee-board that he advocated for had only a partial 
representation of locals.217 Francis Hagerup furthermore stressed in the meeting of October 
20th 1892 in the Norwegian Criminalist Association that... 
“This legal code introduces, as we will see, the authority of the state and its agencies, to simply 
deprive parents of their children, not only when they have committed criminal acts, but merely in 
every case where the conditions in the home does not provide a guarantee for a moral 
upbringing.”218
This way of thinking, represented by both Getz, who was arguably the architect of LBFB of 
1896, and Hagerup, who was the Prime Minister that pushed the legislation through 
parliament in 1896, was highly influential upon the order of expectations at the time. This line 
of reasoning, however, received massive opposition in due time, and the BVL clearly opposed 
the idea of a centralized state-authority and the court-like design of the Trustee-board. From 
the point of view of the BVL of 1953, dissolving families should be avoided whenever 
possible. The way to achieve this aim was to introduce democratic decision-making and a 
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proactive child welfare system that would know what to do. Hence, a shift in the order of 
expectations occurred in the time between two very different legal orders.  
Children were, by the 1920s and onwards, increasingly referred to in a manner that 
reflected a need to provide correct care rather than correctional education. The child in need 
was increasingly perceived as being in need of a harmonious and a natural environment such 
as the family, and that different measures could ensure that a child received it. What was best 
for a child in general was to grow up in a natural family environment together with its parents 
and siblings.219 The introduction of in-house therapeutic measures of different kinds to correct 
the child within the family challenged the former view of segregating parents and child.220 
 Each person was to be seen as embedded in the social practices and relationships 
locally. The new legal order had to focus on, and reflect harmonious local bonds as a part of 
each child’s upbringing. If there were no hope in ensuring that a child could grow up in 
healthy and natural circumstances, it had to be removed through coercion. In this respect, the 
new BVN could draw upon the same authority as the Trustee-board, but for a different 
purpose. If, however, the child was to be removed due to problems caused by the parents, then 
a more significant effort would be made by the Trustee-board to relocate the child to different 
private foster families instead of public homes:  
“…a child that grows up in a good, private home receives a far more natural childhood 
environment than what can be expected from an institution. If it is a choice between a good foster-
home that is fitting for the respective child, and a home for children, then the choice should be the 
foster home.”221
Although the legal code of 1953 was the introduction of a new decision-making design, there 
were not that many local changes with respect to who sat in each BVN. The Municipal 
Council simply appointed members that had been working within the previous Trustee-board. 
Moreover, although the legislative history and the new legal order both argued that coercion 
should be limited to an absolute minimum, the Child Statistics illuminate that coercive 
measures remained unchanged by the BVL, all until the end of the 1970s.222 Statistical data 
reveal a child protection and child welfare organization that did not achieve any differences in 
the life quality and outcomes of the affected children. Did this mean that the BVL had failed 
on departure? The next chapter will discuss it.   
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5.1992:ExpectingRight’sǦbasedandPostǦNationalProtection
 
 
 
 
 
Barnevernloven (Child Welfare Act – bvl) was passed by parliament in 1992. It is the third 
and it is the current legal order regulating and mandates the use of authorized coercion to 
protect children. At present, state officials intervene coercively in the daily lives of private 
families in a different manner, compared to earlier.223 The new legal code constituted in many 
respects an opposition towards the former legal order of the BVL. Hence, the new legal order, 
is a reaction to the two former legal orders, and can thus reflect a result of developments in 
the order of expectations.  
This chapter will differ from the previous two in that it will explain the order of 
expectations at two different points in time. The first is when the new legal order became 
established in 1992, and the other is in the aftermath of the largest reform of the design of 
decision-making involving coercion of 2008. When the new legal order became established, it 
reflected what will be referred to as rights-based because the individuality of the child had 
now become the object of protection—it was no longer a family-focus as in the former 
BVL.224 The development in the order of expectations from 1992 towards 2008 will show that 
trustworthy use of coercion in child protection, involving basic expectations such as the 
child’s best interest and non-discrimination, shifted to also become post-national as well as 
rights-based.  
5.1.ThePathtowardsReform
One of the main reasons for reforming the LBFB in 1953 was to reduce the number of cases 
that involved coercively removing children from their families. They established a democratic 
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decision-making body to replace the Trustee-board. The latter had become labeled a police-
authority. The Trustee-board implemented only coercive means. The Child Welfare Board 
(BVN) of 1953 aimed at raising the conditions of care within the family and make it bearable 
for the child to remain, viz. it introduced in-house measures as a part of decision-making. 
Coercion, it was argued, was to be last resort, and only implemented when all other efforts 
were futile. Hence, parents were to be assisted as far as possible, which made the slogan 
“parent protection” more accurate of most decision-making rather than child protection. 
The primary task of the BVN was, according to the authors of the legal code of 1953, 
to “inform the child’s parents regarding what could be done” to solve the issue at hand.225 The 
entire legal reform was directed at changing the way in which child protection functioned 
with the intention of making coercion an exception rather than the rule. Saving the families 
was the new object of concern. “The entire system is founded upon that relocating children 
[through coercion] is the last resort, and should only be applied if no other measures are 
adequate.”226 Children were saved, it was argued, by saving the families.  
Contrary to the intentions behind the reform of 1953, namely to reduce the number of 
cases involving coercion by use of in-house measures, decision-making involving coercion 
increased. The idea had been to reform the system of child protection entirely and make it on 
par with the modern demands, which did not involve a correctional ideology. The lack of trust 
towards child protection was to be repaired by implementing a democratic approach that 
focused on the family. Within the know-how of the local community was the alleged 
medicine for detrimental care of children. The needs of a child were seen as a social problem 
with social solutions. 
In 1952, there were 2238 decisions made to coercively intervene. In 1954, when the 
new legal code had settled, and the BVNs around Norway had begun to work, the decisions to 
apply coercive measures in response to a child’s situation reached 4159.227 Although the 
Trustee-boards decided to implement around 3400 coercive measures yearly in the period 
from 1920 to 1939, which is a number closer to the year of 1954, the intention to reduce 
decision-making involving coercion had failed for the BVL. Hence, it can be argued that the 
legal order of 1953 had a high amount of tension to the order of expectations just after its 
introduction. This failure of the legal order to comply with the order of expectations, i.e. 
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family protection, is one of the reasons for taking criticism towards the legal order of 1953 
less lightly. The number of cases that involved coercion grew after 1953, and problems with 
the institutional design of the new decision-making body made new reform all the more 
pertinent.  However, 40 years would go by until it happened.  
There were predominantly two main problems that drove the reform of 1992 forth. 
First, it was especially the lack of legal protection of the child and focus upon the 
individuality of the child and the interests of families and second, and relating to the first, the 
decision-making body was often perceived as being discriminatory. It has been argued that 
these shortcomings came about as a consequence of the poor design of the BVN in 1953.  
The most important report that informed the legislation of 1992 regarding coercive 
decision-making, which was a Green Paper submitted in 1985, holds this criticism to be 
common throughout the reform-period that started in 1969. The consequence of these two 
shortcomings led to the following argument:  
“It is therefore a common opinion that decision-making in these cases should be placed in a court 
of law or another independent decision-making body, and that the form of procedure is designed 
in a manner where all affected interests are comprehensively illuminated.”228
This argument is in contrast to the core reason for reforms behind the BVL of 1953, and its 
emphasis on having a democratic decision-making body; only then would anyone know what 
was wrong in families and what to do about it. In NOU 1985:18, it is stated that it had become 
“a common opinion” that decisions should not be made by a decision-making body such as 
the BVN, because it could hardly be referred to as independent and professional. Instead, the 
very point of establishing the BVN was that it was a community-rooted decision-making body 
and consequently not independent nor professional. Hence, we can observe a development in 
the order of expectations, and that what is found worthy of trust has shifted. 
One of the greatest critics of the BVN and the child protection system established by 
the BVL was Gerd Benneche. She argued that that the legal protection of both the child and 
the parents, offered by the BVL, was inadequate, and more importantly, that the slim amount 
of legal protection it did provide was seldom effectuated and upheld.229 Benneche concluded 
that it was a need to reform the democratically appointed BVN into a court-like procedure 
with professional expertise. 
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According to Benneche, child protection was no longer an area left open for people 
who were only democratically qualified simply by their good intentions—this could not 
guarantee the legal protection of the private and family life. To Benneche, it was a need to 
professionalize the area of child protection, and also to have stricter criteria for how people 
became appointed.230 She highlighted the arbitrariness pervading the BVN due to the manner 
in which appointments were made to it. The procedure of appointment could establish very 
different decision-making bodies across municipalities.  
Benneche argued that an amendment to the BVN in 1967 made the arbitrary imprint in 
the design even more problematic. The cases perceived as more of a general social problem, 
involving other areas than mere child protection and child welfare, had become the 
responsibility of a new decision-making body dubbed Sosialstyret (Social Committee).231 The 
Social Committee was still appointed by the Municipality Council. However, within the 
Social Committee, it was not a demand towards the appointment that you had any knowledge 
regarding children in particular. However, decision-making regarding coercion was not 
transferred to the Social Committee, but whenever a problem arose that could be deemed as a 
social issue the case was to be handled by the Social Committee and not the BVN.232 In many 
cases involving protection of a child, and that was not in need of coercion, the decisions were 
made by unsuitably qualified individuals. To Benneche, this was an amendment that pushed 
decision-making within state protection of children further into the hands of unqualified 
personnel, and it removed the legal protection of children.233  
Arguably, to Benneche, the lack of professionalism had become the main argument 
against the BVN. Moreover, the well-intended reform of 1953 had led to gross violations of 
the legal protection of children. It had become apparent that the intention of the law of 1953 
was in strong contrast to how it actually worked.234 According to Benneche, the Trustee-board 
of 1896 had better legal protection than the BVN because its decisions was not as arbitrary.  
Nils Christie argued that the two-folded task of the BVN, to both implement 
“therapeutic” in-house measures as well as coerce in cases in need thereof, was the single 
biggest obstacle for acquiring the necessary trustworthiness that authorized coercion should 
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have.235 He suggested that the BVN should only be focusing on the “therapeutic” measures, or 
in-house measures and voluntary placements of children, whilst removing its ability to 
implement coercive measures. By doing so, it would make the child perceive the BVN as a 
“helper.” Only by relieving them of “all rights to apply coercion,” would they be able to 
“provide a maximum of variety in offering help.”236 He furthermore argued that coercion 
should be applied by another decision-making body. It was imperative that the encounter with 
the BVN should not be perceived as a punishment. 
According to Benneche, it was not just cases were it was a need to coerce that was 
negatively affected. It was, at a basic level, too much arbitrary decision-making—even in 
areas that did not include coercion. The BVN had a design that made it possible to implement 
different decisions in almost equal cases, hence breaching the legal demand towards equal 
treatment. She argued that, “children subjected to the BVL are also subjected to the Law of 
Chance.”237  
5.1.1.ThePointofDeparture–SocialReformCommitteeandNonǦDiscrimination
Although there are many documents that constitute the legislative process that led to the 
reform of 1992, the Green Paper mentioned above, NOU 1985:18, stand out as the central 
one. It includes the discussions necessary for understanding coercive interventions to protect 
children pf the bvl from 1992. However, this Green Paper was not written in a vacuum, but 
should rather be seen as a result of decades of child protection discourse. The shortcomings of 
the legislation of 1953 were all too apparent within the legal-political discourse on child 
protection. There were predominantly two camps that disagreed—one that argued for a 
decision-making body outside the regular civil courts, and the other that supported the idea 
for the civil court to make decisions that involved coercion. Although they disagreed, they 
were both united in the effort to ensure that children were not discriminated against.  
The mandate that laid the ground for NOU 1985:18 was given in 1980 and was, in 
many respects similar to the mandate given Sosialreformkomiteen (Social Reform Committee) 
of 1969. The work that started in 1969 initiated a decade of debate. In the mandate to the 
committee that wrote the NOU 1985:18 in September 26th 1980, it was clearly stated that the 
suggestions for reform that they should provide, should be constructed upon the foundation of 
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the work of the Social Reform Committee.238 It can, therefore, be claimed, at least in 
retrospect, that the discontent with the BVL of 1953 had peaked already in the late 60s.  
It is also important to stress that the reaction in 1969 was a result of a longer academic 
and media-driven critique of the legal organization of child protection from 1953.239 Both 
Gerd Benneche and Niels Christie, mentioned above, can serve as examples of antagonists in 
the critique of the BVL. The work of the Social Reform Committee was initiated in 1969 and 
was the first major attempt to address shortcomings of the BVL. Their work lasted until June 
29th 1972 with a concluding Green Paper, NOU 1972:30—Sosiale tjenester (Social Services).  
The Social Reform Committee was mandated to evaluate the entire public system of 
social assistance and benefits. Its main goal, proclaimed in the mandate of 1969, was to arrive 
at a legal proposal that would be a rationalized, coordinated and effective public distribution 
of social assistance and benefits by building an adequate organizational response to social 
affairs.240 The backdrop for the mandate was that social services were spread across many 
different arenas, in many different legal codes, different offices, and enforced by differently 
qualified personnel. The system was confusing and had shortcomings for the client-groups it 
was supposed to serve. The BVL was considered as part of this system, and hence fell victim 
to the same criticism. It too did not serve the intention that it was designed to fulfill. 
The critique had culminated in an effort to change the totality of the system, and reach 
the goal on designing institutions that would deliver social services and welfare benefits 
according to their intent, namely without any discrimination in how public assistance were 
distributed and received across all the municipalities in Norway.241 At the time, there were 
variations between the municipalities in terms of financing social services, which also 
included the financing of child protection, and with significant discrepancies. The system was 
completely inadequate with respect to legal protection and thus non-discrimination, and had 
the unfortunate consequence that some municipalities could protect children better than 
others.242 
Because child protection was a part of this criticism, a new decision-making design 
had to correct shortcomings. This would mean that it too had to treat its client-group—the 
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parents and the children—in a manner that did not discriminate across all municipalities. This 
is in opposition to the normative principles embedded the BVL, namely purposefully letting 
child protection vary across Norway according to a principle of democratic subsidiarity. 
Within this line of criticism, it can be argued that the principle of non-discrimination was 
acknowledged in parliament in 1971, “The ministry sees it as an important task to implement 
measures that ensures equal treatment in social care and assistance in all of the municipalities 
across the state, and agrees that this cannot be solved without a reform.”243 Equality of 
treatment, legal equality or non-discrimination as I will refer to it, had become in opposition 
to the legal order of the BVL.244 This illuminates a development in the order of expectations, 
namely that trustworthy child protection now had to comply with the basic expectation of 
non-discrimination.  
 With the work of the committee of 1969 it had become evident that equality of 
welfare, and hence protection of children according to a principle of non-discrimination, was 
dependent upon a universal welfare state.245 To avoid discrimination between each case, 
coercion had to be implemented with a minimum of elements that could cause unequal 
treatment of equal cases. This demand would evidently lead to a stricter legal design of 
decision-making, one that had to be uniform across Norway, and not open for local variations. 
The BVN was a democratically constituted board consisting of people living within the 
municipality, and who were conveniently interested in child protection. This board was also 
not subjected to a any great amount of rules of procedure. The lack of specifications on how 
the BVN conducted its decision-making, and also who conducted it, was a threat to non-
discrimination. It can thus be concluded that in the late 60s, the priority of principles was 
reversed, and thus also what to expect, whereby non-discrimination, or equality of treatment, 
taking precedence over the principle of democratic representation.  
The central feature of the Green Paper that was delivered by the committee convened 
in 1969 was most notably that authorized coercion was recommended to be handled only by 
the courts. It considered courts as the entity that ensured the best legal protection possible, 
and hence could ensure non-discrimination. Second, it also suggested an opportunity to appeal 
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cases involving authorized coercion.246 This suggestion stands in clear opposition to the 
democratic design of the decision-making body of 1953. 
Decision-making by the courts would, according to the committee, re-establish trust in 
child protection.247 However, even Bernard Getz had argued, in 1892, that the courts were 
unfit for the type of case-work that child protection would involve. His arguments were 
becoming only more valid, since it stipulated that the type of case-work was too normatively 
complex for the courts to handle.248 However, ignoring this argument, the committee laid 
weight on the dilemma that the BVN was both an institution that provided services for their 
client and was supposed to coerce, and suggested that a bill should be passed to remove 
coercive decision-making from the BVN.249  
The Green Paper of the Social Reform Committee suggested a child protection system 
that would dispose of the democratic component for decision-making design altogether. No 
democratically elected board was to be involved in coercive interventions in any capacity. 
According to the Green Paper, the responsible way to do it was to transfer this type of 
decision-making to a professionalized system of Social Centers that dealt with case-work and 
to the courts for reaching decisions. The goal was to have equally qualified personnel 
providing equal treatment all over Norway.250 Hence, the report responded to the criticism 
that the BVN was in need of a higher level of professionalism when preparing cases and 
reaching decisions.251 The goal was to establish a decision-making process that was less 
arbitrary. Another element regarding professional decision-making was the need to avoid 
prejudiced decisions where members of the board had some type of local relation to the 
parents being scrutinized. The client-work was from now on to become a professional work-
jurisdiction.252  
 However, the suggestions for reform never passed parliament. A Stortingsmelding 
(White Paper) presented in June 1975 by Brattli’s Labour-government, did not agree to the 
suggestions made by the Social Reform Committee.253 Labour could never approve the 
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transfer of the authorized coercion within child protection to the courts, as suggested by the 
earlier Green paper.254 For Labour, it was important to accommodate the criticism, but at the 
same time not reform the system completely. The BVL was after all forged according to a 
social-democratic Labour-ideology. The White Paper focused upon strengthening the social 
services within each municipality; however, since the Social Reform Committee’s Green 
Paper was so clear that the very source of the weaknesses in child protection was the BVN, 
Labour had to answer some of the criticism by reform.  
To this end, the Brattli government put forth the idea that authorized coercion in child 
protection should be elevated to a regional level, between the state and the municipality. It 
would constitute a political compromise. Furthermore, it was supposed to be an administrative 
decision-making body, rather than a court. Their insistence on not having a court reflects the 
same argument applied when implementing the reform in 1953. A court of law, it was argued, 
would send wrong signals with regard to the type of decision-making that was supposed to 
take place, and non-discrimination could be ensured in other ways. It would only re-establish 
a type of decision-making that the LBFB represented the last decades prior to 1953—
something equivalent to a police-organization. Only the Labour-party went against using the 
court as a decision-making body in child protection cases. The non-socialist parties in 
parliament, as well as Sosialistisk venstreparti (Socialist Left), preferred having decision-
making involving coercion done by the courts. In sum, the need for change was motivated by 
a political consensus on ensuring non-discrimination. The problem with discrimination and 
thereby lack of legal protection for children was acknowledged across all the different party-
platforms. At this point, it had become acknowledge that trustworthy child protection had to 
involve a decision-making body that did not discrimination.  
In addition to agreeing to the need for more professionalism, the Labour-government 
now argued that the leader of the regional decision-making body that would be in charge of 
decision-making ought to have competence as a judge. The decision-making would 
furthermore be subordinated to a regional Social Committee. By raising the decision-making 
body onto a regional level, it would receive all the cases in need of coercion from all of the 
municipalities within that region. This would concentrate decision-making on a narrow area 
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of competence, and thus achieve a higher degree of formal equality of treatment, i.e. non-
discrimination. It was also argued that the decision-making body, i.e. those who were 
members of it, would become increasingly professional by focusing on a narrow case-type 
and hence be more aware of appropriate procedures. It was argued that this would enhance the 
legal protection of its client-group.  
Ministry of Social Affairs, that prepared the legal proposal for designing the FBSS, 
argued that they could not understand that the problems with the BVL of 1953 were solved by 
transferring it to the courts as the Social Reform Committee had suggested. Even 
Justisdepartementet (Ministry of Justice) and Den norske dommerforening (The Norwegian 
Union of Justices) agreed to this conclusion.255 Furthermore, new problems emerged, as the 
court was argued to not have competence to deal with matters of child protection, and could 
not make decisions in any professional manner and provide good enough reasons for the 
decisions that were being made.  
 In fact, the arguments presented by the Ministry of Social Affairs were very similar to 
the assessment by Berhard Getz regarding the design of a decision-making body presented in 
1892, namely that it should include a democratic as well as a professional component, and 
situated neither too centrally nor too locally. It seems, at first, that a renewal of this old 
arguments emerged. This is only partly true. The main difference was the development of a 
more solid competence-base for child welfare and child protection in the 70s.256  
 During the 1890s, the legislation was informed by positivist criminology, rather than 
by knowledge on child welfare (this knowledge-base was practically non-existent at the time). 
In the 1970s, the child welfare movement had grown in Norway—and had the child itself 
more at the centre. Although knowledge on child welfare and child protection was fragmented 
and spread, it had become accepted as a more credible area of competence.257 This meant that 
politicians now could provide a mandate to populate the child protection organization with a 
certain type of personnel equipped with certain type of knowledge.258 It could be argued that 
this sparked an incentive to initiate a more systematic professionalization within child 
protection (and child welfare). Indirectly, only by subjecting the case-work of child protection 
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257 See St.meld.nr.9 (1975-76): 85-86. 
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and child welfare to a coherent body of knowledge that was generally applied, could parents 
and children receive non-discriminatory treatment.  
5.1.2.SocialActCommittee–theReform
The Green Paper that led directly to the reform of the BVL to the new bvl, was submitted in 
1985 and written by Sosiallovutvalget (Social Act Committee).259 The committee was 
appointed by the Labour-minority government of Oddvar Nordli on September 26th 1980. The 
Social Act Committee was mandated to carry out a critical review regarding the totality of 
statutory law that could be referred to as social services within the welfare state system. The 
purpose of this committee was to chisel out one unified body of law for social welfare that 
included all the former legal codes in one single package. Child protection, with authorized 
coercion of children, was considered to be a part of social services. The goal was to write 
sosialtjenesteloven (Social Services Act), a body of law that would “promote economic and 
social security,” “improve the living conditions for those in difficulties,” which would 
“prevent social problems.”260 
 The Green Paper contains the initial reasons and reasoning for why the FBSS ended up 
with its particular design. The purpose and goal of the Green Paper was to reform the whole 
legal corpus of social services and establish one legal code. Although this effort failed with 
respect to child protection, which would not become a part of the Social Service Act, the 
design of the decision-making body involving coercion would. Hence, when it comes to the 
FBSS, the justification of design is predominantly located within this specific Green Paper.261 
The Green Paper helped shape a proposition that was presented to parliament in late March 
1989 by Gro H. Brundtland’s Arbeiderpartiregjering (Labour-government). This proposition 
was a direct result of the combination of advice provided by the Green Paper NOU 1985:18, 
consultative statements to this report, and the final draft-proposal made by 
Sosialdepartementet (Ministry of Social Affairs).262 However, Brundtland’s government fell, 
and Jan P. Syse’s Høyre-koalisjon regjering (Right-coalition government) that came into 
power in the spring of 1989 withdrew the proposition. When the proposition was withdrawn, 
                                                 
259 NOU 1985:18. 
260 NOU 1985:18: 15. It should be stressed that the NOU 1985:18 is important with respect to the decision-
making in coercive cases, and not child welfare. The design of the decision-making body in charge of coercion 
cases was not entrenched in the bvl, but the stl.
261 I refer to it in abbreviated form only as the FBSS and not FSS. The decision-making body changed name in 
2007, with the reform following the arguments put forth in Ot.prp.nr.76 (2005-2006) to Fylkesnemnda for 
barnevern og sosiale saker (County Board of Child Protection and Social Affairs). Originally, in 1992, it was 
only Fylkesnemnda for sosiale saker (County Board of Social Affairs). 
262 Ot.prp.nr.60 (1988-1989). 
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it did not imply that Syse’s party, Høyre (Right), wanted to depart from the track towards 
establishing one unified Social Services Act, but rather to put forth a legal proposal with the 
imprint of the coalition government.263 
When Brundtland again came to power in 1990, the earlier proposition was again put 
on the table, but it would now become split into two different codes of law—Social Services 
Act and the Child Welfare Act—and significantly revised. The revision, however, had little 
impact on the design of the FBSS which would remain a part of the Social Services Act. One 
of the important changes that had occurred with Brundtland was that child protection was to 
remain as an independent area of commitment apart from social services.264 The idea of 
forming one unified legal code regarding social services was therefore abolished—child 
protection and child welfare became embedded in a legal code apart from social services. 
Brundtland also established a new ministry to replace the Ministry of Family and 
Consumer Affairs, and renamed it Barne- og familiedepartementet (Ministry of Children and 
Family Affairs). The new ministry was established on January 1st 1991. The fact that Labour 
accepted this development can be argued is a result of a generally escalating focus upon the 
public responsibility for each individual child. 
Most members of the committee that wrote NOU 1985:17 agreed that the new board 
could be neither a regular court nor a democratically elected decision-making body.265 
Something had to be done, and they would have to take into account the decade-long criticism 
against the BVL—a criticism that had mainly been dominated by a discussion with two 
alternatives. One camp would improve the way in which the BVN worked, while the other 
would authorize the courts to deal with decision-making in coercion-cases. Although the 
committee was split on writing its proposal, all agreed upon dispensing the BVN. The 
majority, however, were not in favor of the courts to decide in coercion-cases.266 
The BVN was recognized by all as obsolete. It was no longer maintained that child 
protection could be effectively implemented through the BVN according to modern demands 
for legal protection. The majority preferred to entrust coercion-cases to a designated decision-
making body. This decision-making body was also in need of being independent from those 
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initiating the cases from below in each municipality as well as from being directed from 
above from directorates and the ministry. In this way, the social services could better and in a 
more independent manner be a representative of the “child’s interests.”267  
The goal of the BVL was to ensure best practice by appointing people that had special 
interest or had particular knowledge that qualified them, and also that those preparing the 
case-work were professionals. This was thought to be sufficient to secure the best interests of 
the child. The problem was that this was not always the case. The BVN in 1960, 1963, 1967 
and 1969 were dominated by housewives, followed by teachers; neither group had any 
professional knowledge about what should trigger coercive measures.268 According to Gerd 
Benneche, the overrepresentation of these groups was probably due to the view of the 
Municipal Councils that their daily involvement with children was a sufficient criterion for 
making sound judgments to protect children and ensure their welfare.  
The lack of professionalism, in the sense of coherently applying knowledge of a 
certain type and quality in practice and also by being able to explain why a type of practice 
had been chosen, had become a major problem with the BVN. Without the stabilizing force of 
knowledge, the practice of child protection would vary across cases or lacking any valid 
justification for why a choice on practice was commenced upon. Having no way of knowing 
whether or not a child was treated according to a best-practice standard became interlinked 
with the lack of any prospects of establishing solid protection of the child as an individual. 
On the other hand, the need for coercive intervention had proved to be overwhelming. 
Despite efforts to minimize decision-making involving coercion, the use of coercion to 
remove children had increased after the implementation of the BVL. Additionally, in-house 
measures were implemented on a steadily increase from 1953 to 1975.269 Thus, the criticism 
of the BVN lacking professionalism, which leads to arbitrary outcomes, combined with an 
increasingly active decision-making body, made the need for a reform all the more relevant.  
5.1.3.FourDemandstoEnsureNonǦDiscrimination
In NOU 1985:18, it was argued that the design of casework and decision-making procedures 
was to satisfy four distinct demands.270 These criteria would ensure that the procedure for 
decision-making would no longer discriminate across different cases. The lack of an operative 
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principle of non-discrimination was at the core of the criticism raised towards the BVN, and 
behind it was the idea that the child’s individuality alone had to be subjected to a procedure 
that would respect its need for legal protection.  
The first addressed the criticism that was directed at the BVN for being an 
organization that was too interconnected with other decision-making bodies locally. Other 
public organizations could influence decisions to coerce in a manner that weakened the legal 
protection of both parents and children. It was recommended that the decision-making body 
had to be independent from other municipals, regional or state-level decision-making bodies. 
In this way, it could be autonomous with respect to other state-parties (regional governors, 
social services in the municipalities, Ministry of Children and Family Affairs). Thus, 
decisions were going to be reached only in this one particular decision-making body, without 
any external interference.  
The second demand set to the new design was that the parties to the procedure were to 
be represented by a lawyer. This was an answer to the criticism that the BVN was both in 
charge of investigation and performing decision-making. Both the parents (accused of 
providing detrimental care) and those authorized to protect the child, needed to argue their 
cases prior to any decision. In addition, in order to provide equal treatment of both the accuser 
and the accused, the committee planned to implement specific legal principles and rules of 
procedure into the design. Rules of procedure would subject child protection cases to the 
same type of treatment. The rules that were to be applied existed within the civil courts 
already, in particular in chapter 33 of Tvistemålsloven (Civil Procedure Act – tvml).271 Within 
this chapter, there were several rules of procedure that the committee regarded as easily 
adjustable to fit a new decision-making body for coercion-cases.  
The third demand placed upon the new design was that it had to facilitate best practice 
within the area of child protection. In other words, it was required to equip the procedure with 
professionals that were trained to assess the needs of the child in as neutral manner possible. 
Introducing professionals, mainly psychologists and social workers, would answer the 
criticism that lay-men only had unspecified knowledge in the protection of children. Adding 
professionals to the decision-making procedure would allegedly make decisions more 
systematic and coherent. 
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Furthermore, if the second demand listed above would have any significance, a 
professional jurist would have to be included in the decision-making procedure at all times. 
Not only would it be a need for upholding the rules of engagement in litigation, but also to 
uphold rules of procedure. In contrast, the legal scholar would be able to ensure that 
arguments were asserted properly, and that each case became illuminated in an exhaustive 
manner. Thus, having professionals represented in the board would optimize both the best 
insights in law and knowledge of best practice in child protection.  
It was also argued that laymen were to be included to represent common-sense 
morality. Including lay-men, it was argued, was imperative in this way since decision-making 
had a normative component. It reflected the idea that no professional could reach any final 
decision on what would be best for the child.272 The lay-men represent what can be dubbed as 
common-sense values and become a corrective on the professionals’ epistemic approach. The 
professionals, on the other hand, constitute a corrective on the lay-men’s subjective 
evaluations.  
 The fourth, and last, demand is again directed at the lack of legal protection. Each case 
that was allegedly in need of coercion was to be treated and decided upon swiftly. Such a 
demand reflects that coercion is a matter that was to be settled fast because it was a need for 
protection against detrimental care. This argument was directed to the use of professionals, 
and the need to have them as permanent members and not call upon them as expert-witnesses. 
The swiftness that this type of decision-making needed was an important argument for 
establishing a new and specialized decision-making body.  
 These four demands were the answer to the critique that had been directed at the 
design of the BVN of 1953. The BVN was both responsible for preparing the case, making 
decisions and implementing the measures that it decided upon.273 It was also argued that the 
BVN was unprofessional and too local, thus also frequently legally prejudiced. It was argued 
that these four demands towards design would, if accommodated, effectively dissolve many 
of the problems facing the BVN and restore legal protection of the affected parties.  
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273 This criticism was not new, as already mentioned above. However, the criticism made in this Green Paper 
became more important since its thorough assessment of social services in general, and child protection in 
particular, was directly linked to the introduction of the new body of law that was to come.  
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5.1.4.DesignofDecisionǦMakingwiththeChild’sBestinMind
In addition to these four criteria aimed at instituting non-discrimination into the design of 
decision-making, another principal innovation that would pervade the legislation on child 
protection was introduced—namely to seek out what was best for the child. In Norway, it was 
not an entirely new idea, but the manner in which it was to be implemented was new. In BVL 
of 1953 §17 second paragraph it is stated that, “when the board argues to implement a type of 
measure, it should have the child’s best in mind.” The legislative history to the BVL explains 
what is meant by the “child’s best in mind”-formulation. If it comes to it, and the child must 
be coercively removed from the parents, it should only be because it is imperative for the 
concern of the child. It was also argued that, “Contrary to the view that constructed the LBFB, 
it ought, according to the committee, as far as possible through those means available seek to 
hinder that the child is separated from its home.”274 As such, what was thought to be best for 
the child, during the BVL, was to defend parents, and thereby the child. This has been 
referred to as letting a biological principle drive decision-making. 
Seeking out what was best for a child was not in any way the first and foremost 
priority for the BVN, along with the driving motivation for introducing it, what was best for a 
child was rather held to be concurrent to those of the parents. It can be argued that the child’s 
interest was seen as equivalent with the best interest of the family until the point was reached 
whereby the family could no longer improve the situation of the child. Consequently, a long 
time would pass until a child’s individuality would become protected, and not until the BVN 
had exhausted all non-coercive remedies. Hence, in combination with the motivation to 
decrease the amount of cases in need of coercively relocating children, the parents’ right to 
keep their child in their custody was, according to the BVL, more important than the child’s 
need to be protected. For instance, the board could implement coercive measures if it had to 
protect the child from its parents, but also to protect other children in the family from the 
child in question. This would mean that when coercion was to be applied, it did not need to be 
in the interest of the child, but rather the family. 
 With NOU 1985:18 came also a final shift towards the focus on the child first and the 
family second. Emphasizing that measures were to be in the child’s interest would not do 
away with lending priority to the family, but resorting to a biological presumption had to have 
the child’s best in mind.275 According to this Green Paper, it would be preferable if the 
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principle of the ‘child’s best’ was pervading the entire child protection system, irrespective of 
the type of measures—non-coercive or coercive.276 Hence, it was maintained that what was 
best for a chidl was upheld by ensuring stabile and lasting relationships with adults. Thus, in 
order to, “consider what would be best for a child,” the bonds a child had developed, i.e. what 
was familiar to the child, was to be focused upon.277 This way of interpreting what was meant 
by having the child’s best in mind would include the parents.  
 According to §16 of the BVL, when the biological parents proved fit to care for their 
child, the child would return from foster care. Hence, the child was stuck with its parents. The 
BVN always had the child in their custody. In this way, any coercive means implemented 
would predominantly be temporary. The parents could always get their child back. This 
approach always allowed the principle of biology to trump that of the child’s best interest.  
 Another Green Paper, NOU 1982:26, which focused upon child abuse and failed care, 
argued for strengthening child protection. It was stipulated that in order to protect the child, it 
needed to be implemented a principle of custody instead of a principle of biology. If children 
had developed new bonds to their custodians, the new bonds had to be taken into account 
when deciding what was best for a child. The Green Paper did not refer to these terms 
explicitly, but their critique of the application of the best interest-principle in BVL §16, and 
how children are sent back to their biological parents when home environment improved, 
makes for such an interpretation.278 This was one of the main reasons for NOU 1985:18 to 
include guarantees for those who had the child in custody, i.e. foster parents. This would 
provide an avenue for the biological parents to lose their rights to get the child back if the 
child was in foster care for a long period.279 Once it has been decided that a child is in need of 
protection and received other custodians than the biological parents, the principle of biology 
gradually decrase in importance and parents risk losing their child.  
 In NOU 1982:26, it was argued that the biological principle was taken too much for 
granted, and that the state authorities had to show more willingness to infringe upon the 
biological principle due to the increase in the number of cases that showed a severe lack of 
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care. This very same Green Paper argued that only 10% of abused children were caught by the 
system, and thus made it clear that child protection needed strengthening and reform fast.280 
 Having the four different demands placed upon the design of the new decision-making 
body to ensure non-discrimination, and in combination with the principle of having the child’s 
best in mind, child protection would now become guided by two strong principles for the 
entire process of both non-coercive child welfare and coercive child protection. Both of these 
principles are upheld as important from within NOU 1985:18. They constitute the main 
influence regarding how the FBSS was supposed to work from the introduction of the bvl. In 
the next chapter, this will be referred to as the two basic expectations of the current order of 
expectations.  
5.1.5.BecominganewLegalorder
The design of the FBSS figured in the stl until it became a part of the bvl until 2008. The 
reform of the BVL with regard to establishing a new decision-making body was situated in 
Lov om sosiale tjenester (Social Services Act - stl), and with a design based directly upon 
NOU 1985:17. However, the reform of the BVL led to another legal code, namely the new 
bvl. Hence, those who enforced child protection had to relate to two legal codes. FBSS was 
not merely designed to be a decision-making body that would decide upon whether or not to 
implement coercive measures in child-protection cases, but also in other cases. At first, this 
included only cases of drug-abuse, but the Ministry of Social Affairs planned for it to be left 
open to case-types involving social issues in need of coercion. It was thought as relevant to 
settle the institutional design within a legal order dedicated to social services in general, rather 
than child protection specifically.281
 The proposition emanating from NOU 1985:18, Ot.prp.nr.29 (1990-1991), to reform 
social services was assigned Sosialkomiteen (Social Committee) in parliament. Their work 
started on April 11th 1991, and they put forth their proposal on October 29th. This would mean 
that the members would have more than enough time to contemplate on the political 
craftsmanship thus far of the design of the FBSS. They remarked that: 
“The Committee endorse that the treatment of cases involving coercion is placed to an 
independent regional board with a composition as suggested by the Social Act Committee. 
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According to the Committee, such a board would comply with the needs for a reassuring 
procedure, professional insight, independence and quick procedure.”282
It was only one minor change to the legal proposal, namely that the proposal from the 
Ministry of Social Affairs included a paragraph that stipulated that the Ministry of Social 
Affairs itself could instruct the FBSS to include additional case-types than the original cases 
of drug-abusers and child-protection cases. The Social Committee wanted it rather to be the 
parliament that decided if the board should be authorized to decide in a broader variety of 
cases. As such, the only change made by the Committee was to increase its independence 
further. The consequence was that the FBSS was not subjected to the government’s right to 
instruct lower-level decision-making bodies—making it completely independent.  
The new legal code on child protection, the bvl, was presented in Council of State on 
March 27th 1992, and was assigned Forbruker- og administrasjonskomiteen (Standing 
Committee for Consumer Affairs and Government Administration). The committee embraced 
the new manner in which coercion-cases were to be decided upon by the stl.283 This 
committee, dominated by centre-right parties, was satisfied that the design had become a 
court-like procedure. Hence, they could agree to its basic tenets. Hence, the Labour-
government’s proposal met little resistance. The wide-spread agreement within parliament to 
adopt the legal code on child protection is best summed up in the attitudes towards the 
proposal presented to parliament, coming from the Standing Committee for Consumer Affairs 
and Government Administration on the bvl: 
“The committee emphasized that those measures implemented by the Child Welfare Office should 
be the best for the child, and as far as possible be conceived of as reasonable among the affected 
parties. Emphasis should be laid upon cooperation between the affected parties and the local 
Child Welfare Office, and that the parties’ “legal protection” is strengthened.”284
The quotation underlines both the principle of child’s best interest and non-discrimination as 
central tenets within the design of decision-making procedure. These two tenets will later be 
argued constitute the basic expectations within the current order of expectations.  
 The following sections will present the layout of the design of the FBSS after the 
significant amendment to the bvl and the design of the FBSS made by Ot.prp.nr.76 (2006-
2007), which was put into effect January 1st 2008. This amendment transferred the design of 
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the FBSS from the stl to bvl and, as already mentioned in the introduction, also changed the 
original name from Fylkesnemnda for sosiale saker (Regional Board for Social Cases – FSS) 
to Fylkesnemnda for barnevern og sosiale saker (Regional Board for Child Protection and 
Social Cases – FBSS). The main reason for transferring the board from one body of law to the 
other was simply that the vast majority of cases were directly related to child protection, 
rather than social services.285 This was also the reason for changing its name.  
5.2.TheOrganizationofAuthorizedCoercion:TheFBSS
There are three important aspects from the historical discourse on the legal design of the 
FBSS. These constitute first the discussion of whether or not the decision-making should be 
reached by a court or a separate board. Second, it is the discussion on the composition of the 
board with respect to professionalism. Third, what rules of procedure should guide the 
process of decision-making to ensure non-discrimination. All of these discussions had a focus 
upon increasing legal-protection of the child itself, and that coercion-cases had the child alone 
as a first and foremost consideration.  
5.2.1.WoulditbeaCourtoraBoard?
One of the rather large debates was whether or not the courts should decide in cases of 
detrimental care, or if another type of decision-making body should be established with such a 
particular mandate. Both of the two earlier legal codes had their reasons for not arguing that 
the court should deal with such cases. To Getz, the entire purpose of establishing the Trustee-
board was not to put child protection cases into the court system. To him, decisions regarding 
childcare were not appropriate to be handled by a court of law.286 The thrust behind the 
reform of 1953 was to let the democratic spirit of post-war Norway pervade the new legal 
code on child protection; a consequence of which would mean to omit court-like elements 
from the design of the decision-making body as much as possible, e.g. by not having a judge 
as a permanent member of the BVN.287 
The majority behind the NOU 1985:18 maintained that the court was not a suitable 
alternative. Many of their arguments related to the fact that it was a need to implement a 
reform of the child protection system that included professional expertise on a permanent 
basis. They argued against the courts, which they claimed had a lack of professional 
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knowledge related to many different issues.288 The most explicit argument was that a court’s 
decision was dependent upon expert witnesses, but where the decision-making had to rely 
upon the expert-witness as true because of the inability to understand what the expert-
statements implied. This was seen as problematic, since decisions would become influenced 
by what the expert witness in fact argued.289 The use of expert witnesses makes a court 
accountable for verdicts it cannot vouch for without the expert. In a child protection case, 
there would be many different expert arenas that would confront the board, both internally 
and externally. Knowing that it is a minefield of esoteric approaches to best practice, a claim 
raised regarding the need to incorporate professional know-how can be problematic without 
permanent expert-representation.  
“The one who does not have an understanding regarding these matters, will have great difficulties 
analyzing the meaning and quality of the different professionals’ points of view, and when it comes 
to pass on these points of view to others who is co-deciding.”290
This argument lays impetus to increasingly professionalizing the decision-making body in 
order to make independent and qualified decisions.  
Another reason provided for not transferring the decision-making to the courts was that 
children in need of protection constituted special and complex cases, and a regular court judge 
would not have proper experience in dealing with such cases. Child protection cases would 
only be a small portion of the court’s work, and hence it would not develop proper knowledge 
in dealing with them.291 The last argument was that they argued that the courts did not have an 
adequate secretariat to prepare the cases to them, consequently leaving the courts ill-prepared 
and ill-equipped.292 It was rather a need to establish a professional decision-making body as a 
“neighboring alternative” to the courts.293  
A minority in the committee writing NOU-1985:18, constituted by Ebba Lodden and 
Frank Sundkvist, expressed their thoughts that it was imprudent to establish a new type of 
decision-making body for cases involving coercion.294 Their arguments had the same tone as 
those presented in NOU 1972:30 that argued in favor of transferring decision-making of the 
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BVN to the courts.295 The courts were, according to Lodden and Sundkvist, best equipped to 
deal with cases involving authorized coercion because the courts were best equipped to 
uphold the legal protection. Lodden and Sundkvist argued that the courts possessed the 
necessary trustworthiness to provide legal protection.296 Their arguments stressed that child 
protection cases would not induce trust if decision-making were given to a new administrative 
decision-making body outside the court system. This would, according to them, become an 
object of the same kind of criticism as the design it was intended to replace.  
Their objection was not very well explained or thought out. The committee responsible 
for the NOU 1985:18 was mandated to find a replacement for the decision-making body of 
the BVN. Lodden and Sundkvist argued that replacing such a weak decision-making body 
with another similar and weak decision-making body would counter-productive. They argued 
that, “no administrative body, no matter how it is composed, or how it is organized, will 
accomplish the same kind of prestige in our society as the courts have.”297 This is also where 
the majority in the committee disagreed, as in their view, it was more important to design a 
decision-making body that reached decisions worthy of trust, rather than believing that the 
decision-making became trustworthy simply because the courts were worthy of trust.  
The majority opinion portrayed in NOU 1985:17 can be summed up with a quotation 
from Bernhard Getz. He had also argued against leaving it to the courts to decide in child 
protection cases. According to Getz, these cases were far too complex for the regular criminal 
courts, and normal efforts to subsume actions under a legal rule would be extremely hard, if 
not impossible:  
“In my opinion, it would not be satisfactory to transfer this type of decision-making to the courts, 
whether it would imply a judge alone or a court of appeal. Both of these arrangements would in 
cases where it was not a matter of subsuming or proving the occurrence of single actions, but 
rather revolve around conditions in life as well as understanding the whole character of the 
parents and the child, not be recommendable. Such cases are not suitable for subsumption in a 
court, but must rather be known personally, which judges or random lay-judges cannot be 
assumed to be doing. Judges or courts of appeal would, in these matters of discretion, easily 
become staggering and internally inconsistent and cannot provide guarantees for accuracy in so 
important matters.”298
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The idea behind the FBSS was to introduce a decision-making body that was not only 
professional, but could also become increasingly better as time went by. Improvements would 
be achieved by demanding that decision-making was to comply with certain principles and 
rules of procedures that could ensure a type of training for those in the court to approach these 
cases in a much more adequate and coherent manner. 
The majority argued that transferring child protection cases to the courts from the BVN 
was to stretch the criticism towards the BVN too far in the opposite direction. It was not a 
matter of simply moving the case-work to another decision-making body; such a move would 
have to be justified by showing that it would improve the problems facing case-work within 
child protection.299 Thus, it could be argued that the opinion of the majority was that simply 
moving the type of decision-making that involved coercion to the court, only to guess that the 
decision-making could be parasitic upon the legal protection that the courts provided, would 
be a gamble on reaching decisions that adequately would upheld what was best for a child. 
Reforming the BVL in such a manner would mean that the complexities of child protection 
cases would be dealt with in an adequate and respectful manner, and hence, it could be argued 
that the board was the reasonable outcome.  
5.2.2.TheCompositionoftheBoard
The composition of the board has always been a great topic of concern. In 1892, Getz 
presented a composition of a so-called corporation of professionals that possessed special 
knowledge about children. He advocated for the inclusion of permanent members from the 
school-commission, from the poor-commission, one priest, one medical practitioner, two lay-
women, and a judge to be the leader of the board. 300 Although the composition of the 
permanent members did not adhere to Getz’s proposal as the LBFB was passed in 1896, a 
judge, a priest, and a medical doctor still became permanent members.301 In the BVL of 1953, 
it was explicitly argued that a permanent member—the local judge—was only assigned when 
cases were in need of coercion. The composition of the decision-making board was, apart 
from the judge, supposed to be democratically appointed.302 
The composition was transferred to from the stl §9-2 of 1992 to bvl §7-2 in 2008. The 
amendment that moved the design-principles over to the bvl did not make any significant 
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changes to the original design. The bvl stipulates that each board is supposed to be composed 
by a leader who satisfies demands to be a judge. Barne- og likestillingsdepartementet 
(Ministry of Children and Equality), thus, appoint a panel of professionals and a panel of lay-
men, who are represented in the FBSS proportionally in a 1:1-relationship, with a four-year 
mandate. When the design of the FBSS was entrenched in the stl, it was stressed that, “the 
decision-making body was to be composed so that it best could combine judicial, professional 
knowledge and lay-man discretion.”303 This would establish a professional and court-like 
decision-making body that, according to the consultative statement of Den norske 
dommerforening (Norwegian Judge Union), included in the proposition leading to the stl, 
would increase the legal protection of each case.304 
This legal development is a turning-point with regard to the BVN. By suggesting a 
design that had permanent members, and also that lay-men was no longer appointed locally, 
but centrally by the ministry, it became obvious that the new FBSS was not to resemble 
anything that the BVL once stood for. A child’s need for protection was no longer seen as a 
local problem with the need for local solutions. The child’s need for protection had no longer 
anything to do with the place where the child grew up. 
5.2.3.RulesofProcedure
NOU 2000:12 was the first thorough investigation of the child protection and child welfare 
system in Norway. It was pointed out that, “lacking general rules of procedure creates a lack 
of expectation and a development of different types of practices between the different FBSS’ 
and also within each board.”305 NOU 2000:12 had pointed out that one of the main purposes 
behind the design of the FBSS, namely embedding a principle of non-discrimination, was 
falling short. Both former decision-making boards, but especially the BVN lacked 
predictability in decision-making due to a lack of rules of procedure. The lack of procedural 
constraints such as these was arguably a great threat towards the principle of non-
discrimination. The bvl had rules of procedure implemented already in 1992, but the problem 
was that they were not a formal part of the legal code.  
This line of thought, namely the lack of formal rules of procedure to secure non-
discrimination, helped bring about the mandate given to fylkesnemndsutvalget (FBSS-
committee) responsible for the Green Paper that would later reform the FBSS from 2008:  
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”The FBSS operate according to the basic rules for decent casework that are enforced by the 
courts. Both forvaltningsloven [Public Administration Act], tvistemålsloven [Civil Procedure Act], 
domstolsloven [Courts of Justice Act] and barnevernloven [Child Welfare Act] are applied in 
addition to the special rules in sosialtjenesteloven [Social Services Act]…there are many different 
sets of rules that becomes applied in decision-making, the different boards have somewhat 
different practice of what rules are valid in different areas…On this background, the Child- and 
Family Ministry should appoint a committee to give a general and unified evaluation of the 
decision-making procedure.”306
This prompted the FBSS-committee to propose the adoption of the rules of procedure found 
in the legal proposal to the new Tvisteloven (Dispute Act – tl) §1-1—it was stated that “the 
legal code is going to make arrangements that will ensure a fair, quick, effective and trust-
inducive treatment of civil court disputes.”307 This proposal gives an account of rules of 
procedure that has its point of origin in the European Convention on Human Rights Art. 6 (1), 
better known as the fair-trial-principle.308 The FBSS-committee followed the same pattern of 
arguments as the one that changed tl, and held this article to be the normative foundation for 
any trial.309 Hence, the bvl §7-3, where the current rules of procedure are situated, can be 
referred to as a Norwegian interpretation of the fair-trial-principle of the ECHR—a 
transformation of international law to become regular national law. This is a significant 
element with respect to the post-national turn within the order of expectations towards 
decisions involving coercion to protect children. 
The Green Paper refers to Art. 6 of the ECHR, which argues the relevance of 
establishing institutions that can guarantee “fair trial”: 
“…everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law.”310
Although Art. 6 cannot become directly applicable to the FBSS, due to obvious restrictions on 
publicity of the trials within the FBSS, it is argued that it is a, “highly natural point of 
departure for the [committee’s] considerations, especially because the [FBSS] is expected to 
work according to basic rules of fair decision-making as the courts.”311 The bvl §7-3 has a 
direct link to the rules of procedure and standards provided by the tl §1. 
 The rules of procedure became explicated through an amendment that provided a new 
bvl §7-3 from January 2008. The new “rules of procedure” section was aimed at ensuring that 
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each decision-making process to the FBSS would be made fast, be reassuring and induce trust 
(which is almost a direct quotation of tl §1-1). The §7-3 became the “main principles of 
procedure” and when applied to all cases, it would secure non-discrimination by enforcing the 
same set of rules. This ensured that the leader could assess the seriousness of the case, and 
enforce the principles provided to ensure fair decision-making in each process.312 
 The next important aspect of the design related to the rules of procedure is the forum 
where the deliberations within each case would take place, namely forhandlingsmøte (meeting 
of negotiation).313 The rules stipulate that, prior to any decision reached by the FBSS, a 
meeting of negotiation must be held. According to bvl §7-15, this meeting is going to be 
based on guidelines on how hovedforhandlinger (main meeting of negotiation) is supposed to 
work according to tl §9-15, but, “according to their appropriateness”.314 To this extent, the 
leader of the FBSS is at the helm of the procedure when maneuvering between principles and 
guidelines for how a civil trial is supposed to work within child protection cases. Hence, the 
level of legal protection within the FBSS is allegedly paracitic upon civil trials. 
 The BVL of 1953 did not explicate any principles or rules that would guide the 
procedure, and even though the bvl at its introduction in 1992 did not have them incorporated 
into its legal design, they did however exist as a part of its legislative history.315 The FBSS 
was to observe the same rules of procedure as in civil trials and consequently be parasitic 
upon the legal protection provided by these rules. Such rules of procedure, as they have been 
a part of the FBSS from the start, is in opposition towards the open-ended design of the BVN, 
which lacked reference to any rules of procedure.  
Thus, an open-ended decision-making procedure was integral to the way the BVN was 
designed. However, the decision-making procedure was not stabilized on a national level—
the procedure would vary by default. In many respects, having no rules of procedure would 
greatly narrow down the ability of those deciding within the board to claim that a decision 
could have any statutory authority. The lack of rules diminishes the chance of the decision-
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making being based upon a principle of legality.316 Without any rules of procedure, the BVN 
ensured discriminating decision-making from the start.  
The committee in charge of writing the report NOU 2005:9, which was the background 
report to the latest amendment of the FBSS in 2008, were mandated to suggest explicit rules 
of procedure that would develop a more unified practice within the different boards across 
Norway. The idea was that it would secure the legal protection of those affected more than 
leaving it to the leader of the board to interpret how a civil trial ought to be applied during 
procedures, which was the arrangement settled in 1992.317 Although the committee did not 
reinvent what was meant by rules of procedure, they argued that something needed to be 
explicated formally to guide the procedure itself, as there were no provisions within the bvl or
stl that explicitly put forth the guiding principles for decision-making. The solution 
manifested itself with the amendment of 2008 and the introduction of a section called “main 
principles of procedure.”318  
 The mandate of the FBSS-committee stated furthermore that it needed to consider and 
explore the human-rights standard of the FBSS. By their mandate, it was indirectly admitted 
that the ability to enforce human rights by the FBSS in the past was insufficient, and that 
something had to be done. The need for transforming the bvl into a body of law that complied 
with human-rights standards, and especially the standards of the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC), was a consequence of the process of incorporating the CRC 
into Menneskerettighetsloven (Human Rights Act - mrl) in 2003.319 This increasing focus 
upon making the FBSS and child protection, i.e. decision-making involving coercion, be 
subjected to a post-national turn, has become increasingly apparent.320 When the CRC was 
incorporated to Norwegian law, it was also stressed that it implied passive and active 
transformation of the bvl. For the most parts, it was a matter of passive transformation in that 
it was claimed that Norwegian law was to be considered as already reflecting a post-national 
turn, and that the CRC-standards was already maintained and enforced through Norwegian 
law.321 Some minor changes were made to the bvl, with respect to active transformation. I will 
return to them later. If we compare the effort to incorporate CRC to become part of 
Norwegian regular law in 2003, to the statement in the mandate of the FBSS-committee that 
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argued an insufficient focus upon human rights in 2005, it can be argued that the efforts of 
2003 was inadequate. Especially with the explicit focus upon making the FBSS abide by 
human rights standards from 2005 till present. This development can be summed up as the 
post-national turn in Norwegian child protection. 
The FBSS-committee’s Green Paper of 2005 argued that human rights always needed 
to be taken into consideration so that they would not be broken. Hence, the committee 
admitted that FBSS-design had to have a design that complied with human rights. They 
stressed the important position that human rights had come to play, and that the FBSS was to 
abide by and maintain such a post-national standard. Human rights can thus be seen as a 
primary focus in NOU 2005:9, as to measure the quality and legitimacy of the decision-
making. This focus upon fair-trial and human rights was upheld in Ot.prp.nr. 76 (2006-2007), 
which was the legal proposal that amended the design of the FBSS to its current state.322 
Implicitly, then, there is a claim that the FBSS currently upholds a post-national standard. 
5.3.TheOrderofExpectationof1992:TheRightsoftheChild
The CRC was open for ratification in 1989, and Norway did so in 1991. Consequently, it did 
not influence Ot.prp.nr.44 (1991-1992) that led to the bvl, or Ot.prp.nr.29 (1990-1991) that 
led to the stl and the design of the FBSS.323 The CRC did not become a dedicated part of the 
legislative history at the introduction of the bvl. However, this does not imply that the bvl was 
not underpinned by basic principles that focused upon the protection of the individuality of 
the child as right. The introduction of the bvl was the introduction of a system of protection 
set to secure the individual utility of each child. The aim was, and still is, to secure that each 
child can live a life on its own terms as adulthood and self-determination begins. In this sense, 
child protection is a matter of positively ensuring the negative rights of the future adult.  
The panel responsible for NOU 1985:18 ended up arguing against moving protection 
cases to the court-system. The civil court did not have the competence to uphold modern 
demands towards legal protection of parents and child—the case-work was argued to be too 
complex. The mandate behind NOU 1985:18 required that they specified more clearly the 
terms that led to a more coherent decision-making. The emphasis upon legal-protection is so 
strong that it constitutes the origin of the basic expectation of non-discrimination. It is basic to 
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the extent that the FBSS-design had to abide by it already in 1992 in order to redeem a 
promise of trust.  
On the other hand was the need to have enough discretionary competence to plunge 
deeply, and in an informed manner, into the complexity of each case in order to make the best 
type of decision for the individual child.324 Decisions that affected a child had to be in the best 
one for the particular child. Its individuality had now become the object of protection, and 
ensuring what was best for a child had become another basic expectation. It was explicitly 
pointed out that “solutions are not to be found that serve the parents or local community at the 
cost of the child.”325 This is clearly departing from the order of expectations that was reflected 
by the BVL, and points towards establishing a new legal order that attempt to comply with an 
order of expectations where basic expectations of ‘child’s best’ and non-discrimination.  
The bvl of 1992 was set to focus on the child itself, as an individual in need of 
protection. When it had been decided that the parents had forfeit their duty to provide non-
detrimental care to the child, the child would become the only focus of attention. The new bvl, 
can be considered as a profound change in how child welfare and protection became enforced. 
Child welfare would still be considered as the attempt to solve problems in how parents 
provided care, but once it had become established that the child was in need of protection, the 
child alone would stand at the centre of attention. Cases involving coercion to protect the 
child went from being a family-oriented social protection to a child-centered focus by the 
introduction of the bvl.  
The combination of foci, i.e. upon each individual child and ensuring non-
discrimination, is what I will refer to as the basic expectations of a right’s based order of 
expectations. It is the principle right of the child, and only the child, to receive protection in 
its own best interest. It is a right in the sense of a principled entitlement the child has to public 
protection. This is how we can argue that the order of expectations is constituted in 1992, if 
the legal order complies with it is another thing. As time has gone by, how to interpret these 
two basic expectations has changed. Eventually, a post-national turn has changed the order of 
expectation and thus the face of child protection from within the same basic expectations. 
This means that the focus upon what was best for a child and non-discrimination was first 
introduced in a nation-based context, but eventually became subjected to a post-national turn 
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which means that child protection in Norway currently needs to comply with the principle of 
the child’s best interest and non-discrimination with a cosmopolitan imprint.  
5.4.TheOrderofExpectationof2008:ThePostǦNationalTurn
It is argued in NOU 1985:18 that human rights set fundamental demands to the design of the 
decision-making procedure for the FBSS.326 At the time, the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) had already developed strong historical roots in Norwegian rule of law, 
together with the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(CCPR). However, according to NOU 1985:18, other conventions had not.327 
 In 2003, the parliament incorporated the CRC into the mrl. This meant that the 
authentic text of the CRC became part of Norwegian regular law. In this effort, the bvl was 
also transformed to abide by the CRC.328 For the most parts of the bvl, it was rather confirmed 
legal harmony between the bvl and the CRC.329 The intention behind amending the bvl was to 
give it the cosmopolitan and post-national imprint bestowed by the origin of the CRC as a 
global legal document. 
Currently the CRC has precedence to the bvl due to a rule-of-precedence within the 
mrl. It implies that when a conflict occurs between the CRC and the bvl, the CRC has 
precedence.330 Prior to 2003, the CRC did not have this explicit legal precedence. By having 
the CRC as part of the mrl, it indirectly makes the bvl a rights-law because the bvl cannot be 
in conflict with the CRC. In the effort to maintain the rule-of-precedence, the amendment of 
the bvl in 2003 was argued would ensure that the bvl would uphold standard of the CRC.  
The demands set towards the FBSS-design by the CRC was reconfirmed in the Green 
Paper NOU 2005:9. This Green Paper, in combination with the legal proposal Ot.prp.nr.76 
(2006-2007) held the reference of bvl to the principle of the child’s best in bvl §4-1 to be on 
par with the child’s best interest standard according to CRC Art. 3-1. As such, every decision 
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reached by the FBSS, which would uphold bvl §4-1, could from now on be interpreted as also 
the enforcement of the human rights standard of the CRC.331 
In order to have a child protection system that is worthy of trust, it is imperative for 
the political craftsmanship of parliament to design a decision-making body that complies with 
the current order of expectations. The increasing focus upon human rights within the order of 
expectations set constraints upon the design of the FBSS, and the current child protection 
system must accommodate a human rights rational in order to redeem the promise of trust. 
With regard to the post-national turn, it is important to stress that we are talking about 
a transformation of the content of the basic expectations that was introduced in bvl, and which 
we can see has increasingly an effort in politics. The basic expectations of child’s best interest 
and non-discrimination, developed from being founded in national child protection discourse 
in 1992 towards becoming based in a post-national line of thought in 2008. The latter implies 
a non-nationalist understanding of child protection. A post-national turn implicitly states that 
there are key-demands to the legal architecture that are not nation-based, but originates rather 
from a universalistic legal order. Although 2003, and the incorporation of the CRC into the 
mrl, constitute the most important formal expression of this development, the post-national 
turn is the result of a development that started prior to the introduction of the bvl, and refers to 
the gradual increase in reference to the protection of the individual child as a matter of 
right.332  
 There are several things that points towards this development, and I will briefly state 
some of the most important factors that underpin the post-national turn in Norwegian child 
protection and that has not been mentioned earlier. They all relate to the argument that the 
legal order, in order for it to become worthy of trust, must comply with a post-national turn: 
1. In the introduction of the design of the FBSS, it was a focus upon maintaining general 
human rights (not child-specific rights). It was argued that the design had to uphold 
the standards of a fair trial set by the ECHR.333 They focused upon decision-making in 
coercive-cases, and how demands towards were supposed to be measured according to 
human rights standards. It was emphasized especially a need for independent and 
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neutral decision-making, and the inclusion of professionals and lay-men in a court-like 
proceeding in order to reach the aim of a fair-trial. Hence, central design-traits have 
their justification based in a human rights-rational. The meeting of negotiation, which 
is the decision-making node within the FBSS, is currently one example of what is 
supposed to adhere to the principle of fair-trial. The principle is formulated in Art. 6 
(1) of the ECHR, and “constitute the bedrock of civil procedure” in Norway.334 The 
rules of procedure that the FBSS must adhere to are deduced from this principle. 
Hence, the decision-making body within child protection is claimed to adhere to a 
human rights standard. 
2. By ratifying the CRC, Norwegian authorities acknowledged that the CRC constituted 
an important part of international law, and Norwegian authorities committed itself to 
uphold the human rights-standards expressed by this rights-catalogue. This effort have 
been reported upon to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child.335 Although their 
comments are not legally binding, they have become significant as legal source.336 
3. In a White Paper submitted in 2001, it is a section devoted to the increasing focus 
upon the CRC. It states that the CRC have had a decisive impact regarding how the 
public is to protect children, and that children was to be treated according to their 
particular context and interest. It supports the notion that the order of expectations was 
changing from within through an increasing focus upon the human rights catalogue of 
the CRC as a point of reference.337 
4. This White Paper was again based upon the Green Paper submitted by the Befring-
committee—NOU 2000:9. This major Green Paper states that children in need of 
public protection were to receive protection according to what was best for them. It 
even states that this principle was the “incontestable value and fundamental principle 
within the law.”338 The Green Paper concluded also that this fundamental principle 
was embedded in the bvl and was de jure in harmony with the CRC’s principle of the 
child’s best interest.339 Hence, long before the CRC was incorporated into Norwegian 
law, we can see a change in how the basic expectations become evaluated.  
5. Within the amendment of Barneombudsloven (Ombudsman for Children Act – bol) of 
1998, it became explicated in bol §3-b that the Ombud is supposed to ensure that the 
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rights of the child became secured. Hence, already in 1998 was a watchdog 
established to ensure oversight and review of the practices that affected children, and 
to ensure that these practices upheld the self-inserted commitment of Norwegian 
government to uphold the CRC. Over 70 hearing-instances underlined the importance 
of the Ombud with regard to promoting the rights of the child.340  
6. In 1999, the Human Rights Act (mrl) was introduced. It is explicitly stated that the 
child-convention was to be incorporated at a later stage.341 In the Green Paper behind 
the legal proposal to the mrl, NOU 1993:18, the CRC was not provided any 
evaluation.342 Hence, it would be premature to incorporate it at that point. This had to 
do with the short amount of time that the CRC had been around. The CRC became 
incorporated in the mrl in 2003, and a consequence of that incorporation was the 
amendment of the bvl to abide by it.  
7. It was reaffirmed by parliament, Innst. O. nr. 51 (1998-99):5, that the CRC had to 
become a part of the mrl. The CRC, it was argued, belonged to the fundamental 
human rights conventions. The broad parliamentary agreement on this issue marks a 
lack of opposition towards the CRC and the consequences it would have on regular 
law.  
8. A White Paper submitted in 1999, St.meld.nr. 21 (1999-2000), present an action-plan 
on incorporating human rights into the Norwegian law and legal practice. Here, 
already in 1999, it was pointed out that the CRC was to be incorporated into the mrl. 
The parliament asked the same year, 4th of May, the government to begin the process 
of incorporating the CRC into the mrl. This led to Ot.prp.nr. 45 (2002-2003) that 
amended the bvl by affirming legal harmony with the CRC. Hence, the claim that 
human rights for children was a focus, was backed up by action to craft legislation. 
9. The Green Paper of 2005, leading to the large amendment of the FBSS in 2008, NOU 
2005:9, was mandated to ensure that the decision-making procedure was observing 
standards of human rights. The subsequent legal proposal, Ot.prp.nr. 76 (2006-2007), 
refer to the NOU 2005:9, and argues that since the CRC was incorporated into the mrl,
and thus had precedence, any amendment had to abide by the CRC.343 Hence, the 
recent design of the FBSS is indirectly argued to uphold human rights. Among them 
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are most notably the principle of child’s best interest, non-discrimination, and fair-
trial.  
10. The last point I will make is that if we pragmatically hold the Norwegian legal order to 
abide by principles of an ideal constitutional democracy, it would be sufficient for the 
bvl to be subjected to a post-national turn if the legal order was amended to be in 
harmony with a human rights convention of global reach designated children only.  
 
It is argued that the bvl is not in conflict with human rights.344 However, in the next part, it 
will be argued that the order of expectations, that can be dubbed as post-national and rights-
based is not embedded in the legal order adequately. Both of the basic expectations, the 
child’s best interest and non-discrimination, must be embedded in the legal order if the 
promise of trust is to be redeemed. The post-national rights-based order of expectations and 
its dominant basic expectations, set demands upon the legal order. The specifics of such a 
demand, and whether or not the FBSS complies with them, is what we will discuss in part III. 
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PartIII–DoestheFBSSRedeemthePromiseofTrust

 
134 
 
6.HowBasicExpectationsRedeemaPromiseofTrust
 
 
 
 
 
What does the order of expectations currently entail? What can be argued is the normative 
self-understanding expressed by its basic expectations? Asked differently, what is trustworthy 
child protection today? These are questions that still need an answer in order to evaluate the 
FBSS and find out if it can redeem the promise of trust. So far, the historical development of 
the order of expectations, with two basic expectations, has been laid out: The child’s best 
interest and non-discrimination. This effort has been made to unveil what is claimed to be the 
current order of expectations. Now, I will seek to lay out the expression of the normative self-
understanding of the order of expectations, viz. elaborate on the rationale that underpins 
current trustworthy child protection. Arguing the complexity of the current order of 
expectations will allow us to perform an illuminating critique of political craftsmanship, and 
answer, in the next chapter, if the legal design of the FBSS was crafted in 2008 to comply 
with the order of expectations. 
 In part II, it was argued that the development within the order of expectations in child 
protection has entered what can be dubbed rights-based and post-national, where the two 
basic expectations dominating are non-discrimination and the child’s best interest. Since 
1992, it was supposed to be a “new child protection code with increased legal protection for 
children, more in line with a current and future child protection and the reality that children 
live in.”345 The 2008-amendment that focused upon the FBSS was the latest grand effort for 
the lawmakers to craft legislation that complied with such an aim—does the legal design 
redeem the promise of trust?  
 In order to lay out the normative self-understanding of child protection, I will begin by 
explaining the purpose of child protection by drawing upon the legal purpose of child 
protection that stipulates that a child’s development and health needs protection if it is 
                                                 
345 Ot.prp.no.44 (1991-1992): 12. 
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subjected to detrimental care.346 I will also explain how we need to understand this purpose 
with respect to the post-national turn. Secondly, I will lay out thresholds of intervention that 
uphold the demand of non-discrimination. Third, I will argue that reasonable pluralism of 
parental care and within the interests of children, leads to a conflict of claims on what is in a 
child’s best interest. This sets demands towards decision-making in that it needs to be 
argumentative. Fourth, I will elaborate upon the two basic expectations, and argue how they 
set constraints upon decision-making designs. I will draw upon the discourse on child 
protection, the legal order itself and the legislative history in the attempt to present a more 
detailed argument for what is worthy of trust in child protection. 
 Once the aim of child protection no longer applies to the child, i.e. that the child 
becomes an adult, the child receives self-determination, which is what I will refer to as 
autonomy or personal liberty. At this point, the person is no longer held to be in need of 
protection as a child. The transition from dependency of parents to autonomy is when the 
child receives the right to personal liberty as an adult. The importance of this transition has 
been upheld throughout the history of child protection, and it has been used as a reference 
point for what type of protection has been needed. Furthermore, I will claim that this 
prospective right to personal liberty, carried by a child, is linked to the development of the 
interests of the child—it is the interests developed during childhood that directs the choices of 
a young adult. Hence, how interests develop during childhood becomes significant for the 
prospective right to personal liberty and what constitute the best interest of the adult person.  
6.1.ExtrapolatingthePurposeofProtectionAfterthePostǦNationalTurn
Throughout child protection history, the bvl is the first legal code with a so-called statement 
of legislative purpose. It states:  
“§1:The purpose of this Act is (1) to ensure that children and young persons who live in 
conditions that may be detrimental to their health and development receive necessary assistance 
and care at the right time. (2) to help ensure that children and young persons grow up in a secure 
environment”347
This legislative purpose is set to direct all actions authorized by the legal order of the bvl. 
Hence, this purpose also encompasses the FBSS-design. As this legal code applies to all 
                                                 
346 This formulation was also part of the legislative history of the BVL §16-a of 1953. However, in 1953 it was 
not referred to as a specific statement of legislative purpose. Although we can trace the focus upon protecting 
development and health far back in time, it became clearer with the establishment of bvl §1– Ot.prp.nr. 44 (1991-
1992):16.  
347 Bvl §1-1. The second sentence to this purpose, “…to help ensure that children and young persons grow up in 
a secure environment”, can be argued relates more to child welfare in general, rather than to coercion of the 
parents. In this second sentence, the child’s development is not threatened.  
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children, it can be argued that the purpose of child protection is to safeguard each child’s 
development until they are no longer subjects of the legal code, i.e. until adulthood and self-
determinate is reached.348  
Hence, at a general level, current protection is set to ensure that children do not 
become harmed by their childhood as they develop into adults. This legislative purpose serves 
the function of being a general formulation of child protection itself, and should not be seen 
as uncontroversial. I will apply this regulation as a basic ingredient to the normative self-
understanding of trustworthy child protection.  
This purpose of child protection implies that when the child receives autonomy as an 
adult, and must take care of oneself, its development and health is supposed to have been 
above a certain threshold. The new adult, who has not had a detrimental childhood, can then 
choose to act upon its own interests. A childhood without detrimental care leaves a new adult 
with the liberty to choose among a certain amount of opportunities.349 A child affected by 
detrimental care, on the other hand, will not acquire the sufficient amount of opportunities to 
make use of autonomy. Hence, such a child must be protected. Due to the principle of non-
discrimination, every child is supposed to receive equal protection of their development. If the 
meaning of “development” is inadequately understood, and a coherent threshold of 
intervention is not enforced, it opens up for a variety of interpretations of what “development” 
entail, and risk discriminatory protection of children. Hence, we can argue that each child, in a 
non-discriminatory fashion, must receive a sufficient amount of opportunities when they 
become adults.  
However, the problem in finding out what is in the child’s best interest is that children 
cannot advocate their own interests because they are children. Thus, the local Child Welfare 
Office must raise a claim to protect the child’s interests on its behalf if threats towards their 
development are suspected. This doctrine can be dubbed in loco parentis, which means that 
the local Child Welfare Office claim “the place of a parent.” When the state wants to protect, 
it must raise a claim against the parents, and hence a conflict of claims must become resolved.  
                                                 
348 In special cases, this age-limit can be exceeded from 18, which is normal, to the age of 23 – cf. bvl §1-3.  
349 This does not mean that the quality of the childhood itself is disregarded. This is embedded within the 
demand to a decent development. If you have a miserable childhood, it is equivalent to detrimental treatment and 
hence a threat towards the development of the child. Across Norway there has been implemented arrangements 
that ensure economic compensation for “lost childhood” for children who lived in some type of institution prior 
to the implementation of the bvl – cf. St.meld. 45 (2004-2005).
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 When the FBSS was introduced in 1992, it did not include today’s interpretation of the 
principle of the child’s best interest. Currently, the fundamental consideration during the 
decision-making procedure is a principle of the child’s best interest that is in harmony with 
human rights; this principled shift constitutes the essence of the post-national turn in child 
protection. With respect to the child’s best interest, this turn was affirmed through the passive 
transformation of the child’s best-principle of the bvl §4-1 to that of CRC Art. 3.1. in 2003, 
which meant that the CRC-principle of the child’s best interest was confirmed as already 
embedded in the bvl. Hence, the current version of the principle embedded in the legal order 
is supposed to be rights-based and post-national, while it initially was merely rights-based and 
a reaction to the BVL.350  
 In NOU 1985:18 and in Ot.prp.nr.45 (1991-1992), the fundamental consideration of 
the legal code was dubbed “barnets beste for øye,” which is an expression that translates to 
“having the child’s best in mind.”351 This is not the same as having a particular child’s best 
interest as a primary concern, as it is stated by the CRC. Hence, it is debatable if the original 
principle of 1992 is alluding to interests of the particular child at all, or what is meant by 
having the “child’s best in mind.”352  
 This difference in principle has not been noted in the more recent legislative history 
regarding the principle of the child’s best interest. It can rather be argued that the difference is 
ignored in that it is taken for granted that they are in harmony and imply the same thing.353 
The original consideration of “child’s best in mind” was nation-based and could involve a 
simple way of reasoning. The denomination was also provided long before the CRC was even 
finished, let alone ratified. I will argue that the turn towards having a primary consideration in 
a particular child’s best interest from 2003, makes child protection much more complicated 
that it was in 1992.  
Arguing that the child’s best interest principle was already rights-based and in 
harmony to the CRC Art. 3-1 in a post-national sense in 1992 disregards the legislative 
history that established the bvl §4-1 where the child’s best-principle is embedded.354 If the 
                                                 
350 Ot.prp.nr. 76 (2006-2007):127, NOU 2005:9: 38-39 and Ot.prp.nr.45 (2002-2003):25.  
351 This is a typical Norwegian expression and it does not work in English. It means that those who are to decide 
is supposed to think about what would be the best for the child when they reason on what to do. This does not 
mean that they are supposed to approach the child’s own interest.  
352 NOU 1985:18: 145 and Ot.prp.nr.45 (1991-1992):6.  
353 Ot.prp.nr.45 (2002-2003):23.  
354 Ot.prp.nr.45 (2002-2003):25. This interpretation is reaffirmed later in both Ot.prp.nr. 76 (2006-2007) and 
NOU 2005:9. 
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amendment of the bvl in 2003, which incorporated the CRC, had taken the differences into 
account, it would have noticed that the §4-1 advocates for the child’s best in mind, rather than 
a guarantee that decisions are in a particular child’s best interest. Currently, the bvl §4-1 does 
not have the word “interest” built into it at all. This omission is, as will become clear later, 
significant. Since the child’s best interest of the CRC is claimed to be in harmony with the 
bvl, and hence claimed to guide the decision-making process of the FBSS, it is a matter of 
political craftsmanship to ensure that the FBSS operates according to a post-national turn. 
However, this craftsmanship has yet to occur.  
 Through the FBSS, both the parents and child are protected by rights. This does not 
imply formal legal rights, but alludes to the fundamental principle purpose of the system of 
child protection in Norway—namely to protect the individual parent as long as the child is 
subjected to non-detrimental care, but protect the child once the type of care becomes 
detrimental. The defense of parental rights, or what has been referred to as the biological 
presumption, is the task of the local Child Welfare Office and the non-coercive measures at its 
disposal. On the other hand, FBSS must potentially be prepared to revoke this right. Hence, 
parents are coerced only as a last resort, namely when it has been established that it is in the 
best interest of the child to intervene coercively. 
Once childhood crosses over to adulthood, the child is granted the right to personal 
liberty as a regular adult, and it must continue further alone, and choose what to do in life, 
according to his or her own best interest. In this manner, it can be argued that the child’s best 
interest, being a fundamental principle of child protection, is internally linked to the right to 
personal liberty of adults.355 The protection of a child’s development is directed towards 
ensuring that a child can choose for itself the way it wants to live life once it becomes an 
adult. 
As the bvl has a statement of legislative purpose that focus upon the protection of the 
development of the child, it can be seen as a protection of the development until adulthood 
when a right to personal liberty is obtained—this is a way to provide a post-national rights-
based rationale to the purpose of child protection. This type of rationale is not feasible if you 
simply interpret that protection of a child is to have the “child’s best in mind”, which does not 
                                                 
355 It can be argued that the right to liberty is explicitly entrenched many places in Norwegian law. The most 
obvious formulation is Art 1 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (spr). It 
states that all people have the right to self-determination, which entail the right to choose for themselves what 
type of conception of good they want to live by. It is also covered in Art. 5 of European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (emk): The right to liberty. 
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imply the protection of the interests of the child until it reaches adulthood. The rationale 
presented here is deduced from the CRC-principle focusing on the interests of the child.  
Linking an adult’s personal liberty to the purpose of child protection set demands 
towards how the design of the FBSS should function. If a child did not have an opportunity-
set that matched reasonable interests, the development of the child has not been protected in 
its best interest. If opportunities do not cover a reasonable amount of interests of the child, the 
care that the child has been subjected to has been detrimental to the child and to the life that 
child could reasonably want. At this point, coercion against the parents is necessary, I would 
argue, because the parents have violated the child’s prospective right to personal liberty. 
That the purpose of the bvl is to protect the child’s prospective right to personal liberty 
is not a normative claim in the sense of arguing for a child protection system we ought to 
have, but is a way of providing a normative language to an interpretation of child protection 
that the current order of expectations reflect provided its basic expectations. By protecting the 
best interests of the child as long as it develops, the adult will be able to act upon its interests 
when it becomes free to do so as an adult. The focus upon protecting the development of the 
child until it receives the right to personal liberty is the key to understand when to intervene 
and what to protect. 
6.2.ThePostǦNationalThresholdofIntervention
The principle of non-discrimination is the key to understand how institutional design provides 
procedural equality when enforcing a principle of child’s best interest. Enforcing the latter 
principle imply a protection of the individual interest of the child—it is the prospective right 
to personal liberty of one particular child that is at stake here. In this regard, we can draw 
lessons from John Stuart Mill, about the state’s duty to educate children.356 I am preoccupied 
with the protection of the child’s prospective right to liberty, and Mill’s reasoning regarding 
the need for state run “education” is equally valid for child care. According to Mill:  
“...to bring a child into existence without a fair prospect of being able, not only to provide food for 
its body, but instruction and training for its mind, is a moral crime, both against the unfortunate 
offspring and against society; and that if the parent does not fulfil this obligation, the State ought 
to see it fulfilled, at the charge, as far as possible, of the parent.”357
If a child is subjected to detrimental care, the child’s ability to fulfill its potential in life would 
become impaired, hence the “State ought to see it fulfilled.” Mill’s argument, if applied to 
                                                 
356 See Palmer, Bresler, & Cooper (2001): 116. 
357 Mill (1867). See also Eriksen and Skivenes (1998).  
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child protection, stands as a crude description of the order of expectations of child protection. 
If parents fail to provide non-detrimental care, it is the duty of the state to intervene and 
protect the child.358 The state must ensure that the child is cared for so that it receives its 
prospective right to liberty, and hence take over as “the parent does not fulfill this obligation.”  
 Since 1896, it can be argued that a certain type of protection doctrine has been 
enforced by the state to ensure that a child develops with the ability “not only to provide food 
for its body,” but also with an adequate “instruction and training for its mind.” All adults 
would become “prepared” for a life of their own, for self-determination or autonomy. 
However, protection must be conditioned by a threshold of intervention that relates to the 
transition to adulthood and autonomy, namely what this newly acquired autonomy is there to 
provide—the opportunities needed to choose how one wants to live life. Hence, protection of 
children is directed towards ensuring that once adulthood is reached, the ability to live an 
autonomous life according to the child’s own choice, is not impaired. 
The threshold of intervention is set to ensure that each child receives a sufficient 
amount of opportunities once they become adults. Those who receive protection cannot 
expect to receive a type of treatment that would make them better off than those who did not 
receive any protection but nevertheless received a smaller amount of opportunities than 
others. In other words, those who receive the worst non-detrimental care, and who are 
consequently not deemed in need of protection, set the threshold of intervention. As such, it is 
the children subjected to “almost” detrimental care that has set the threshold to be one of 
sufficiency. In sum, decision-making of the FBSS, which is supposed to be in the child’s best 
interest, must ensure that the child receives a sufficient amount of opportunities once 
adulthood ticks in.  
6.2.1.ARighttoaSufficientAmountofOpportunitiesasNewAdult
As of 1953, by admitting that the parents were best suited to provide care for their children, 
parents were also guaranteed a right to provide care of their choice. In this way, reasonable 
pluralism was embedded in the way child protection and child welfare worked. A pluralism of 
conceptions of childcare and levels of quality of care provided for by parents was the new 
hallmark. It could no longer be maintained by the LBFB-doctrine that children were to 
develop to become a part of a monolithic “normality” or “morality”; rather, their upbringing 
was from then on the result of a reasonable choice of care provided for by parents.  
                                                 
358 Bvl §1-1. 
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Based on this logic, children could be subjected to an acceptable, albeit less than 
perfect type of care, which could not be deemed detrimental. However, although “almost” 
detrimental care would not trigger coercive intervention, the care-type could be subjected to 
non-coercive child welfare measures. This established a first threshold for non-coercive state 
interference of child welfare, as child-care was non-detrimental and tolerated. Once a type of 
care could no longer be tolerated it would be because the parents allegedly had crossed the 
second threshold of child-care and provided detrimental care. The latter threshold is the focus 
here, namely when the need for coercive intervention is necessary.  
 If it was established that care was detrimental to the child, it would be a threat towards 
the child’s development and health, and the care of the child needed to be re-established to 
once again become non-detrimental. The mandate of child protection has never been to 
safeguard a happy childhood, but rather to guarantee that the child’s life as an independent 
adult is not ruined because of childhood. It can be argued that, if a child’s future right to a 
sufficient amount of opportunities becomes threatened, it is the state’s duty to intervene so 
that the child is unable to freely choose how to live life once self-determination is acquired.  
The principle of sufficiency of opportunity can describe what guides child protection. 
It stipulates that state-run child protection should ensure that each recent adult is granted the 
ability to live a life that is worth having for the particular person in question.359 Hence, it is a 
focus upon protecting the individuality of each child. The point of divergence from the former 
legal codes (even the bvl of 1992) on child protection of 2008 is, thus, that the type of 
development of the child that is the object of current child protection is the particular child’s 
best interest.  
6.2.2.OpportunitiesfromCivicRepublicanismtoConstitutionalism
Although it can be argued that the principle of sufficiency of opportunity, i.e. a certain 
minimum standard threshold for care, has sufficed throughout the history of child protection, 
what these opportunities have entailed has varied according to what the purpose of protection 
entailed.  
In 1896 and partially in 1953, child protection aimed to safeguard the development of 
children so that they, at least ideally, became citizens of a kind that the lawmakers wanted. In 
1896 they established corrective education, whereas in 1953 the interests of the child was 
                                                 
359 This means that the child’s best interest is a demand towards the principle of sufficiency of opportunity that is 
agent-relative. Such a principle is also presented in NOU 2000:12.  
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either that of the parents or that of the local community—it was never about developing the 
particular child’s best interest. Liberty, in such a civic republican view, implied the obligation 
to participate freely in civic duties and self-government.360 In both of these legal codes, but 
1896 in particular, it was a desire to make children develop into becoming “normal” 
individuals in the sense of complying with a general good. Thus, child protection had an 
element of social hygiene. It was a belief that the success of the recruitment of a civic culture 
adhering to a general good was a condition for this culture to remain thriving. This is why the 
two first legal codes can be referred to as dominated by a civic republican imprint. 
The bvl introduced the child’s individuality as a primary focus, and hence liberal 
constitutionalism. The fact of reasonable pluralism had led the state in 1953 to accept that the 
aims of parents are not necessarily the same as the state. Child protection incorporated a wider 
principle of toleration that accepted reasonable and different ways of parenting, making a 
thicker conception of general good to be disbanded. In due time the focus had become 
directed towards the child itself, and that they too had to be allowed to vary according to their 
individuality. From within the new legal order of 1992, the child’s individuality was to direct 
decision-making. Currently, in 2008 and after the post-national turn, the state must find out 
what is in the particular child’s best interest in each child’s case. From now on, the child was 
to develop into an adult on his or her own terms. Trustworthy decision-making is no longer a 
matter of deciding what type of interest this child is supposed to have, which was upheld in 
1896 and partly in 1953, nor is it an effort to have these best interest “in mind”, which was 
instituted in 1992. Current child protection is trustworthy when each child’s individuality is 
upheld.  
The threshold of sufficiency of opportunity, which is the object goal of child 
protection, is relates in a non-discriminatory fashion to the particular child’s individuality. 
The development of the particular child must become elevated above the threshold in order to 
safeguard his or her right to receive a sufficient amount of opportunities once it becomes an 
adult. Only then can the child make use of the right to personal liberty.  
To a certain extent, the entire history of coercion in child protection has been a matter 
of developing the normative self-understanding away from the dominance of civic 
republicanism and towards a dominance of constitutionalism, i.e. the individual right to 
liberty. It is as if political liberty instilled in civic republicanism can no longer trump the 
                                                 
360 Civic republicanism is equivalent to “liberty of the ancients” proposed in Constant (1988).  
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overarching goal of child protection—namely to ensure that the development of the individual 
child is not detrimental to that particular child’s interests, and that what is done to mend the 
situation is in that particular child’s best interest. 
6.2.3.SummingUpSoFar:AProspectiveRighttoPersonalLiberty
What does the liberty-principle entail in terms of state-driven protection of children? It is not, 
for instance, an idea of protecting a child’s right to personal liberty when it is a child.  
“To turn [a child] loose to an unrestrained liberty, before he has reason to guide him, is not the 
allowing him the privilege of his nature to be free, but to thrust him out amongst brutes, and 
abandon him to a state as wretched and as much beneath that of a man as theirs. This is that 
which puts the authority into the parents' hands to govern the minority of their children.”361
Children do not have a right to liberty when they are children; this is a right that they receive 
once they become adults. Hence, the child has a prospective right to liberty. This sudden shift 
into adulthood is outlined in the legal history of the FBSS, dating back to Ot.prp.nr. 44 (1991-
1992).362 Children are today granted full self-determination once they become adults at the 
age of eighteen. The right to personal liberty that the child receives as an adult must be 
something the child is prepared for and can make use of. This preparedness is developed in 
childhood, and is the underlying meaning behind the purpose of child protection—namely to 
protect the development of the child. 
Presently, as a child reaches adulthood, that particular person is equipped to strive for 
whatever that person choose to do, as long as it is reasonable.363 This person-relative view 
must be, in a non-discriminatory fashion, compatible with all others having the same chance 
of choosing among a sufficient amount of opportunities on how to live their own lives.364 
Once the child reaches adulthood, the child has a level of opportunities sufficient for that 
child. To illustrate, measures that are to be implemented are always going to be in the affected 
child’s best interest, rather than that of a child’s best interest. This is completely different 
from merely having the child’s best in mind. Thus, if detrimental care provides an insufficient 
amount of opportunities, child protection has not served its purpose.  
6.3.ReasonablePluralismandProcedurallyResolvingaConflictofClaims
The order of expectations that maintain post-national child protection standards is embedded 
in a social system characterized by the fact of reasonable pluralism. Basic expectations within 
                                                 
361 Locke (2000): §63.  
362 Ot.prp.nr.44 (1991-1992): 5ff.  
363 Cf. reasonable pluralism in part I. 
364 See Nagel (1986): 153. 
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child protection must also be understood within such parameters. Every parent has the right to 
choose how to provide care, and each child can choose, according to its interests, how it 
wants to live life once it becomes an adult. In order to reach such an end, the decision-making 
design must incorporate reasonable pluralism.  
 The FBSS must have the ability to reflect upon a multitude of moral and ethical 
reasons for providing care, ethical and reasonable disagreement etc. The design of the FBSS 
must assume that parties that confront the board have, or can potentially have, a multitude of 
views on what non-detrimental care entails. To understand what counts as trustworthy 
decision-making, it must be presupposed that any procedure must accommodate a multitude 
of views on how to provide decent care, where all of these views, or claims, can become 
potentially challenged. Consequently, the decision-making body that needs to solve the norm-
conflict must have a design that can deliberate upon every possible choice of care, i.e. 
whatever conception that is conceivable and contestable. If not, it would be a danger in that 
even reasonable choices of care could potentially be deemed as detrimental. This means that 
the decision-making must be designed so that it can justify a final claim upon the best interest 
of the child. 
If the decision-making body becomes confronted by a norm-conflict, the case cannot 
be resolved according to any pre-conceived notion on what constitute non-detrimental care, in 
a combination with enforceable norms regarding best types of care, or even a kind of strict 
non-discretionary rule-governed procedure that stipulates how to reach a decision. None of 
these approaches would be able to abide by a fact of reasonable pluralism without running 
counter to such a principle.  
The type of norm-conflict we are dealing with here must have a design of the FBSS 
with the potential to decide in every type of case, in an independent fashion and according to 
its own authority and discretion. The latter demands towards independence and according to 
its own authority are a consequence of the need to deliberate upon any type of care-situation 
in a non-discriminatory fashion. 
The need to have an open board that can decide according to its own discretion does 
not imply that the decision-making does not need to abide by rules. In order to uphold a 
principle of non-discrimination, the argumentative procedure must become stabilized, and 
apply equally in all cases. Thus, the decision-making procedure must be neutral, and serve as 
a device that can reach decisions according to every conceivable input after careful 
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deliberation. Consequently, the decision-making needs to abide by formal procedural 
constraints.  
 It is a predicament in embedding reasonable pluralism into decision-making designs 
that also needs to ensure stable non-discriminating decision-making. Decisions must reach 
rational acceptability through procedurally stabilized decision-making. Because of pluralism, 
in order for a promise of trust to be redeemed, any type of decision must be able to reach the 
standard of rational acceptability. Is the type of care provided to this particular child 
detrimental? Should this type of care of this child be tolerated? Searching for answers to such 
questions, and which only relates to a particular child every time, can only be done through a 
process of argumentation. The reason is that identifying cases of detrimental care can only be 
possible if the underlying justification of a type of care, either provided by parents or 
allegedly desired by the child, pass an argumentative test that answers the questions above. 
Hence, to find out if a child is cared for in a detrimental fashion, its care-situation must be laid 
out and justified. If it cannot be justified, it is detrimental. Thus, the FBSS must have a 
procedural design with an ability to identify, define and test if a care-type is detrimental or 
non-detrimental.  
 In the need for locating the threshold of care that determines when the child needs to 
become protected, it becomes apparent that the threshold of care will take different shapes due 
to the pluralism of care-types. Nevertheless, all forms of child rearing below the threshold 
have the common trait of being detrimental. Since the local Child Welfare Office most often 
does not know if the threshold is crossed—a claim must be raised by them and qualified. 
They must test their argument. In this effort, parents are likely to raise a counter-claim 
arguing they are providing non-detrimental care, and that they do not want their parental 
rights revoked. As such, a conflict of claims arises in every case raised. The FBSS must 
therefore be able to reach, through processing different claims, an ultimate claim to 
correctness, reached by procedural constraints guaranteeing rational acceptability.  
The parties on either side of the conflict of claims must relate to two different 
principles—the principle of tolerance of the choices that the parents make on how to provide 
care, and the principle of the child’s right to receive the care that safeguards its prospective 
right to personal liberty, i.e. its alleged best interests.365 The claims are either parent-centered 
                                                 
365 Cf. Art. 8-1 of the ECHR, Art.17 of UNCPR, Art.18-4 of UNESCR for the negative right of freedom from 
interference into the privacy of family-life. Cf. Art. 8-2 of the ECHR, Art.24 UNCPR, Art.10-3 of UNESCR—
all are incorporated into the mrl in Norway. 
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or child-centered, but each claim must relate to the best interests of the child. 366 Just because 
public officials raise a claim regarding the child’s best interest does not mean that the parents 
have their own interests as a primary concern. Instead, they would claim that the best interest 
of the child is to remain in their custody. Again, since this is a norm-conflict on how to 
provide care, there are several right and wrong answers. The decision-making body in charge 
must consequently be able to qualify and justify its final decision.  
According to bvl §4-1, which is the bvl’s equivalent to the best interest of the child of 
CRC Art. 3-1, it is a demand to both parties to uphold the child’s interests. For instance, it 
might be decided that the claim of the local Child Welfare Office is wrong to some degree, 
and that the prospective right to personal liberty is not under threat. In this case, the FBSS is 
supposed to decide not to coercively intervene because non-interference is in the child’s best 
interest. Alternatively, if the best interest of the child is to be protected due to detrimental 
care, it is to receive compensation for detrimental care in order to increase the likelihood for 
the child to receive a sufficient amount of opportunities at the dawn of adulthood.  
However, the child’s best interest can only be approximated because the principle is 
indeterminate.367 The best interest of any child can only be assumed—it is a matter of 
simulating the child’s own rational choice when the child is an adult. No one knows what is in 
a child’s best interest, but claims can be made to qualify an assumption. As such, a final 
decision can only reach rational acceptability through a procedure of claims that culminate in 
a final and ultimate claim acceptable to all participants as the rational thing to do. In order to 
qualify such a decision, the process of argumentatively approximating the best interest of the 
child must open up for all relevant types of arguments, i.e. a multitude of knowledge-bases in 
order to have an exhaustive and fully ventilated argumentative procedure that tests all types of 
potential best interests of the child.  
6.4.TheChild’sBestInterestandNonǦDiscrimination
What is in the best interest of a child? Specifically, what is in a particular child’s best interest? 
More generally, what can be the best interest of any child? Nobody knows the answer—the 
principle is indeterminate. This means that a decision that claim to be in a child’s best interest 
                                                 
366 This line of thinking can also be traced within the CRC as the principle of toleration and can be argued as 
entrenched in Art. 5: “States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents…to 
provide…appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present 
Convention.” Hence, this explicates the need for the state not to intervene unless it is a matter of parents not 
upholding their “responsibilities, rights and duties.”  
367 See e.g. Mnookin (1975).  
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can never become equal to the best interest of the child—such knowledge is inaccessible. 
Hence, a principle of the child’s best interest must be answered by admitting the need for 
approximation. Decision-making within child protection must observe such an indeterminate 
principle, and have the child’s best interest as a primary consideration in order to be worthy of 
trust. Some have argued that the indeterminacy of this principle makes it unattainable and 
hence virtually useless.368 The purpose here is nevertheless to try to make sense of this 
principle because it is a basic expectation within child protection.  
Many of the critiques of the principle of the child’s best interest do not focus upon 
child protection, but rather upon the application of the principle in general.369 Here, I will 
interpret the principle as it figures within the order of expectations, viz. provide it with a post-
national human rights rationale. Hence, the approach that will be embarked upon here has a 
different type of motivation. When a child is in need of protection, it can be argued that any 
alternative guiding norm besides the child’s best interests would be deemed as highly 
illegitimate, provided the current order of expectations.  
In order to uphold the prospective right to personal liberty, the principle of the child’s 
best interest must be pursuant to it. The child must receive measures that would make it 
capable of making use of autonomy, i.e. to have a sufficient amount of opportunities as an 
adult. This is the purpose and aim of protecting the development of a child. To deny the child 
measures that will remedy its detrimental situation in favor of its best interest, is to deny the 
same child a sufficient amount of opportunities and indirectly deny the right to liberty of that 
child in adulthood.370 Such practice would be in conflict with the order of expectations.  
The state can only elevate the care-situation of the child up to the level where the child 
again is subjected to non-detrimental care, and not further. It is illegitimate, according to the 
current order of expectations, to leave the children that are subjected to inadequate, but non-
                                                 
368 The two who has argued the most prominently about the principle of child’s best interest being indeterminate 
and therefore useless as a guiding norm are Mnookin (1975): 229 and Elster (1987): 7. The latter is in debt to the 
former. They are obviously correct in dubbing the principle indeterminate, but they do not argue the case of the 
need for it to be indeterminate, or open-textured. Furthermore, it is quite obvious that the principle is more 
indeterminate in divorce cases where both parents are good parents, and the child is in good mental and physical 
health, than in a case where parents provide detrimental care, and the mental and/or physical state of the child is 
threatened. Elster implies that he will provide a publication that argues that the divorce-case is equal to the 
conflict between parents and the Child Welfare Office, ibid.:1f. He has not published such an argument yet.  
369 In their defence, both Mnookin and Elster published their critique prior to the establishment of the CRC, and 
their arguments were, at the time, correct. However, the most important points are still relevant, i.e. that it is, in 
general, an indeterminate principle.  
370 Implicit to this is the obvious argument that the failure to ensure that the principle of opportunity is not 
secured in manner that makes liberty feasible.  
148 
 
detrimental care, worse off than those captured by the state apparatus. It would be 
discrimination against those children that were subjected to, and the parents who provided, 
the worst kind of non-detrimental care. Enforcing a principle of sufficient amount of 
opportunities must be applied equally to all children—also those directly above the threshold. 
More importantly, it would violate parents’ right to provide care. Parents have the 
right to provide less decent care, as long as it is not detrimental to the child’s health and 
development. Arguing in such a way allows for development of rational principles to the 
interpretation of the principle of child’s best interest itself. As Philip Alston argues about the 
principle of the CRC: 
“The convention as a whole goes at least some of the way towards providing the broad ethical or 
value framework that is often claimed to be the missing ingredient which could give greater 
degree of certainty to the content of the best interest principle.”371
In order to make sense of it all, we need to attempt, although knowing that the guiding 
principle of the child’s best interest is indeterminate, to establish a design of a procedure that 
optimizes the search for what is in a child’s best interest without believing that such a goal is 
attainable. The general stipulation made in the purpose of bvl, i.e. §1-1, is one example of an 
indicator on what direction we need to go to ascertain a child’s best interest—namely to focus 
upon development.  
An individual child cannot know what is in its future best interest. We might know 
something regarding the immediate best interests, but in the long run and with a regard to the 
development of the particular child, nobody knows what constitutes the best interest. We can 
never be sure that a decision in a child’s best interest was reached and whether or not his or 
her subsequent development benefits the child in a way it would rationally consent to. 
Although reaching this goal is the legal claim of the bvl, it is nevertheless unattainable. 
Even though the principle of the child’s best interest is indeterminate, it is important to 
stress that the indeterminacy of the principle of the child’s best interest, within the realm of 
child protection, is smaller than in, for instance, divorce-cases. The point is that it is always 
better for the child not to remain in the custody of persons that provide detrimental care. This 
means that the measures that are implemented to help the child will always improve its 
situation since the child is removed from detrimental care to non-detrimental care. Hence, this 
action is always something the child would want, presently and as a future adult. The problem 
                                                 
371 Alston (1994): 19. 
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still remains though. Although the situation of the child has improved, it might not mean that 
the decision fulfills the promise of serving the child’s best interest.  
6.4.1.TheChild’sBestInterestandtheClaimtoCorrectness
There are no scientific proof that supports any claim of the best interest of any child. 
Moreover, it is no hierarchy of ultimate values guiding the decision that would ensure that a 
child’s best interest is attained. It is no clear-cut consensus on what would be the best type of 
child-rearing strategy. It is absolutely nothing that can guarantee the child’s best interest.372 
Why, then, have such a principle at all? 
 To argue that the bvl is in harmony with the CRC, which was done in 2003, and 
thereby also argue that the principle of the child’s best interest was a part of the bvl, did not 
take into account the moral problems of the principle as it figures in the CRC. In NOU 
1985:18, it was argued that the principle of the child’s best interest had to be seen in relation 
to the weight that the developmental psychology puts on the bond between the child and the 
parents.373 Hence, the Green Paper argued that decision-making should have the relationship 
to parents as an indicator on what was best for the child.374 The principle, as it stands today 
within bvl §4-1, after 2003, has an entirely different purpose, namely to argue that measures 
implemented according to the bvl are aimed at always serving the best interests of the child 
and nobody else.  
 For a child that is subjected to detrimental care, any non-detrimental care is better than 
its current situation. In such cases, something needs to be done, and the interest of the child is 
the only interest of concern; it is about raising the child’s care situation above the threshold 
and out of detrimental care into non-detrimental care. This does not mean perfect care, but it 
is a decision on how the child’s best interest is served above the threshold so that its 
prospective right to liberty becomes secured. Hence, the present discussion is not about the 
principle’s application in general, nor is it aimed at how it works in child welfare, but how it 
works in child protection specifically.  
                                                 
372 Mnookin (1985): 18. 
373 NOU 1985:18: 27.  
374 This type of debate illustrates the need to differentiate state involvement between the protection of children 
and the welfare of children. When the care of a child can be guaranteed by assisting parents voluntary, the rights 
of parents, as well as the interest of the child, are served. However, when the child is in need of protection 
because it is subjected to detrimental treatment, the rights of parents are removed prior to the implementation of 
measures that should be in the child’s best interest. Furthermore, non-coercive measures are always to be 
attempted prior to coercion, which gives the parents ample opportunity to correct their path away from state-
interference. 
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 In child welfare, the rights of parents are not revoked or disputed, and hence they still 
constitute a primary consideration on par with the child’s best interest. This implies that the 
child’s best interests constitute different types of consideration as to where that principle is 
applied. Hence, the best-interest principle must be specified so that it becomes applicable to 
child protection. It could for instance be argued that the more a situation is deemed as 
detrimental for the child, the less difficult it becomes to reach a decision that is better for the 
child, albeit not the best.  
In order for the child to receive measures that are in his or her own best interest 
involves a demand towards decision-making that stipulates that a decision can claim to be the 
right one, i.e. what Robert Alexy refers to as “the claim to correctness.” Due to 
indeterminacy, we can never do anything else than raise claims to what we argue is in a 
child’s best interest. Hence, the procedure of decision-making must enforce a rule of 
approximation in the attempt to reach the best possible solution. A claim to correctness 
involves a claim that is rationally acceptable but nevertheless not valid in a strict sense.375 By 
approximating the best interest of the child, an agreement can be established that does not 
claim to be in the best interests of the child. In a process where many claims can be raised, it 
becomes a matter of finding out how an ultimate claim to correctness can be reached, i.e. the 
claim that all affected parties can rationally accept.   
 The process of rational justification must also observe a principle of non-
discrimination, as this is the other basic expectation—the demand that children was to receive 
an equal type of protection and subjected to an equal type of decision-making procedure. This 
means that the procedure of decision-making must become rule-governed so that each case, 
although being unique, can be trialed in the same manner. The design of the decision-making 
body must therefore follow a rule-driven procedure where argumentation consists of raising 
and testing different claims to correctness, and where the goal is to reach an ultimate claim to 
correctness that is rational acceptable.  
6.4.2.TheNeedforIndeterminacyandtheUltimateClaimtoCorrectness
The child’s best interest needs to be decided upon in a way that simultaneously upholds the 
principle of non-discrimination. This can be achieved by designing a decision-making 
procedure as a legal procedure that can ensure a legitimate outcome based upon principles of 
                                                 
375 Alexy (1989): 16. Alexy relates to indeterminacy of rules in itself. However, we are not preoccupied with 
legal argumentation per se, but rather a procedure involving legal-normative argumentation. His theoretical 
propositions are nevertheless relevant to this arena as well.  
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a general practical discourse—namely rational acceptability. By embedding such an aim into 
a decision-making design, that also have the capability of reaching it, each decision can be 
supported by a rational justification in the sense that any moral person can rationally accept 
the outcome. Such a justification is dependent upon a process of fair argumentation.  
 A design that meets the procedural demands of a legal discourse must be activated by 
a problem that must be argued for in the sense that it is a practical problem that needs a 
solution. Hence, the problems raised by the indeterminacy of the child’s best interest 
principle, i.e. the need for exhaustive procedure of argumentation, can be argued is a 
precondition for reaching rational acceptability in that it sets demands towards such a 
procedure. Indeterminacy is rather about the practice of the right in itself—that it is not 
possible to enforce with certainty. In order for the principle of the child’s best interest to be 
applied in a sensible manner, provided its indeterminacy, we need to approximate certainty 
each time knowing certainty is unattainable. Since the best interest of the child is contingent 
upon others making a judgment on behalf of the child, efforts should be made in order to 
safeguard highest possible certainty that the best interest of the child become served. 
 The prospective right to personal liberty provided to each child is internally linked to 
the child’s best interest. Decision-making enforcing the prospective right to personal liberty 
implies decision-making with a current focus upon the future interests of the child. This is an 
interpretation of the meaning behind protecting the development of the child, provided the 
backdrop of a post-national human rights rationale that is reflected by the current order of 
expectations. What justifies such a guiding norm is the importance of the right to personal 
liberty for adults, and how this type of autonomy is embedded in a constitutional state.376  
Attempting to solve the ethical problem in question is a matter of practical reason, i.e. 
a question of drawing upon the faculties of reason in order to decide on how to act in the best 
interests of a child. As such, a decision becomes forged on the correct course of action for a 
particular child through a process of argumentation; it is a matter of expressing a final ethical 
position by way of constructing an argument. Since nobody knows, or can know, with any 
certainty what the correct answer is, all relevant arguments must be put on the table. One 
argument alone can claim to be correct, and claim the just course of action to ensure the best 
interest of the child. One such argument reflects a type of reason from the person or entity that 
                                                 
376 Any moral discussion on whether or not this is good or bad thing in itself is unnecessary at this point; this is 
merely stated as a characteristic for a nation-state that claims to uphold human rights. Norwegian government 
claim to uphold human rights.  
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utters it alone. Such a claim is not universally held to be correct, as it is the opinion of one 
person or one entity alone—others have competing and potentially equally good justifications 
for why a particular action should be commenced upon.  
The ethical point of view of one person or entity that claims to be the right one 
constitutes one claim to correctness. If others make claims to correctness, they must also be 
heard in order to establish the validity of their claims. All claims that can inform the process 
of reaching an ultimate claim to correctness must be allowed to enter the procedure of 
argumentation—if not, the final decision might lose valid insights and thus lack the quality of 
rational acceptability towards the guiding principle of being in the child’s best interest. 
The claim that can be argued is legitimate is the one that all affected parties can accept 
through a procedure of scrutiny and deliberation, where rational acceptability of a decision in 
the child’s best interests is reached by the decision closest to being the objectively justified 
action norm of the particular case at hand. This claim is most often not carried by one 
speaker, but is a result of argumentation. It could be carried by one speaker, but then it would 
need to address other arguments in order to reach rational acceptability among all affected 
parties by way of the argumentative test. Hence, the design of the decision-making procedure 
itself is imperative.  
By confronting a distinct problem to practical reason, a distinct normative question 
becomes raised at the point of departure. In this case, the question is: “What is in a child’s 
best interest, given this particular child’s circumstances?” The solution is sought in a decision 
stipulating an action regarding what ought to be done. At this point, securing the interests of 
the child is not a matter of facts and how such facts become established. Such matters have 
been settled, and then it is a need to decide on the issue of what ought to be done in order to 
ensure that the child’s best interest is fulfilled.  
The solution to the problem should be within the realm of what Kant referred to as 
objective practical reason—namely “valid for the will of every rational being.”377 This is what 
is meant by rational acceptability. As noted above, each carrier of an argument can only make 
a claim upon representing something that is subjectively valid until such an argument has 
been confronted, confirmed or dismissed in a process of argumentation that includes all 
parties that are relevant. Only by subjecting an argument to an argumentative procedure 
                                                 
377 Kant (2002): 29. Many modern theorists have argued around this type of thinking. However, we will discuss 
or present them here.  
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would it be possible to make it valid to the will of every rational being and reach rational 
acceptability. Hence, it is not a matter of claiming what is in a child’s best interest, which is 
indeterminate, but to reach a conclusion that all can agree to is the optimal one. However, in 
the case discussed here, it is not necessary to include every rational being directly, but rather 
those who are affected by the decision and who thereby posit relevant arguments.  
Important parties to the procedure is the child, the parents, the accusers, the mediators, 
medical practitioners, psychologists, neighbors, and friends, but this list is by no means 
exhaustive. A relevant argument raised by a parent is to be treated as one subjective practical 
argument on par with, for instance, the medical practitioner or social worker. Since the goal is 
to achieve an outcome that satisfies “every rational being,” it becomes mandatory that every 
relevant argument must be heard and scrutinized.  
Due to reasonable pluralism of modern societies, of continuous differentiation and 
increasing normative and epistemic complexity, the amount of relevant arguments can be 
many. Due to indeterminacy, none of them can claim certainty in knowing what is in a child’s 
best interest. This rather makes it more important to establish procedural decision-making that 
can include all relevant arguments relating to the child in question.  
Three important issues must be accommodated in the attempt to approximate a 
decision that is in a child’s best interest. First, nobody alone can make decisions in the child’s 
best interests that have the quality of rational acceptability. Second, every argument that can 
be relevant must be included; hence the need to include every affected party. Third, such a 
procedure must be able to extrapolate the relevant arguments in a fair manner. Due to these 
three circumstances, which can accommodate variations of input between cases, the design of 
the decision-making procedure must become rule-based to ensure a fair procedure of 
argumentation that do not discriminate between cases. This also sets demands towards the 
leader of the decision-making board, who must be able to understand what arguments are 
permissible or not.  
On this note, we must resort to the central background principles of a fair process of 
argumentation that can solve the practical problem we are confronted by. Reaching a 
legitimate decision can only be achieved if “every rational being” becomes included in 
argumentation. This demand is limited by the fact that in order to be regarded as a “rational 
being,” one must present rational arguments, which implies being, at some level, affected by 
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the purpose and aim of decision-making. Each argument presented must have the particular 
child’s best interest at heart, and on some level relate to this aim.378 
Habermas formulates a discourse-principle that incorporates the Kantian precept: 
“valid for the will of every rational being.” Here, I will apply such a discourse-principle as a 
design principle for establishing an ideal standard for a decision-making body that can be said 
to harbor the ability of reaching legitimate consensus through argumentation that merits 
rational acceptability. The principle underpins objective justification of norms in general: 
"Only those norms are valid to which all affected persons could agree as participants in rational 
discourses."379
According to such a principle, a decision can only be reached through a discursive test that 
includes all those affected. This line of thinking is what has to pervade the design of the 
decision-making body and its procedure of decision-making.  
It is simple to narrow down most of the affected parties. Since most people have no 
sensible arguments, then “most people” have no place in the general practical discourse 
concerned with one particular child’s best interest. As such, everyone can, at least 
theoretically, be represented in the fact that most parties external to the case have no 
convincing arguments to present, or so we can at least assume for practical purposes.  
By demanding that every conceivable relevant argument is to be raised and argued for 
before reaching a decision, the discourse-principle approaches the aim of decision-making 
from an angle that makes the indeterminacy of the child’s best interest less important. It is a 
matter of treating the problem at hand as a practical problem that has many solutions, and 
makes it rather into an effort to approximating the child’s best interest exhaustively. Reaching 
an ultimate claim to correctness is the goal, since a valid or factually correct decision is still 
impossible. If the design of the procedures observes the discourse principle, it could be 
assumed that an ultimate claim to correctness would arise at the intersections of arguments, 
where many different claims to correctness are raised and are potentially of equal strength.  
                                                 
378 Professionals are representatives of knowledge-regimes that are qualified on their own terms. An argument 
made by medical practitioner that stipulates a particular treatment of a child in order to develop affects the 
decision in a reasonable manner. Professionals make claims upon best practice and must be included into the 
procedure discursively. Their claims are equally scrutinizable. This point will not be argued further in this 
dissertation. 
379 Habermas (1998a): 107. 
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6.4.3.UpholdingthePrincipleofNonǦdiscriminationthroughRulesofDiscourse
The fact of reasonable pluralism is a consequence of the free exercise of reason under 
conditions of personal liberty for all.380 Interests of children are embedded in such a highly 
normative complex landscape in a distinct fashion, namely by their prospective right to 
personal liberty. In order to incorporate the fact of reasonable pluralism, how protection 
becomes enforced operatively must be allowed to vary according to the differences between 
children that are rooted in their individuality. For instance, two children who are subjected to 
the same detrimental care can receive different treatment because children, it can be argued, 
have different interests. This means that different treatment, on one level, is called upon in 
order to enforce a more fundamental principle, namely non-discrimination. To reach such a 
goal, some basic rules of discourse must be accommodated that can safeguard that the 
conclusion that claim to be in the particular child’s best interest is also applied as a general 
right of the child, i.e. that it does not discriminate. Hence, rules of discourse can secure a 
principle of non-discrimination embedded in decision-making and thus safeguard an equality 
of treatment although each child is to be treated according to their individuality.  
The principle of non-discrimination is, perhaps, the most basic principle in rule of law. 
Here, it could be argued that the principle of non-discrimination is what makes democratic 
law legitimate, namely that law applies to all equally. In the CRC, non-discrimination is the 
first article to be mentioned after the definition of the child, and it is a principle definition of 
demands set towards enforcing post-national standards of non-discrimination: “State Parties 
shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within 
their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind.”381  
 Hence, each time a decision in a child’s best interest is reached, or claimed to be 
reached, it must be reached in a manner that does not discriminate between children’s positive 
right to receive measures in their own best interest.382 Frøydis Heyerdahl argues that “[t]he 
protection of non-discrimination in the CRC, imply that children is to have equal access to the 
rights of the convention.”383 Since the outcome of such a demand, i.e. namely that the 
decision is in a child’s best interest can vary from one child to the next, according to the 
interests of the particular child, as is one of the central features of the normative self-
understanding of current child protection presented here, the design of decision-making 
                                                 
380 Rawls (1993): XXIVFF. 
381 CRC Art. 2.1.  
382 This is a social right equivalent to an allocation-rule – Goodin (1986):186. I will return to this later.  
383 Heyerdahl (2008): 32.  
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procedure itself is the equalizer in being stable from case to case whereas the input to the 
procedure can vary. Said differently, whereas each child is treated according to their 
individuality, the procedure remains the same.  
Any infringement upon the principle of non-discrimination, which would mean that 
equal cases were treated unequally, or unequal cases were treated equally, would mean that 
some or all children lack legal protection. Both cases could threaten the potential for decision-
making in child protection to redeem a promise of trust—namely, different children would be 
treated as if they had the same interest or that equal children (however unlikely there is such 
an event) were treated different. Consequently, it can be argued that the manner in which the 
principle of non-discrimination becomes enforced, influence the way the child’s best interest 
is reached. 
So far, it has been established that since the child’s best interest is an indeterminate 
principle, it needs to be approximated through a process of argumentation. This involves 
opening up for all types of arguments that can lay claim upon being in the particular child’s 
best interest. Hence, the discourse-principle, with its ability to shape mutual understanding 
and rational acceptability, is a strong contender to become the fundamental design-principle. 
The stability provided by the discourse-principle is the need for abiding rules of discourse that 
originate in practical discourse. In this way, each decision can make use of the ideal standard 
of reaching decisions that are “valid for the will of every rational being” as a regulative ideal. 
This sets yet more demands towards how the procedure, namely that rules of discourse must 
be enforced.384 These rules are different from formal rules of procedure in that they are 
embedded in the logic of discourse itself. 
In order to solve the problem of indeterminacy, a legitimate consensus can become 
established that all parties can be made to accept a decision as an ultimate claim. Hence, the 
fact of indeterminacy becomes also a resource in that reasonable pluralism is allowed to 
pervade the procedure through different claims upon what is in a child’s best interests. Hence, 
a general practical discourse, which upholds rules of discourse, should become incorporated 
into the decision-making design in combination with formal rules of procedure that mimic a 
legal practical discourse. The design-principles that stipulate a rule-governed procedure will 
ensure non-discrimination, and a general practical discourse within such a framework can 
ensure that the best interest of the child is approximated through exhaustive argumentation. 
                                                 
384 I will return to this briefly.  
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 By applying a discourse-principle to a legal design, which is needed in order to 
approximate the child’s best interest, both basic expectations can become incorporated 
simultaneously. In such a way, it can be argued, a legal order can comply with the current 
order of expectations to become worthy of trust. Hence, by extrapolating design-criteria, 
empirical assessments can be made on whether or not the design of decision-making body 
complies with basic expectations. 
A design must first be confronted by a problem that requires practical reason, i.e. an 
ethical problem.385 The solution to such a problem cannot be settled in any other way, either 
by for instance scientific methods or by aggregating preferences on this particular issue. It is a 
problem where the solution is essentially contested. Although the indeterminacy of the child’s 
best interests sets constraints on design, indeterminacy does not become a problem once 
reasonable pluralism is embedded in the design. The reason is that the constraint of 
reasonable pluralism admits that any outcome is contestable, and that the best interest cannot 
be reached in any absolute terms. Due to the contested nature of the decision, it is not an 
exercise in rhetoric skills and theoretical considerations, but rather one of practical reason. 
The process of reaching a decision that is in the best interest of the child constitutes such a 
practical problem.  
Second, the practical problem must be recognized by those involved, and that would 
motivate them to participate and present arguments that are relevant. The participants must be 
affected in a manner that makes them want to argue their case. The solution to the ethical 
conflict is something that those affected must live by, and it is in their interest to be a 
participant. If those affected did not join the discussion, their arguments would not be aired 
and the outcome of the process could become illegitimate because relevant actors did not 
partake in the process of reaching the final decision. Hence, rational acceptability would not 
be established.  
Including parties that have nothing to lose or gain, or are equally motivated to 
disinterest as to interest towards the matter at hand, can unnecessarily disturb the procedure. 
They are not qualified as affected or relevant. Consequently, the number of parties that are 
affected must be kept to what is constructive for the decision in question. Child protection 
cases where parents potentially become coerced and might lose their child are cases that 
                                                 
385 See Eriksen & Weigård (2003): 199ff. 
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constitute situations where those affected, either because their life-situation is at stake, or can 
make qualified professional opinions on the matters at hand, are easy to identify.  
 Third, it must be a competent mediator, whom all parties to the procedure can trust to 
be fair. This person must ensure that the parties to the procedure abide by certain rules that an 
argumentative procedure must adhere to in order to reach rational acceptability of the 
outcome—that decision-making adhere to a principle of non-discrimination. The role of the 
mediator is to ensure that the argumentative procedure navigates according to a rule-driven 
procedure towards the aim of decision-making, namely that decisions are in the best interest 
of the child. This involves formal rules of procedures and rules of discourse. Any attempt to 
cheat, to pressure, or to selfishly argue contrary to the aim of decision-making, the child’s 
best interest, would be in need of correction by such a mediator. The purpose is to construct a 
platform from which a solid decision can arise. In order for this role to be fulfilled in a fair 
manner, the mediator must also be the judge, i.e. the decision-maker. The mediator is in need 
of having a full understanding of the case-matter and must safeguard a procedure that 
convinces all those involved the rational acceptability of the decision. 
 Fourth, those who participate must have equal capacities. Since rational acceptability 
requires mutual understanding, discursive asymmetries must be compensated for. In this 
context, discursive asymmetries refer predominantly to competence and authority. Hence, 
having extensive competence or having authority should not push the discourse in any 
particular direction. Either a party must become empowered to participate, for instance by 
having legal representatives, or the other party must be controlled for not using illegitimate 
coercive means. If parties are not set to be equally represented, it would not be possible to 
reach legitimate consensus. In the case under consideration in this study, the party who is 
most likely to feel like the “smaller part” is the parents. They become subjected to a decision-
making procedure that every other party, except their family, has experienced before. Hence, 
the parents and the child must receive some kind of support. 
6.5.Conclusion
Since 1992 it has been a significant development within the legal order of child protection. 
This development’s strongest manifestation was the amendment of the mrl that incorporated 
the rights-catalogue of the CRC into Norwegian law in 2003. This amendment supported the 
development of making the legal order more in line with a post-national order of expectations. 
However, in order to redeem the promise of trust, the entire bvl must be pervaded by a proper 
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human rights rationale so that it too complies with the order of expectations. The problem is 
that no significant attempt has been made to reach such a goal. The legal proposal that sought 
to break this ground merely changed two rules within the bvl. It is safe to say that efforts have 
not been made to lift the bvl onto a human rights-rationale it needs to be in order to redeem 
the promise of trust.386 
The principle of non-discrimination and the principle of the child’s best interest are the 
most important components of the order of expectations in child protection. These basic 
expectations were both introduced by the bvl in 1992, but have been through a post-national 
turn. However, the design of the FBSS has not become altered specifically to comply with the 
order of expectations after a post-national turn. Due to the lack of any legislative history 
concerned with the application of a post-national principle of child’s best interest, we can 
guess that the bvl has yet to comply with the order of expectations fully. Consequently, the 
FBSS does not necessarily abide by the current order of expectations. We will seek to 
evaluate the FBSS in the next chapter.  
In an attempt to construct an expression of how a human rights-rationale for the 
child’s best interest can be approximated to child protection, a principle of sufficiency of 
opportunity has been applied. This principle is an interpretation of what a prospective right to 
personal liberty must entail with regard to child protection. The aim of protecting the child’s 
prospective right to liberty is directed at the development of the child and the child’s health. 
This protection principle is empirically construed in the sense that I have drawn upon the 
rights-based post-national turn in combination with the purpose of the bvl to lay out a 
normative self-understanding that can be argued is worthy of trust. The discussion has not, 
and will not, lead to any claim upon its moral validity or truthfulness. The point has been to 
infer the current order of expectations empirically and its basic expectations and thus explain 
what they could imply.  
Protection must safeguard personal liberty in that the child has a sufficient amount of 
opportunities to choose from. The threshold of sufficiency is set because children in state-
custody cannot be given an advantage compared to those who receive non-detrimental care, 
but who have a smaller amount of opportunities. Decisions that involve coercion must ensure 
that the child receives non-detrimental care, and also that this type of care is in the best 
interest of the child. If the state did not protect children and failed to ensure that they received 
                                                 
386 Ot.prp.nr.45 (2002-2003).  
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measures that would re-establish non-detrimental development towards adulthood, the 
freedom to choose for one self how to live life would not become realized for that child. 
Hence, the threshold of coercive intervention is conditioned by the worst type of non-
detrimental care provided by parents. Every kind of care is detrimental to the development of 
a child if it ends below this threshold. Detrimental care threatens the child’s right to personal 
liberty and narrows down the child’s future autonomy as an adult. The larger the gap becomes 
between the worst type of non-detrimental care and the detrimental care a child is 
demonstrably subjected to, the more likely it is that the parents would lose custody.  
Since the goal of the decision-making process is embedded with normative complexity 
by the indeterminacy of the child’s best interest, the attention towards the principle of non-
discrimination becomes all the more important. As such, in order to establish non-
discrimination, each case must be subjected to procedural equality. Discrimination occurs if 
children would become subjected to different types of decision-making procedures, or rules of 
procedures, as was the case with the BVL of 1953. The lack of upholding the principle of 
non-discrimination was one of the main criticisms that led to the downfall of the BVL. By 
establishing rules of procedure that does not restrict argumentation, but secure the discursive 
space needed, procedural equality that ensures non-discrimination can become established. In 
the present case, the rules of procedure must encapsulate the discursive space in order for a 
decision to approximate the best interest of the child. Rules can construct the necessary 
procedural conditions to optimize the goal of reaching the child’s best interest.  
No matter what the nature of the case is, or how apparent the lack of care is perceived 
to be, the implementation of measures in a child’s best interest is never a rock-solid verdict. 
The child’s best interest is not a science. It is also hard to imagine that it can become a part of 
any one profession’s epistemic platform, although some claim to have a way of calculating 
what is in the child’s best interest.387 There are numerous perils when making decisions upon 
a principle that is indeterminate: the empirical evidence is complex and confusing, weighting 
arguments can differ, concepts are vague, disparate life experience makes judgments diverge, 
                                                 
387 Here, I refer to the development of evidence-based practice within child welfare. This type of practice can be 
a threat towards the need to particularize the decision-making within child protection. Hence, if evidence-based 
practice became introduced into coercion cases, where the particular child in question needed its best interest 
maintained, evidence-based practice would be an unwarranted practice.  
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different normative considerations makes overall assessments different, and some type of 
selection must be made that unintentionally exclude others.388  
It can be argued that, theoretically, those who claim to set forth design principles, such 
as those that have been produced here, also carry shortcomings and inadequacies, such as 
cognitive biases and misconstruing morality, overtaxing their own rationality or 
misdiagnosing reason. In sum, the pitfalls of deliberation in practical problem-solving are 
apparent and out in the open. The pitfalls aside, the alternative to producing design principles, 
i.e. not doing so, is leaving design to chance and discrimination. Let us now turn to the 
evaluation of the FBSS, and discuss if it can redeem the promise of trust.  
  
                                                 
388 See Rawls (1993): 56-57.  
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7.HowtheDesignoftheFBSSComplywithBasicExpectations
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter will discuss the important strengths and weaknesses of the FBSS-design with 
respect to the promise of trust. This means that I will provide an evaluation of the congruence 
between the current legal order and the basic expectations of child protection. Hence, we have 
finally reached the point where we can focus upon answering the main research-question of 
this dissertation: Does the FBSS redeem the promise of trust? 
In the former chapter, an expression of a normative self-understanding was 
reconstructed from basic expectations. It established a special interpretation of the principle of 
sufficiency of opportunity and the child’s right to personal liberty once it becomes an adult. In 
order for child protection to safeguard a sufficient amount of opportunities for each child, 
decisions must be reached that are in the particular child’s best interest and at the same time 
uphold the principle of non-discrimination. These two expectations and how they are 
embedded in a particular type of design will be the underlying critical framework throughout 
this chapter.  
The strengths of the design will imply that the promise is kept. The weakness, on the 
other hand, will imply a weakening or breaking of the promise of trust. Hence, the 
weaknesses can overshadow the strengths, so that—although there is solidity with respect to 
trust—the promise of trust can nevertheless no longer be argued is redeemed. Thus the 
argument emerges whereby the greater the tension between current legal order and the order 
of expectations, the less worthy of trust the FBSS’ decision-making becomes.389 
 In the following section, the focus will be upon the design of the FBSS in January 
2008, when the last great reform of the FBSS became implemented. There are important 
changes to the design from 2008; for instance, the FBSS became transferred to the bvl from 
                                                 
389 See the model of the approach in the introduction.  
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the Social Services Act – stl, and the design of the FBSS has now explicit formal main 
principles of procedure, including absolute demands. These changes are all put forth by 
Ot.prp.nr.76 (2006-2007). The transfer from stl to the bvl was done because the original 
FBSS, which was set to perform decisions within social affairs that involved coercion in 
general, was predominantly making decisions in child protection cases. With reference to the 
formalization of rules procedure, the committee set in charge for proposing these measures, 
first put forth in NOU 2005:9, proposed to copy the rules and principles that were to guide the 
civil courts. They argued that the fundamental principles guiding a civil procedure, formally 
expressed by tl §1-1, contained fundamental demands to the quality of the decision-making 
needed for the FBSS. This effectively made it quite explicit that the decision-making of the 
FBSS were to observe principles guiding a legal discourse within a court of law.390 
However, the greatest change from the implementation of bvl in 1993 until 2008, is 
not within the legal order itself, but in the transformation of the basic expectations, and how 
the legal order must abide by them in order for it to become trustworthy. As shown in the 
previous two chapters, it can be argued that the basic expectations have developed in a post-
national direction, and that the political craftsmanship has not been competent enough to 
incorporate the type of rationale that is involved in such a turn of events. This means that 
what we can expect is tension between the legal order and the order of expectation, a tension 
that indicate that the promise of trust is not redeemed.  
The forthcoming discussion will be divided into five parts. They represent the main 
building blocks of a design of any decision-making body. The first will focus on how a case is 
initiated and the localization of the board. The second will discuss the composition of the 
board and how it is convened. The third will discuss in what way the parties to the procedure 
is included. The fourth will discuss the main principles of procedure as they are formulated in 
the bvl. Finally, the fifth will focus on the procedure of negotiation. In this last part, the four 
prior sections will intersect, as the procedure of negotiation constitutes the core of the 
decision-making procedure.  
7.1.LocalizationoftheFBSSandInitiatingitsAuthority
With regard to localization and the initiation of the authority of the FBSS, there are three key 
aspects that will be discussed. The first is how the private party is drawn into the procedure, 
                                                 
390 NOU 2005:9: 31ff and 38. To mention some: Parties to the procedure have a right to be heard, case-
proceedings is based upon equal treatment, contradiction/adverserial principle, decisions are to be justified. The 
subsequent proposition upheld this demand, and these rules of procedure are today a part of bvl §7-3, 
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focusing on the parents rather than the child. The second is to argue that the authority of the 
FBSS is independent from geographic distance to those affected. The third is to argue that the 
principle of child’s best interest calls for a separation of child protection from child welfare.  
7.1.1.InitiatingAuthorityandthePrivateParty
The FBSS is set to respond to petitions put forth by the local municipal Child Welfare Office 
in combination with a counter-claim to the petition made by the private party (if such 
exists).391 It is submitted to the FBSS because non-coercive means have not worked, implying 
the need to coerce in order to elevate the care of the child from detrimental care to non-
detrimental. This petition corresponds to a regular court subpoena.392 Within the petition, 
there are two particularly important elements: The first is the claim from the local Child 
Welfare Office on the need to intervene, namely a justification of what constitute the 
detrimental nature of the care. Second, is what measures to implement to improve the life of 
the child supposedly in that child’s best interest.393  
 These two steps are intertwined but they do constitute two very different parts of the 
overall decision-making procedure. The first is a claim upon the need for coercion of parents 
and revoking their parental rights temporarily or permanently. The second is to find out what 
to do with the situation of the child that would help bring his or her development back on 
track. The petition is to include claims from the Child Welfare Office on why coercive 
measures should be taken, the case matter, propose measures, who the parties to the procedure 
are, what type of the FBSS to convene.394 
 The private party does not need to put forth a counter-claim, or stay in the meeting of 
negotiation, and if they do not present a counter-claim in ten days, the case is presented to the 
board with only the claims put forth by the Child Welfare Office.395 This can obviously 
weaken the case of the private party, since the leader of the board would have no way of 
knowing how the claims raised by the local Child Welfare Office can disputed by the parents. 
                                                 
391 Bvl 8-4, 2-1 c, 7-11.  
392 Cf. tl§9-2. The difference between the bvl Norwegian denomination begjæring (petition) and the tl
denomination stevning (subpoena) can be incidental. Nevertheless, the difference underlines the fact that the 
FBSS and civil court are different systems (although this is a copy-paste rule from tl to bvl), and that a civil court 
is not to act in the way the FBSS must—namely implementing measures as well as reaching a decision on 
whether or not the parents have, in fact, delivered detrimental care.  
393 How these petitions are written is not an object of the present study. I do not know if the child welfare office 
have obeyed by a post-national turn or not, but the petition should include, if it is to redeem a promise of trust, a 
justification of action that is directed upon restoring the child’s development so that it receives a sufficient 
amount of opportunities as adulthood ticks in.   
394 Cf. bvl §7-11. 
395 Bvl §7-7, 7-11 – fourth paragraph.  
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Another problem is that the complexity of the case is underestimated, and hence the board can 
be convened in a manner not fit for the case. 
 Another problem with the fact that there are no formal requirements to the private 
party presenting a counter-claim is that the private party does not become included in the 
procedure appropriately on par with the public prosecutors. Parents can thereby loose their 
rights to parent their children in absentia. Thus, an important demand set to a decision-
making procedure that is supposed to reach a legitimate consensus is compromised, as the 
parents have not become sufficiently empowered to participate in the procedure. They loose 
their rights due to the asymmetric relationship between those involved. By not forcing them to 
attend, the ability to reach a legitimate consensus on the child’s best interest is weakened. 
Knowing what the weaknesses of the particular parents are can for instance qualify the needs 
of the child. Hence, forcing parents to attend would help reaching decisions that are more 
relevant to the need for compensating for the detrimental treatment of the child.  
 If a counter-claim is not produced, the leader of the FBSS has no way of knowing the 
circumstances of the private party. The parents are the closest relatives to a child, and the 
possibility of not including them at all will affect not only the relevancy of measures, but also 
the solidity of the decision-making. The board has to establish how bad, and in what way the 
parents have been bad, and not only if they have provided detrimental care or not. Detrimental 
care is also a matter of degree, and this has to be established together with the parents. If the 
parents choose not to, or are unable to submit a counter-claim to the petition, or fail to attend 
the meeting of negotiation, this might lead to a decision that is too harsh with respect to the 
rights of the parents, decisions can become less relevant, and they are less solid. Not hearing 
the voice of parents will affect the procedure one way or the other and make the decision 
shakier. If a decision is to be worthy of trust, it must approximate the child’s best interest 
from all sides. Excluding one side harms this aim.  
If the parents of the child are allowed not to attend, then the mindset behind the design 
also accepts that the parents do not need to be there in such decision-making. This can be 
interpreted as a lack of understanding for one important role that the FBSS is set to play, 
namely to protect the rights of the parents from an obtrusive state interference and ensure that 
the child’s best interest is upheld with or without the implementation of coercion.  
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7.1.2.TheRegionalLevel–GeographicDistanceorCourtofFirstInstance
One of the most significant design changes made when the FBSS replaced the old BVN-
regime from 1993, was that the protection of the child from then on was to be entrusted to a 
separate decision-making body from those implementing non-coercive measures, i.e. those 
responsible for relief and welfare-measures at the municipality level. The reform of 1953 was 
motivated by including parents, or family, into the equation when securing the welfare of the 
child. This system attempted to rescue a family without resorting to coercion, and 
consequently introduced the biological presumption. It stipulates that the child is to remain 
with its parents as far as it is possible without the child receiving detrimental care.  
 The development of 1992 was to separate distinctly between the welfare of a child and 
its family from the need for protection of a child subjected to detrimental care. The separation 
between coercive and non-coercive measures was made partially to ensure the legal protection 
of the parents, and that decisions involving coercion was to be raised to a higher level. The 
biological presumption remains in the sense that when the parents can no longer be 
empowered by public officials and their relief-efforts to deliver non-detrimental care, they 
also lose their rights of parenting the child. 
The bvl of 1992 lifted the decision-making body responsible for such decisions out of 
the local bonds, where it was settled by the legal code of 1953. The BVN had predominantly 
locally appointed members, and the new FBSS was not to follow on such track. However, 
non-coercive measures remain the task of each municipality. If the local Child Welfare Office 
claim it to be necessary to coercively intervene in the care-situation of a child, they must put 
forth their case on a regional level.  
“The committee on the Social Services Act has unanimously suggested that the treatment of 
coercion-cases is to be moved out of local administration and over to an independent body, and 
about 80% of the hearing-respondents supports this proposal…The proposal has its background in 
the criticism directed towards the case-work in the boards within the municipality. The rules of 
procedure are to contribute to a result that is correct and just, and the criticism towards 
weaknesses regarding the case-work must be taken serious.”396
Elevating the board to a regional level made it possible to perform coercive decision-making 
by members of the board that did not run the risk of making decisions that set a stigma upon 
familiar faces within the local community.397 Hence, the first article of the design of the FBSS 
in chapter 7 of the bvl states that each fylke (region) is to have one board that would make 
                                                 
396 Ot.prp.nr.29 (1990-1991): 134.  
397 It can be argued that the problem of legal protection and being legally prejudiced became greater in the local 
communities with a low population density.  
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decisions in child protection cases, whereby each municipality within one region is 
subordinated to one board.398  
 The geographic jurisdiction of an FBSS is simply meant to be practical. The purpose 
of the 1992-reform was to have a state-driven board with a professional imprint that could 
ensure the legal protection of all those affected. It was not a point any longer, as pointed out 
within the NOU 1985:18, that led to this design of the FBSS, for the geographic localization 
to have substantial meaning, as was the case with the former BVL.399 Within the former BVL, 
the entire point was to establish a local decision-making board, symbiotically linked to the 
local community. 
 That the FBSS became independent or separated from the logic of geography can be 
illustrated through the arrangement that ensures that each municipality is linked to one 
regional FBSS. If an FBSS could not handle a case, or had other problems with capacity to 
handle a case, the neighboring regional board, it was argued, was just as fit to perform 
decision-making.400 This made the former logic of geography, or locality, redundant. 
Moreover, the local representation was no longer an issue. Decision-making within the FBSS 
was no longer seen as best accomplished through having democratically appointed members 
of the board. It is rather a point that the decision-making body was to be of a professional and 
independent nature.401 This underpins the post-national turn of the basic expectations of child 
protection, since children within the FBSS are treated as equals, independent from their local 
background. Although on par with the basic expectation of non-discrimination, this is 
contrary to the BVL arrangement where children was seen as intimately linked to their 
families and local communities.  
Even though the board is only meant to be regional of practical reasons, it still has a 
geographic denomination. The geographic denomination, which the word fylke (region) 
suggests, clouds the very essence of what the FBSS is set to do, namely to protect the interests 
of the particular child no matter where that child came from. Any board, in any region, is 
supposed to do the same job and thereby uphold the basic expectation of non-discrimination. 
This expectation stipulates that it cannot be any variations in the protection of children 
                                                 
398 Region is more accurate than the administrative areas referred to as fylke. There are fewer FBSS that there are 
fylke. The regional level is also not administratively entrenched, but rather geographically – the FBSS is state-
driven from 2004 and not on a fylke level or kommunalt level (i.e. local, or municipality). 
399 Ot.prp.nr.29 (1990-1991): 131.  
400 Ot.prp.nr.76 (2005-2006): 24. 
401 Ot.prp.nr.29 (1990-1991): 134. 
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depending upon where they reside, it harbors the principle of non-discrimination fundamental 
to rule of law. Hence, it helps to redeem the promise of trust. 
The basic expectation of non-discrimination can become embedded in the legal order 
by equalizing the ability of the boards to decide on what to do in any potential case. 
Geography had lost its value as a legitimizing factor in child protection—it had, in fact, 
brought about discrimination. New basic expectations had emerged, and the principle of 
subsidiarity within decision-making could no longer redeem the promise of trust. When non-
discrimination is embedded in the design, decisions are supposed to receive equal treatment 
across the different boards. The word court is in this respect neutral, and could replace the 
obsolete geographic connotations such as municipality or region. Since fylke, region, is of no 
meaning, it should also bring about a change of the denomination to become ‘court’. As we 
will see in this chapter, the FBSS can rather be referred to as a type of court of first instance 
for cases involving protection of children, albeit still an administrative court.  
If any board’s practice varies, i.e. by treating equal cases unequal, or unequal cases 
equally, the decision-making discriminates between children. This is a breach with the basic 
expectations and a threat towards the promise of trust. Although the regional denomination of 
the decision-making board does not lead to a weaker decision-making in and of itself, it 
suggests that the system is somehow dependent upon being regional. This is hardly any 
demand today, which is underlined also by the post-national turn within child protection. As it 
stands now, the name of the board is part of a reasoning regarding administrative decision-
making belonging to the past logic of geographic denominations. 
 The FBSS is to decide in cases that are raised by the Child Welfare Office in each 
municipality.402 This is what activates its authority. The Child Welfare Office in each 
municipality is responsible for seeing the case through, from raising a claim to the follow-ups 
and implementations of the decisions of the FBSS. This implies that both initiating and 
implementing the decisions of the FBSS still depends upon the personnel of the local child 
welfare office.403 
 This office can only do as much as its capacity allows. Hence, variations between the 
local Child Welfare Offices can occur with respect to differences in capacity. If a situation 
arises and the capacity is blown, the office cannot take care of children in need of protection, 
                                                 
402 Bvl §8-4. 
403 Bvl §2-1. 
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and it can be argued that problems arise both with respect to the basic expectations of child’s 
best interest and non-discrimination. For instance, some children might not receive equal 
priority because the detrimental treatment of a child is less severe than other more deserving 
children. Hence, a petition to the FBSS is not submitted. The threat is nevertheless still there, 
albeit less prominent. Hence, the entire purpose of child protection, i.e. bvl §1, can become 
unattainable still because of variations between municipalities, and how their offices have 
capacity to deliver petitions and also that what is deemed as detrimental care is dependent 
upon those working at these local offices. The way of correcting such a weakness is to leave 
child protection entirely to a state-level that perform practice that does not discriminate 
according to municipal borders.404   
The FBSS must ensure that decisions that are to be in the best interest of the child are 
enforced when the Child Welfare Office in the municipality takes over the process of 
implementation. If the municipality interprets and implement decisions wrong, the intention 
behind a decision within the FBSS becomes compromised.405 This can have the consequence 
of lowering the threshold of what constitutes non-detrimental care, as argued in the former 
chapter. If the Child Welfare Office implement a decision inadequate, it becomes a breach 
with the child’s right not to be discriminated against and the child’s best interest might not be 
served. The lack of a mechanism to ensure that decisions actually become implemented 
makes for another argument, namely that the decision-making design of the FBSS should not 
be dependent upon other agencies that are driven forth by other types of logics, as for instance 
that of child welfare. The decision-making of the FBSS should, therefore, also include the 
implementation of decisions.  
7.1.3.ChildWelfaresetApartfromChildProtection
According to the former chapter, there are two thresholds that the current bvl aims to 
determine. The first is where the child is subjected to non-detrimental care and is only in need 
of non-coercive child welfare measures. The other is when the child is subjected to 
detrimental care and where the parents must be coerced. The focus of this study has been on 
the latter. However, both of these measures aim to ensure a level of welfare for the care of 
children, i.e. both relate to thresholds, whereby one refer to tolerable non-detrimental care and 
the other to detrimental care. The part of the legal code that is preoccupied with child welfare 
is mainly delegated to the Child Welfare Office in each municipality. The first threshold that 
                                                 
404 The practical implication is to remove bvl §2-1 in its current version.  
405 Cf. bvl §2-1 d. 
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relate to child welfare, is when a child in some sense is not receiving the care that is required 
to satisfy his or her need to develop normally. However, the lack of proper care is deemed not 
detrimental to the child. The second threshold comes into force when the child welfare 
officers have failed to improve the care situation for the child, and they need to step in to 
protect it from the parents, since the care has become detrimental. This latter intrusion 
includes the use of coercion, and how coercion is implemented depends upon the reasons for 
why the parents are not able to provide reasonable care.  
When the care of a child has crossed the lowest threshold, the responsibility for raising 
the case to the FBSS is with the Child Welfare Office. As it has been shown earlier, this office 
is also responsible for seeing the cases through once the FBSS has reached a decision. 
Therefore, the same office is responsible for enforcing the decisions of both child protection 
and child welfare. This can become problematic because the logic of child welfare and that of 
child protection can conflate, given that these two logics are different on a principle level in 
that the former is based upon the biological presumption, whereas the latter is not. The 
parents’ ability to care is the entity that is interfered with in a non-coercive way within child 
welfare. This means that the rights of the parents are not set aside—the child is still in their 
care. This means that the logic established by the biological presumption can taint the 
considerations for what is deemed as detrimental care, viz. that the child’s prospective right to 
personal liberty has become violated. If the practice of the bvl within a municipality is driven 
forth by a biological presumption, a child risk staying at home when it actually needs 
protective measures.  
If it is no separation between protection and welfare, it is a risk that the enforcement 
of protective measures in the child’s best interest becomes driven forth tainted by how such a 
principle is operative in child welfare. When the FBSS receives a case, the entire case is 
removed out of the control of the local Child Welfare Office, thus dispensing with the logic 
that drives child welfare. However, the amount of cases that do reach the FBSS can be fewer 
because the municipal Child Welfare Office is working to keep children at home. By 
transferring the entire decision-making procedure of the FBSS, including petitions as well as 
the implementation of the decision, to an institution dedicated to child protection, it can 
maintain the focus upon the basic expectations needed to promote trust. A practical way of 
achieving this aim is to have an FBSS-review of the casework within each municipality. 
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If the bvl continues to be one legal code that includes both child welfare and child 
protection, it can continue to fail to differentiate the principle of the child’s best interest to 
these two different state-driven measures. Decisions involving coercion to protect the child is 
different than decisions made to empower the parents to take care of their children. Both types 
of decisions are to be in the child’s best interest, but the care-situation is different between 
them, and currently this has very little consequence. It is the same interpretation of the 
principle of child’s best interest, whereas parents have not lost their right to provide care in 
non-coercive cases.406 For instance, in child welfare, the best interest of the child is not the 
only primary consideration. The parental rights are still strong rights that clearly constitute a 
primary consideration. With regard to child protection, the principle of the child’s best 
interest is the only primary consideration.  
Thus, it is the task of legislators to explicate the meaning of the principle of the child’s 
best interest in the different areas that affect children.407 The best interest of the child is 
always a primary consideration, but it must be up to the signatories to find out if there are 
other primary considerations. With respect to child welfare, there can be a multitude of other 
primary considerations. For instance, it can be argued that parents have a fundamental right to 
care for the child, in a manner that is not in the child’s, but rather in the parents’ best 
interest.408  
It should be stressed that the FBSS is not, and cannot be, regarded as a regular civil 
court.409 However, if child protection where to be separated from child welfare completely, it 
would for all intends and purposes become a new and specialized administrative court. This 
would clearly institute state-enforcement of the principle of the child’s best interest in a much 
more accurate manner, and clearly in line with the basic expectations of child’s best interest 
and non-discrimination. In this respect, child protection can become more worthy of trust if 
the bond with child welfare becomes broken off.  
                                                 
406Bvl §4-1 explain that the implementation of measures according to this chapter shall be to the “child’s best.” 
Since this chapter lays out both coercive and non-coercive measures, it does not separate between child welfare 
and child protection. The principle is applied in the same manner in both instances. See also footnote 11.  
407 Art. 4 of the CRC is referred to as “general measures of implementation.” It is an obligation-clause that orders 
the state-signatories to implement rights to all children so that they do no longer receive discriminatory 
treatment. See UNHCHR (2007). 
408 Brighouse & Swift (2006). 
409Although it was argued in NOU 1985:18:23 that the FBSS was to be regarded as a court of law, or a court-like 
decision-making body that satisfied all the demands set to a regular court, it is not a part of the court system of 
Norway. The FBSS is an administrative tribunal. I will return to this later.  
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7.2.CompositionoftheBoardandWhatBoardtoConvene
During the history of design of decision-making bodies within child protection, the focus 
upon composition has been both controversial and important each time. It has been realized 
from the beginning that those types of members who receive a formal delegated authority to 
reach decisions significantly affect the outcome of the procedure. Consequently, the 
composition of the board is a dimension of the design that helps shape the quality of the 
decision. The aim of the current composition is to ensure that those who contribute in the 
decision-making procedure are able to optimally approximate the child’s best interest each 
time. They must possess the necessary competencies that in total can determine what type of 
decision and what type of measures can claim to be in the best interest of the child.  
7.2.1.TheMembersoftheBoard
Optimizing the board’s ability to reach decisions without discrimination that are in the child’s 
best interest was the purpose of the composition of the board.410 As such, the FBSS of 1992 
have a design that has the potential of corresponding to the current basic expectations in that it 
incorporates both child’s best interest and non-discrimination. The question is whether or not 
it can comply with the post-national turn and comply with the order of expectations. The bvl
§7-2, which stipulates the composition of the board, is a continuation of the original stl §9-2. 
Decisions were to be reached after deliberation among the members of the board where 
arguments could be put forth and grind against each other.411 Thus, the idea was to have 
representatives within the board that were the best fit for a process of argumentation leading 
to decisions in the child’s best interest.  
͹ǤʹǤͳǤͳǤ
According to the bvl, each FBSS is to consist of a leader who is qualified to the competence-
level of a judge.412 This demand has been one of the most controversial in each of the earlier 
decision-making bodies. According to Bernhard Getz, the legal-proposal of 1892 was in need 
of a judge as a leader in order to ensure that the legal protection of a child was maintained. 
Later Getz’ hopes were left behind with the final LBFB in 1896, and the judge became a 
regular but permanent member of the Trustee-board, rather than its leader. Although, 
formally, the leader was not necessarily the judge, it was still important to have legal 
                                                 
410 NOU 1985:18: 298-299.   
411 It is the board that is supposed to deliberate and reach a decision. As such, it is the board that is to reach an 
agreement on what to do. This does for instance mean that everyone must agree to the decision, including the 
parties to the procedure.  
412 Bvl §7-2. 
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competence represented in the Trustee-board that involved something as grave as coercive 
intrusion into family-life. In the BVN of 1953, the judge was no longer a permanent member 
of the decision-making body, but called upon when a case was in need of coercion.  
 Currently, within the legal code established in 1992, this line of thinking is still 
maintained as a judge is called upon only when it is a matter of coercion, and not in regular 
child welfare cases. However, the differentiation between child welfare and child protection 
within the bvl established a single institution in charge of coercion, namely the FBSS. This is 
a result of the criticism towards how coercion-cases were lacking legal protection during the 
BVN, and the need to separate decision-making within child welfare from that of child 
protection.  
 This line of reasoning would suggest that all the three different legal codes actually 
have been in line on the issue of legal representation in child protection cases that involve 
coercion. This can be interpreted as if the child protection discourse, throughout the history of 
child protection, agrees upon the issue of the need for legal control of the state’s coercive 
intrusion into the private lives of families in order to protect a child. Hence, it is a matter of 
finding a threshold for intrusion, which should be legally established, and can only be 
legitimized through filtering it through the legal principles carried by the competence of the 
judge.  
 According to the post-national turn, the bvl is now supposed to be in legal harmony 
with the rights of the child stipulated by the CRC.413 Provided the importance in observing 
demands of human rights to redeem the promise of trust, it is essential to establish a legal 
procedure that is fit to reach a decision that can enforce the aim of making decisions in the 
child’s best interest. Approximating the child’s best interest is a practical problem in need of a 
procedure both adhering to certain rules and allow for a flow of relevant arguments. This 
demand has been obtained by the design. Regular legal adjudication has become established 
by embedding the principle of fair trial into the FBSS-design.414 Hence, the leader must be 
competent in matters of legal adjudication, and ensure that the decision-making procedure is 
heading in the right direction, which is to be in the child’s best interest. This is also answered 
                                                 
413 This was at least one of the intentions behind Ot.prp.nr.45 (2002-2003), which amended the bvl: “Considering 
the child’s best is established in law that directly affects children, cf. i.a. Child Welfare Act §4-1, but this is not a 
general principle of law. By incorporating the Convention on the Rights of the Child it will become established 
in law that the child’s best is to be a primary concern regarding all decisions concerning children.” 
414 The principle of fair trial is embedded in bvl §7-3 – see Ot.prp.nr.76 (2007-2008): 32, cf. NOU 2005:9: 31. I 
will return to the fair trial-principle later.  
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by the design, by demanding that the leader of the board has a degree in law. This strengthens 
the likelihood that the procedure of argumentation abides by the principle of fair trial, which 
again strengthens the likelihood of approximating the child’s best interest in an adequate 
manner.  
 The leader is required to ensure that decision-making abides by the principle of fair 
trial. By enforcing a fair trial principle, and having a judge is the same as admits that the 
decision-making attempt to establish a court-like procedure in order to enforce protection in 
the child’s best interest. In the former chapter, this was a central point for approximating the 
principle of the child’s best interest without discrimination. A leader, with legal competence, 
has the ability to enforce a court-like proceeding that ensures a coherent process of 
argumentation each time. This helps redeem the promise of trust by strengthening the basic 
expectation of non-discrimination. 
The leader of the board is according to the legislative history to the bvl to posit 
specific experiences or training that qualifies to work within areas of law relating to 
children.415 The judge is the one that ensures that the procedure of each case observes certain 
demands to how a case is processed up until the decision-making itself. Does a judge posit 
these qualifications? The answer to that question is both yes and no.  
The demands set towards the judge is in the third chapter of Domstolloven (Courts of 
Justice Act – dl). Such a reference is simply not suited in its current configuration for the 
purpose of describing the qualifications needed to perform as a judge within the FBSS. The 
reason is that the legal protection of children falls outside traditional Norwegian 
jurisprudence, and hence has not been incorporated into formal procedures of qualifications 
entrenched in the dl. For instance, the rights that children have to legal protection today are 
very comprehensive, cf. CRC Art 3, that the demands towards an FBSS-leader are likely to be 
higher than in other circumstances. The child’s best interest is supposed to be a mindset 
guiding every decision that affects a child. For the purpose of the FBSS, it involves a need for 
a legal understanding of what constitutes the threat towards any child’s development and 
health.  
The principle of the child’s best interest relating to issues of care, is a specialized field 
of competence in itself due to the wide range of applications of children’s interests, and also 
the need to approximate the best interest for each child without discrimination. It can be 
                                                 
415 NOU 2005:9: 15 and Ot.prp.nr.76 (2005-2006): 126.  
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argued that specific training is needed in order to abide by the demands set towards decision-
making that is supposed to uphold the child’s best interest. How, then, can a judge be said to 
process a case when the judge has no professional training in advance? The bvl has no answer 
to this question.  
There are no demands except that the leader of the board shall have the competence of 
a judge. If the court-system depends upon training through experience, a type of situated 
learning, then bad local practices at one FBSS can prevail. Bad interpretations of the bvl can 
cement into the decision-making body. Hence, there is a continuing threat towards the 
principle of non-discrimination since some boards can develop practices that depart from 
other boards. This type of learning—i.e. situated learning—is emphasized as the route to 
becoming qualified in the current FBSS.416 Thus the question must be asked—is this adequate 
to redeem the promise of trust? 
By comparison, a medical practitioner, once educated as a general practitioner, 
admittedly has no knowledge necessary to perform advanced surgery. Specialist-education is 
necessary in order to qualify to such positions. Qualifying for advanced surgery is not 
something that can be done purely through “cutting meat.” Objective knowledge that has been 
found reliable and valid must become a part of qualification to practice in order to avoid the 
threat towards the principle of non-discrimination when practicing advanced surgery. It is not 
difficult to see that this can be equally relevant for judges. Having a traditional legal 
education in Norway today does not necessarily make a person fit for specific jobs. The 
demands set towards being the leader of a board, where the board is the final protective 
measure for a child, needs specific and general training prior to the appointment if the threat 
towards the principle of non-discrimination is to be avoided.  
These skills can, for instance, include training in the rights of the child, the breadth of 
its application, of the moral responsibility of child protection, etc. This is not a demand set to 
the legal order of the bvl today. Hence, it is no guarantee that leaders of different boards 
practice equally. Equal practice is a formal criterion for the decision-making in the FBSS 
according to the principle of law. If this is threatened, we can also argue that discrimination 
can occur, and that the promise of trust would become harder to cash in. 
The problems are augmented by indeterminacy of the principle of the child’s best 
interest. Since the child has a right to whatever is in his or her best interest, the judge must, in 
                                                 
416 NOU 2005:9: 15. 
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fact, know a way of ensuring that the procedure establishes a solid foundation for making a 
decision that can approximate this principle in a legitimate manner.417 If not, the child’s best 
interest might not have been approximated at all. This responsibility currently rests solely on 
the shoulders of the leader.418 
 When the FBSS was introduced from 1993, decision-making within child protection 
was merely one part of the job of being a judge. It was argued in NOU 1985:18 that being a 
leader of the FBSS was to be considered as a part-time job.419 The idea was that a judge also 
had other responsibilities outside the FBSS. However, when the FBSS became a reality, this 
was a type of practice that was soon abolished. The workload was higher than expected; thus, 
full-time leaders of the board were required.420 As a consequence, the leader of the board can 
today be compared to a full-time judge in a regular court of law. 
In NOU 2005:9, it was held that the leader of the FBSS ought to have contact with 
other judges within the court-system, i.e. belong to a judge-culture. This presupposes a view 
that, within such a culture, “being a judge” could be taught.421 According to this Green Paper, 
the leader of the FBSS should attempt to maintain being a judge in the regular sense and not 
in a sense that is specific to that which affects children.422 Although it is an obvious need for a 
judge within the FBSS to maintain the competence regarding the basic rules of procedure 
constitutive of a fair trial, which is equally valid for the FBSS as the civil court, there are 
insufficient demands for ensuring the legal protection of children by not seeking specific 
requirements for judges in the FBSS. The rights of the child according to a post-national turn, 
and consequently the child’s special place within law—as a person who cannot decide for 
itself, i.e. having self-determination, with regard to perhaps the most important decisions of 
their lives—needs more qualification than merely knowledge regarding how a court works.423 
                                                 
417 It is the leader of the board who is responsible for ensuring that the principles of procedure, bvl §7-3, is 
enforced, and that a solid foundation is established.  
418 Bvl §7-3 third paragraph. 
419 NOU 1985:18: 297. 
420 Forhandlinger i Odelsthinget (No. 25): 58. 
421 NOU 2005:9. 
422 NOU 2005:9: 15. 
423 NOU 2005:9, being the Green Paper that led to the bill that later where to alter the design of the FBSS from 
2008, became criticized for having too much belief in the court-system. The Green Paper was ruled as waiving 
too much in direction of applying regular court-principles to decision-making within child protection. The NOU 
2005:9 was written during Christian-Conservative coalition government of Kjell Magne Bondevik, while the 
Ot.prp.nr. 76 (2005-2006), that put forth this criticism, was a bill presented by Jens Stoltenberg – See for 
instance Ot.prp.nr.76 (2005-2006): 83. 
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Enforcing the rights of the child, and especially an indeterminate principle, is currently 
considered a learning-by-doing process for each judge respectively. There are no formalized 
qualifications besides the demands set to be a regular judge, whereby any additional education 
is optional and left to the judge’s own discretion. This means that the level of competence is 
allowed to vary between the board leaders, and constitutes a threat of discrimination. 
If it is any point in acquiring new knowledge, it must be that it leads somewhere or 
anywhere. The lack of coherence in what constitute a judge’s formal competence outside 
being a judge can lead to a discriminatory treatment between children and between boards. 
Currently, it is no systematic training of those that should populate this particular office. If the 
interpretation of the practice of the principle of the child’s best interest is founded in very 
different knowledge regimes and learning-arenas, then the different boards throughout 
Norway will have decision-making procedures that potentially discriminate.  
 The solution to this problem is to have a more carefully considered plan on how a 
judge to the FBSS actually can be said to become qualified in such a manner that it is not a 
threat towards the principle of non-discrimination. Although it is no shortage on ideas on how 
to think and apply the principle of the child’s best interest, there is a lack of debate as to what 
type of best practice a judge should posit today within the FBSS in order to ensure a principle 
of non-discrimination when enforcing the principle of the child’s best interest. If a judge leads 
one FBSS to provide better practice objectively, then this is unfair from a legal point of view 
on behalf of children who have their cases trialed at a different, and not as competent, FBSS. 
This weakness ultimately leaves the child in the hands of a board-leader that may or may not 
have a well thought-out idea of what the principle of the child’s best interest means.  
͹ǤʹǤͳǤʹǤ
In addition to the leader of the board, a regular board is to be convened with a professional. 
The professionals are presumably representing the necessary knowledge regarding best 
practice relating to both evaluating if the child receives detrimental treatment as well as 
knowing what measures the child is in need of. The original idea, posed in NOU 1985:18, was 
that there should always be two professionals participating in decision-making. If they 
concurred, there would not be any need to call upon further professional expertise.424 The 
introduction of professionals into the board, which at the time of the introduction of the bvl 
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was an innovative idea, was aimed at remedying the problem with the lack of professional 
expertise that crippled the design of the BVN of 1953.425  
By incorporating permanent professional members into the FBSS, two problems were 
thought to be solved. The first was that by replacing members that were politically appointed, 
they could establish a distance between those who decided and those who had to live by the 
decisions. It was no longer any point in having a panel of local laymen. Due to the political 
appointment of the BVN, the legal protection of both the child and the parents had become 
fragile and incoherent. By introducing professionals and removing democratically appointed 
members, the legal protection would become more solid due to less discrimination between 
decision-making. 
Through NOU 1985:18, another idea was presented in that decision-making could 
become more coherent through basing decision-making upon knowledge. By including 
professionals into the decision-making procedure, the practice of their esoteric expertise 
would qualify them to board membership. This line of thinking bring back the argument of 
Bernhard Getz in 1982 that the leader of the board should be a legal professional, and that 
leaders from both the poor-commission and the school-commission were to be represented 
because they knew about best practice—they had the expertise.426 The Trustee-board, as Getz 
saw it first, was not only having representation of locals, but also the type of expertise that 
would balance the laymen’s common sense approach. Getz’ proposal regarding this part of 
the composition was not met in 1896. Today, the professionals are included in the process 
much in the same manner as Getz intended, namely in order to safeguard that decisions rests 
within the boundaries of what is known to be best practice. At least, that is the idea.  
The second problem that could be solved by bringing in professionals was that 
knowledge-based practice would replace the randomness of the decision-making of a board 
purely consisting of democratically appointed laymen. Professionals that must appeal to best 
knowledge, or best practice, must resort to arguments that must be valid and reliable, viz. 
intersubjective and neutral. If not, it would not be referred to as credible knowledge, and 
therefore not applicable to practice in the sense of being professional.  
Compared to the potential for discrimination caused by judges as leaders, as 
mentioned above, the professional representatives of the board represent a more significant 
                                                 
425 NOU 1985:18: 293. 
426 Cf. Getz’ (1892:25) desire to include “unbiased knowledge” (“den saglige kundskab”). 
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threat towards the principle of non-discrimination. No profession have a solid guide of 
reasoning in cases that are normatively complex and indeterminate—they cannot have. The 
variations between concepts, approaches, empirical data etc. are enormous; professional 
knowledge cannot reach the aim of the decision-making, namely to say bluntly what is in a 
child’s best interest. No knowledge-base can argue about the prospective right to personal 
liberty, and what a sufficient amount of opportunities of a particular child entail. If a social 
worker was chosen as the professional within the FBSS, it will be a different professional than 
if a psychologist was selected. A psychologist and a social worker have different approaches 
to the decision-making of the FBSS. However, these are the two major professions that 
occupy positions as professional members of the FBSS.427 
Having no explicit criteria that set demands to the professionals that occupy the 
positions within the board, or any review of professional decision-making within the design of 
the FBSS, clearly constitutes a threat to the practice and enforcement of the child’s best 
interest and the principle of non-discrimination. Since the professionals within the board can 
vary between different professions, equal cases can receive unequal treatment. Although this 
threat towards the principle of non-discrimination is clear, a solution to it is hard to find. 
However, as there is no explicit thinking regarding what could be argued constitute the 
desirable professional within the board, the threat towards unfair treatment remains.  
Another controversial debate that has been ignored is what type of profession, or 
combination of professionals, can best argue the case of best practice with regard to finding 
out what is in a child’s best interest in decision-making of the FBSS. Best practice does not 
mean that they know what the best interests of the child entail, but rather that they have an 
approach that approximates this aim in a coherent and agreed upon manner. Why e.g. are 
psychologists the dominant profession? Why not social workers? Why are not both 
represented in every board? Are there others that have professional knowledge that would 
benefit the decision-making process? What about the medical practitioner? The point to be 
made here is that there is a complete lack of debate on what it means to have professional 
representatives within the FBSS.  
Currently, any expert that has knowledge regarding children—a psychologist, 
psychiatrist, child welfare officer, social worker, or a special-educator—can be recruited to 
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the FBSS as a professional.428 A critical argument here is that educations such as psychology 
and social work are meant to serve different purposes—they are very different professions. 
Hence, the educated psychologist and the educated social worker have very different ways of 
arguing the case of the child’s best interest. 
However, what can be stated with certainty is that there are no professions with 
monopoly on best practice knowing what to decide is in a child’s best interest.429 Many 
different professionals have many different types of good reasons for wanting to put forth 
claims in a child’s best interest. However, it is a normative and indeterminate aim, and cannot 
be determined by any one type of professional’s technical knowledge. Claims of protecting a 
child can only serve to approximate the prospective right to personal liberty, and hence, all 
relevant claims must be put forth. 
A different perspective can also be presented, namely that professionals control and 
evaluate the arguments that are presented in the process of argumentation within the meeting 
of negotiation.430 According to this argument, the professional must be able to comprehend 
different claims that are provided in this meeting and, as such, help the FBSS retain its 
independent decision-making status. What is then lacking is the insurance that professionals 
would always contribute to this process in a way that other professionals would not dispute. 
This would mean that the professional that holds the office within the FBSS actually must be 
able to judge and evaluate the expert-opinions that are presented to the board as evidence by 
the state and private parties as well as those the board itself calls upon. The professionals 
must be able to comprehend and evaluate the different types of expertise that make claims 
upon what is in a child’s best interest and make sure that the other members of the board 
understand the fundamentals of these claims. If this is not the case, the FBSS cannot be said 
to be an independent decision-making board. There is much evidence suggesting that the 
differences exist in practice, whereby the lack of coherent recruitment becomes a threat 
towards the basic expectations of both child’s best interest and non-discrimination.  
͹ǤʹǤͳǤ͵Ǥ
The final type of permanent member of the board is the layman. This member-type has 
endured all the different boards throughout the history of child protection. They represent 
common sense, and they have had a prominent place within the boards and especially in the 
                                                 
428 BLD (2008): 5. 
429 Eriksen (2001). 
430 I will discuss the meeting of negotiation later.  
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period of 1953 to 1992. However, both in 1896 and in 1953, their inclusion was conditioned 
upon the need for local representation. In the bvl, this reason no longer applies. The main idea 
in 1953 was that representatives that have experiences with the local area where the child 
resides were needed. From 1993 and onwards, the idea was to have common sense 
represented in dealing with normative matters, which were recognized as rather complex and 
thus needed a broader perspective.431 
However, it is one problem with respect to current child protection. It has to do with 
the duality of the decision-making procedure. First, the decision of whether parents need to be 
coerced—i.e. that the child needs protection. Second, the type of measures to be implemented 
to remedy the wrongs concerning the child’s development must be identified in order to 
remedy the wrongs the child has been subjected to. Under no circumstances can it be 
maintained that laymen are peers of the child, which is something that the denomination 
‘layman’ alludes to. Relying on laymen in the process of deciding what to do for the child can 
be questioned. The child is the primary focus of attention throughout the proceedings, but if 
the child’s parents lose their custody, it is only the child’s best interests that count.  
On the other hand, although laymen cannot be seen as peers of the child, they could be 
argued as being peers, or equals, to the parents. Should not this division have consequences 
for how laymen contribute in the FBSS-proceedings? The decision-making, if the parents 
have lost their custody, is only going to find out what is in the child’s best interest and not that 
of the parents. Thus, given that laymen cannot be referred to as peers to the child, their ability 
to contemplate on what is in a child’s best interest becomes random. Are laymen fit for the 
task of understanding if a child receives detrimental care, or what type of measures should be 
decided upon? Is this line of thinking still valid? Can they be included without threatening the 
basic expectation of non-discrimination? 
 In NOU 1985:18 the following is stated:  
“Also the use of non-professionals is important because we have to do with conflicts that raise 
difficult value questions with a common sense character. It is in the opinion of the committee 
that...it should be a layman element.”432
                                                 
431 Bernt (2001): 35 argues that laymen were included into the FBSS to balance the professionals’ “conception of 
reality.” However, laymen did not serve such a corrective purpose in the design of the FBSS. This will be 
discussed in more detail below.  
432 NOU 1985:18: 298.  
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This line of reasoning explains why there are laymen in the FBSS today.433 Hence, it is a 
widely different reason from what was provided in the BVL of 1953, where the logic was 
rather that laymen represented the local community and the families living there.  
 The NOU 1985:18 was written during the reign of the BVL, and long before any 
ratification of the CRC. At the time that these ideas were committed to paper, prior to 1985, 
the coercive measures within child protection were decided upon almost entirely by laymen. 
However, with the development in the beginning of the 21st century, there has been a turn of 
events. Children have a prospective right to personal liberty, and this type of thinking 
provides parameters on how to reason on child protection and the implementation of 
measures.434 Is laymen representation desirable any longer? Upholding a child’s prospective 
right to liberty, which is a normative self-understanding of the current order of expectations, 
which incorporates the basic expectations of the child’s best interest and non-discrimination, 
must be strengthened through the use of laymen. Thus, whether or not laymen pass this test 
will help to answer if they contribute or not in redeeming the promise of trust.  
 In the first legal code on child protection, it was a need to have laymen to contribute in 
arguing what constituted a “moral” or “normal” child when finding out whether or not 
correctional measures were to be implemented. Once they reached the decision, they could 
implement measures that would remedy the lack of “normality” or “morality.” In the second 
legal code, the point was that healthy local common sense, carried by locals who were 
appointed, would lead to decisions that were to the best for the family and the child. The BVN 
consisted of members appointed from the municipality, and included individuals who knew a 
great deal about children. Both of the former legal codes have been dependent upon this 
common sense element in its justification for pushing the legal codes through parliament. 
None of these earlier codes has argued that the best interest of the child should be the primary 
consideration of child protection.  
Currently, a child is a rights-holder due to the ratification and incorporation of the 
CRC into the mrl. If the rights of a child are breached, then the state has a duty to intervene 
and protect the rights of that child.435 The rights of children are supposed to be defended by 
others because children de facto and de jure are unable to put forth claims themselves. This is 
a modern version of the doctrine in loco parentis. In this situation, laymen are confronted by a 
                                                 
433 This idea is reaffirmed in Ot.prp.nr.76 (2005-2006). 
434 This duty is entrenched in the CRC Art. 4.  
435 The state is obligated by the CRC to secure legal harmony – Art. 7-2.  
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new situation. How can common sense be fit to guide what is in one particular child’s best 
interest, given the fact that the child’s right to receive measures are not to be guided by 
anything else than the child’s best interest, viz. its prospective right to personal liberty? Is it 
so that “difficult value questions” are best answered by those who have no training in thinking 
about values, i.e. to resonate regarding practical problems?  
The goal is to approximate the particular interest of a child that no other interest can 
trump. This can hardly be referred to as a common-sense issue. It is a question that can be 
answered best through qualified personnel. Hence, in using laymen, the lack of a 
methodological approach to normative questions can become a threat to the legal protection 
of the child. A methodological approach to normative questions can help to establish a way of 
influencing this issue that ensures non-discrimination.  
There is nothing that can ensure that the layman’s common sense does not simply 
ensure discrimination between cases, and thus represent a threat towards the basic 
expectations. The manner in which common sense has been entrenched today is more 
motivated by the political ideology of Labor rather than an optimizing design. It is ideological 
in the sense that it is a continuation of the BVN-practice, rather than being any well thought-
out implementation of common sense. If common sense moral evaluation were to be 
introduced in a coherent manner, the FBSS could recruit philosophers, rather than laymen. 
Philosophers can, in many respects, be said to have more training in how to reason with 
regard to normative questions and in a coherent manner, which is also a demand if decision-
making is not to discriminate between cases. 
 As early as in 1953, the concept of reasonable pluralism was introduced as a baseline 
in Norwegian legal thought on child protection.436 It implied that “the society in question is 
one in which there is diversity of comprehensive doctrines, all perfectly reasonable.”437 
However, with the current legal code, each child is to have its health and development 
protected, so that it can claim personal liberty as an adult. It implies that the child must be 
able to make choose among a sufficient amount of opportunities regarding how to live life. 
When the child reach adulthood, it must have the capabilities to actually perform such a 
                                                 
436 Here, the reference is made to the toleration of different, yet reasonable, ways of providing care for children, 
and that being a parent could have a variety of meanings for children. Hence, what type of protection a child 
needed was determined locally and variations across Norway were allowed to emerge. The idea of defending an 
idea of “normality” or “morality” was no longer permissible.  
437 Rawls (1993): 24 and 36. This illustrates that, for instance, parent’s rights are strong rights. Namely, the 
boundaries of reasonableness also include types of care that are not beneficial.  
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choice freely. This is where the need for competence on values becomes relevant. The goal of 
protection of a child should be, if it is to adhere to the normative self-understanding worthy of 
trust, to attempt to reach a decision that would best ensure that the child’s development and 
health steadily develop as he or she approaches adulthood without the disturbance of 
detrimental care.  
 Such a task requires methodological competence in resonating on ethical issues. 
Laymen are defined as such because they do not posses such methodological competence. If 
the person acquired professional knowledge on how to reason in child protection cases, this 
person would cease to be a layman. The need for competence in ethics is high, since the fact 
of reasonable pluralism demands that any type of life-prospect entail potentially different 
measures for a child. Laymen, in their search for best answer to the decision on what 
constitutes the child’s best interest, are poorly equipped to provide well thought out answers. 
 However, the issue of laymen can be approached from another direction. Do laymen 
act indiscriminately between the different boards and different cases? The answer to this 
question is “no.” The most obvious reason is that there is no consistency in what constitutes a 
respective common-sense layman-answer. To use Toulmin’s terminology: Laymen across the 
different boards lack consistency of “warrants” for what action to proceed with. Warrants are 
propositions of a certain kind, such as rules and principles. To illustrate, a case that enters one 
FBSS will have all the necessary inquiries, empirical evidence to settle upon in this decision-
making body. The board has an adequately lucid picture of the situation of the child and it is 
thus time for the layman to consider the course of action, and present the arguments to this 
particular FBSS. The goal for that particular layman is to take under consideration the 
situation of the child as a point of departure, and take the next step to decide upon what to do. 
At this point, and this is where it becomes crucial, what is called upon are general 
propositions for action. These are the warrants. They act as “bridges, and authorize the sort of 
step to which our particular argument commits us.”438 The particular layman therefore 
resonates “if the situation is A then do B,” and the warrants constitute the authorization that 
binds A to B. The problem is that these warrants are not shared knowledge across the 
different boards—the warrants laymen uses are random. Hence, the common sense of the 
layman can easily be argued as being a threat towards the principle of non-discrimination and 
thus a threat towards the promise of trust. 
                                                 
438 Toulmin (2003): 91. 
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Although there are certain qualifications that safeguard that certain laymen are not 
represented, for instance, through the demand to an unblemished record, there is nothing that 
suggests that these individuals are capable of defending the rights of the child. Their 
representation is on the contrary a threat towards the rights of the child, since rights should be 
employed and safeguarded in a non-discriminatory fashion.  
 The question that needs answering is: Do laymen benefit the enforcement of the rights 
of the particular child, or do they not? Laymen have no way of knowing, or should not know, 
how the rights of the child work, from what their rights entail, and why this is so. With regard 
to their role as taking a part of defending children’s rights, and their lack of competence in 
doing so, they risk treating an indeterminate principle in a manner that is a threat to the 
principle of non-discrimination. The likelihood of laymen actually benefitting the legal 
protection of the child is minimal.  
The use of peers within the BVN of 1953 was justified because a child was seen in a 
symbiotic relationship with its biological parents and the local community they resided in. 
Hence, their representation was a direct result of the order of expectations of 1953. The 
democratic aspect to the legal order of 1953 was an important step to reform the Trustee-
board of 1896. The Trustee-board was, at that time, seen as a state-driven extension of the 
prison-system with a focus upon correction of the child. When the BVL was introduced in 
1953, and child welfare was recognized as the primary state involvement in child-rearing, the 
democratic aspect of it, and the need for a local foundation for decision-making, provided the 
peer-system with a primus motor function of bestowing legitimacy to the BVN at the time. 
The use of democratically appointed peers was justified as parents were the ones put on trial. 
It was their child rearing competence that was disputed, which had nothing to do with the 
particular needs of the child. Hence, the child was, in one sense, subordinated to his or her 
custodians. This view upon children and their belonging has become far more elaborated as 
time went by, and legitimate decision-making is today dependent upon taking all parties into 
consideration. As the bvl is supposed to be in harmony with the rights of the child, the laymen 
arrangement can no longer be maintained as an argument for increasing the legitimacy of the 
decision-making procedure. Today, the enforcement of the rights of the child must be applied 
equally without any local variations, or else it would be a breach with non-discrimination.  
The natural question is, are there any good reasons for having laymen at all? There is 
one reason, but only in the part of the decision-making process that deals with the rights of 
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parents and the question of revoking them. For reasons mentioned above, there are no 
seemingly good arguments in favor of involving laymen in decisions that affects children. 
However, laymen can contribute in the same sense as jurors in deliberations upon whether or 
not parents should be coerced or not.439 Laymen can be peers of parents, but not the child. 
However, this is not how they are included into the FBSS, and laymen consequently stand as 
a threat to the basic expectations of non-discrimination.  
7.2.2.DifferentBoardstoConvene
In this section, the discussion focus on the two main types of boards that can be convened in 
order to perform decision-making. The first paragraph of bvl §7-5 stipulates that the general 
rule is to convene a regular board. This board is to consist of the leader of the board, one 
layman and one professional representative. However, there are two other types of FBSS-
boards. If a case is complex, the leader can determine to convene a large board that consists of 
two professionals, two laymen and the leader. Convening a board in this latter way was how 
the original board was designed upon the introduction of the bvl from 1993. However, due to 
economic and efficiency reasons, the current regular board is smaller. The final type is a 
single board, consisting of the leader alone. This last board can be established instead of a 
regular board if adequate regard to legal protection is taken, or if the type of case involves 
minor changes to earlier decisions.  
 When the petition is delivered by the local child welfare office, the leader of the board 
is to decide upon what board to convene. Within the petition, the child welfare office suggests 
what type of board the leader is to convene. This arrangement, perhaps, ensures perfectly 
reasonable claims by the child welfare offices responsible for raising the case and appurtenant 
casework. This makes the casework for the leader of the FBSS simpler, but the threat towards 
allowing cases that in fact are complex to be labeled as regular still remains. The private party 
can answer the petition, and hence comment upon what board to convene.440 
 The main reason for having three different types of boards is that cases can allegedly 
be differentiated without being a threat towards the legal protection of the child.441 Prior to the 
amendment of the bvl and the design of the FBSS in 2007, its design generally had the shape 
                                                 
439This does not mean that the use of jury is necessarily normatively defendable, but since the use of jury-peers is 
widespread in Norway, it is an accepted way of involving laymen. The role of the jury is, however, outside the 
scope of this discussion.  
440 Bvl §7-11.  
441 Ot.prp.nr.76 (2005-2006). 
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of a large board.442 Simpler casework could still be decided by the judge alone. This meant 
that, prior to 2007, the board could not be differentiated into two different boards designated 
to either complex or non-complex cases. The argument the amendment introduced in 2007 
was that it was more cost-efficient not to always have a large board, especially since in some 
simpler cases this decision allegedly did not reduce the legal protection for those involved. 
However, one of the reasons for establishing the original design was that there was always a 
need for this composition in order to establish sufficient legal protection. This would mean 
that if the parties to the procedure disagreed, there would be a need to ensure that the decision 
of the board was reached upon a solid foundation.  
To illustrate, we can turn to the original design, especially how it is laid out in the 
legislative history leading to the 1991 stl §9-6, where the original design of the FBSS 
regarding the composition of the board in each case proceeding is situated.443 The background 
for this rule was that an agreement could be reached within the board without relying upon 
external expert witnesses. Hence, having the original type of board was seen as a precondition 
for independent decision-making. If discord erupted between two professionals within the 
board, additional evidence could be called upon in the form of additional expert witnesses.444 
Only by ridding the board of discord could a decision be reached with no reasonabe 
rejections.  
By including two professionals into the board, the NOU 1985.18 presented the 
argument that professional expertise could help to make the board independent. If decision-
making could be professionally guaranteed through professional representatives in the board, 
the FBSS would become more independent as well as fully accountable for decisions. This 
motivation was a result of the criticism of the former arrangements in the BVN—that it was 
dependent upon expertise and could not make decisions on its own.  
Having professional members could ensure that any case was illuminated in a 
professionally sound manner, which would ensure that the board itself shaped the platform for 
decision-making and also reached the decision. The role of the professionals would either 
imply that each petition to the board is settled by the board alone, rather than through external 
                                                 
442 Stl of 1991 nr.81 §9-6. The leader of the board could decide not to have professionals participating in the 
board if both parties to the case agreed to it, cf. §9-6. It was not allowed to disregard the laymen-members to the 
board, cf. Ot.prp.nr.29 (1990-1991): 168. However, the general rule was to have two professionals and two 
laymen, together with the leader.  
443 NOU 1985:18 and Ot.prp.nr.29 (1990-1991): 136.  
444 NOU 1985:18.  
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professional witnesses, or that the board itself became able to understand the arguments of the 
witnesses that were called upon. Either way, the FBSS was enabled to reach independent 
decision. The extra effort in making this work for the FBSS was to make the professionals 
accountable by making them a part of the entire decision-making process as permanent 
members of the board.445 Professionals are not included to argue on certain dimensions of the 
decision, but are accountable as board members in the entire decision-making procedure on 
par with the other members. 
The idea of putting the professionals’ “feet to the fire” is somewhat disregarded in the 
current design where regular boards consist of one professional instead of two, thus avoiding 
potential for professional friction. However, having only one professional implies the lack of 
ability for qualifying the board with professional knowledge through arguing what is best 
practice. Furthermore, it is no way for the leader to know if the professional within the regular 
board represent “best practice.” Having a social worker or a psychologist as the professional  
members would most likely lead to two different evaluations. Hence, it is a threat towards the 
principle of non-discrimination by having only one professional.  
There are no convincing arguments that address the current design of the FBSS and 
that can explain in what manner professionals should be involved, and why laymen are 
members at all. Furthermore, the use of regular boards and single boards has significant 
shortcomings because their introduction in 2008 was based solely on cost-efficiency. This 
bodes ill for the promise of trust. There are especially three reasons for why the large board is 
best suited to answer the purpose of the FBSS: 
1: Having two professionals is always better than one, as no professional’s best-practice 
solution can guarantee best type of decision.  
2: Having two professionals, or even two different professions, can help qualify the 
arguments presented and yield a more solid decision. 
3: The responsibility of the leader, and how large role the leader takes, is smaller in a large 
board. In a large board, greater number of members must carry the responsibility for decision-
making.  
 The purpose of convening a board such as the large board, which was the only type of 
board in the original FBSS-design of 1992, was to find out what type of care is detrimental 
                                                 
445 NOU 1985:18: 298. 
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and would trigger the removal of parental rights, and what measures are in a child’s best 
interest. The protection of these two rights is less strong if the board is reduced to the regular 
board. Hence, the differentiation of the board, and with a regular board consisting of only one 
professional, is a threat towards the basic expectation that stipulate decisions to become in the 
child’s best interest.  
7.2.3.ArbitraryDesignFeatures:MembersandBoards
The shortcomings of each of the member-types, and each of the boards, have not been 
addressed in the legislative history to the current decision-making design. Discussions on 
what constitutes professional knowledge are absent, and it is no good reason for why laymen 
are participants other than their ability to discuss complex normative issues, which arguably is 
disputable.  
 The judge is the professional member that has received a role in each board throughout 
the history of child protection, and the reason for including judges has been the same. They 
have been the, and for good reasons, the alibi of legal protection. However, in the current 
child protection regime, the demands are higher to legal protection than ever before. The 
current demand towards legal protection is a result of criticism raised against the first two 
legal orders and their inadequacies when it came to the protection of those affected. The 
LBFB had inadequate legal protection for parents and for children, whilst the BVL had 
inadequate legal protection for the child. With the introduction of bvl, demands are not only 
set to respect both parents and child, but also to ensure that anything that happens to the child 
would be in its best interest. This means that there are higher demands to the judge as a legal 
scholar. If a leader lacks the professional ability to understand the complexities of the 
indeterminacy of the principle of the child’s best interest, it might lead to discrimination in 
practice, especially if cases become treated as if they were similar. The indeterminacy of the 
child’s best interest makes it necessary to make new evaluations for each case, because each 
case is unique to the particular interests of each child. 
If decision-making is to redeem a promise of trust, for the ability of some members to 
contribute to the decision-making process must be elaborated further. If, for instance, the 
professionals within the FBSS were replaced with Volvo-drivers, then the decision-making 
would not be said to be equally qualified. Hence, representation of certain types of members 
must be made for a reason. There are two ways of discussing the composition of the board 
with respect to trust. First, do the respective representatives contribute towards redeeming the 
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promise of trust? Second, does the entire composition contribute towards redeeming the 
promise of trust? These questions must focus upon how representatives contribute to the 
decision-making being in the child’s best interest and that the composition of the board 
ensures it in a non-discriminatory way. These questions have been answered in the negative. 
There are shortcomings in including representatives of the board; moreover, the regular board 
and the single board are both established with inadequate attention towards the purpose of 
child protection. Hence, the promise of trust becomes threatened and cannot be cashed in.  
7.3.PartiestotheProcedureandTheirPossibilities
When the child welfare office submits a petition to the FBSS, the FBSS is authorized through 
the bvl to claim jurisdiction of the case-matter.446 In this respect, it distinguishes itself from 
most types of civil courts where the parties generally have disposal of the case-matter.447 
Decision-making, in this respect, makes the FBSS inquisitorial because the board is 
responsible for both clarifications of matters of fact and decisions once the petition is 
delivered.448 This means that the FBSS is the entity that has decision autonomy in settling the 
issue once the petition has set things in motion. It is also further independent in that the board 
itself must reach a decision where they are not in need of any outsiders to deliberate or 
understand the ramifications of the decision.449 This type of independency is equalizing the 
boards across Norway in the sense that the boards have equal competence to reach a decision. 
This help securing non-discrimination. 
This section will draw the attention towards how the parties to the procedure becomes 
involved in the decision-making procedure once the petition is submitted and the procedure is 
set in motion, and what the possibilities are with respect to preceding and appealing their 
case. Said differently, the discussion will focus on how the different parties become included 
into the decision-making procedure.  
                                                 
446 Bvl §8-4. This point is made very clear in both NOU 2005 and Ot.prp.76 (2005-2006). 
447 Cf. tl§11-2, 11-4. 
448 Robberstad (2009): 14. Administrative decision-making with respect to coercion is a type of decision-making 
that is omitted from the ordinary civil trial-proceedings where each party has control of the case matter, see 
Ot.prp.nr.51 (2004-2005): 177. Within administrative decision-making of the sort that the FBSS is responsible 
for, the board becomes inquisatory because (1) the parties do not have control with the outcome/decision, (2) no 
parties to the procedure can determine sentence and (3) the parties are not to decide upon the sufficiency of 
evidence. As such, the parties to the procedure cannot plead the case, and the FBSS can exceed the limits set by 
either of the parties’ claims, see Robberstad (1999): 129.  
449 This is what is meant by bvl §7-3-e. It states that the FBSS is supposed to make decisions independently and 
through a real examination of the foundation for the decision – see Ot.prp.nr.76 (2006-2007):32. It is also 
important to combine the need for independency to the fact that it is an inquisitorial trial, namely that the FBSS 
has a sole responsibility for establishing the foundation for making the decision.  
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7.3.1.PartiestotheProcedure
If the FBSS did not have full disposal of the case, but rather the parties to the procedure 
“owned” the procedure, the FBSS could never be said to be able to reach decisions that were 
in the child’s best interest. If the decision-making was a matter of settling a dispute between 
two parties, which would be typical for a general civil procedure, there would only be two 
claims upon what would be seen as the child’s best interest, and neither of them needed to 
even be close to being in the child’s best interest. As such, a general civil procedure is not any 
guarantee for a decision being qualified as the best approximation to the principle of the 
child’s best interest. Hence, arranging the decision-making procedure in a manner where the 
board settles the issue independently is clearly strengthening the potential of approximating 
the child’s best interest. Neither of the parties to the procedure need to be correct on their 
claim, and by instituting an inquisitorial decision-making board, there is an ability to take in 
the complexity that the principle of child’s best interest entails. This would not be possible if 
the parties to the procedure had disposal of the case-matter.  
The parties to the procedure will, however, direct the course of deliberation by being 
the most important supplier of arguments to the decision-making procedure and, in this 
manner, they have certain control of the procedure. This does not mean that the FBSS is 
bound by either of the claims put forth by either of the parties. The decision claimed to be in 
the child’s best interest includes both the removal of the rights of parents and implementing 
measures. Agreement on these two issues is to be reached within the board rather than among 
the private parties or the child welfare office.450 Hence, it is the board itself that is accountable 
for the decision that can reach rational acceptability for all.  
The definition of party to the procedure is a “person that a decision is directed toward 
or who the case directly concerns.”451 The right to be included in a decision-making 
procedure is claimed by a person that carries the status as a party.452 Furthermore, contrary to 
the traditional Public Administration Act (fvl), a party to the FBSS receives full access to all 
types of information that the decision is based upon—a right to conditional transparency. 
                                                 
450 Agreement means that there are no claims that can be deemed as more convincing or better. This means that 
parents might not like the outcome of the decision, they might disprove it, but if they do not produce arguments 
that are more forceful than the decision of the FBSS, then their feelings become irrelevant with respect to what is 
in a child’s best interest.  
451 Bvl §6-1.Definition in fvl §2-e. See Ot.prp.44 (1991-1992):78. 
452 In most cases the local child welfare office claims the right to a proceeding, cf. bvl §8-4, but the private party 
can also, in some cases, claim such a right, cf. bvl §7-10, second paragraph.  
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Conditional transparency is a special exception to the fvl §19 for the casework in the FBSS 
that involves sensitive cases, such as the future of a child.  
Only the board itself makes the decision. Hence, no parties participate in decision-
making. Rather, they are parties to the decision-making procedure of the FBSS, whereby they 
contribute and influence the argumentative procedure in the meeting of negotiation (discussed 
in more detail later). In this context, the term ‘parties’ refers first of all to the private parties, 
i.e. parents and, in some cases, the child.453 Furthermore, parties are also the public officials 
from the child welfare office. Although they also submit the petition to the FBSS, they are not 
accountable for the process itself. Anything they submit to the FBSS can be disputed in a 
counter-petition, if necessary, from the private parties, as well as from the board.454 
The question regarding who is a party to the board and procedure is important in 
regard to many of the rules that are activated as a result. In such cases, a party to the decision-
making procedure has access to all relevant documents (§7-4), they are warned regarding the 
petition (§7-11 – fourth paragraph), they have the right to participate in the meeting of 
negotiation (§7-7 and also §6-3), as well as the right to legal representation (§7-8), the right to 
influence the preparation for procedure (§7-12 – third paragraph), they influence how the 
meeting of negotiation is constituted (§7-5 – second paragraph and §7-12 – third paragraph), 
and finally they hold the right to appeal (§7-24). 
 How parents and children, viz. those directly affected by the decision, are incorporated 
into the process of decision-making is imperative with regard to the promise of trust. It is their 
lives that are about to change and, if their inclusion is made in a manner where their 
arguments are not taken into account, the post-national rights-based aim of child protection is 
hard to obtain. If their arguments were not taken into account, it would not be possible to 
reach rational acceptability of the decision. If their treatment is not on par with the basic 
expectations towards child protection, it is nothing that can provide reasons for anyone to 
have trust in the decisions.  
 To illustrate how a practice could not redeem a modern promise of trust, the BVL of 
1953 should be revisited. Here, the parents did not have the right to see the relevant 
documents to the case they were involved in.455 This meant that they could not defend 
                                                 
453 Children are parties to the procedure in both a special sense and in a directly judicial sense – as discussed 
later.  
454 What I refer to as a counter-petition is the bvl §7-11 - fourth paragraph. 
455 Benneche (1986): 113. 
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themselves properly because they were not included as a legal party to their own cases in any 
proper manner. Thus, the report of the child welfare office was not something that the parents 
could contribute or influence, criticize or answer to in a manner that could help the decision in 
becoming in the best interest of the child. The child welfare officers conducted investigations 
and interrogations that would lead to writing a so-called social report. Most often, the BVN 
reached their decisions according to these reports, which effectively made the BVN into a 
dependent decision-making body.456 These documents were withheld due to restrictions 
imposed on private parties, preventing them from accessing public documents. This type of 
exclusion of the private parties did not enable the BVN to establish an exhaustive 
argumentative process that could help finding out what was in a child’s best interest. This was 
remedied with the introduction of the FBSS.  
7.3.2.AnInquisitorialPartyProcedure
With the introduction of the bvl, the decision-making procedure became based upon a 
traditional civil trial and party-procedure, or at least a special version of it. This was not the 
case with the BVL or the LBFB. However, the introduction of the party procedure principle 
can be seen as a reaction to both the BVL and the BVN. By establishing a party procedure, 
the local child welfare office in each municipality became a party to the procedure on par with 
the parents. In this type of procedure, the two parties present claims upon what is in a child’s 
best interest, which are considered equally in front of the FBSS.  
 Establishing a party process, where the meeting of negotiation is one of the most 
important characteristics, can be considered as the most important step in re-embedding the 
order of expectations into the legal order. This idea is reflected in NOU 1985:18:  
“It must be added up to a party procedure in which the municipal social services, or Ministry of 
Social Affairs, promote well-founded proposals for specific measures…The other party is that 
which the action is directed towards…The private party should always be represented by a 
lawyer.”457
The most important difference between the traditional party procedure of the civil court and 
the FBSS is that the board must itself determine the solidity of the decision-making platform. 
In order to achieve such an aim, which is reaching a decision in the child’s best interest on a 
solid platform and in an informed manner, the FBSS had to become equipped with a design 
that was independent. It can be argued that the FBSS is independent from those below and 
those above, through two design-mechanisms—(1) the FBSS is an administrative court. It 
                                                 
456Kjønstad (2002): 70. 
457 NOU 1985:18: 299. 
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means that it is separate from the regular court system.458 As such, the FBSS is only similar to 
a court, but a part of public administration and pursuant to forvaltningsloven (Public 
Administration Act – fvl) §1.  
(2) The leader of the FBSS has a responsibility to remain independent and ensure that 
cases reach a decision according to the main principles of procedure and in accordance with 
the purpose of the legal code, rather than resting on either of the parties’ claims. The FBSS is 
independent in that the decision-making does not risk being influenced by political tampering 
or different administrative directives. The FBSS is exempted from these types of instructions. 
This allows the FBSS to work independently as if it was a court, something that has been 
stressed in most of the reports regarding the decision-making board.459  
The leader plays an active role in establishing a solid foundation for decision-making 
by, for instance, deciding to add more evidence to the procedure.460 The active leadership 
entrenched in bvl §7-12 has no parallel in current law.461 The active leadership is set to ensure 
that the main principles of procedure of bvl §7-3 is enforced. The idea of active leadership 
was first launched in NOU 1985:18 as a way to establish legal protection for those affected by 
the child protection system.462 The lack of legal protection was the largest problem with the 
BVL, and a way to remedy such a problem was to introduce a jurist that could enforce civil 
court-principles as well as principles underpinning a legal practical discourse. The jurist could 
draw upon esoteric know-how in order to secure a fair trial proceeding.  
A child protection case involves a child who cannot automatically be a party to the 
procedure on par with others. The decision-making procedure is to decide what is best for this 
child, and nobody else. The board is not only going to establish facts, but they also must 
decide upon the treatment of the child in order for its best interests to be met. The party-
procedure is not about two adverse parties who must settle a disagreement; it is a matter of 
locating what is in the child’s best interest, irrespective of the two parties. Hence, having an 
inquisitorial trial procedure becomes a precondition for reaching such a principled aim. It 
renders it possible to approximate the child’s best interest in an argumentative fashion where 
the best argument that serves such an aim can be made acceptable to all. This helps to redeem 
                                                 
458 Bvl §6-1. 
459 The reference to the FBSS as a court-like decision-making body is found practically everywhere, e.g. 
Ot.prp.nr.44 (1991-1992): 13, NOU 2000:12: 267, NOU 2001:32: 234, NOU 2005:9: 50 and Ot.prp.nr.76 (2005-
2006): 119.  
460 Bvl §7-12b, d, e, f. 
461 See Ot.prp.nr.76 (2005-2006): 129-130.  
462 NOU 1985:18: 293. 
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the promise of trust, while it opens up the possibility for reaching the aim of upholding the 
child’s best interest.  
7.3.3.ThePublicParty:TheRoleoftheLocalChildWelfareOffice
The local Child Welfare Office is the key actor in Norwegian child protection and child 
welfare. However, this dissertation will not evaluate its role with regard to ensuring the 
welfare of children within families, but on the protection of children. The local child welfare 
office is in charge of the child’s welfare and attempts to remedy his or her situation through 
non-coercive means. If these measures fail, or the situation is acute, they can move to prepare 
a petition before the FBSS on a request to use coercive measures.  
 When a petition is submitted by the local child welfare office, the situation of the child 
has become labeled detrimental, and it is a threat to the child’s health and development. The 
claim raised by the child welfare office is allegedly in the child’s best interest. The office is 
thus attempting to advocate for the interest of the child, irrespective of the parents’ views. 
Even if the child is entitled to be a party on its own, this still does not remove the right of the 
child welfare office to stand by their claim that they know and will protect the child’s best 
interest. Onora O’Neill argues this very point: 
“Children easily become victims. If they had rights, redress would be possible…Although they … 
cannot claim their rights for themselves, this is no reason for denying them rights. Rather it is a 
reason for setting up institutions that can monitor those who have children in their charge and 
intervene to enforce rights.”463
This has the practical consequence in that the local child welfare office can claim to represent 
the child’s best interest on behalf of the child, against the parents’ claims. This is the local 
child welfare office’ role called in loco parentis—“being in the place of the parent.” 
 In loco parentis is a positive right, carried by the child. It stipulates that the child has a 
right to protection. This social right can be given the following formulation:  
“If some individual I, who satisfies certain background conditions B, displays characteristics K in 
circumstances C, then an individual O, who occupies official position P, should do T to or for 
individual I.”464
Using this description, we get the following scenario. An individual (I), who is a child 
according to law (B), is receiving detrimental care (K) within its current family or care-
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situation (C), then the individual (O), who occupies the position as a child welfare officer (P), 
should raise a claim to protect (T) the child (I) from the family or care-situation (C).  
That the local Child Welfare Office is supposed to raise such a claim upon what is in a 
child’s best interest opens up for variations across municipalities according to the quality of 
the personnel at the particular local office. Do all the local offices act upon the same 
knowledge-base regarding when to file a petition? Do they act upon the same notion of 
detrimental care? Is the threshold of intervention coherent across municipalities? The answers 
to these question are “no”. This implies that the FBSS might not be activated coherently, and 
some municipalities can be more active than others. This discriminates between cases.  
During the time of the BVL, these variations provided a breeding ground for critique of 
the lack of non-discrimination. The criticism was directed at the system’s acceptance of 
variations in decision-making. The purpose behind the BVL was to safeguard the distinctive 
character of the municipalities. Healthy families in healthy communities were the goal of 
child protection. This idea instituted discrimination across municipalities. Hence, the BVN 
discriminated by design.  
Lifting the decisions on coercion out from the municipality could remedy the problem 
of discrimination between municipalities. Thus, making decisions on a regional level and with 
a professionalized board could ensure less discrimination between cases. However, it is still a 
threat that there would be variation amongst those who activate the FBSS.465 Local variations, 
as e.g. lack of competence, lack of personnel, lack of budget, lack of time etc. will inevitable 
occur.  
The child itself cannot raise a rights-claim effectively since it is a child; thus, it can be 
argued that the local child welfare office is given the task to enforce the rights of the child as 
stipulated by CRC Art. 3.2: “States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and 
care as is necessary for his or her well-being.” The Child Welfare Office takes the view, as 
they move forth to formulate a petition to the FBSS, that the child would want their parents to 
be coerced and that the care of the child potentially transferred to someone else. 
Conceptualizing the purpose of the local child welfare office in this manner is somewhat new, 
and cannot be found explicitly in the legislative history of child protection. However, as 
                                                 
465 This relates to the professionalization of the local Child Welfare Office and the operative street-level child 
welfare. The manner in which the different local Child Welfare Offices can avoid discriminating children is to 
equalize practice through the application of the same knowledge-base and equal procedures.  
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argued in the former chapter, it is a consequence of a rights-based post-national turn in child 
protection where the protection of the child’s best interest is the primary consideration. 
Although variations occur between municipalities, the possibility for raising petitions on 
behalf of the child, because it is in that child’s interest, is embedded in the FBSS-design. This 
helps redeem the promise of trust.  
One of the ways in which cases become equalized, and thus contribute to ensure that 
decision-making does not discriminate by design, is that the local child welfare office is 
represented by a lawyer when pleading the case at the FBSS. This is also the case with the 
private parties. Hence, the way parties to the procedure raise their claims is equalized in that 
respect. This clearly strengthens the likelihood that the FBSS can treat cases in a non-
discriminatory manner, and that everyone involved can be shown equal respect.466 
7.3.4.ParentalRightsandTheirLegalRepresentative
The private party’s procedural rights are activated when the local Child Welfare Office 
commences its investigation into a care-situation. The parents of the child are entitled to legal 
representation as well as access to all case-documents from this point on.467 This type of 
relative transparency can be seen as a reaction to the lack thereof during the BVL-period 
when parents did not receive access to all documents, and their ability to argue their case 
became difficult. In many respects, the role of the local child welfare officers were too 
integrated with the BVN in reaching decisions on matters that needed coercion.  
By providing parents status as a party, corresponds with the demands set to maintain 
the rights of parents. Since parental rights are seen as a general precondition for ensuring the 
best interest of the child, securing and respecting these rights in a decision-making procedure 
is imperative. Respecting the rights of parents and keeping them operative in including them 
as parties to the procedure is a way of ensuring that the interests of the child is enforced as far 
as possible. 
What is at stake when the FBSS receives a petition from the local child welfare office 
is a claim that the rights of parents to provide care for their child should become limited or 
revoked. According to the principle of least intervention (minste inngreps prinsipp), the rights 
of parents are respected until the point where coercion is deemed as the only viable action. At 
this point, it is claimed that the child receives care that is detrimental because it has become a 
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threat to his or her health and development. This implies that parental rights are presumed 
until coercive intervention is deemed necessary—it is referred to as the biological 
presumption.468  
The biological presumption is maintained by the state to safeguard parental rights as 
long as it does not threaten the child’s development and health. This is so because it is in the 
child’s best interest to remain within the family until a certain point, i.e. when care falls 
beneth a certain threshold and becomes detrimental. In order to legitimize the removal of 
parental rights, the parents must be allowed to put forth a counter-claim to the local Child 
Welfare Office in an effective manner. This will illuminate the care-situation of the child, and 
will contribute in the process of approximating the child’s best interest.  
On the other side, the local Child Welfare Office must communicate on an equal 
footing with the private parties in order for their arguments to understand each other. To reach 
such an end, the parties to the procedure in the FBSS have legal representatives—lawyers. 
These representatives function as an equalizer that levels the playing field. This will help to 
establish discursive symmetry between those involved. As with the local child welfare office, 
the legal representation of parents is a way to ensure that the argumentative level of the claims 
put forth in front of the FBSS is provided on an equal level and according to similar type of 
specialized adjudication. This makes the FBSS more likely to understand each case on equal 
terms—implicitly enforcing the basic expectation of non-discrimination. By providing legal 
representation of the parties to the procedure, the promise of trust becomes increasingly 
cashed in.  
7.3.5.TheChild’sCoǦDeterminationandSelfǦDetermination
The bvl §6-3 stipulates the most important inclusion of children into FBSS proceedings. 
According to the legislative history, the reason for its inclusion was to empower children and 
make them able to participate in their own lives.469 The right of the child to be heard is now a 
part of bvl §6-3. It is directly derived from a specification of the principle of the child’s best 
interest in Art. 12 of the CRC, and was one of the few efforts made to harmonize the bvl to 
the CRC through active transformation.470 Hence, the bvl §6-3 is a result of incorporating the 
CRC into Norwegian law. Children from the age of 7, or younger, if they are capable, are 
given the right to express themselves on matters affecting them. The FBSS should weigh their 
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opinions according to the age of the child and its maturity. According to Barneloven (The 
Children’s Act – bl) §31, opinions of children aged 12 or older are to be given great weight in 
the decision-making procedure.471 Finally, a child at the age of 15, and sometimes younger, 
can be provided the status as a party to the procedure.  
By gradually increasing a child’s involvement as the child matures, the law has 
formalized a type of relative autonomy of the child. While an adult at the age of 18 can be 
said to be autonomous in deciding in all matters, a child does not receive any type of formal 
self-determination until the age of 15. Even at that age, the type of self-determination is very 
limited. A child’s relative autonomy prior to 15 is not as if it alone can shift the decision-
making in its favor and towards its claim. The age-limits of 7, 12 and 15 reflect an 
operationalization of the development of a child. Furthermore, the FBSS is given leeway to 
argue that children under the age of 7 can be heard, as well as that some children younger than 
fifteen can have status as a party to the procedure. The important question is then if this 
operationalization of a child’s relative autonomy in the legal order complies with basic 
expectations.  
In bvl §6-3, it is stipulated how a child can become a participant in its own trial. 
Arguably, the older a child becomes, it becomes correspondingly likely that opinions become 
indicators on what is in its best interest. The reason is that the child’s best interest is 
increasingly argued coherently by the child itself.  
 There are two problems regarding how the child becomes included into the process. 
The first is the arbitrary age factor, and the other is what I refer to as the party paradox. The 
age-limits 7, 12 and 15 cannot be said to have any scientific support. Similar arguments can 
be made for the configuration 5, 10 and 13 instead. Moreover, as the CRC does not operate 
with any age-limits, the question regarding what the particular reasons are that stipulate the 
particular age-limit configuration of 7, 12 and 15 arises. These age-limits, in its general 
application, are redundant. Why cannot the child’s relative autonomy be sought out in each 
case?  
 The FBSS can argue that a child can follow a different and more liberal age-limit 
configuration than what is formalized by the bvl. Hence, hearing a five-year old may be 
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equally valid. To avoid such arbitrariness, the bvl should not operate with age-limits with 
respect to hearing the opinion of the child, especially since the interpretation of the age-limits 
can differ between boards and discriminate between children that should otherwise be 
considered as equals. There are no reason to avoid hearing the child, as it cannot be known if 
it “is capable of forming his or her own views” before given the chance to talk.472 
 The second point is the party paradox. It revolves around the paradox of having an 
entire decision-making body’s purpose of ensuring that a decision is in a child’s best interest 
on the one side, and a claim from the child that allegedly is its best interest on the other. Can 
the FBSS decide upon anything else than the claim of the child if that claim is considered as 
reasonable? The answer is yes. The board, through an exhaustive argumentative procedure is 
the entity that is to settle on the issue of what is in a child’s best interest. The problem, 
nevertheless, remains that the child is authorized to raise its own claim on its own best 
interest. As every child that has turned 15 is to receive the status as a party to the procedure, 
he or she can raise a claim regarding what is in their own best interest.  
 Arguments that go against the claim of the child must be particularly strong. Once the 
child has become empowered to become on par with adults, its relative autonomy suggests 
that it must understand the perils of its own situation and raise a claim similar to that of an 
adult.473 This would mean that the child took control of the situation. This is not the case. By 
empowering the child to become a party to the proceedings, the FBSS provides the child with 
a confusing role with regard to its relative autonomy. This autonomy has ceased to be relative 
and rather became on par with self-determination, placing too much responsibility on the 
child. Although the formal responsibility for any decision is on the shoulders of the FBSS, the 
very idea that the FBSS can relax itself whenever a child at the age of 15 or older puts forth a 
reasonable claim, is to set aside the purpose of child protection to ensure that the development 
of the child continues in a non-detrimental fashion until adulthood.  
 Consequently, the type of empowerment that enables a child to become pseudo-
autonomous can threaten the entire purpose of the decision-making procedure. The reasoning 
behind having a carefully designed decision-making procedure is that the child cannot know 
what is in his or her best interest as long as it is a child, and because it is a child. This is not 
an argument against including a child into an argumentative procedure according to its 
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relative autonomy, listening to its arguments and taking them very seriously, but rather a 
criticism towards setting a child’s relative autonomy aside in order to include them as if they 
no longer were children, i.e. as a party to the procedure represented by lawyer. Including the 
child as a party to the procedure becomes questionable since the child still is only a child who 
is not to be held accountable for the measures that should ensure that its development and 
health gets back on track.474  
The aim of any decision is the child’s best interest, and the interests of the child is the 
only issue worth considering once parental rights are set aside due to detrimental care. 
However, the child is not an adult, and should not be treated as one. Granting the child status 
as a party to the procedure is counterproductive to the work of the FBSS. It becomes a threat 
both towards the promise of trust if or when the child makes a claim towards its best interest 
that becomes set aside by the FBSS or when the FBSS accommodates such a claim.  
Given that the child’s age is an arbitrary factor, the party paradox can be solved by 
simply deciding that any child is to be allowed to put forth its arguments no matter how old 
that child is. This means that the FBSS should always hear the child’s point of view without it 
being considered as a claim put forth on par with that of the parents or local Child Welfare 
Office or any other actor. In this way the treatment of a child becomes similar across boards, 
and the child itself contribute on an equal footing.  
One further way of including a child, and irrespective of age, is to make use of the 
already established arrangement of appointing a spokesperson to the child.475 This 
arrangement was pushed through by the parliamentary committee responsible for the final 
formulation of the legal order of bvl.476 It introduced the ability for the FBSS to appoint a 
spokesperson for the child. The Labor-government responsible for the bvl was not in favor of 
such a spokesperson, since it complicated the decision-making procedure and risked 
confusing the child. Since the bvl was dependent upon reaching a majority in parliament, the 
spokesperson became a part of the legal arrangement. It was argued that: 
“In these cases, the interests of children do not need to be identical with the interests of the other 
parties to the procedure. According to the understanding of the majority it would be a 
strengthening of the child’s legal security and their position in relation to such decisions that it 
has its own “representative” that can speak the case of the child and present the case from the 
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child’s perspective. Such a representative must be trained to speak with children and be 
independent of the local child welfare office”477
The current arrangement makes it voluntary to appoint such a spokesperson, and it is a 
qualified guess that such a person not always becomes appointed. This is obviously a threat 
towards the ability to raise valuable and qualified arguments in the process of finding out 
what is in a child’s best interest.  
 Participants to the discourse on child protection emphasize that empowering the child 
is a step in the right direction of securing correct decisions.478 This can be true, but the way 
they are included should be more thoroughly considered. If the decision-making is to redeem 
the promise of trust, the basic expectation of the child’s best interest must become reflected in 
the way children are included. Having age-limits that are arbitrary, including children as 
parties to the procedure and having a voluntary appointment of a spokesperson does not 
necessarily constitute empowerment that safeguards the child’s best interest. Currently, it is 
rather a risk for discrimination to occur between children and how they are included—this 
threatens the promise of trust. 
7.3.6.FixedorFreeMeasures
As we have seen, according to the bvl, the FBSS is to decide to coercively intervene and 
remove the rights of the parents, and then to implement measures that are in the child’s best 
interest.479 This does not mean that the FBSS can formally do whatever it desires in order to 
achieve its aim of finding out what is in a child’s best interest. The types of measures that are 
available to choose among are specified in the legal order, and as such, what is in a child’s 
best interest is claimed to be one of the measures settled within the legal order. Hence, the 
legal order assumes the capacity for determining the indeterminate—that care-measures 
decided upon are in fact the child’s best interest. 
This means that from within the legal order itself, it is a claim that every conceivable 
child that the FBSS can be confronted by will receive measures in its best interest through the 
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fixed measures within the legal order. The problem is that the local child welfare office 
activates the FBSS with a claim to implement certain types of coercive measures that are 
entrenched in chapter four of the bvl. However, the FBSS is, in fact, not restricted to follow 
the claim raised by the local Child Welfare Office. The FBSS can do whatever is in the best 
interest of the child. For instance, if what is in a child’s best interest is a more complex matter 
than first suggested by the local Child Welfare Office, the FBSS can decide to proceed 
differently. 
 The question of finding measures that is in the child’s best interest, and coincidentally 
attempting to uphold a basic expectation towards child protection, is loaded with normative 
complexity. What ought to be done to qualify what is in a child’s best interests can entail a 
multitude of measures. Competing claims can easily be made, and all of them claim to be 
correct. These claims can all involve different measures. Different arguments are raised by 
e.g. a social workers or medical practitioners, the judge, or even the child or the parents, but 
they all emanate from an idea of what constitutes the best type of interest of the child. This 
type of normative complexity is at the core of the enforcement of the child’s best interest 
principle, and hence the procedure must be able to include, confront, and settle all the 
arguments in order to dismiss or confirm aspects that can lead to a decision that can be said to 
be in a child’s best interest.  
The input that one child’s case provides to a decision-making process must have 
consequences for the outcome of the decision-making. The answer to the question of what is 
in that child’s best interest should be treated as potentially varying from child to child. In 
order to achieve such an aim, which is founded upon a child’s right to receive a trial that 
treats them uniquely, there is a need to address every case with an open mind regarding what 
measures ought to be settled upon. The FBSS is not supposed to ‘know’ about any measures 
prior to hearing the child’s case, i.e. hearing what the interests of the child are. If the different 
types of measures that the FBSS can decide upon are fixed prior to any argumentative 
procedure, arguments can become prejudiced and blind towards the fact that the best interests 
of a child could only be settled unrestrained by such measures. By having fixed measures, the 
argumentative procedure within the FBSS can become fixated by the bvl and can run counter 
to a child’s best interest. Indirectly, it can even be argued that the legal code attempt to 
determine the indeterminable principle of the child’s best interest as measures that are open 
for the FBSS to pursue are fixed. This is clearly a threat towards the basic expectation of the 
child’s best interest, and the potential of redeeming a promise of trust.  
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 In order to ensure that a decision approximates the best interests of the child in an as 
satisfactory manner as possible, the different fixed measures within the bvl might distort this 
goal and simply not be enough. Having deliberations in the FBSS regarding measures must be 
open to accommodate any eventuality within argumentation on a principled level. If not, a 
child’s best interest might not become approximated in an optimal fashion because the child’s 
interest is settled through a few fixed measures. The latter goes against, and threatens the 
basic expectations of the child’s best interest, and could easily be removed by not dictating 
what type of decisions that can be made by the FBSS.  
There is no way of knowing how the board reasons with fixed measures, at least not 
without empirically studying the deliberations themselves. Since this type of examination is 
not conducted here, only illuminating this potential problem area of the design will have to 
suffice. By explicitly formalizing what measures to decide upon, the bvl functions as a type of 
limitation on what and why specific measures and hence specific interests can be in a child’s 
best interest. Furthermore, if a board thinks in terms of fixed measures, then they might view 
any case with prejudice in the sense that it is not the child’s interests that are being deliberated 
upon at all, but rather what type of measures should a particular child fit into. The latter is an 
obvious threat towards the basic expectations of the child’s best interest. In this sense, the 
fixed measures are procedural constraints on what type of interests can be considered, and can 
obstruct the flow of arguments leading to a particular child’s best interest.  
7.4.7.AppealingDecisionoftheFBSS
When a decision of the FBSS is not accepted by any of the parties to the procedure, they can 
appeal this decision to tingretten (court of first instance/district court), according to chapter 36 
of the Civil Procedure Act.480 This court is a special type of civil procedure that deals with 
appeals from administrative decision-making involving coercion. When appeals arise from 
the FBSS, it is because either the local child welfare office or one of the private parties—the 
child or the parents—do not believe that their claims are met in any reasonable manner. Said 
differently, the decision of the FBSS becomes contested. 
Once the case is raised to a civil court of law, it becomes subjected to a different type 
of scrutiny to the one within the FBSS. When a case is appealed, it enters a different system 
of norms, and with an entirely different background history. Said differently, once the child 
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protection case leaves the FBSS, it also leaves a decision-making body that has gone through 
decades of discourse on how to perform decisions in a trustworthy fashion.  
The case enters a civil court system that has notoriously been proclaimed, throughout 
the history of child protection discourse, as unfit for making decisions in child protection 
cases.481 Even in the Green Paper that contained the groundwork to the FBSS design, the 
traditional court system is argued as inappropriate for the purposes of reaching decisions 
regarding coercion cases in a legitimate manner. The FBSS has a design made more or less in 
opposition to the court system. Thus, it can be argued that, according to NOU 1985:18, the 
goal of ensuring the child’s best interest could not be achieved within the regular court 
system. The decision-making body set in charge, which became the board, had to combine 
independency with a procedure of argumentation. A court, it was argued, could not. When the 
civil court reaches a decision, claims become assessed according to principles underpinning a 
civil court instead.  
If the court of appeal cannot safeguard the principle of non-discrimination and the 
principle of the child’s best interest, the criticism that child protection cases lack any proper 
legal protection with regard to a court of appeal—i.e. a lack of any proper way of testing the 
ultimate claim to correctness that is the final decision of the FBSS—is valid. If the design of 
the FBSS is an answer to what is promoting trust the most, then a design of the type of 
appellant court procedure that differs, would not induce trust in the same manner. Hence, the 
promise of trust becomes threatened. If the FBSS has become the most optimal decision-
making body to answer such a question, then the appellant body should essentially be built 
upon the same design principles.482 This is presently not the case.  
This means that the promise of trust, even though it might be redeemed in the 
decision-making of the FBSS, would not automatically be true for the appellant body. Two 
entirely different institutions cannot induce trust in the same manner when certain principles 
are to be upheld in order to do so. In this regard, it can be argued that there is a principled 
shift in how casework is processed when a case leaves the FBSS and enters the civil courts. I 
will not discuss this further as it falls outside the reach of this dissertation.  
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enforcing the purpose of child protection.  
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7.4.MainPrinciplesofProcedureintheFBSS
In comparison to the predecessor of the FBSS, the BVN of 1953, the FBSS has had an 
elaborate set of rules that are supposed to guide each decision-making procedure. These 
constraints upon argumentation were introduced to reestablish legal protection. Initially the 
rules of procedure were not a formal part of the bvl or the stl. Rules were to be enforced, and 
the legislative history referred to the rules specific to the Civil Procedure Act.483 Today, rules 
of procedure have become an explicit part of the bvl and are dubbed as “main principles of 
procedure” located in bvl §7-3. Having rules of procedure, as I will refer to it, is a result of 
transforming the principle of fair trial from the ECHR into Norwegian regular rule of law and 
to child protection. It will be argued that the rules of procedure are, to a certain extent, the 
main design-features that comply with the basic expectation of non-discrimination. Observing 
such principles can be equivalent to having a rule-guided decision-making procedure that can 
ensure the formal principle of equality and hence the basic expectation of non-discrimination.  
7.4.1.TheCriticismoftheBVLGaveRulesofProcedure
One of the main shortcomings of the BVL of 1953 and its decision-making board was that it 
had no formal rules of procedure. Nevertheless, the legal code contained a potential to put 
forth demands to the procedure, since decision-making in coercion-cases needed the local 
judge to ensure legal protection. A judge could thus enforce rules as if it was a court-like 
procedure, but all according to the will of the judge. No rules were explicitly formalized that 
the judge had to enforce. The lack of rules of procedure in the BVL would potentially, but 
most likely, lead to arbitrary enforcement of coercion. Consequently, decision-making would 
have an imprint of arbitrariness, rather than being an explicit and formal legal discourse with 
rules of procedure that would maintain a coherent decision-making procedure. By demanding 
that rules are to be enforced, the FBSS have definite constraints on discretionary decision-
making, compared to the BVL. The implementation of rules of procedure can be referred to as 
the answer to the criticism towards the BVL and its lack of legal protection. 
To Gerd Benneche, the lack of rules of procedure was one of the elements that 
contributed to the BVL becoming a threat towards the legal protection of the child. She 
referred to the BVN, quite accurately, as a democratically appointed committee with no 
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guarantees for having qualified personnel sitting there.484 The subtext for such criticism was 
that the personnel occupying the BVN had no particular good reasons for making decisions. 
The original design of the FBSS did not contain any explicit main rules of procedure 
as is the case with the current bvl §7-3. It was argued, in the amendment of the bvl in 2006, 
that the rules of procedure, known from a civil court-procedure, were already expressed in the 
legislative history of the original FBSS introduced in 1992.485 They can be found in both 
NOU 1985:18 and Ot.prp.29 (1990-1991).486 The design was from the beginning supposed to 
adhere to certain principles of procedure. Although these principles were operative but not 
codified, it could lead to confusion as to how they would be enforced.  
The confusion was even greater since the FBSS was originally a part of the stl and not 
the bvl. One potential consequence of not explicitly codifying the principles within the bvl
itself, but having two different legal codes designing the decision-making body, the stl and 
bvl, was that it could lead to confusion regarding what type of main principles should in fact 
be guiding the decision-making procedure and also for what purpose. Hence, the introduction 
of bvl §7-3 as well as moving the FBSS from the stl to the bvl from 2008, can be said to 
equalize how procedures of the FBSS are accomplished. Therefore, the new rules of 
procedure is a positive development in ensuring that decision-making does not discriminate.  
Although the list within §7-3 is incomplete, it can be argued that it formalizes the most 
important demands set to a civil trial.487 These are the immediacy of evidence – §7-3-a, that 
those affected are heard §7-3-b, the need for thorough and sufficient contradiction §7-3-c, 
equal treatment §7-3-d, that the FBSS performs independent decision-making §7-3-e, and that 
the decision is rationally justified §7-3-f. All these principles are supposed to be operative in 
the decision-making procedure; moreover, they intersect and are mutually dependent. For 
instance, it is possible not to have thorough contradiction without the immediacy of evidence; 
moreover, rational justification cannot be made without including affected parties; equal 
treatment is not ensured if the decision-making body is not independent etc. As such, civil 
court principles become imported into an administrative decision-making body. 
 When the rules of procedure finally became formal constraints upon decision-making, 
it simultaneously settled formally that case-work involving coercion is supposed to proceed as 
                                                 
484 Benneche (1967): 82-83 
485Ot.prp.nr.76 (2005-2006): 27. 
486 NOU 1985:18:293, Ot.prp.nr.29 (1990-1991):168. 
487 Ot.prp.nr.76 (2005-2006): 27. 
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a legal discourse adhering to formal rules of procedure. The implementation of these rules, 
that simulates a civil court-procedure, was argued setting the most optimal boundaries of an 
argumentative procedure equipped with finding out what is in a child’s best interest.488 
Admitting that the above-mentioned principles serve the purpose of optimizing the accuracy 
of the decision-making procedure is not to say that such principles belong only within a 
traditional civil court-procedure. Applying rules of procedure known from civil procedures 
onto coercion cases will enable the leader, who is supposed to enforce these rules, to structure 
the procedure of argumentation to reach the predetermined aim of the child’s best interest. It 
has the potential of ensuring that each case is deliberated upon equally. Not only does the 
rules of procedure structure the flow of argumentation, and hence makes decision-making 
more lucid, it also implies that the procedure in one FBSS becomes more similar to the next, 
hence strengthening the principle of non-discrimination. 
7.4.2.ApproximatingtheChild’sBestInterest
As established in the former chapter, in order for the child’s best interest to become optimally 
approximated, it is a need to establish a procedure that can settle a conflict of claims on 
normative matters as accurate as possible. Since the principle of the child’s best interest is 
indeterminate, the problem to be solved is the matter of reaching a decision that reflects a 
qualified agreement upon what is the child’s best interest. In order to get there, arguments 
must be laid out, and consequently, the decision-making procedure must be designed as a 
deliberative forum that can incorporate an open exchange of arguments.  
 In the search for identifying the child’s best interest, which is a search for finding an 
answer to a practical problem, all arguments that make a claim upon what this entails must be 
aired and scrutinized. If not, valid arguments might be overlooked, or arguments that lead to 
the decision could be overrated. How, then, has the FBSS met such a challenge? 
Formalizing rules of procedure and making them operative within the bvl underlines 
their perceived importance in guiding the entire decision-making procedure. By doing so, a 
legal discourse was established that could abide by the purpose of the bvl. Once established, it 
was thought that the board was enabled to approximate the principle of the child’s best 
interest in a coherent fashion without discriminating between cases. This is the reason why 
the leader of the board needs to be a competent legal scholar, and why it is provided legal 
representatives for the parties to the procedures—namely to equip the procedure with 
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necessary legal components for coherent argumentation. The rules of procedure institute the 
principle of non-discrimination by establishing a stable structure of argumentation that the 
FBSS must relate to in each case. The rules of procedure embed a practical legal discourse 
into the overall design of the FBSS and instruct a judge to ensure that they become enforced. 
 Moreover, the rules of procedure must be able to ensure that, once the procedure has 
commenced, a case-proceeding move in the right direction, implying the direction of the 
child’s best interest of any child. In order to ensure that each case has a legitimate outcome, 
one that is upholds the order of expectations, it can be argued that enforcing structural design 
criteria such as this safeguards non-discrimination within the procedure and cash in on the 
promise of trust.  
7.4.3.ExpressingPrinciplesofFairTrial
The first paragraph of bvl §7-3 is allegedly the transformation of the fair-trial principle of 
ECHR Art. 6.1.489 ECHR Art. 6.1, which states the fair trial principle, is, therefore, also 
claimed to be incorporated into the legal order of child protection. Bvl §7-3 reads as follow:  
“The procedure of each case within the FBSS should be reassuring, fast and promote trust. It 
should be adjusted to the measure and the nature of the case, its size and degree of difficulty, and 
support the fundamental consideration of the Act.”490
The “fundamental consideration” that this paragraph refers to is the purpose of the bvl—
which is to protect the child’s prospective right to liberty and thereby the interests of the 
child.491 Furthermore, it is a clear reference to the CRC and human rights in the legislative 
history of §7-3, which underlines the post-national rights-based enforcement of the child’s 
own best interest. It is this fundamental consideration that must be upheld every time. In other 
words, a fair trial implies that the procedure must ensure each child’s best interest every time 
a decision is reached. Implicit to a fair trial principle that implies equal formal treatment of 
children, is the basic expectation of non-discrimination. 
By applying this ECHR’s fair trial-principle to the bvl and specifically to the design of 
the FBSS, it contributes to shift the design of the FBSS in direction of becoming a regular 
                                                 
489 Bvl §7-3 is primarily a copy-paste legislation first written as the rule of legislative purpose in tl §1. It is in the 
preparatory-works to the tl where the argument is laid out that stipulate that this is a Norwegian adaption of 
ECHR Art. 6.1. – see NOU 2001:32: 564ff and Ot.prp.nr.51 (2004-2005): 36ff. 
490 Bvl §7-3 first paragraph. This is my translation. The semi-official translation that the Ministry of Children, 
Equality and Social Inclusion is not satisfactory. Their translation use “tillitsskapende” as “confidence-inspiring” 
and “betryggende” as “satisfactory”. These translations are not good and convey a legal practice that is not 
Norwegian law.  
491 Ot.prp.nr.76 (2005-2006): 127.  
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trial-proceeding. Many of the rules of procedure also count in civil trials and bvl §7-3 is 
nearly a replica of §1-1 in tvisteloven (Civil Procedure Act– tl). A potential problem with 
replicating a fair-trial principle from tl is that the cases presented to a civil trial are very 
different from those cases that are presented to the FBSS. Furthermore, the implementation of 
§7-3 became accepted by parliament without any real arguments as to how they were to 
operate within the FBSS as opposed to a civil procedure. Consequently, the design stipulates 
that bvl §7-3 is supposed to be enforced as if it was a regular civil trial. This can be 
unfortunate. The main problem is that the FBSS is independently responsible for establishing 
a sound platform for reaching a decision, which implies that the parties to the procedure are 
not in control of case-proceeding. Furthermore, the decision of the FBSS should always be in 
the child’s best interest—and nothing else.492 These two points will be revisited later, but they 
serve to illustrate the difference between a regular court and the FBSS. 
It could be argued that this line of reasoning, namely to incorporate the fair trial-
principle into the bvl and the design of the FBSS, ensures that the bvl develops in the direction 
to be on par with modern standards of legal-protection through the use of the court-design and 
legal adjudication.493 This development, although helpful to strengthen the rights-protection 
for children, is an historical paradox. The discourse on child protection, since the late 1960s, 
has been about introducing a court-system or maintaining a democratic decision-making 
process. The introduction of the current design, and its most important amendments, has been 
dominated by Labor governments. Hence, the party that introduced the BVL of 1953, and that 
defends it all the way through the 1960s and until late 1980s, contributed to re-design the 
system of child protection by stealth into a decision-making procedure that is close to being a 
design of a regular civil court—something Labor governments have had historical reasons for 
opposing the court-design. This is, nevertheless, also a compromise in that it is neither a 
democratically appointed decision-making body nor a court—it is a special type of 
professional board with a court-like procedure including laymen. This can, provided how the 
fair trial-principle is embedded in the FBSS-design, currently be labeled a special court for 
children. 
This type of pseudo-court position, it can be argued, is needed to uphold both the basic 
expectation of the child’s best interest, which its normative complexity is not easily observed 
                                                 
492 Once a process of decision-making is initiated by the FBSS, the parties to the board have no longer the 
jurisdiction of the case-matter. This has been transferred to the board.  
493 Ot.prp.nr.76 (2005-2006): 127. 
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within a regular court, and non-discrimination, which is fundamental to a court. Ensuring that 
any coercion case meets a board that is supposed to have a coherent decision-making 
procedure, combined with the ability to draw upon a variety of competencies and reach 
independent decisions, bridge the two basic expectations within the design.  
Although this development points towards having a special court of law, the debate 
has never been raised whether or not it is actually desirable. Historically, the Labor party has 
fronted a democratic decision-making body and, without any explicit rationale or justification 
that explains the development, Labor has met the criticism raised towards the former BVN, 
and has incrementally introduced a type of design that is supposed to be comparable with the 
civil court-system. Although this is a Labor-paradox, it has nevertheless strengthen the 
likelihood of redeeming the promise of trust. Securing a coherent argumentative procedure is 
a way of securing both non-discrimination, and the best interest of the child.  
7.4.4.VariationsofClaimsandtheStabilityofProcedure
The caseload that meets the FBSS includes a wide range of care-types provided by parents. 
This implies also a variety of ways to cross the thresholds from non-detrimental care to 
detrimental care. In order to meet the challenge of such a caseload, the procedure of decision-
making must become stabilized in a manner that treats all these different cases in a non-
discriminatory manner. Although each case is potentially unique, or is supposed to be treated 
as such, the FBSS can be argued is equipped with rules of procedure, i.e. §7-3, that are able to 
accommodate pluralism by way of having a stable rule-driven procedure that could ensure 
non-discrimination. The basic expectation of non-discrimination, thus, can be seen as 
procedurally entrenched.494 Due to rules of procedure, the input to the procedure can vary, 
while the procedure remains stable.  
Even though there are no way of reaching valid decisions when the goal is 
indeterminate, a rule-driven procedure can ensure that decisions reach an agreement worthy of 
trust because it is the best answer to the practical problem that is to find out what is in the 
child’s best interest. Because of rules, an understanding can be built through a process of 
rational argumentation that all affected parties can accept mutually. Having formal rules of 
procedure that abides by the demand for rational justification is therefore a strength towards 
the ability of the legal discourse to shape legitimate decisions, i.e. be worthy of trust. The 
three most important rules embedded in the bvl, and that can ensure that a legitimate 
                                                 
494 Cf. CRC Art. 2.  
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agreement emerge through rational argumentation, are including the affected parties (bvl §7-
3-b), the principle of contradiction/adversarial principle (bvl §7-3-d) and the immediacy of 
evidence (bvl §7-3-a). These principles ensures that the procedure establish a platform from 
which a rationally justified decision can erupt. 
However, what do the rules of procedure entail? Contradiction, for instance, is an 
abstract legal denomination for confronting arguments with arguments. If the parties to the 
procedure are to understand each claim’s implication, they must also know what each claim 
means. How arguments are presented and how they are understood in an equal fashion 
therefore becomes imperative. If, for instance, parents do not understand the situation, they 
must be given adequate explanation in order for them to contradict arguments they disagree 
with or even know to be wrong. If they do not understand the counter-arguments, the board 
has a duty to provide an explanation so that contradiction can continue. Moreover, it is a duty 
of the legal representative presenting the counter-claim to talk to the parents without losing 
the accuracy and consistency that legal argumentation demands. Hence, by formally 
demanding that contradiction is to take place, the argumentative procedure can become 
thoroughly ventilated and a solid base from where to reach a decision in the child’s best 
interest can be established. 
7.4.5.RaisingClaimstoCorrectnessinaProcessofArgumentation
Each claim put forth by either parties to the procedure are normative claims upon what ought 
to be done to remedy the threat towards the child’s development and health. Each claim is, 
irrespective of what the intention of either of the parties is, a claim to correctness. In order to 
ensure that the arguments put forth in the meeting of negotiation can convince others, as well 
as to move the procedure in the direction of an agreement on what is in the child’s best 
interest, it has to be such a claim to correctness. In order to reach agreement when such claims 
are the input to the argumentative procedure, the argument must observe certain ideal rules of 
discourse. The basic rules of discourse proposed by Robert Alexy will suffice: 
1. No speaker may contradict him or herself. 
2. Every speaker may only assert what he or she actually believes. 
3. Every speaker who applies a predicate F to an object A must be prepared to apply F to 
every other object which is like A in all relevant respects. 
213 
 
4. Different speakers may not use the same expression with different meanings.495 
It can be argued that these abstract rules are implicitly operative within any legal discourse in 
search of rational acceptability of the outcome. Nevertheless, these rules describe the ideal 
speech situation, a situation that underlines both equality of participation and freedom to 
conduct argumentation without coercion or unfair asymmetries. By adhering to these rules, 
the parties to any legal procedure makes arguments that implicitly also constitute a claim to 
correctness, and each other claim to the procedure will contribute to unveil the ultimate claim 
to correctness. The latter is simply the denomination of the decision.  
Although the basic rules of discourse are ideal, they can become formalized into 
becoming enforceable rules of procedure that can assist in establishing decision-making that 
do not discriminate, which also means trustworthy agreement. Said differently, if rules are 
broken or not enforced, agreement is unattainable. Enforcing rules of discourse when the aim 
is the child’s best interest can lead to rational acceptability of the decision because the 
strengths of any argument have been allowed to be contested.496  
 By formally entrenching the principle of contradiction into the decision-making 
procedure of the FBSS, which imply a procedure of argumentation, decision-making will 
entail a specific type of justification. This type of justification is only accessible if there are 
no relevant arguments against the conclusion. The reason is that every argument can be heard 
and deemed as relevant or irrelevant. Moreover, everyone relevant has been given the 
opportunity to present their views, either as a party to the procedure or called in as a witness. 
This makes it more plausible for all relevant arguments to be asserted. Thorough contradiction 
implicitly upholds basic rules of discourse because the principle is set to remove any 
inconsistencies and wrongful or objectionable arguments, and ensure an exhaustive 
argumentation that establish a solid platform from where a decision can be based. The final 
and ultimate claim to correctness deserves agreement because it is the closest claim to the 
child’s best interest by an agreement among all those affected. 
 No legal representative of the parents, child or state parties could lay out arguments 
effectively if they contradicted themselves. Moreover, the representative must also be 
consistent in its argumentation. Also, in argumentation, the parties involved must reach 
common understanding of the presented facts and arguments. The latter is important for all 
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types of communication, and alludes to the attitude of the speaker. In sum, it can be argued 
that the formal legal boundaries of the FBSS are there to establish the rational exchange of 
arguments that observes rules of discourse, and which also will lead the participants within 
the procedure to move in concert towards an ultimate claim to correctness that is the decision 
in the child’s best interest. By having such design-traits, it helps to redeem the promise of 
trust.  
In designing the FBSS, it was stressed that, in order to reach a decision that is in a 
child’s best interest, the decision-making needs to be independent, allow for contradiction, 
include ethical, judicial and scientific representation and reach an expedient decision.497 Apart 
from the last factor relating to speed, which will be discussed later, the three former factors, 
independence, contradiction and representation, are all put forth as necessary components for 
establishing a qualifying discourse that will optimize the final decision.498 Hence, it has been 
a need to optimize the argumentative procedure and establish a rational justification of each 
decision. When announcing the decision, the FBSS is supposed to explain and justify how the 
decision is reached, thus rooting the decision in an argumentative process become upheld as 
essential.499 Regarding these design aspect of the FBSS, it optimizes the very essence of the 
goal of the basic expectation of the child’s best interest and non-discrimination. Every child in 
need of protection is to be acted upon according to decisions settled by a rule-driven 
argumentative procedure that solves the particular practical problem of finding the child’s 
best interest in an optimal fashion. It clearly contributes towards redeeming a promise of trust.  
7.4.6.RulesofProcedureEstablishaLegalProcedure
By establishing formal rules of procedure within the FBSS-design, it can become dubbed as a 
legal discourse that also must abide by rules of discourse, it can be argued that the FBSS 
draws upon the general human capacity to pragmatically solve practical problems through a 
process of argumentation. The justification of arguments that are presented in a rule-governed 
procedure, as the one governed by e.g. a principle of contradiction, are also implicitly 
“claiming that the justification is sound and the assertion therefore correct.”500 Each 
participant to the discourse is, therefore, presenting a claim to correctness.  
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498 Ot.prp.nr.76 (2006-2007). 
499 Bvl §7-3-f. Cf. NOU 2005:9: 79. 
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The goal of the FBSS is to reach a claim that can be rationally justifiable, rather as 
determined to be correct or valid. The goal is to make a decision that is agreed upon and that 
approximates the best interest of the child by acceptance, and without claiming the 
impossible, namely that the best interest of the child has become determined. Such a legal 
discourse, having to do with something indeterminate, has such a rule of approximation built 
into it in the sense that it has the ability to approximate the best interest of the child and reach 
rational acceptability.  
Due to the indeterminacy of the principle of the child’s best interest, it is no need for a 
procedure that does anything else than to raise claims to correctness and work steadily 
towards agreement on an ultimate claim to correctness that everyone involved can accept. 
Having different claims to correctness as the input to the process of decision-making in the 
FBSS simply translates to being one claim on what ought to be done with the child at hand. 
Each claim put forth must be held to be valid by the person who represents it. If that person’s 
claim is deemed as wrong by others, the opposing argument must gain the necessary 
acceptance to either adjust the other claim, or falsify it altogether. 
In order to present an argument claiming to be correct during a proceeding, those 
included into the procedure must know what reasons are permissible as claims to such an end. 
For instance, the child’s best interest is a primary consideration for every argument. 
Consequently, all those involved must have some sense of why their argument is in the child’s 
best interest in relation to other arguments during argumentation. Arguments can thereby be 
used to reinforce one side’s claim or stipulate the reasons for it being more legitimate than 
that of others. This means also that either party must not only put forth claims, but also have a 
rational commitment to the rightness of the claim in the potential opposition of others. Having 
this dynamics built into the principle of contradiction, it enables the FBSS to reach decisions 
that approximate the child’s best interest without discriminating between cases. On this 
design trait, we can argue that the promise of trust is redeemed.  
7.4.7.ACivilCourtforChildren?
There are many aspects of the decision-making process that makes it a suspect of being a civil 
trial in disguise. The leader is a judge and the main principles of procedure are replicated from 
the Civil Procedure Act. At first glance, it is in fact very little that suggests that this is not a 
type of civil court. The development from being a board-procedure towards becoming a court 
of law specified to the needs in child protection cases has been incremental. In fact, from 
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NOU 1985:17 to Ot.prp.nr.76 (2006-2007), it has been referred to as a court and not only a 
court-like procedure.501 The background report for Ot.prp.nr.76 (2006-2007) even advocated 
for going further in establishing the FBSS to be on par with a civil court.502 However, there 
are two important differences between FBSS and a regular civil court, which is relevant to 
discuss with reference to the promise of trust.  
The first difference between a civil court and the FBSS is that the members of the 
board are always going to reach a decision that is in the child’s best interest. The civil court 
does not have an equivalent to such a principle. In order for the FBSS to uphold such a 
principle, the parties to the procedure cannot, as already mentioned, have the case-matter at 
their disposal. None of the parties to the procedure ‘own’ the right answer to such a question; 
it needs to be deliberated upon, argued for, and it is acknowledged that the child’s best 
interest can only be reached after all relevant arguments have been heard. Hence, the board 
has full control of the decision-making procedure.  
The second important difference is that the decision-making within the FBSS is meant 
to be independent.503 This is broadly held to be an important precondition for establishing a 
legitimate and fair trial in child protection. First, it means that any decision made within the 
FBSS is supposed to be a result of the procedure of negotiation and the deliberation among 
the board members within the FBSS alone. Secondly, it implies that the board itself should be 
capable of reaching decisions that are in the child’s best interest by themselves. Although the 
latter is a strict demand towards decision-making, lending decisive weight upon an expert 
witness, for instance, will make the FBSS dependent upon that witness when it performs 
decision-making. Hence, the board must consist of professionals capable of making informed 
decisions. Since the FBSS have professional representatives, this problem is sought solved. If 
the board was not independent, it would be incapable of approximating the child’s best 
interest because the board would simply not know if the arguments put forth were valid.  
 If the FBSS is to perform decision-making worthy of trust, it must have a permanent 
delegated authority that blocks anyone from instructing or interfering with it. This means that 
changes or instructions to the procedure can only be introduced by the entity that established 
the authority to coerce in the first place, namely parliament. This type of independency is the 
                                                 
501 For instance: NOU 1985:17: 23ff, Ot.prp.nr. 76 (2006-2007): 12. 
502 See Ot.prp.nr. 76 (2006-2007):69-74. One reason for having such a focus and viewing such a development is 
that the members of the panel that were responsible for NOU 2005:9 were all, except one, of the jurist 
profession. 
503 Bvl §7-3-e and the ECHR Art 6-1, first sentence.  
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case for the FBSS—nobody can instruct the FBSS on how to perform decision-making. As 
such, the board is equally independent as the courts. This does not make it a court. The FBSS 
is still not a part of the court-system, but a part of public administration of child protection. 
However, the FBSS secures the principle of non-discrimination by embedding important 
design-principles known from the court system into its own design. We can argue that being 
parasitic upon important court-principles have made the design more capable of complying 
with basic expectations. 
7.4.8.Conclusion
By having rules of procedure, it can be argued that the FBSS, although with some 
shortcomings, has been capable of optimizing the procedure for reaching a decision in the 
child’s best interest. This clearly helps to redeem a promise of trust. By formally introducing 
an argumentative procedure, the parties to the procedure are given the right to put forth their 
claims.504 Although the ultimate claim to correctness is settled by the board itself, the 
argumentative procedure, borrowed from the civil court system, ensures that all the parties to 
the procedure can affect the outcome and thus inform the decision-making. It makes the 
decision more solid, and more likely to reach rational acceptability.  
7.5.TheProcessofNegotiation
The main goal of the design of the FBSS is to lead the decision-making process up to an 
argumentative procedure that has been dubbed forhandlingsmøte (meeting of negotiation). 
The design of the FBSS stipulates that once the petition has been submitted by the local Child 
Welfare Office, the wheels are set in motion towards this meeting.505 The foundation for 
making the final decision is molded during these negotiations, and the solidity of the 
decisions is depending upon the arguments presented here.506 This is where the FBSS can 
receive a coup de grace or not with regard to the promise of trust. This is the reason why this 
is the final part of the discussion of the FBSS and whether it redeems the promise of trust or 
not.  
                                                 
504 Bvl §7-3-c. 
505 There are two exceptions to this case. First, when the parties to the procedure accept it and the judge finds it 
acceptable, then a meeting of negotiation does not need to be arranged. Second, when a prior decision needs to 
be altered and it is acceptable to not have a meeting of negotiation, cf. bvl §7-14. However, for all intents and 
purposes, the central node of decision-making in the FBSS is the meeting of negotiation. 
506 Ot.prp.nr. 76 (2007-2008):79: “In practice, the reasons applied when making a decision, in cases that is 
decided by a meeting of negotiation, is settled in this meeting.” 
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7.5.1.CourtǦRoomDiscretion
So far, we have seen that there are problems with how the board is convened and how parties 
to the procedure are included and treated. This means that the preparation for the negotiating 
procedure and its framework have partly substantial shortcomings that threaten the promise of 
trust. Now, the focus will be predominantly upon what is not entrenched in the bvl, but rather 
left open as the area where FBSS is free to reach decisions—namely its delegated authority. 
The framework of the decision-making procedure that has already been illuminated can be 
referred to as a “surrounding belt of restrictions,” where the negative void in the middle of the 
belt is the area left open for free exercise of the authority of the FBSS to protect children. This 
is the discretion that the FBSS is authorized to act upon.507 It is what happens in the meeting 
of negotiation that constitutes the main input to this authority.  
It can be argued that a general practical discourse has become inserted into a legal 
design whereby it is provided with practical restrictions that focus the decision-making to 
reach its predetermined aim.508 The child’s best interest is this aim, and an argumentative 
procedure is thought best equipped to reach such an aim. This corresponds with the demands 
set upon how you reach decisions upon indeterminate issues that constitute practical 
problems, i.e. the child’s best interest. Establishing such an argumentative procedure cash in 
on the promise of trust.  
The legally established constraints make the decision-making procedure into a legal 
discourse. As argued in the former chapter, the “need for legal discourse arises out of the 
weaknesses of the rules and forms of general practical discourse.”509 By establishing a legal 
discourse, a decision can be reached that maintain the quality of rational acceptability without 
claiming to determine what is indeterminable. This is particularly important when the goal is 
to decide on the child’s best interest, which is indeterminate. The belt of restrictions is a 
pragmatic tool to guide the procedure towards making a practical decision.
“Law must once again be applied to itself in the form of organizational norms, not just to create 
official powers of adjudication but to set up legal discourses as components of court-room 
proceedings. Rules of court procedure institutionalize judicial decision-making in such a way that 
the judgment and its justification can be considered the outcome of an argumentation game 
governed by a special program. Once again, legal procedures intertwine with processes of 
                                                 
507 Here, I use “discretion” differently than what is intended by Dworkin (1977): 31. However, I do believe his 
concept of discretion can be applied also to the context prescribed here. See also Goodin (1986): 233.  
508 This is similar to the third interpretation of the special-case thesis (die sonderfallthese) of Robert Alexy 
(1989), dubbed as the integration thesis.  
509 Alexy (1989): 287. 
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argumentation, and in such a way that the court procedures instituting legal discourses must not 
interfere with the logic of argumentation internal to such discourses.”510
On this note, it can be argued that the stability that a decision-making body adhering to formal 
rules of procedure provides, is a precondition for reaching decisions upholding the basic 
expectation of non-discrimination. Whereas the limitation of a legal procedure forces through 
a decision that can uphold rational acceptability in that all those included into the discourse 
can accept that the decision is the most optimal one in the child’s best interest.  
The meeting of negotiation is a denomination borrowed to the bvl from the court of 
civil procedure. It is entrenched in bvl §7-15 and reads as follows:  
“The leader of the board directs the negotiation and ensures that it proceeds according to the 
framework that is set. Furthermore, the Civil Procedure Act §9-15, applies correspondingly as far 
as it is compatible.” 
This means that principles underpinning a civil trial are to be applied “as far as compatible,” 
whereby the most important principle is that of contradiction, which is the legal doctrine of 
audi alterem partem, and implies hearing both sides of a case.  
With respect to child protection and the design of the FBSS, the core process has been 
dubbed as a meeting of negotiation all the way back to NOU 1985:18.511 However, referring 
to it as a negotiation without substantiating what is implied can cloud the very purpose of the 
bvl. If the word “negotiation” is not elaborated upon as an argumentative procedure, which is 
what has been intended according to legislative history, and, furthermore applied to child 
protection specifically it can lead to interpretations that are unfounded. It is, for instance, not a 
matter of negotiating between parties, such as the parents and the child, or the parents and the 
Child Welfare Office. The parties to the procedure have lost their right to control the 
outcome, and the board can question anything they believe to be relevant. Hence, the term 
“negotiation” is not accurate. It is rather a matter of internal deliberation within the board, 
based upon what is presented in the meeting of negotiation by way of contradiction between 
the parties to the procedure.  
Although this is not something that actually threatens the decision-making procedure, 
the difference between a regular civil court and the FBSS is important to stress. The FBSS 
does not negotiate with or between the parties that are involved. The FBSS, i.e. the board 
alone, reach decisions independently from the parties on what action to take. Hence, the FBSS 
                                                 
510 Habermas (1998a): 234-235. 
511 NOU 1985:18: 357.  
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can be said to have the potential of reaching the best type of answer available each time—the 
final decision is thereby an ultimate claim to correctness.512 Treating the practical problem of 
finding out what is in a child’s best interest in such a manner is a very important contender in 
complying with basic expectations.  
7.5.2.BuildingaSolidFoundationforDecisionǦMaking
Claiming to make decisions that are supposed to adhere to a principle of a child’s best interest 
in a non-discriminatory fashion is equivalent to raising a claim to correctness. This means that 
it is “reflective of the impartiality norm of general practical reason.”513 A claim to correctness 
presuppose that members to the legal discourse are capable of, and argue to justify what is in 
a child’s best interest according to the ‘impartiality norm’ implicit to the rules of discourse. 
This means also that the members of the discourse must be capable of practical reasoning 
with respect to finding out what is in a child’s best interest. They must be prepared to be 
challenged, and potentially proven wrong. This means that any claim that has been put forth 
must be argued as being correct, valid, or just, by the person who carries it. This is made 
possible through the establishment of the meeting of negotiation.  
 If a claim has weaknesses or is deemed to be wrong, the negotiation process of the 
FBSS has the design capability to ensure deliberative quality that can argue that a claim is not 
a claim to correctness. Weaknesses or arguments that are plainly wrong can become corrected 
through counter-arguments. In this process the ultimate claim to correctness, the final 
decision, carry the impartiality norm that stipulates the correct action in universal terms. 
Everyone involved can accept the argument made because of the rational acceptability of the 
decision. The final decision becomes the right course of action in each case, even if the aim of 
protection, viz. the child’s best interest, is indeterminate.  
 The ultimate claim to correctness, which is reflected by the final decision, is not 
qualified unless every type of relevant argument has been aired. Hence, since all who have 
relevant arguments can be included into the FBSS and provide their claims, either as parties to 
the procedure or as witnesses, the FBSS has the ability to perform an exhaustive 
argumentative process. Each participant believes the claim constitutes a claim to correctness, 
but a claim is not qualified as a decision that is ultimately a claim to correctness. The ultimate 
claim to correctness can only be qualified through a process of argumentation. This process, 
                                                 
512 Alexy (1989): 219-220. 
513 Eriksen (2004): 118 
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enabled by the meeting of negotiation, makes it possible for decision-making to rest on a solid 
foundation. 
It is the task of the leader, or mediator, which is the jurist of the board, to ensure that 
no relevant question is unanswered, and must ensure that the board-members provide every 
claim put forth with exhaustive scrutiny. Embedded in the design of the FBSS, the leader 
enforces the pragmatic conditions of rational discourse to ensure that the compelling force of 
the better argument is continuously in the child’s best interest.514 By institutionalizing the 
possibility of achieving a rational outcome for each child in a non-discriminatory manner, 
both of the basic expectations are upheld during the meeting of negotiation.  
It can be argued that what redeems the promise of trust the most during decision-
making is that the design is meant to be an argumentative procedure. The FBSS borrows 
principles of a legal discourse, combining it with being independent and professionalized. 
This means that a decision can reach rational acceptability, where all affected parties are able 
to accept the decision based on what they themselves believe to be valid reasons.515 
By embedding an argumentative procedure that upholds rules of discourse into the 
institutional design of the FBSS, decision-making can become capable of establishing an 
ultimate claim to correctness. All parties can become able to accept the outcome. It is the 
rational acceptability that the procedural design establish that can accommodate both the 
indeterminate principle of the particular child’s best interest coincidentally with maintaining 
the principle of non-discrimination. Reaching decisions in the best interest of the child is a 
practical moral problem that is indeterminate, and is best accommodated as an object of 
argumentation. By having an argumentative process that can be claimed to be exhaustive, 
independent and neutral, the child’s situation can be given the chance to be investigated in an 
exhaustive fashion. This increases the probability for reaching a decision that is best qualified 
to be in the best interest of the child, and thereby contribute in redeeming a promise of trust. 
7.5.3.EnforcingthePurposeofthebvl
The FBSS must uphold the legislative purpose of bvl §1, and find out if the child’s 
development or health is threatened to the extent that coercion must be applied to protect it. 
The decision is, irrespective of the parties to the board, to be in the child’s best interest.516 
                                                 
514 Habermas (1998a): 166. See also Elster (1998). 
515 Habermas (1998a): 103.  
516 This function of independency is stated among other places in bvl §7-3-e. 
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 So far, the main characteristics of the board have been discussed, i.e. who sits in the 
board, who participates and what the main rules of procedure consists of. These elements 
constitute the framework for the negotiations. According to bvl §7-15, the leader of the board 
must ensure that the meeting of negotiation proceed according to this framework. Now, the 
discussion will focus on this role and what the denomination “according to framework” 
entails with respect to basic expectations. The principle of the child’s best interest and non-
discrimination will be discussed according to the design principles launched at the end of the 
previous chapter that could incorporate both of the basic expectations through rational 
argumentation.  
1. The problem required practical reason. 
2. The problem included affected parties. 
3. There must be a competent mediator. 
4. Equal possibilities among participants. 
It can be argued that all of these demands are upheld by the design of the FBSS. Effectively, 
this means that, with respect to the meeting of negotiation, it encompasses both rational 
argumentation and decision-making.  
͹ǤͷǤ͵ǤͳǤ
As stated earlier, the location of the board, the composition of the board, and the parties to the 
procedure all have certain shortcomings with regard to redeeming the promise of trust. 
Nonetheless, the intention behind the design—reaching decisions on matters that are 
normatively complex and that involve a multitude of legitimate claims—must be 
appreciated.517 The idea was, and still is, to have a decision-making body with the ability to 
solve a practical problem in a way that is in the best interest of the child. Nobody knows or 
owns the right answer, and it is no solid way out of such a predicament due to the 
indeterminacy of the child’s best interest. As long as this is a basic expectation, it can be 
argued that nobody in isolation can know with any certainty the right course of action or what 
the right decision is. Hence, the solution must become qualified through argumentation as the 
indeterminacy of the problem has a built in need for practical reason. The design of the FBSS 
is equipped with a procedure that has the ability to solve practical problems.  
                                                 
517 NOU 1985:18.  
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An initial demand towards finding a solution to such a problem is that the FBSS must 
put forth an expedient solution. This means that a solution must be presented since there is a 
claim that the child is in detrimental care. A quick response time is a condition for upholding 
the child’s best interest. The opposite would be to admit that it is acceptable for children to 
remain in care that threatens to harm its development or have already harmed its development. 
By subjecting the decision-making to a judicial procedure, which is what the FBSS is doing, a 
decision can be reached fast.518 Hence, having the potential of reaching a decision fast can 
also help to secure what is in the child’s best interest.  
The FBSS makes decisions involving the need for a justification that rests within the 
argumentative input of the procedure and nothing else.519 The correctness of the decision is 
therefore confined to the options available to the FBSS in each case. Hence, it is a need to 
base the decision in the arguments presented in each case. Only by accepting arguments that 
abide by rules of discourse, and which has the child’s best interest as a regulative ideal can the 
child’s best interest be approximated optimally in each case. This, it can be argued, has 
become accommodated by the FBSS-design’s incorporation of a legal discourse, and helps 
redeem the promise of trust. The legitimacy of the ultimate claim to correctness, the decision, 
depends upon upholding the formal rules of procedure that underpin the meeting of 
negotiation as well as rules of discourse, and establishes an intersubjective standard of 
decision-making that safeguards non-discrimination between cases.  
A legal discourse is in need of adhering to certain formal rules of procedure that 
control the exchange of arguments. This is what separates it the most from a general practical 
discourse that does not have formal rules of procedure. These rules can for instance be the 
immediacy of evidence and contradiction. Without formal rules of procedure, it would not 
become a legal procedure per se. It is not enough to appeal to a type of legal culture that is 
allegedly self-enforcing. This was the case in 1992 when the bvl was introduced. If rules of 
procedure are not formalized, variations could occur that would not become visible to those 
affected by the process. This would, again, present a clear threat towards the basic expectation 
of non-discrimination. Hence, as the rules of procedure became explicitly formalized in the 
bvl from 2008, the procedure became also more stable.  
                                                 
518 There are many places where time is stressed as an essential component. See e.g. Ot.prp.nr.76 (2005-2006), 
Ot.prp.nr.29 (1990-1991). 
519 Cf. bvl §7-3 e, f and §7-14. 
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 In the present case, a solid platform that optimizes decision-making has become 
established through an argumentative procedure that can qualify rational acceptability 
regarding the child’s best interest. It is the combination of strengths of a general practical 
discourse to deal with practical problems—namely that its rules of discourse can become 
enforced in a manner that makes argumentation fair, and within a legal framework provided 
by the formal rules of procedure which ensures that decisions are made. In this way 
arguments become charged with relevant and exhaustive criticism from all necessary angles. 
Integrating the rules of discourse into a legal framework helps to deal with the practical 
problem in a relevant and timely manner, leading to a decision-making process that does not 
discriminate even though the input to the procedures vary.  
͹ǤͷǤ͵ǤʹǤ
Along each petition to the FBSS, there are claims put forth by the parties to the procedure.520 
The local Child Welfare Office raise what can be dubbed as a claim to correctness, and the 
private parties have a deadline of ten days to submit a counter-claim. Hence, once 
deliberations has commenced during the meeting of negotiation, there are two or three main 
claims that have been raised. These are the central claims of those who are directly affected 
by the decision: The local Child Welfare Office, the parents and perhaps also the child. Other 
claims that will inform the discussion come from either the board or different types of 
witnesses. 
 The local Child welfare office enforces child welfare and child protection operatively 
on street-level. They are the ones the FBSS is dependent upon to seek out children subjected 
to detrimental care.521 The casework within the FBSS is dependent upon the child welfare 
office finding every child subjected to detrimental care and put forth a claim on behalf of the 
child. Thus, the local Child Welfare Office represents and implements the will of the law, and 
become the last link in the democratic chain of command as street-level bureaucrats in child 
protection.522 When they put forth a claim, they take on the role as a pseudo-parent and raise a 
claim on behalf of the public with respect to what constitutes detrimental care.  
The other claims that are made initially come from the private parties—they are 
supposed to respond to the claim made by the local Child Welfare Office. These claims 
                                                 
520 Bvl §7-11. 
521 I will not focus upon how they do this job, or if this job is done well. I only discuss what they represent in 
relation to the FBSS.  
522 Lipsky (1980). 
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constitute individual claims, including the child’s own, upon the correct care of the child, i.e. 
on what they argue is in the child’s best interest. The child and the parents must be able to put 
forth counter-claims and justify them, and advocate for the type of care being provided.  
 In addition to these main claims to correctness, the parties themselves can front other 
types of affected parties as evidence into the procedure. This type of evidence, although most 
likely backing the claims that are put forth by the party who presented them as evidence, is 
only considered if they have relevant arguments that can support, dismiss or come up with 
claims upon what would be the child’s best interest. These can e.g. be psychologists, medical 
practitioners, as well as extended family. If the parties to the procedure fail to present a 
sufficient amount of evidence to the procedure, the FBSS itself can introduce it. In this sense, 
the child’s best interest serves as the focal point for arguments, and any argument that can 
make the foundation for a decision more solid, can become introduced. This focus upon the 
child’s best interest, in the combination with the process of argumentation, qualifies the 
outcome with respect to rational acceptability. All of the affected can argue their case, and an 
outcome can be reached that accommodate all arguments, dismissing those that are wrong and 
granting emphasis upon those arguments that are deemed as important or correct. This 
potential for reaching rational acceptability upon what is in a child’s best interest clearly cash 
in on the promise of trust.  
Finally, the board itself can call upon others as witnesses or evidence, as well as 
appoint a spokesperson for the child. It is no restriction upon whom the FBSS can call upon 
and, consequently, all relevant arguments can become heard.523 The leader of the board can 
formally call upon expert witnesses and also decide how the submission of evidence precedes. 
The spokesperson for the child will attempt to produce the voice of the child by claiming what 
the child’s point of view might be.524 The abilities of the FBSS and its leader to perform ad
hoc adjustments to the procedure in order to establish a solid platform for the decision is not 
restricted in any way. Hence, the procedure within the FBSS can involve all affected parties 
in order to establish what is in a child’s best interest.  
͹ǤͷǤ͵Ǥ͵Ǥ
In order for the rules of procedure to be upheld, it must be a mediator that ensures that the 
procedure observes the principles underpinning a legal discourse. The rules of discourse have 
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become formalized in the main principles of procedure and, consequently, must be enforced 
by a mediator. Moreover, the mediator is supposed to be neutral to the goal of the decision-
making. The FBSS has two such mediators. 
 The first is the leader itself, who is, as already pointed out, authorized to decide on 
what board to convene and secure that the rules of procedure are upheld. The second role is 
played out by the entire board itself. The board is the main mediator in the sense that all 
parties to the procedure must argue their case in front of it. The board constitutes a 
professional and a layman component that can understand and take in all potential arguments 
presented to them, and mediate in order to find the ultimate claim to correctness.  
 Although the idea behind the design was to perform decision-making in the child’s 
best interest in an independent manner, the type and consistency of professional 
representatives and the idea of laymen as members of the board can easily contest the 
attainability of the purpose of the FBSS. A further demand towards the mediator is that he or 
she must be qualified with the ability to differentiate between the interests that different 
children can have. The interests of the particular child must become localized within the 
process of negotiation. The motivation behind the design was to establish a board that could 
mediate in a sea of arguments in order to make a solid decision regarding the particular child. 
The idea behind such a design-characteristic, namely to ensure that the board could be 
independent, complies with the order of expectations, but the way it is sought obtained have 
certain drawbacks with respect to non-discrimination and therefore also the child’s best 
interest. These drawbacks were laid out above.  
There is no knowledge-base, and no legal precedence that can help to overcome the 
predicament of finding a particular child’s best interest due to indeterminacy. The need for a 
mediator is a need for ensuring that the procedure of argumentation abides by rules of 
discourse within a legal discourse.525 Establishing a legal discourse that observes principles of 
general practical discourse and formal rules of procedure means to ensure that a process of 
negotiation approximates the best interest of the child exhaustively and in a non-
discriminatory fashion.  
 During the BVL regime, with the design of the decision-making board at the 
introduction in 1953, the BVN was neither neutral nor a mediator of arguments. The BVN 
was to perform decision-making that was not neutral, conducted by members appointed by the 
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local council by their reputation on knowing what to do regarding children. The members 
were local trustees that had an interest in the welfare of children and their families. This 
decision-making body was meant not to be a neutral mediator in the dual sense of the 
FBSS.526 Introducing a jurist into a democratically appointed BVN assembly was not 
sufficient to establish a solid foundation for making a decision. The effort to establish a 
neutral mediator within the FBSS answered much of the criticism towards the former BVN, 
and contributed in making the legal order comply with the order of expectations.  
The neutral mediator is supposed to lead the process of argumentation and ensure that 
every type of relevant argument is presented in a manner that can aid raising a final and 
ultimate claim to correctness. This ultimate claim is forged through an agreement within the 
board itself, and has the standard of rational acceptability for all. The lack of neutrality in the 
BVL was one of the main reasons for elevating decision-making of the FBSS up onto a 
regional level, as well as having members that were not appointed by the local municipality 
council. Consequently, it can be argued that the FBSS is an attempt at establishing a neutral 
ground to decide upon what is in the child’s best interest, which consequently becomes 
neutral for all those affected by the FBSS.  
͹ǤͷǤ͵ǤͶǤ
Within a process of argumentation, it is vital that all parties involved are on an equal footing. 
As such, arguments presented in an open procedure are deemed to be the only way to 
influence the decision-making in a legitimate manner. This is also what happens in the 
meeting of negotiation. If different parties can use illegitimate pressure, such as coercion or 
propaganda, it would distort the ability to reach decisions abiding the demand for rational 
justification and thorough contradiction demanded by bvl §7-3. The demand towards 
equalizing the ability to put forth arguments has been met by making both parties be 
represented by lawyers. This effort integrated a principle of non-discrimination between and 
within cases by ridding the procedure of illegitimate asymmetries, and coincidentally made 
the process of argumentation more coherent by leaning towards regular court-room 
adjudication. 
By making the form of argumentation become courtroom adjudication, the leader of 
the board, who is a jurist, would interact with other legal professionals that know what rules 
to follow during argumentation. Since the procedure is driven forth as a legal discourse, and 
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where lawyers argue their cases, the leader of the board ensures that rules are followed. This 
is equalizing the possibilities of the parties to influence the case. This is clearly a strength 
with regard to the principle of non-discrimination and contribute in establishing a solid 
foundation for the ultimate claim upon what is the best interest of the child.  
 None of the two earlier legal codes had any safeguards against public bias, thus the 
public became often criticized for unqualified use of coercion. It threatened the legal 
protection of those involved. None of the former designs had the public claim to be on par 
with the private. It was not demanded in either of the two former legal codes that the public 
claim could become contested and justified through argumentative procedures. Obviously, the 
parents could state their claims in both of the two prior decision-making bodies, but it was no 
obligation to discuss and provide reasons against their claims.  
 The FBSS is a decision-making body that is not supposed to be influenced in the same 
manner as the two former decision-making bodies. The FBSS can establish a neutral and solid 
ground for decision-making, and reach decisions that uphold the standard of rational 
acceptability. The latter, i.e. rational acceptability, was not possible to establish given the two 
former decision-making bodies. Whoever put forth a claim will become measured on the 
claim itself, and nothing else. However, some challenges are confronting the FBSS. The 
problem can, for instance, arise if the public have an ability to prepare arguments better than 
the private party, provided that the private party have very little time, as well as having 
substantially more experience with case-proceedings. Such discrepancies could violate the 
principle of non-discrimination since some members of the argumentative process would not 
become able to put forth their case convincingly or exhaustively. However, with regard to 
coercion and propaganda, the leader of the board has a duty to eliminate its potential to 
influence the case.  
 The conclusion to these four design-principles, the need to incorporate practical 
reason, the inclusion of those affected, the competent mediator and equality of possibility, is 
that it can be argued that the FBSS carries design characteristics of a legal discourse. It makes 
it possible for the decision to be guided by rational argumentation towards decision-making. 
The design of the FBSS, when it comes to both rules of procedure and the meeting of 
negotiation, is resting upon many important design-principles that contribute in qualifying 
decisions in the child’s best interest. Although some of the other design-traits mentioned 
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earlier in this chapter collide with the promise of trust, the rules of procedure and the process 
of negotiation are both contributing strongly to cash in on the promise of trust.527 
7.5.4.ToSumUpthePostǦNationalTurn
During the two prior legal codes, the LBFB and the BVL, the order of expectations expressed 
the contemporary respective basic expectations that were, at the time, what induced 
trustworthy authorized coercion. During the third legal code, the bvl, it is again different, as 
the current order of expectations can be described as rights-based and post-national.  
 Trustworthy practice must treat each child in a non-discriminatory fashion and thus 
transgress the design of the former nation-based and community-based legal code of the BVL. 
The first step that the bvl took was to establish a decision-making procedure that no longer 
was to discriminate between children in the way that the BVL did, and secondly it needed to 
treat each child in their individuality and not as part of the family. These reform-efforts made 
the bvl, in 1992, into a rights-based protection in the sense that the child’s individuality was 
the object of protection. In due time, the order of expectations pushed the legal order further. 
The order of expectations went from merely rights-based to also become post-national in the 
sense that protection of children needed a legal order respecting universal rights-based 
standards with a cosmopolitan imprint in order to become worthy of trust. To a large extent, 
the legal order has conformed to this order of expectations—especially with regard to the 
rules of procedure and the meeting of negotiation.  
Within the current legal order, it can be argued that the order of expectations is 
complied with through the establishment of a decision-making procedure that is 
argumentative, where arguments construct a solid foundation for decision-making that is in a 
child’s best interest in a non-discriminatory fashion. Although there are elements that do not 
cash in on the promise of trust, the design of the FBSS nevertheless have these strong 
contenders that comply with tht order of expectations.  
͹ǤͷǤͶǤͳǤ
By dubbing the FBSS into an argumentative and deliberative decision-making body, as e.g. 
Erik Oddvar Eriksen and Marit Skivenes have done, it is implied that the FBSS adheres to 
traits of an argumentative process.528 Adhering to rules of discourse and formal rules of 
procedure establish the potential of resolving conflicting claims through argumentation. 
                                                 
527 For a similar argument see Eriksen & Skivenes (1998).  
528 Eriksen and Skivenes (1997). 
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Hence, their claim is that the FBSS adheres to a procedural conception of legitimacy. It can 
now be confirmed that this conception of legitimacy is also what is found worthy of trust. The 
FBSS is enabled through procedural constraints to normatively justify an ultimate claim that 
is in the child’s best interest. 
Since the FBSS subscribes to certain rules and principles of discourse that can 
accommodate any type of claim in child protection, the FBSS has incorporated the fact of 
reasonable pluralism.529 Interests can thereby be discussed exhaustively, and it can be argued 
that the child protection system, through its historical development, has come to a point where 
it incorporates current basic expectations fairly well. The FBSS is a decision-making body 
that can confront any type of conflict of claims emanating from the social realm it is set to 
govern. The fact that Norwegian society is characterized by social conflicts and profound 
ethical disagreements regarding the conception of what is a child’s best interest is a challenge 
that the FBSS can answer.  
The rule-driven procedure that encapsulates the deliberations within the meeting of 
negotiation is a hallmark of the FBSS. It depicts a manner in which justifications can only be 
provided for decisions that adhere to a process of argumentation alluding to rational 
acceptability among all affected parties. Hence, the imprint of rationality onto decision-
making is determined by the decision-making procedure upholding the formal constraints 
provided by rules of procedure. The leader plays an imperative role in enforcing such rules.  
 Within the FBSS-design, any argument put forth must be backed up by reasons that 
are acceptable, and all types of arguments and counter-arguments that are relevant for the case 
is supposed to be asserted. Reasons for these arguments can only become accepted by others 
if they understand reasons equally. Hence, it can be argued that the rules of discourse 
mentioned in the former chapter have been incorporated. To illustrate: A medical practitioner 
should, when confronted, be able to explain why he or she is of a certain opinion without 
resorting to purely esoteric and exclusive argumentation. Such arguments, when 
communicated to the board, must express esoteric knowledge through language that is 
comprehendible to all. Only then, can all parties to the procedure relate to it, respond and 
accept it. In this sense, the rules of procedure set restraints on the arguments and reasons that 
can be given. Reasons that are provided must claim to be and prove to be intersubjectively 
acceptable within the particular legal discourse, i.e. ensure the demand for an argument to 
                                                 
529 See also Eriksen (2001). 
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carry an inherent claim to correctness. If a claim did not abide by standards that were 
intersubjectively valid, it would not be shared by all affected parties and thus lacks the 
necessary legitimacy needed for this type of decision-making to reach a level of rational 
acceptability. However, the leader of the FBSS have the capability to ensure that claims 
abides by such standards, and that consequently can craft decisions that are rationally 
acceptable.  
Within the principle of contradiction is also a right for, where possible, 
comprehension.530 This means that no decisions are made before a case is exhaustively 
investigated and made comprehensible to all affected parties, so that potential counterclaims 
can be asserted.531 This can be ensured by the leader and help build a solid platform where a 
decision can reach rational acceptability. The goal is to provide each case an exhaustive 
contradictory treatment, and hence an illumination of all aspects concerning each case, and as 
already argued, this aim is embedded as a potential within the design of the FBSS. 
͹ǤͷǤͶǤʹǤ
The major difference between a regular civil proceeding and the one within the FBSS is that 
any decision made should be in the interest of the third party, namely the child. It should not 
only be in his or her interest, but also the best interest.532 It is the fate of a third party, the 
child, that is the focus of attention, which is not the case in a regular civil court procedure. If 
the rights of the parents are revoked, the FBSS must implement protective measures that 
would reestablish the healthy development of the child.533 
 As a professional decision-making body, the FBSS is adaptive or capable of becoming 
adapted to everything that can inform the case at hand. What can be argued as being best 
practice among lawyers, social workers, medical practitioners, psychologists etc. can all be 
incorporated to influence the case, as long as their arguments are relevant to the procedure. 
Those who provide arguments for any claim will be held accountable in the process of 
deliberation. This security is an integrated part of the design of the FBSS.  
                                                 
530 The principle of contradiction is usually referred to as hearing both sides of a case. However, it follows that if 
it is a point in being heard, it is due to a relevant argument. Moreover, a relevant argument can only be made if 
all aspects of any given case are made comprehensible.  
531 Bvl §7-3-c refer to tl §11-1-3 first paragraph. However, more importantly, bvl.§7-3 is, in many respects, the 
same as the formulation of the purpose of the Civil Procedure Act  (tvml. §1). These specifications came with the 
amendment of Ot.prp.nr.76 (2005-2006): 127, and were a direct influence from how the principle of 
contradiction is utterly significant for civil proceedings (tvml.), see NOU 2005:9: 38, or see the proposition that 
amended the Civil Procedure Act, Ot.prp.nr.51 (2004-2005). 
532 Bvl §4-1. 
533 cf. NOU 1985:18: 298. 
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Although it is the duty of the leader of the FBSS to ensure a solid foundation for each 
decision, the other members of the board must also participate in the deliberative process 
through the process of argumentation.534 Those who provide the most important claims are 
“as a general rule” lawyers that represent the local Child Welfare Office, lawyers representing 
the parents and, in some cases, the child.535 These claims set the premises and parameters for 
the initial deliberation, but the board is alone responsible for the decision-making procedure. 
In order for the FBSS to build a solid foundation on which to base its decision, the 
board cannot rely completely on the parties to the procedure, and their claims. The reason for 
why the parties stand before the board is due to a conflict that could not be resolved by non-
coercive means. Hence, the design assumes that the parties to the procedure will defend 
themselves. The evidence presented by each party provides the basis for the reasons that are 
given for each decision, whereby, if the parties do not put forth sufficient evidence, the FBSS 
can by itself acquire such evidence independently to establish solid decision-making.536 
 The ability to process all types of relevant information makes the FBSS a professional 
decision-making body. It means that lawyers, child psychiatrist, medical practitioners, social 
workers, child protection officers, psychologists etc. can collectively challenge each other’s 
arguments in order to qualify decision-making. The professional design has the potential of 
providing the decision-making with the imprint of an interprofessional “best practice” 
solution in each case. This type of design ensures procedural equality with a high level of 
complexity in a non-discriminatory fashion and helps redeem the promise of trust.  
͹ǤͷǤͶǤ͵Ǥ
The inclusion of the laymen as a valuable contribution in reaching a best possible decision is 
stressed as a very important component in the preparatory works of the bvl, namely “because 
it has to do with conflicts that raise difficult value question common to all mankind.”537 Some 
would argue that this becomes a corrective mechanism to the professionals’ esoteric expertise 
and provides the platform for reasonable disagreements to occur by instituting common sense 
as a field of “expertise” of the laymen. There are no professional competences able to conquer 
the ethical and political minefield that the FBSS can be confronted by. Laymen are in this 
respect thought to be a supplementary necessity to best-practice know-how of professionals.  
                                                 
534 Ot.prp.nr.76 (2005-2006): 73. 
535 Bvl §7-8. 
536 Bvl §7-17 cf. tvl §21-1. andbvl §7-17 (d) cf. tvl §25-2 (2). 
537 Om skolehjemmenes ordning (1909): 298. 
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 However, the quality of the layman varies, and it is absolutely no guarantee that their 
inclusion will support the principle of non-discrimination across the different boards that exist 
in Norway. Hence, the inclusion of the layman threatens to discriminate between children. It 
can, nevertheless, be argued that it is a need for a corrective force to counter the professional 
expertise, whereby philosophers could be included instead, or a more coherent recruitment of 
different types of professionals as members.  
 Professionals have the capacity of having a role as laymen.538 The decision-making 
realm of the FBSS is typically characterized by a multitude of “right answers.” The different 
competencies populating the FBSS, where no one is given monopoly on the right answer, 
correct one another. As such, the decision that is reached has the potential of being the best 
“right answer” each time. Thus, the key is to equip the FBSS with a sufficiently wide range of 
competencies so that the argumentative procedure can become truly exhaustive. Competence-
hierarchies are built down, and knowledge-spheres are combined for the purpose of reaching a 
decision that ultimately satisfies the child’s right to receive measures in its own best interest.  
͹ǤͷǤͶǤͶǤǫ
As argued previously, there are many professional opinions as well as common-sense 
opinions on what constitutes decent childcare and need for protection of children subjected to 
detrimental treatment. When arguments are presented on what action to proceed with, they are 
directed by the abilities of participants in decision-making. This means that those who are 
supposed to find and implement the type of measures that is in the best interest of the child 
would present arguments that are accessible to them. A psychologist, a jurist, a social worker, 
the child welfare office and a layperson might all have good but different reasons for 
prescribing certain treatment of a child and parents. However, this might not be enough. 
The most optimal decision can only be established in an environment where all the 
different types of arguments, that claim to hold a relevant and right course of action for the 
particular child, becomes sharpened through the resistance of open criticism from other 
arguments. On the other hand, we need to be realistic. It is not possible to recruit every type 
of profession or everyone affected that has something sensible to say regarding the best 
                                                 
538 A professional must resort to different type of reasoning when he or she deploys professional knowledge in 
argumentation. Moreover, professional “warrants” for actions must be presented, rather than those of a laymen. 
However, the layman warrants are still accessible. Putting on a uniform might provide an impression of 
professionalism, but it remains a cloth and does not do away with the layman.  
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interest of a child. Certain professions are, more than others, better equipped to provide valid 
contribution to such cases.  
In today’s boards, two professions dominate—psychology and social work. They are 
not both represented in each board, but constitute the two main bases of recruitment to staff 
the positions as professional members. For a child that becomes confronted by a board of 
social workers, how can the lack of psychologists be of no concern? Is the equal treatment of 
each child that is subjected to the FBSS guaranteed when the expertise can diverge between 
psychologist in one board and a social worker in the other? The answer is most certainly no. If 
it was no difference between these professions, why have two different professions at all? The 
professions have different knowledge-base, knowledge-production as well as knowledge-
practice. In sum, being treated by a psychologist is most likely very different from that of a 
social worker.  
By not elaborating upon who is best qualified to evaluate the arguments on what the 
best decision is, or how to reach it, reflects a way of dealing with professional personnel as if 
it did not matter who sat as professional members. The composition of each board, as 
described in bvl §7-2, does not stipulate any specification regarding what type of profession to 
recruit from. It is hardly a strength when the professional competence is allowed to vary 
across boards. This directly threatens the basic expectation of non-discrimination. Indirectly, 
it also threatens the child’s best interest, since perhaps not all types of arguments have 
become accommodated or evaluated.  
7.6.Conclusion:
It is important to stress that, although this chapter revealed shortcomings within the design of 
the FBSS, it is not a matter of trust-crisis. On the contrary, the historical perspective reveals a 
development towards two basic expectations that on a general level still can be argued is 
complied with by the legal order. Historically, the FBSS can be stated to be a legal innovation 
that is on the right track if protection of each child’s interest on the child’s premises is a goal. 
This is true due to the manner in which children are introduced into the decision-making as 
the main focal point, as well as in how the affected parties have been extended to gradually 
include the child. Nevertheless, having an historical development that increasingly includes 
those affected, and perhaps especially the child, does not excuse the shortcomings to the 
promise of trust.  
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As was shown through closer scrutiny, the FBSS has shortcomings with respect to the 
decision-making procedure with regard to basic expectations. Hence, it is a gap between what 
the basic expectations state can redeem a promise of trust and what the operative design 
within the legal order stipulates and can actually answer. Said differently, it is a gap between 
what expected protection of children is, and the legal protection of children. Thus, it can be 
argued that problems with the FBSS-design are uncovered, whereby a promise of trust is not 
being redeemed fully, i.e. the types of expectations that constitute trustworthy child protection 
today are not fully operative in the FBSS design.  
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8.IsthePromiseofTrustRedeemed?
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in the two previous chapters, the FBSS fails to comply fully with the order of 
expectations in many areas with respect to the promise of trust. This does not imply that the 
FBSS has no important design features that redeem the promise of trust. It does, and the most 
prominent are the rules of procedure and the process of negotiation. These two features of the 
design express that the legal order complies with the basic expectations of the order of 
expectations of child protection.  
 This dissertation has analyzed the development within the order of expectations 
throughout history, and evaluated the current legal order and how it complies with the current 
order of expectations. Through the historical approach I have established how current child 
protection has become worthy of trust, and also the normative self-understanding of such a 
trustworthy system. The last part evaluated if the FBSS can be said to observe basic 
expectations currently held to be worthy of trust. Clearly, child protection is heading in a 
direction where those involved increasingly become protected according to standards that are 
both post-national and rights-based. Although the basic expectations of 1992 originated 
within a Norwegian discourse on child protection, the same basic expectations have currently 
been subjected to a post-national turn. 
 Parents and child have both received protection with respect to child welfare and child 
protection. Parents are protected by the biological presumption, and the child must receive 
protection against detrimental care that threatens its health and development. The focus upon 
securing the legal protection of those involved reflects how the liberal ideal of 
constitutionalism has settled in the legal order of child protection in the sense that state-
interventions upon the liberty of parents and child must become thoroughly qualified. On the 
other hand, there are still several shortcomings to the FBSS design. This is especially true 
with regard to the board composition, the type of board convened, and the inclusion of the 
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parties to the procedure. In this conclusion, I will first present the evaluation of the promise of 
trust with regard to the FBSS, followed by the discussion of the historical development.  
8.1.DoestheDecisionǦMakingoftheFBSSWarrantaPromiseofTrust?
Although some of the most important aspects of the FBSS design, i.e. the rules of procedure 
and the meeting of negotiation, contribute to redeem to the promise of trust, the decision-
making process is dependent upon all of the design-traits adhering to the basic expectations. 
Consequently, the only conclusion that can be reached is that the promise of trust is not kept. 
This was not to be expected either. It will always be a matter of degree of compliance, while 
the order of expectations is in constant flux.  
8.1.1.PoliticalIncompetence
In chapter 6, it was illuminated that the incorporation of the CRC into the mrl had very little 
consequence for the legal order on child protection. During the review of the bvl at the time, it 
was for the most parts an assumed harmony with international human rights. The process of 
integrating the CRC into Norwegian legal order went by without laying out any rational 
principles as to what it would mean for child protection to adhere to international human 
rights, viz. to take a post-national turn. The problem that arises is a lack of ability to enforce 
the CRC within child protection. Hence, it is implied that the bvl has a huge potential in 
becoming more rights-based and post-national. This flaw makes the entire legal code less 
likely to redeem a promise of trust. However, we will only focus upon the FBSS-design. 
For child protection to become trustworthy, I laid out in chapter 6 an interpretation of 
the normative self-understanding of a post-national rights-based child protection system. It 
was argued that a post-national and rights-based child protection had to adhere to a 
combination between a principle of the child’s best interest and the principle of non-
discrimination in a manner consistent with a system of rights. If a child has been subjected to 
detrimental care, it was argued that the state had a duty to protect and ensure that the child’s 
development settled upon a track that compensated for the former detrimental care, and 
ensured that the child received its right to liberty that accommodated a sufficient amount of 
opportunities in adulthood.  
This is one way of arguing what the order of expectations currently embodies. 
Referring to the order of expectations as post-national and rights-based sets certain constraints 
upon how the decision-making procedure is to be designed if it is to redeem a promise of 
trust. In the following sections, the most important findings of the former chapter—i.e. 
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findings that relate to whether or not the design of the FBSS observes the basic expectations 
of the order of expectations—will be laid out.  
8.1.2.LocalizationoftheFBSSandInitiatingitsAuthority
The first apparent issue with the current design is that it allows for parents to become 
completely left out of the process of negotiation. It is argued that the FBSS is not dependent 
upon having the parents present during the process of decision-making. Not hearing the 
parents, and confronting them with arguments, can result in omitting the information that 
would enrich the platform for reaching a decision that would be in the child’s best interest. 
Even horrible parents can provide important information that can help to understand what 
type of measures the child needs. This arrangement can therefore be said to threaten the 
solidity of the foundation from which a decision should erupt in the best interest of the child.  
 By not having a demand towards the parents for providing counter-claims, the 
procedure is designed as if it did not need the parents in order to revoke their parental rights 
and reach a decision in the best interest of the child. This is a misperception of the need for 
information on what constitutes the interests of the child, and the procedure fails to uphold the 
process of contradiction—arguably dependent upon the presence of the parents. By not 
including parents into the procedure, i.e. omitting affected parties, it risks becoming less solid. 
 With the introduction of the bvl, the protection of children through coercive means 
became the responsibility of a separate decision-making body apart from those cases that had 
a need to intervene non-coercively. Child protection became separated from child welfare. 
Although these are two very different types of intervention, and performed by two very 
different decision-making bodies, they are still legally entrenched in one and the same legal 
code. This is a confusing element since the use of coercion is such a drastic step compared to 
relief efforts and council. The separation of the bvl could avoid the confusion that arises if 
child protection is misunderstood as governed by the same principles as child welfare—they 
are not. This would clarify that coercive intervention is an effort of last resort, and that child 
welfare is a service that is set to make parents that provide borderline detrimental care fit to 
maintain custody of their child.  
 Moreover, in Norway, child welfare and child protection is gathered in one term, 
namely barnevern (child protection). A child does not need to be protected, de facto and de
jure, when it is subjected to non-detrimental care and the parents are receiving non-coercive 
measures. At that point, the parents still hold the right to provide care for their child.  
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 By lifting the localization of the board onto a regional level, as was done with the bvl,
and thereby argue that any board is set to handle any case, thus excluding the prerogative of 
geography that was significant to the BVL of 1953, grounded the basic expectation of non-
discrimination into the design efforts. The reason for doing so was to establish a more legally 
competent decision-making body that did not have any ties to the area where the child 
resided, and underlined the principled difference between local non-coercive measures and 
regional coercive measures. These design efforts made it comply with the order of 
expectations.  
 Since the local Child Welfare Office is set to implement the decisions of the FBSS, the 
decisions are dependent upon funding and personnel locally. Thus, if decisions that the FBSS 
has reached are not implemented due to suboptimal funding or personnel, the purpose of child 
protection is threatened. A solution to such a problem could be to situate the apparatus needed 
to take care of such cases in a separate administration under the FBSS.  
8.1.3.CompositionoftheBoardandWhatTypeofBoardtoConvene
The composition of the FBSS includes three different role-types—the leader of the board, the 
professionals and the laymen. Whilst the leader has extended roles, the rest of the members 
play a substantial role regarding decision-making. The leader also administrates case-
proceedings of the process of negotiation. The most important role that the leader upholds is 
to ensure that rules of procedure are enforced. The entire board, on the other hand, must be 
able to evaluate any type of argument presented, whether such arguments originate from 
laymen or professionals.  
  The original motivation for providing the specific design of the original board of 1992 
was based upon ensuring that the board became independent and neutral. Its independent 
status can easily become dismantled by making the board become dependent upon others. It 
is, nevertheless, important to point out that the FBSS’ independence still needs revision. 
Independency as a design-principle is a strong contender in redeeming the promise of trust. If 
the board became dependent, for instance upon former decisions or external expertise in order 
to make a decision in a particular case, it would be no way of establishing a solid foundation 
from where a decision can erupt as an ultimate claim to correctness. The board would not 
know if decision had reached rational acceptability or on what terms it would become an 
ultimate claim to correctness. Hence, the FBSS would not know if a decision is the child’s 
best interest. Hence, doing away with independency as a design-principle that, for instance, is 
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suggested in NOU 2005:9, set the basic expectations in peril and leads decision-making to not 
redeem the promise of trust.539  
 However, there are certain problems that emerge with the composition, of which four 
will be illuminated here. First, how does the leader become qualified today? There are no 
demands set to the leader of the board regarding the aptitude for reaching decisions that are in 
the child’s best interest. It is implicitly accepted that if the leader of the board upholds 
principles of a regular civil trial, the decision-making procedure will be ‘good enough’. This 
is not the case. Reaching decisions in the child’s best interest is a specific aim. Having 
claimed that the child’s best interest principle of the bvl is in harmony with the CRC makes 
the principle fundamentally post-national and requires knowledge on how to reason on the 
topic. Thus, the decision-making of the FBSS is driven forth by a person that does not 
necessarily know how to obtain the necessary quality to abide by the post-national turn in 
decision-making. This is a threat towards how the decision-making procedures are handled, 
and case-proceedings can become discriminated against across the different boards.  
 Second, does the professional representative secure independency? Since there are no 
coherent practices regarding the recruitment of professionals—moreover, what is meant by a 
professional is not discussed in the legislative history of child protection—it can be argued 
that it is a general uncertainty towards what the role of the professional is. With regard to 
independency, it is hard to argue that the professional can de facto ensure independency. If 
the professional is a social worker, he or she will simply not have any professional idea as to 
what the medical practitioner argues, or the psychologist or any other professional that is not a 
social worker. This threatens the professionalism of the board and raises doubt towards 
whether or not a relevant or correct type of best professional practice is applied to the process 
of decision-making, and if the decision-making actually can be deemed as independent at all. 
 Third, there is no discussion leading to the design of the FBSS about what type of 
professional role is needed. This introduces an unresolved conflict as to what type of 
professional competence is called for. Clearly, choosing one profession over another might 
have its advantages, but at what cost? There are mainly social workers and psychologists 
occupying the FBSS. Although these are two different professions, it is no guarantee that 
these are even the right types of professions. If the purpose of the bvl is to be upheld, namely 
to protect a child when its health and development is threatened, should it not be a medical 
                                                 
539 See NOU 2005:9. 
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practitioner and a psychologist that are represented? One that could evaluate the health of the 
child, and another that could evaluate the psychological development. Why a social worker at 
all? Having these questions unanswered underlines an uncertainty relating to the professional 
that threatens the role that he or she is supposed to play. 
 The fourth and the last point is the lack of any good arguments for including laymen, 
which are currently included based on the premise that the FBSS makes decisions with a high 
amount of normative complexity. However, their involvement is rather some type of 
continuation of the BVN and its democratic component. This, nevertheless, does not 
contribute to the qualified search for decisions that would be in the child’s best interest. What 
are needed are representatives that can argue on normatively complex cases, which does not 
automatically imply laymen. 
8.1.4.PartiestotheProcedureandTheirPossibilities
Having a party procedure enables affected parties to put forth their claims in an exhaustive 
manner. Furthermore, anyone who has relevant arguments that can illuminate the case can be 
included as witnesses. By enabling everyone that has a relevant argument to put them forth, 
the process of decision-making can become truly argumentative. However, their inclusion is 
not a matter of reaching a decision that accommodates the views of all the parties to the 
procedure. Although the parties to the procedure contribute to establish the platform from 
where a decision is to emerge, the board alone is accountable for the decision. 
 The local Child Welfare Office has the role of protecting the child who receives non-
detrimental care. This is how they must argue, provided that the child’s best interest is always 
a primary consideration. Thus, the local Child Welfare Office can be seen as a representative 
of the child’s interests, in loco parentis, since it cannot protect itself. However, the bvl
gradually include the child, and until it also can become a party to the procedure.  
 Although having the local Child Welfare Office to advocate the interests of the child is 
a positive step, it might not be an advantage that the child can represent itself. This can lead to 
either of two problems. First, the FBSS may choose to listens to the child and make a decision 
that is on par with his or her desires. This would make the child accountable for its own best 
interests as a child. Second, not listening to the child would be to admit that a child’s opinion 
is not taken seriously. Either of the outcomes can be solved by not including the child into the 
procedure as a party to the procedure. This does not mean that the child’s opinion is not taken 
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seriously, or that the child is not a central part of the deliberation, but to argue that including 
the child as a party to the procedure leads to counterintuitive consequences.  
 The court of appeal for the parties to the procedure is the civil court. When a case 
leaves the FBSS and enters the court system, the type of decision-making body that the FBSS 
is set to be is replaced by a different one. The civil court is mostly not preoccupied with 
reaching decisions in child-protection. Its staff lacks training and the necessary ability to be 
independent in a correct manner, which means to reach decisions in the child’s best interest 
through an independent and fully ventilated argumentative provedure. Furthermore, since the 
CRC did not establish a court, and its incorporation was unsatisfactory with regard to what the 
principle of the child’s best interest would mean, the Supreme Court has no ability or 
incentive to enforce a post-national rights-based child protection system. Such a system is, 
nevertheless, a necessary consequence of the incorporation of a rights-catalogue for children. 
The absence of a coherent system of appeal, one that can base decisions in a rights-based and 
post-national manner, can threaten the basic expectation of the child’s best interest.  
 The board is supposed to reach decisions upon measures according to certain 
paragraphs of chapter four of the bvl. This confuses the decision-making process and the 
procedure of negotiation in that these measures constitute pegs that any decision must hang on 
to, which—if removed—would not direct decision-making at a too early stage. The local 
Child Welfare Office is supposed to suggest measures when raising a case to the board, and 
by doing so, it can influence the procedure of decision-making in a direction that is 
unfortunate and threaten to destroy the dynamic that a completely open process could provide. 
This could be solved by either removing the types of measures that a decision must adhere to, 
or remove the demand of the bvl towards the local Child Welfare Office to suggest measures.  
 Furthermore, by having fixed measures in chapter four of the bvl, it implicitly argues 
the impossible—namely that any child’s best interest is served through these measures. 
Somehow, the indeterminacy of the principle of the child’s best interest becomes determinate. 
This is unfortunate. Although it is a need to have a legal discourse that pragmatically argues 
that something is in a child’s best interest, as if it is determinate, to legally entrench these 
measures in the chapter four of the bvl is too far in the opposite direction. The different 
measures can direct or influence the deliberations in an unfortunately manner. The child’s 
best interest is indeterminate; and, should be embedded in a legal discourse on those terms.  
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8.1.5.MainPrinciplesofProcedureintheFBSS
The FBSS is an independent administrative decision-making body shaped like a court-
procedure. It is a special court for set in charge of reaching decisions involving coercion to 
protect children, and it has the potential of testing the correctness of the claims held by the 
parties to the procedure. In many respects, the casework that enters the FBSS belongs to a 
path that goes through the FBSS to the civil courts and up to the Supreme Court. Thus, it can 
be referred to as a special court of first instance, with a procedure controlled and driven forth 
by a judge that enforces principles of procedure belonging to the civil courts. The FBSS is 
designed to encompass a legal discourse in order to uphold the basic expectation of non-
discrimination and have the ability to reach decisions in the child’s best interest. 
 Having formal principles of procedure contribute in upholding the basic expectation of 
non-discrimination. As such, formal rules that encapsulate the decision-making procedure 
constitute a clear contender in redeeming the promise of trust. Prior to introducing bvl §7-3 
from 2008, the rules were entrenched in the legislative history to the stl and bvl. Providing a 
formal expression of these rules from clarifies priorities, and makes decision-making across 
different boards more coherent. The formal rules of procedure is what ensures the potential of 
having a general practical discourse inserted into the judicial precept of reaching a resolute 
decision that can be said to be the ultimate claim to correctness. 
 Having a formal rule-based procedure subjects every case to the same type of 
procedure. This will remove discrimination as well as establish what can be called a 
individual-oriented child protection system. As this type of decision-making would be in line 
with the basic expectations of the current child protection regime, it promotes trust.  
8.1.6.TheProcessofNegotiation
The process of negotiation can be referred to as a legally confined practical discourse, i.e. a 
legal discourse. Thus, the procedure of negotiation between different parties does not serve to 
reach an agreement among parties; instead, it is an argumentative process aimed at reaching 
decisions according to the child’s best interest. Hence, the denomination forhandling
(negotiation) is misleading when it comes to the FBSS. By entrenching the principle of the 
child’s best interest as the aim of every legal discourse, it is possible to pragmatically draw 
the line and choose that which seem optimally in the child’s best interest without disregarding 
the fact that such a principle is indeterminate. Replacing such a principle with another is not a 
solution, since no principle would neither conflate with the basic expectation of the best 
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interest of the child nor do away with indeterminacy in matters that are wedged into a sphere 
of high normative complexity.  
 The decision-making procedure, by itself, becomes optimal if the child’s best interest 
is to be treated as a principle right prescribed by the CRC. However, it is nothing that 
suggests that the CRC is incorporated in a real sense. Confirming legal harmony without 
providing the argument for why it is in harmony, as was done by Ot.prp.nr. 45 (2002-2003), is 
a weakness with respect to this amendment. As was shown earlier, having the “child’s best in 
mind,” which is how this principle has been argued for when establishing the bvl in 1992, is 
not the same as ensuring the child’s best interest when it is supposed to be in harmony with 
the CRC from 2003.  
 Leaving this important shortcoming aside, the decision-making of the FBSS 
encompasses a design for rational argumentation and decision-making. By applying an 
argumentative process that includes all affected parties in a mediated fashion, and having the 
principle of the child’s best interest as a regulative ideal, the decision will accommodate both 
basic expectations constitutive of the current order of expectations. The argumentative 
procedure is needed in order to flesh out every relevant and conceivable argument that can 
assist in building a solid platform from which to base a decision. An argumentative procedure 
is simply a precondition for qualifying the child’s best interest. Such a procedure, which aside 
from adhering to formal rules of procedure also abides by rules of discourse, clearly cashes in 
on the promise of trust. 
 Applying such an argumentative procedure, where rules of discourse are upheld, is 
necessary as the problem at hand is a practical one. In order to make an optimal decision, 
given the indeterminacy of such a principle, all affected parties must be included. This 
includes not only those who are directly affected, such as the parents and the child, but also 
competent professionals that can make claims that affect the particular child’s best interest as 
well as family and friends of the child or parents.  
 By having a decision-making body that is enabled to include all relevant parties, it can 
be argued it is qualified with the ability to reach a decision that is optimal with regard to the 
best interest of the child. At the point of departure, it is the public claim versus that of the 
private parties. Furthermore, the private and the public parties can call upon additional 
affected parties, or simply individuals that can put forth relevant arguments. If this is not 
satisfactory, the board itself can call upon whoever can illuminate what is in the child’s best 
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interest further. Consequently, the decision can become as illuminated as is needed. This is an 
important component that prepares the ground for a solid decision due to the potential of 
exhaustive argumentation. At this point the legal order complies with both of the basic 
expectations, and consequently helps fulfilling the promise of trust.  
8.2.ConstitutionalLibertyandtheHistoryofChildProtectionLaw
During the discourse on child protection from late 1880s until today, it has always been 
maintained that each individual was to be provided the right to liberty upon adulthood.540 
What has differed is the conception of liberty that each legal code has been justified under, i.e. 
the meaning of liberty. As argued earlier, the order of expectations have produced three very 
different legal orders as products of different representative law-making assemblies. Each of 
the legal codes is a part of the process of democratic self-government at three very different 
points in time.  
During the LBFB, the aim was to ensure that the child became “normal” or “moral.” 
During the BVL, the child was to be raised within a healthy family as a part of its local 
community. The bvl is to ensure that the child’s best own interests become protected. These 
are all three different ways to establish child protection worthy of trust. Consequently, it can 
be argued that each type of historical child protection system relate to a specific conception of 
liberty, whereby a stylized continuum can be established where the legal codes can become 
placed regarding what type of conception of liberty was applied to justify the legal code.541  
As was argued in part I, we can differentiate between two main types of liberties. On 
the one hand are constitutional rights carried by one citizen that enables personal autonomy 
through individual freedom. Benjamin Constant referred to these liberties as “liberties of the 
moderns.” On the other hand are political liberties and the values of civic life referred to as 
“liberties of the ancients.” On one side of the stylized continuum are guarantees of personal 
liberty, or autonomy, and can be referred to as rights. The other side grants equal political 
liberty and can be referred to as civic republicanism.542 The latter version grants collective 
freedom—“admitted as compatible with this collective freedom the complete subjection of 
the individual to the authority of the community.”543 The Norwegian history of decision-
making in child protection has weighted the different types of liberties differently when 
                                                 
540 To illustrate, see e.g. Andenæs (1965); Smith (1994), (1996). 
541 Rawls (1993), Calhoun (1992): 193 and Berlin (1958).  
542 See Constant (2003). Here, we will merely use these two types of liberties to frame the historical discourse on 
child protection, and not pose any argument that involves Constant.  
543 Constant (1988). 
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justifying the legal order. In general, child protection law can be said to have drifted on the 
continuum from a principle of liberty dominated by “liberty of the ancients” and gradually 
closer to the “liberty of moderns.” Today, the best interests of the individual child and its 
ability to choose for itself how to live life is at the centre. In 1896, it was rather a matter of 
constructing “normal” or “moral” individuals that would freely choose to contribute and 
maintain collective self-government, hence an emphasis upon the “liberty of ancients.” 
The continuous reflexivity in the progress of the child protection discourse has had a 
similar overall motivation—namely that the law on child protection has incrementally 
incorporated the affected parties into the decision-making itself. The different legal codes 
reflect different solutions to such an end, and has gradually lent higher priority the 
constitutional liberalism of the “liberty of the moderns.” 
As can be argued here, the legal development in child protection begins with the 
LBFB—through a justification that is lending priority to the “liberty of the ancients,” i.e. the 
republican virtue of civic participation—and ends in the current bvl that lends priority to the 
“liberty of the moderns,” defending the child’s constitutional rights to choose how to live life.  
8.2.1.TypeofTrustPromotedbytheLBFBandwhyitbecameAbandoned
The first legal code, the LBFB, had the objective of rescuing neglected and abused children 
from failed care. The idea was that failed care of children lead to adult loafers, beggars and 
criminals, i.e. abnormal and undesirable conceptions on how to live life.544 According to the 
motives behind the legal code, the criminal career posed the single biggest threat towards the 
civilized world, and no one would want to be a part of such a world.545 It had to be the state’s 
duty to intervene so that the child was not recruited to such a life. The solution was to develop 
a way to correct and develop children into not becoming criminals once it had been 
discovered that the parents, indeed, provided care that would lead them onto such a path.  
The initial motives developing the LBFB focused upon the protection of a child from 
developing into a so-called low-life or criminal adult. As such, the correction of a child was 
not only for the sake of the child acquiring a “normal” or “moral” adulthood, but also that 
society itself remained healthy by developing healthy recruits to its citizenry. This was a point 
that Bernhard Getz pointed out explicitly, namely that the LBFB was to serve a twofold 
purpose. On the one side, it was to correct the child so that it became a person that itself 
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545 Getz (1892): 2. 
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would want to be, namely “moral” and “normal.” On the other was that the citizenry itself 
remained healthy and normal, and the number of recruits to the criminal ranks would be on a 
decline.546 
This dual purpose illustrates that, within the legislative history of the LBFB, the 
conflict of priority of liberal justification resides. If the legal code shifted in the direction of 
the “liberties of the moderns” or the “liberties of the ancients”—given that parental rights 
could easily be revoked and that the child was not to develop in any manner according to 
individual utility, but instead become “corrected” at the whim of others—neither the parents 
nor the child would receive constitutional protection that superseded the need to develop 
healthy citizens for the sake of the citizenry. Both the parents and the child had to obey some 
ethical life-choices, or conceptions regarding how to live life.  
Consequently, the LBFB was set to correct children to become a specific type of 
person—a type of minimum personal standard at the time. They had to become “normal” and 
“moral” enough to both take care of themselves as adults as well as not become a corrupting 
influence on the civilized population. The consequence is that the personal right to liberty is 
narrowed down to a minimum, and in the foreground stands the republican ethos of ensuring 
that society is working with a healthy demos.  
The focus upon a type of civic “normality” won ground. Rune Slagstad has referred to 
this development as the establishment of the Norwegian demos.547 His argument has become 
further documented and affirmed in chapter 3 as relevant also for the child protection 
institution. With respect to the development of demos, the primary role of the LBFB was to 
ensure that the corrupted children did not threaten this development. Moreover, they were 
hopefully enabled to become a part of such demos as an active citizen. This leads to the 
conclusion that the LBFB was a legal code that leaned towards the “liberties of the ancients,” 
with a justification in ensuring the political rights for equal participation in public life. It 
could be argued that the underlying assumption for such a justification was that a thriving 
democracy needed a thriving demos. 
What stands out in the LBFB as the most important characteristic is the treatment of 
children who were deemed a threat towards the development of the Norwegian demos. The 
emphasis was clearly on social hygiene rather than the safeguards of each child’s prospective 
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right to liberty. It was not the established decision-making body, the Trustee-board, that 
would lead to the reform in 1953—as this decision-making body did not constitute the great 
problem with the LBFB—it was rather the failure of the system that took care of the children 
ruled as morally corrupted by the LBFB.  
To illustrate, once the parental rights were set aside, most children were sent to so-
called decent families who could take care of them.548 As such, the children received close to 
a normal childhood at the time. However, the reference-point in the public debate, one that 
was ultimately the reason for reform in 1953, was the children of the asylums. These children 
were the ones subjected to the double strike of coercion—first removed from the parents and 
then sent to coercive correction. As shown in part II, it was the very idea of correction that 
was argued to be wrong or even unnatural.  
The idea behind correction was that the effect of the system of child protection also 
defined what type of opportunities a child should and should not have later in adulthood. The 
focus here was not merely on preparing the child to become a part of society from the 
standpoint of justice, but also on shaping the child’s future conception on how to live life 
beyond such a standpoint. The asylum children, as such, were corrected beyond what could be 
referred to as the necessary character traits to abide by civic duties. They were corrected 
beyond what was needed to participate in social cooperation on fair terms, based upon an idea 
of reciprocity and mutuality. Their ethical choice on how to live life was supposed to be made 
for them through correction. 
The plan was that correction of the child involved making a choices for the child 
because it had no one else that could do so with regard to its way of life. Life was in this 
respect already determined through the state’s correctional efforts. At least, that was the 
plan—namely to reestablish “normality” and “morality.” Because of this type of paternalism, 
the “liberty of the moderns” was not facilitated as a source of justifying what to do in child 
protection. The republican ideal of democratic self-rule, the development of a healthy demos, 
an active and healthy popular sovereignty, trumped the constitutional defense of the child’s 
right to personal liberty as an adult.  
It can nevertheless be argued that the system of child protection presupposes a certain 
amount of constitutional right to liberty. If there is no free choice or a constitutional 
protection of the liberty to choose how to live life, there would be no need for any Trustee-
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board to evaluate each case. There would be no need for an elaborate system of state-
intervention. It could rather be a matter of a legal or illegal type of care. Getz, as well as 
Hagerup, argued that the state had to protect the privacy of family life as well as the child’s 
future development. 
The free choice of the parents and the natural development of a child, both are 
“liberties of the moderns,” was narrowly enforced by the LBFB. The subsequent historical 
development in the discourse on child protection, leading towards the new legal order of 
1953, turned in direction of opening up the “liberty of the moderns” as personal right to 
liberty. Parents were, as time passed towards the introduction of the BVL, increasingly 
perceived to be the natural provider of care for children, and were in need of relief-measures 
that could empowered them to cope. The new idea would lead children to have the 
opportunities in life that was prescribed through their parents’ care, and no longer the state. 
Hence, the personal liberty of parents was provided, albeit the situation for the child’s 
prospective right to personal liberty was still missing.  
As has been shown through the massive protests against this system of child protection 
set up by the LBFB, the idea of correction through discipline, isolation, hard labor, education 
etc. did not produce the desired outcome. Children did not become “moral” or “normal,” and 
crime did not recede.549 Furthermore, new knowledge had entered the arena, placing the idea 
of “correction” under scrutiny. The time had come to reform child protection to deal with 
respecting the rights of parents through pro-active child welfare, where the child should be 
enabled to remain in its natural environment with its biological parents. The family itself was 
now sought to be the best suited place to ‘correct’ children. 
8.2.2.TypeofTrustPromotedbytheBVLandWhyitbecameAbandoned
The reform of the LBFB in 1953 was a long awaited one. Even forty years prior, the legal 
code already had a substantial opposition. Explicit plans for reform began in the 1930s. In the 
1930s, arguments that the child protection system created by the LBFB worked counter to its 
intent were brought to the parliament, implying that child protection was a legal code that 
needed to be incorporated into a bigger picture of social regulation. Furthermore, children in 
need were not corrected into becoming “moral” or “normal”; they rather ended up becoming 
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the “liability” once feared—criminals and adults who did not cope well in society.550 
Assessed on its own intents, the LBFB had developed into a complete failure. 
 Although the LBFB had failed its purpose, it did establish an infrastructure that was 
set to protect children. It was never any discussion of simply getting rid of the state-driven 
effort to protect children. It was only a matter of changing it to what was assumed to be better. 
Its development had settled the idea of the state having an apparatus that would take care of 
children subjected to detrimental care. The Getz had established, through the LBFB, that 
children who had become in need of care in order to develop into an adult had a legitimate 
claim, and that the state had to make sure such a claim became answered in some way.  
 The use of correctional asylums became criticized to the extent that something had to 
be done. The children was to develop the ability to acquire knowledge on how to live life as 
emanating from psychological bonds within family and local communities. Psychological 
strains such as these had particular causes that were seen as roots of the child’s developmental 
problems. Hence, psychological causes could not be defeated by disciplinary and coercive 
methods, but rather through relevant treatment of each child. As such, the correctional 
ideology was abandoned, at least in denomination.551 Coercion was no longer to be 
implemented if it was not absolutely necessary. The family had become the new correctional 
facility, and parents were to be empowered to solve the problems of care. 
The difference to the LBFB was that child protection was from now on to lend support 
to the natural development of the child within the family. The new legal code established pro-
active state-driven child welfare to ensure that parents became capable of providing care for 
the child in its natural environment.  
However, with the BVL, the individuality of the child was still mainly left out of the 
decision-making equation. The interests of the parents and their responsibility as the prime-
caretakers were the focus of the entire establishment of child welfare. From 1953, the 
interference from the state was always supposed to be non-coercive wherever possible and 
coercive only as the last resort. This has been dubbed the biological-presumption.552 This 
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meant that from 1953 and onwards, the child could be subjected to care that was questionable, 
but held to be non-detrimental because the child’s natural place was with its biological family.  
The BVL went only half way onto applying the “liberties of the moderns” to child 
protection. It was only the parents who were admitted a right to personal liberty. Their right to 
provide care was to be enforced as far as possible according to a principle of toleration. The 
way children were ensured a natural development and good health was to ensure that parents 
could provide adequate care. Child protection went from being predominantly engraved with 
“liberties of the ancient” within the era of LBFB, into becoming gradually a rights-based child 
protection system through by granting parents their rights. It can be argued that parental rights 
had become the first line of defense against the will of the people. Hence, child protection 
illustrates a gradual development towards the regulative ideal of the constitutional democracy 
where the focus upon securing individual liberty of those affected has been given increasing 
priority. Today, it can be argued that child protection has taken a post-national turn where the 
order of expectations lends priority to the individual rights of all involved. Hence, 
emphasizing “liberty of the moderns.” 
 As discussed earlier, the decision-making of the FBSS is yet to deliver fully on the 
promise of trust. The promise is in many respects not kept if the argument regarding the basic 
expectations is accepted. As summarized earlier in this chapter, it is a tension that makes the 
promise of trust hard to fulfill. However, the most important aspects of the design, i.e. the 
rules of procedure and the process of negotiation, comply with the basic expectations of child 
protection and by themselves contribute a long way to redeem the promise. In total, even 
though the promise in itself is not kept, the wrongs of the design can be seen as bearable and 
repairable.  
 Prior to a reform, as the one in 1953 and 1993, the past legal codes deviated away 
from what was child protection worthy of trust to the extent that the construct of the legal 
order itself no longer could become adjusted to comply with the order of expectations. In due 
course of time, the legal design that once passed through parliament and that had a minimum 
of tension to basic expectations would no longer be worthy of trust because new basic 
expectations have entered and thus the nature of the order of expectations changed. In the end, 
the legal order is simply no longer repairable. The new legal order removed the tension 
between the former legal order and the order of expectations by again crafting the legal order 
to comply better with the order of expectations. The way in which a legal order can be made 
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to redeem a promise of trust, is the result of political craftsmanship to repair distrust or 
reestablishing trust by removing the tension between legal order on one side and order of 
expectations on the other.553 
8.3.Conclusion
Despite the weaknesses within all the legal codes throughout history, it can be concluded that 
all law-making in Norway have upheld the respect and importance of implementing a state-
doctrine to protect children. It has been argued affirmatively since 1896 to have strong 
decision-making bodies in child protection. It is the shape of this doctrine that has been a 
source of disagreement, i.e. the point of discord has always been on when and how to 
coercively intervene. These variations will probably continue to emerge as time progresses, 
new knowledge emerges, and society is confronted by new problems that push the order of 
expectations in new directions.  
 In order to establish a fair start in life, which in chapter 6 was argued is implicit to bvl
§1-1, any child’s development must be protected so that it comes on par with what is 
acceptable. In other words, child protection needs to only mend the failed development of the 
child up to the point where the child’s chances in life are on par with children who are 
marginally above the threshold that trigger a need for protection. This means that once the 
care of a child falls below a certain threshold, the state must intervene to ensure that the child 
receives a sufficient amount of opportunities needed for personal liberty to make sense. 
 Norwegian child protection rests upon the premise that it upholds the individual right 
to liberty more effectively. Today, the affected parties are included to a much greater extent 
than ever before. The gradual introduction of such a rights-based protection of parents and 
children can potentially only allow for the design of decision-making bodies that take into 
account these two main affected parties. Constitutional liberties, such as these, cannot be 
overthrown easily, and have incrementally become qualified throughout Norwegian history. 
We can argue that… 
“…the constitutional state does not represent a finished structure but a delicate and sensitive – 
above all fallible and revisable – enterprise, whose purpose is to realize the system of rights anew 
in changing circumstances that is, to interpret the system of rights better, to institutionalize it more 
appropriately, and to draw out its contents more radically.”554
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The priority of the “liberties of the moderns” above the “liberties of the ancient” has 
introduced the respect for the individuality of each citizen, it be a parent or a child. At the 
same time, the manner in which we answer a rights-based development “anew in changing 
circumstances,” will determine whether or not a decision-making body is able to redeem a 
promise of trust.  
The design of the FBSS favors constitutionalism over civic republicanism. Rights 
principles restrict what can be done to individuals, i.e. they restrict popular will. Both 
conceptions of liberty are preoccupied with safeguarding the prospective right to liberty of the 
child. However, they differ in ideas on how to get there. Civic republicanism aims to develop 
children into individuals that engage in civic life on equal terms, in a shared civic tradition 
and in establishing an agreement on a common good. Constitutionalism, on the other hand, 
will safeguard the freedom of the individual against unreasonable interference—either it is the 
parents or the child. It is a protection of the interests of the child. The development towards 
lending increasing weight on rights can be argued is a type of maturation of child protection 
in Norway and reflect a constitutional democracy in the making.  
The prospective right to personal liberty for the child is where the historical 
development of the order of expectations has brought us. The rights-based child protection 
system have included the child into the equation as affected party in child protection cases. As 
such, children, ironically, were the last piece of the puzzle for ensuring that decision-making 
includes all affected. They are included, not as participants in the discourse of child protection 
itself, but as a group that everyone else is demanded to accommodate according best interest.  
The historical development has left the Norwegian discourse on child protection in a 
predicament. To deny a child the right to develop in a manner that makes it prone to act upon 
a principle of personal liberty has become normatively and politically impossible. To 
paraphrase Kant, Norwegian child protection has reached the point where any child is granted, 
“by virtue of his humanity,” its “birthright of freedom.”555 To Kant, every other right is 
externally acquired, and cannot be in conflict with the birthright. As presented in chapter 6, it 
is plausible to argue that children in Norway are entitled to a prospective right to personal 
liberty. In order for such a right to be indiscriminately applied, children must become adults 
with a sufficient amount of opportunities so that their life can fully make use of liberty.  
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If a child is not provided for in a non-detrimental fashion, the state needs to intervene 
to protect it so that the child can have opportunities sufficient to live the life that it can 
reasonably want as an adult. In doing so, the state must see the right to personal liberty, as a 
primary guiding norm for entrenching the basic expectations of a post-national rights-based 
child protection system. This effort must be made by the state because children cannot be said 
to be free, or have liberty-rights as children.556 They have a prospective right to liberty. Once 
they receive personal liberty, they do, in certain respect, cease to be children.  
Throughout history of child protection, decisions have been made on what to do in 
order to protect a child with no regard for the particular child’s best interest—at least not as a 
prospective right to liberty of the child. What has now become a part of trustworthy child 
protection has developed to this point through incrementally establishing the child’s best 
interest as a basic expectation. The legal protection of the child itself is now at the center. The 
FBSS-design incorporates these important developmental traits, and in this regard cash in on 
the promise of trust. 
The challenges today is rather about perfecting the design of the FBSS to better 
accommodate the principle of the child’s best interest and make it adhere better to the logic of 
human rights. Doing this will better ensure that the legal order conflate with the order of 
expectations and that once again restore a trustworthy decision-making body. Even though 
this decision-making body is a strong one in upholding the underlying principles of the 
current order of expectations, and hence redeems a promise of trust, there are many aspects of 
the design worth further assessment. This is where political craftsmanship comes to play. 
To redeem a promise of trust completely is perhaps impossible because of the 
normative complexity of the task. Moreover, it is also the matter of having a order of 
expectations in constant flux. However, the small, but important, efforts that are made to the 
attempt of optimizing the enforcement of the rights of the child is an important step in 
safeguarding a decision-making practice worthy of trust. As such, child protection discourse 
has settled in a realm where it is a discussion on how to protect children’s prospective right to 
liberty.  
  
                                                 
556 This is also a duty entrenched in CRC Art. 4: “States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, 
administrative, and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention.” 
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